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Abstract 
This thesis explores the moral implications of watching suffering on the media. 
In particular, it addresses the question of how audiences construct their moral 
agency vis-à-vis the suffering of distant others they witness through television 
news.  
Theoretically, the thesis takes as a point of departure the concept of mediation 
as media practices. Based on an underlying assumption of moral agency as 
discursively constructed and articulated, I have drawn an analytical framework 
which employs the discursive practices of media witnessing and media 
remembering to explore the ways audiences talk about distant suffering and 
position themselves in relation to it. The thesis is empirically grounded in the 
context of Greece and based on focus group discussions with members of the 
Greek audience.  
The empirical analysis indicates that viewers engage with distant suffering in a 
multiplicity of ways that are not exhausted in feelings of empathy or 
compassion and their diametric opposites of apathy and compassion fatigue. 
These forms of engagement are filtered through both the nature and extent of 
media reports of suffering, and discourses about power and politics entrenched 
within the national culture.  
In this context, the analysis demonstrates that viewers position themselves as 
witnesses vis-à-vis news reports of distant suffering in four different modes, 
which are described as “affective”, “ecstatic”, “politicised” and “detached” 
witnessing. The exploration of the practice of media remembering illustrates the 
construction of a moral hierarchy in the way viewers remember distant 
suffering, where some events are constructed as banal and others become 
landmarks in audience memory. Finally, the viewers’ positioning as public 
actors with regard to media stories of human pain is shown to be, on the one 
hand, conditional upon the media staging of humanitarian appeals, and, on the 
other hand, embedded within and limited by frameworks of understanding civic 
participation in public life. 
The thesis contributes to a growing body of literature on the mediation of 
distant suffering. It especially addresses the largely neglected empirical 
question of audience engagement with media stories of human pain, offering 
both empirical evidence and an analytical framework for the study of this 
engagement.    
 
 
  
4 
Acknowledgments 
 
I am eternally indebted to Professor Lilie Chouliaraki, for her feedback and 
support. She has given me invaluable guidance whenever I felt lost, and I do not 
know what this thesis would look like, if it weren’t for her intellectual input.  
I am also thankful to my supervisor, Professor Terhi Rantanen, for encouraging 
me and believing in me, as well as bearing with my occasional frustration 
throughout the years.  
A big “thank you” is owed to my two examiners, Mirca Madianou and Paul Frosh, 
for their insightful comments and feedback.  
The topic of this thesis was largely inspired by my conversations with the late 
Roger Silverstone and his contagious enthusiasm about his mediapolis and I am 
grateful to him for this.  
This thesis was funded for its first three years by the Greek State Scholarship 
Foundation. I am also thankful to Jean Morris for her invaluable help with all 
kinds of paperwork and applications throughout the years.  
This research would not have been possible, of course, without the research 
participants, who gave me their time, provided me with rich empirical material 
and made the thesis come alive.   
I would also like to thank my wonderful friends and colleagues at the LSE and 
beyond for their feedback, support and more than a few good laughs: Niall 
Brennan, Max Hanska-Ahy, Anne Kaun, and especially Michael Skey and Patrick 
McCurdy, not only for reading my work and enriching it with their insights but 
mostly for their encouragement, which has meant more to me than they can 
imagine.  
I am grateful to my dearest friend, Julie Uldam, for her support, comments and 
tolerating all my moaning and whining, but most of all for being a real friend 
during the really hard times. A lot of encouragement and inspiration came from 
visions of dragonflies and frogs on ebony and a sunny 2047.  
Most of all, I am grateful to my parents, who have always supported my 
decisions but mainly for teaching me how not to worry about the stuff that do 
not matter and be brave about the things that matter. I would have never 
managed to finish this thesis, if it weren’t for our two dear friends, whose 
presence in our lives has given me the peace of mind to come back and focus: 
Soula Papadopoulou, whose love and devotion are limitless; and Lena Tsatsou, 
who became my mother’s sister, daughter and guardian angel over the last 
couple of years.  
It is to my beautiful mother, who did not live to see me finishing this, that I 
dedicate this thesis.  
  
5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 9 
1.1. CONCEPTUAL ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................................................................... 12 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................................. 18 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................................... 30 
1.4. THESIS CHAPTER PLAN ............................................................................................................. 33 
CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALISING THE VIEWER AS A MORAL AGENT ...................... 38 
2.1 THE MEDIA AS A MORAL SPACE............................................................................................... 40 
2.1.1 Mediation: a theoretical framework ............................................................................. 41 
2.1.2 The media as a global moral space .............................................................................. 44 
2.1.3 The nation as a moral space ......................................................................................... 51 
2.1.4 Tensions in the formation of the moral agency ............................................................ 53 
2.2 THE VIEWER AS A MORAL AGENT ............................................................................................ 62 
2.2.1 Moral agency in late modernity ................................................................................... 64 
2.2.2 Conceptualising the audience....................................................................................... 68 
2.2.3 From audience reception to audience practices ........................................................... 74 
2.2.4 Audiencing and the articulation of moral agency ........................................................ 76 
2.3 MORAL AGENCY AND PUBLIC ACTION .................................................................................... 78 
2.4 MEDIA WITNESSING ............................................................................................................... 82 
2.5 MEDIA REMEMBERING ........................................................................................................... 88 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 92 
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCHING AUDIENCE DISCOURSES: DESIGN AND METHODS... 95 
3.1 RESEARCHING AUDIENCE DISCOURSES .................................................................................. 96 
3.1.1 Focus Groups in Media Studies ................................................................................... 98 
3.1.2 Focus Groups and the Social Production of Discourse ............................................. 103 
3.1.3 Problems with Focus Groups ..................................................................................... 107 
3.2 CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH ............................................................................................... 109 
3.2.1 Planning the focus groups .......................................................................................... 109 
  
6 
3.2.2 Sampling the disasters to trigger the discussions ....................................................... 117 
3.3 GREEK AUDIENCES IN CONTEXT............................................................................................ 120 
3.3.1. The television news media landscape in Greece ............................................................. 121 
3.3.2. Greek audiences.............................................................................................................. 122 
3.3.3. The Greek context ........................................................................................................... 125 
3.4. CONDUCTING THE FOCUS GROUPS .......................................................................................... 133 
3.5. ANALYSING THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS MATERIAL ............................................... 136 
3.5. ISSUES OF EVALUATION AND REFLEXIVITY ...................................................................... 142 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 147 
CHAPTER 4 MEDIA WITNESSING ....................................................................................... 149 
4.1 AFFECTIVE WITNESSING ....................................................................................................... 150 
4.1.1 Emotional involvement as empathetic identification .................................................. 152 
4.1.2 Empathetic identification and hospitality ................................................................... 156 
4.1.3 Sensationalism and complicity ................................................................................... 160 
4.2 ECSTATIC WITNESSING ......................................................................................................... 164 
4.2.1 Ecstatic emotion ......................................................................................................... 166 
4.2.2 Ecstatic empathy ........................................................................................................ 170 
4.2.3 The immediacy of ecstatic witnessing ......................................................................... 172 
4.3 POLITICISED WITNESSING ..................................................................................................... 174 
4.3.1 Indignation and powerlessness ................................................................................... 176 
4.3.2 Deserving victims and the limits of hospitality ........................................................... 179 
4.3.3 The media as part of the power structures ................................................................. 184 
4.4 DETACHED WITNESSING ....................................................................................................... 188 
4.4.1 Rationalisation of detachment .................................................................................... 189 
4.4.2 Hospitality conditional on immediacy ........................................................................ 193 
4.4.3 Complicity with the media .......................................................................................... 197 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 201 
CHAPTER 5 MEDIA REMEMBERING ................................................................................. 206 
5.1 “FORGETTING” SUFFERING ................................................................................................... 208 
  
7 
5.1.1 Hurricane Katrina and Anti-Americanism ................................................................. 209 
5.1.2 Kashmir and the ordinariness of earthquakes ............................................................ 216 
5.1.3 Hurricanes, earthquakes and the banality of suffering .............................................. 222 
5.2 ICONIC MEDIA DISASTERS AND THE SPECTACULARITY OF SUFFERING ................................... 227 
5.3 THE TURKISH EARTHQUAKE AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN PAIN ................................ 236 
5.4 MEDIA DISASTERS AND THE GLOBAL AUDIENCE ................................................................... 243 
5.4.1 Global media disasters ............................................................................................... 245 
5.4.2 Localising the global .................................................................................................. 251 
5.4.3 Media remembering: between the global and the local ............................................. 255 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 257 
CHAPTER 6 AUDIENCE AGENCY AND ACTION AT A DISTANCE ............................. 260 
6.1 ACTION AT A DISTANCE ........................................................................................................ 261 
6.1.1 Telethons and the media staging of action at a distance ............................................ 262 
6.1.2 Justifying inaction ...................................................................................................... 271 
6.2 MEDIATION AND THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST ....................................................................... 277 
6.2.1 Mistrusting humanitarianism ..................................................................................... 278 
6.2.2 Mistrusting the mediators of aid ................................................................................. 284 
6.3 MEDIATED AGENCY AND POWER .......................................................................................... 291 
6.3.1 Mediation and the impossibility of overcoming distance ........................................... 292 
6.3.2 Powerlessness in the global public space ................................................................... 295 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 304 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 309 
7.1. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ...................................................................... 310 
7.1.1 Key empirical findings ..................................................................................................... 314 
7.1.2. Discourse diversity among respondents ......................................................................... 319 
7.2. DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 322 
7.2.1. The mediation of suffering and the problem of particularisation ................................... 322 
7.2.2. The problem of action at a distance ................................................................................ 324 
7.2.3. The moral hierarchies of suffering and the symbolic power of the media ...................... 327 
  
8 
7.2.4. Distant suffering and mediated cosmopolitanism ........................................................... 330 
7.3. REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND CONTEXT ......................................................... 332 
7.4. FUTURE DIRECTIONS ................................................................................................................ 335 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 342 
APPENDIX A. TABLE OF FOCUS GROUP COMPOSITION ................................................. 367 
APPENDIX B. PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS .......................................................................... 368 
APPENDIX C. TOPIC GUIDE ....................................................................................................... 370 
APPENDIX D. MONITORING FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS ................................................. 371 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The 26th of December 2004 was marked by one of the biggest disasters in world 
history: an earthquake that occurred in the west coast of Sumatra in Indonesia 
became the cause of a gigantic tsunami, which hit a significant number of 
neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, resulting in an unfathomable death 
toll of 250,000 victims and devastating entire areas. Media around the world 
reported the disaster as soon as it occurred in the form of breaking news 
followed by lengthy media coverage, which included footage from the wave as it 
erupted, live reporting from the affected areas and stories of human tragedies as 
they unfolded along with the increase in the counting of the victims. These 
marathon broadcasts were accompanied by humanitarian appeals made 
through national media around the world, raising unprecedented aid pledges 
for the affected populations. With the background of the Christmas celebrations 
in the Western world, and great numbers of tourists from Western countries 
holidaying in the area at the time and losing their lives in the disaster, the South 
Asian tsunami monopolised the interest and attention of the media and their 
audiences all around the world. This disaster and in particular the apparent 
impact of its reporting on its audiences was also the inspiration for the present 
thesis.  
As luck had it, I spent the Christmas of 2004 in London and completely isolated 
from the media and people alike. The events of Boxing Day were completely 
unknown to me, until I arrived in Greece a couple of days later, on December 
28th. As I was exchanging greetings with my family at the airport, I was 
confronted with an unintelligible question: “What do the British say about the 
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tsunami”? Tsunami was a word hitherto unbeknownst to me; as it turned out, it 
was the word in everyone’s mouth for quite some time after I first heard it. For a 
couple of days I had to attend endless discussions among friends and family 
about the events that had taken place and exchanges of human stories of loss 
and suffering that the media had reported. Apart from a few exclamations of 
surprise and awe, I was unable to take part in the conversations, let alone 
comprehend the full intensity and devastating power of the disaster. It was only 
until I saw the footage of the wave taking over entire areas and destroying 
buildings and natural environment alike, and I got more information about the 
events, that I managed to fully understand the specifics of this incredible 
disaster.  
This personal experience was an opportunity to reflect on two issues: first, the 
extent to which an event that had taken place somewhere so remotely from the 
lifeworlds of the people in my hometown, in the north of Greece, became such a 
significant part of their lives for some time, to the degree that it virtually 
monopolised their everyday discussions; second, the degree to which I was 
excluded from these media-instigated and media-sustained discourses, due to 
my temporary isolation from the media for just a few days. It felt as if I had 
missed out on a mediated experience the whole world had taken part in; as if 
there was a mediated space of social life that I was excluded from because of my 
short lack of exposure to the media. And this space expanded well beyond the 
immediacy of the local. This was more than a theoretical reflection on the 
mediation of everyday life; it was an actual experience of the extent to which the 
domain of the everyday is infiltrated with the distant through the media in a 
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way that isolation from the media, however short in time, can actually entail 
isolation from social experience.  
These reflections were gradually translated into the research concerns that led 
to the present thesis. The initial research question was inspired by the 
remarkable flow of discussions on the Tsunami and its victims and the 
infiltration of the local experience by the distant and the global that led me into 
thinking whether the media and television in particular could form the basis of a 
sense of belonging in a wider global community, a sense of cosmopolitanism, 
based on relations of commitment and care for the distant other, the suffering of 
whom audiences encounter on their media screens. As my interest and 
theoretical investigation of this question developed, the media-centrism of it 
became clearer, as well as the fact that a more accurate question would be what 
kind of relations with the distant these discourses revealed and whether these 
actually expressed any kind of commitment and care in the first place. It 
eventually became apparent that a more useful point to start was to explore 
discussions similar to the ones that inspired the research and through them the 
ways people position themselves in relation to media images of distant suffering 
and the faraway victims. What kinds of things do people say in relation to the 
suffering of distant others they encounter through the media? How is their 
sense of self articulated in these discourses and how do they position 
themselves with regard to the media images of distant victims of disasters and 
crises? How do they negotiate the moral implications of watching human 
suffering from afar? These became the broader research questions that led the 
design and conduct of this research project.  
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1.1. Conceptual assumptions 
Ultimately, this is a thesis about the way viewers discursively construct their 
agency with regard to distant others whose suffering they become aware of 
through the media. It is, in particular, a study about the mediation of the moral 
agency of Greek audiences vis-à-vis distant suffering. Agency, as approached 
and explored here, entails the expression of affective involvement and 
judgement, as well as its manifestation through social action in response to 
distant suffering. It is articulated through the ways audiences think about and 
engage with the media that report this suffering. The concept of the moral is not 
adopted here within the normative constraints of an abstract deontology that 
would define how the viewer ought to feel and act vis-à-vis the suffering of 
others. It is employed on the premise that, in the case of distant suffering, 
whatever the viewer feels, says or does in relation to the media reports is 
always oriented towards others, the distant sufferers. In so far as the viewer’s 
agency is expressed in relation to other people, it is of a moral significance 
(Silverstone, 2007). As such, the concept of the ‘moral’ here is a category to be 
empirically explored rather than normatively confirmed or defied.   
The media are understood here as both technologies and symbolic forms. 
Although the thesis focuses on the discourses and practices of media users 
rather than specific media and the moments of consumption of media texts, the 
research is underlined by a primary interest in television, as will be evident by 
the use of the terms “viewers”, “audiences” and “spectators” throughout the 
thesis. This privileged position of television is accounted for on two grounds. 
First, due to its inherent qualities, both technological and discursive, the 
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medium of television positions its viewers as “witnesses” of the events reported 
(Ellis, 2000), an experience instrumental to the construction of the spectator’s 
agency vis-à-vis distant suffering, as will be further explained in Chapter 2. 
Second, despite the intrusion of new media in everyday lives and the public 
discourses surrounding them, it is a premise of this thesis that television still 
holds a privileged position as an unquestioned part of the fabric of everyday life 
(Silverstone, 1994). This is even more so the case in Greece, which constitutes 
the context of the research, where with internet penetration amounting to 
hardly 40% of the total population and extremely low numbers of newspaper 
readership, television is the indisputably reigning medium in the country1. This 
will also become evident in the empirical chapters of the thesis, where the 
discussions explored centre around television reports of distant suffering.   
The focus on Greece as the research context for the study reflects the initial 
conceptualisation of the research topic, which was born as a response to the 
discourses of Greeks discussing the Tsunami. At the same time, Greece 
constitutes a context of study of how the Western spectator relates to the far 
away other, which is ultimately the question underlying the mediation of distant 
suffering. The assumption is that with regard to suffering there is a clear 
distinction between zones of safety and danger, with the Western world 
occupying the former (Chouliaraki, 2006: 10). The concomitant question that 
has preoccupied the relevant theoretical and empirical work is, therefore, how 
mediation overcomes – or recreates, for that matter – this distinction by 
                                                        
1 Information obtained through the European Journalism Centre 
(http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/greece/, page accessed in May 2011) and the 
Eurobarometer EB72.5 E-Communications Household Survey  
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_335_fact_el_en.pdf, page accessed in 
May 2011) 
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bringing the distant closer at hand. Greece, constituting part of the safety zone, 
offers a context of the empirical exploration of such questions.  
Greece is also, however, a context with its own national, cultural, and political 
specificities, which will become apparent in the empirical discussion of the 
thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). These specificities formulate a unique political, 
social, and media context (Chapter 3, section 3.3.), which underlines the ways 
Greek audiences engage with public life overall, and the suffering of distant 
others in particular. As the empirical chapters will illustrate, this context 
challenges some of the assumptions made in the literature of distant suffering, 
which tends to assume a unified Western perspective on the ways spectators 
relate to trauma and humanitarian crises.   
Focusing on the question of how the spectators of suffering position themselves 
in relation to it, the study explores audience discussions about distant suffering. 
Through a number of focus group discussions with Greek viewers I study the 
ways they discursively construct their agency with regard to the pain of distant 
others they witness through the media. The underlying assumption of the thesis 
and its methodological choices (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) is the 
discursive construction of the self, namely that individual identity and agency 
are socially constituted and articulated through discursive practices and social 
interaction (Billig, 1987; Edwards, 1997; Harré, 1998). Looking, therefore, into 
how people talk about others’ misfortune, allows for the exploration of their 
agency vis-à-vis this suffering.  
The open-ended discussions covered a number of media stories of suffering 
viewers were asked about but also brought up unprompted as relevant to the 
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issues addressed. There were three disasters participants in the groups were 
explicitly asked about as triggers for the initiation of the discussions. The first 
one is the Southeast Asian Tsunami of 2004, which has been the defining 
moment in terms of the inception of the thesis. The other two are Hurricane 
Katrina and the Kashmir earthquake of 2005, which closely followed the 
Tsunami just a few months later. Hurricane Katrina hit – mainly – the area of 
New Orleans in Louisiana in the last days of August 2005. The severe floods 
claimed virtually 2,000 victims and devastated extensive areas rendering 
Katrina one of the deadliest and most catastrophic hurricanes in U.S. history and 
an event that was extensively covered by foreign media around the world for 
weeks. The coverage of Katrina was followed by media reports of another major 
disaster just a couple of months later, when an earthquake of 7.6 hit the 
Pakistan part of Kashmir on the 8th of October 2005. The death toll of the 
disaster amounted to virtually 80,000 victims and the following media reporting 
around the world resulted in remarkable international humanitarian response 
for the relief of the affected areas.   
To be sure, the three disasters named here, the Southeast Asian Tsunami, 
hurricane Katrina and the Kashmir earthquake, were radically differed in 
nature, aftermath, recovery plans and mode of reporting2. They also touched 
and involved audiences around the world in different ways and with different 
aims. The reasons behind the inclusion of the three disasters as triggers in the 
focus groups’ topic guide lie, first, in the relative recent occurrence of the three 
                                                        
2 For an overview of the Western media coverage of the three disasters, see CARMA, 2006; 
Franks, 2006; for the coverage of the Tsunami, see Robertson, 2010; for the coverage of 
hurricane Katrina see Tierney et al., 2006 and Sommers et al., 2006. For a discussion of the 
Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina as media rituals, see Cottle, 2009.  
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disasters with regard to the time the discussions were conducted. Being 
relatively recent in audience memory and also diverse, the three events were 
judged to be suitable in order to prop lively discussions among the participants. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of three events is based on the choice to discuss 
human suffering not in relation to isolated incidents but with regard to a media 
“landscape” of reports of suffering around the world. This landscape consists of 
different events entailing different aspects of human suffering and an 
alternating repertoire for their reporting. Furthermore, the thesis does not aim 
at being a “reception study” exploring how viewers “react”, “respond” or 
“consume” specific images of suffering. As Chapter 2 will further discuss, the 
interest here lies with how viewers “move about” and navigate themselves in a 
mediated environment where the vulnerability of the other is a frequent 
occurrence (Couldry, 2006; Silverstone, 2007). To that end, as it will become 
evident in the empirical chapters of the thesis, despite the choice of these three 
events as triggers, the conversations were much broader, including other 
disasters and instances of distant suffering participants in the focus groups 
found significant and relevant.   
The choice to use natural disasters as triggers for the focus group discussions 
was a deliberate one, stemming from an attempt to avoid initiating the 
discussions with ideologically charged issues, which would claim the attention 
of the viewer on the basis of some pre-existing political or cultural bias, as might 
be the case with regard to suffering caused by political conflict and wars. To be 
sure, this distinction is overdetermined; catastrophes and crises are rarely self-
contained events that can be neatly captured by clear-cut categorisations and 
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monolithically attributed to single causes (Cottle, 2009: 16)3. Furthermore, the 
expectation about the discussions was that they would expand beyond the 
events used as triggers in a way that distinctions between natural disasters and 
other events would be blurred. Starting the discussions with events that did not 
involve suffering related to an apparent political or partisan cause was 
considered to be appropriate in order to ensure the opening up of the 
discussions towards the directions the viewers themselves considered relevant.  
As this thesis engages with the relationship between television audiences and 
the distant sufferers they encounter on their screens, it is embedded within and 
aims at enriching a significant and increasingly expanding body of work on the 
mediation of distant suffering, which has preoccupied media theorists, 
sociologists and philosophers alike. The management of the visibility of 
suffering and the possibility of bridging the moral distance between faraway 
victims and Western spectators corresponds to the urgent question of the 
ethical role of the media in a globalised and increasingly mediated world. This 
work has offered significant critical insights into the reproduction of symbolic 
inequalities and representational hierarchies through the media’s mainstream 
practices (Shaw, 1996; Philo, 1993b; Philo and Berry, 2004; Butler, 2004; 2009; 
Chouliaraki, 2006), the characteristics of the media as a moral space and their 
potential role in the construction of a mediated cosmopolitan civic space 
(Bauman, 1993; Tester, 1994; 2001; Couldry, 2006; Silverstone, 2007). Despite 
the rich theoretical insights and continuous debate this work has given rise to, 
                                                        
3 Indeed, as Cottle aptly points out, disasters caused by natural phenomena are always 
implicated with structural failures, insofar as they “represent the failures to deal with hazards 
and are therefore contingent on the social structure and relations that mediate them and the 
available resources directed at their prevention, mitigation and response” (Cottle, 2009: 44).  
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however, what is strikingly surprising is the absence – a few notable exceptions 
aside, to be sure – of considerable amount of empirical work investigating and 
supporting the relevant theoretical arguments. In this context, the present 
thesis offers an empirical footing to a hitherto largely theoretical debate by 
focusing on the audiences of distant suffering and the ways they relate to the far 
away other. At the same time, it provides a further understanding of the process 
of mediation and its role in the articulation of viewers’ agency, exploring the 
place of media representations of suffering in audience discourses. The 
following section will briefly map out the academic debate on distant suffering 
simultaneously contextualising the present study and underlining its 
contribution to the broader field.   
1.2. Literature review 
The reporting of distant suffering, disasters and trauma has long been on the 
agenda of media scholars, who approached the issue through different 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. Early media research recognised 
disasters and catastrophes as events that often appear on the news, as they 
readily conform to the journalistic criteria of newsworthiness (Galtung and 
Ruge, 1965; Ostagaard, 1965; Gans, 1980). In their seminal research project on 
“the structure of foreign news”, Galtung and Ruge highlight the western bias in 
international news, where events concerning elite nations and people are more 
probable to become news items (Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 67), whereas “lower 
rank” countries mostly attract news coverage at times of crises and disasters 
and only when satisfying a threshold of criteria in order to be considered 
newsworthy (Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 84). The research evidence thus supports 
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the existence of hierarchies of place and life in the coverage of foreign news, as 
constructed through the choices and practices of Western journalists.  
Such hierarchies in the coverage of international news, aptly encapsulated in 
the cynicism that “one dead fireman in Brooklyn is worth five English bobbies, 
who are worth fifty Arabs, who are worth five hundred Africans” (Boyer, 1985), 
has since preoccupied academic debate and research (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 
1984; Stevenson and Gaddy, 1984; Adams, 1986, Chang et al., 1987; Singer et al., 
1991). A common theme among these studies has been the observation that the 
severity of a disaster based on the number of victims can only marginally 
explain the extent of its coverage; organisational factors and social and cultural 
affinities play a significant role in determining the coverage a foreign disaster 
will attract (Adams, 1986). These studies on the ways professional practices of 
Western journalism affect the reporting of suffering and catastrophe around the 
world dovetail with accounts of the political economy of international news 
media, which highlight the global dominance of western news agencies and 
networks in the global media market (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen, 1998; 
Thussu, 2003, Schiller, 2005). This dominance, it is argued, is reflected on the 
agenda of the global news, as well as its form, which is increasingly 
homogenised according to Western models (Thussu, 2003).  
More recently, Livingston and van Belle in their study of foreign news in US 
media have argued that technological advances have increased the possibility of 
the coverage of disasters from remote areas (Livingston and van Belle, 2005). 
This greater visibility of the distant, however, is not to be uncritically celebrated 
as a challenge to established hierarchies of reporting the world. A report on the 
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“Western Media Coverage of Humanitarian Disasters” published by CARMA has 
concluded that “there appears to be no link between the scale of a disaster and 
media interest in the story” (CARMA, 2006: 6). The report indicates that 
Hurricane Katrina, although claiming considerably fewer lives in comparison, 
received far greater attention than the Kashmir earthquake, the death toll of 
which approached the 80,000 victims. This discrepancy is attributed to the 
impression of “Western self-interests” on the coverage of different areas of the 
World (CARMA, 2006: 5).   
A turning point in the debate about the reporting of distant suffering on the 
media has been the media coverage of the Ethiopian famine of the early 1980s 
(Philo, 1993b; Tester, 2001). Although the famine began in 1982, it was not until 
it became a story on the BBC television news by Michael Burke and Mohamed 
Amin in the summer of 1984 that it raised global public concern (Philo, 1993b). 
A succession of more news coverage and outburst of public response followed, 
culminating to the Live Aid concert, broadcast live to “80% of the total number 
of television sets in existence through the world” (Live Aid, 1985: 13). The 
media coverage of the Ethiopian famine thus exemplified the potential of 
connecting the Western spectator to people suffering in the other side of the 
world and initiating public action and solidarity across geographical borders on 
the basis of feelings of compassion and empathy4. It also expanded the relevant 
debate to concerns beyond the organisational and structural factors of the 
coverage of suffering to issues of content and form of the coverage. This agenda 
has been at the forefront of two relevant and interrelated debates, one explicitly 
                                                        
4 For a critical reading of Buerk’s documentary as sensationalistic and lacking in causal 
clarification of the famine, see Harrison and Palmer (1986).  
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focusing on the politics of representing suffering, especially in relation to 
humanitarian communication, the other more theoretically concerned with the 
social role of the media, and especially television, in engendering and sustaining 
moral relationships among spectators and sufferers.  
The debate on the politics of representation has engaged with issues of both 
advocacy (the degree to which the distant sufferers are able to represent 
themselves) and stereotypical reporting (Shaw, 1996: 80). The focus of the 
discussion has mainly been on humanitarian campaigns and the use of 
photographic imagery in order to raise public awareness and attract donations. 
Underlining the choice of this imagery is the ethical dilemma posed by the need 
to use shocking images for impact, on the one hand, and the degrading of the 
dignity of the victims, on the other hand, in order to instigate feelings of 
empathy and compassion (Bethnall, 1993; Save the Children Fund, 1998; 
Lidchitt, 1999; Dogra, 2006; Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Kennedy, 2009; 
Chouliaraki, 2010a). These issues have further posed broader critical questions 
about the power relations between the West and the “rest” (Hall, 1992) 
reproduced through the stereotypical representation of the dependent South. 
Critical studies of the coverage of war and political conflicts around the world 
(Brooks et al., 2003; Lewis, 2004; Butler, 2004; 2009; Chouliaraki, 2005) have 
also exposed the construction of hierarchies of life in media reports, where the 
voices of non-Westerns are symbolically annihilated or “radically effaced” 
(Butler, 2004: 247).  
These discussions are embedded within but do not exclusively exhaust the 
broader theoretical debate over the potential of the media, and especially 
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television, to establish relations of moral commitment between spectators and 
sufferers. The relevant arguments have been mainly polarised around what 
Chouliaraki has named the “pessimistic” and the “optimistic narrative”, each one 
underlined by opposing assumptions about the ethical role of the media and 
their role in forging relationships of commitment and solidarity between 
Western spectators and distant others (Chouliaraki, 2006: 23).  
On the one hand, the pessimistic thesis generally argues that television as a 
technology and as a medium cannot bridge the physical and symbolic distance 
between the scene of suffering and its spectators. Within the premises of a 
postmodern approach to the mediation of suffering, the “reality” constructed by 
the television images has been described as nothing but a “hyperreality”, which 
effaces authentic experience (Baudrillard, 1983; 1995), whereas the strangers 
on the screen, lacking in physical presence, “appear solely as objects of 
enjoyment, no strings attached” (Bauman, 1993: 178). In the context of a 
viewing experience, where “the catastrophic and the banal are rendered 
homogeneous and consumed with equal commitment” (Robins, 1994: 475), 
television, the argument goes, fails to essentially commit its audiences to the 
distant world.  Furthermore, the screen, being another part of the domestic 
environment where the viewer is situated, functions as a physical barrier that 
shields the spectator from the represented reality (Robins, 1996). The actual 
distance between the scene of suffering and its spectator is, thus, further 
accentuated at the symbolic level through the juxtaposition between the 
unfortunate others and the comfort and safety of the quotidian. Distance 
becomes fathomless because of “the unimaginability of this happening to you or 
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your loved one” (Cohen, 2001: 169). Underlying is the assumption of the 
“existential priority” of the space of immediate experience both as the horizon 
of experiences and concerns (Tomlinson, 1999: 178) and as the space of “ethics 
of care and responsibility” (Silverstone, 2002: 761).  
A more popularised version of the pessimistic approach is expressed in the 
“compassion fatigue” thesis, which assumes that the continuous flow of images 
of human suffering leads to the viewers’ emotional overload to a point where 
suffering and pain become banal, impossible to instantiate any emotion and 
undermining any impulse for action (Moeller, 1999). Images of horror have 
become frequent in audience experience and therefore treated by viewers’ as 
“banal” due to their “over-familiarity” and “inevitability” (Tester, 1997: 39). 
Journalistic conventions and the rules of news production along with the time 
restraints of news bulletins allow only for a superficial presentation of news 
stories, including those of suffering in distant places. At the same time, it is 
argued, the need for audience attention favours sensationalism expressed in the 
mere horror of images of pain without the necessary explanations of the factors 
that resulted in this horrific outcome. “Television”, Moeller argues, “is 
essentially a headline service” (Moeller, 1999: 29). In this context, images of 
suffering become overly familiar, similar to one another, failing to engage the 
audience.  
On the other hand, the “optimistic narrative” (Chouliaraki, 2006: 26) celebrates 
the integrative role of the media as introducing new forms of proximity and 
bridging the distance between the sufferers and their spectators. Living in a 
mediatized world, Thompson argues, has created new kinds of global 
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responsibilities towards distant others (Thompson, 1995: 258). The author 
names this process “the democratization of responsibility”, in the sense “that a 
concern for distant others becomes an increasing part of the daily lives of more 
and more individuals” (Thompson, 1995: 263).  
At the same time, the worldwide broadcasting of news of suffering triggers 
“empathetic experiences”, which in their turn instigate “an upsurge of fellow 
feeling” (Dayan and Katz, 1992: 196) towards fellow spectators around the 
globe. Images of distant atrocities, disasters and suffering expand the viewers’ 
moral space beyond barriers of citizenship, religion, race and geography, 
promoting an “internationalisation of conscience” (Ignatieff, 1998: 57). In this 
optimistic approach the symbolic power of the media is celebrated as 
generating a new kind of cosmopolitan moral imaginary (Chouliaraki, 2008: 
331), whereby cosmopolitanism is expressed as a form of “ethical glocalism”, in 
the sense of the expansion of the moral horizons of the locally situated lifeworld 
(Tomlinson, 1999: 196).  
Both approaches have important limitations in their own right. There is an 
assumption of moral universalism in the optimistic narrative, assuming that 
empathy is an automatic response to images of human suffering, therefore 
taking for granted what should be the object of investigation. The pessimistic 
approach, on the other hand, presumes a distinction between the mediated and 
the real which seems obsolete. A common problem between the two opposing 
narratives, however, is that both approaches neglect the constructive character 
of mediation as “a transformative process in which the meaningfulness and 
value of things are constructed” (Silverstone, 2002: 761). They seem to assume 
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that meaning resides in the text or the medium itself and, as a consequence, 
spectators’ responses are automatic outcomes of the media. There are two 
interrelated weaknesses stemming from such a premise. First, there is an 
assumption of a uniformity of media images of suffering on which spectators’ 
responses depend, ignoring the heterogeneity of the media representations of 
suffering and the way these situate the viewer (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 
2006). Second, what is largely neglected in the above arguments is an empirical 
examination of the ways audiences actually engage with reports of distant 
suffering (Tester, 1994: 83; Höijer, 2004: 513; Cottle, 2009: 133).  
Empirically informed studies on the mediation of distant suffering have 
illustrated the role of media discourse, as technology and as text, in differently 
situating the viewers in a moral relationship to the distant victims by making 
different demands on their political and emotional sensibilities (Chouliaraki, 
2006; Cottle and Rai, 2008; Joey, 2009).  Chouliaraki, employing a semiotic 
analysis to study television news of distant suffering, what she calls “the 
analytics of mediation”, identifies three different “regiments of pity” based on 
three different modes of reporting, namely “adventure”, “emergency” and 
“ecstatic” news (Chouliaraki, 2006). These types of reporting make different 
moral claims to the spectator: adventure news only registers information 
without inviting emotion (Chouliaraki, 2006: 106), emergency news proposes “a 
frame of action to the spectators themselves” (Chouliaraki, 2006: 119) and 
ecstatic news constructs a relationship of identification between the viewer and 
the sufferer (Chouliaraki, 2006: 175).  
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The complexity of communicating distant news has been also illustrated by 
Cottle and Rai in their study of the ways “leading world news channels 
communicatively present the voices, views and values of contending interests 
and identities from around the world” (Cottle and Rai, 2008: 157). The authors 
identify a variety of communicative frames of reporting the world, which they 
analytically differentiate as “reporting”, “dominant”, “contest”, “contention”, 
“campaigning”, “exposé/investigative” and “reportage frame” (Cottle and Rai, 
2008; Cottle, 2009). Within this typology, disasters and trauma can be covered 
by the media in a variety of ways, ranging from “basic description” within the 
“reporting frame” (Cottle, 2009: 139) to the “more in-depth, analytically 
elaborate and emotionally inflected package” of the reportage frame (Cottle, 
2009: 140).   
These studies elaborately confirm that the mediation of distant suffering and 
the moral positioning of the viewer is a much more complex and varied process 
than the theoretical arguments that frame the relevant debate seem to imply. 
The question of how the meanings constructed by the different news stories of 
suffering, however, are actually employed and elicit responses among their 
audiences largely remains untested. Much is speculated and assumed about the 
audience of suffering but very little is empirically known. Highlighting the 
significance of the audience, Ignatieff argues that “images of human suffering do 
not assert their own meaning; they can only instantiate a moral claim if those 
who watch understand themselves to be potentially under obligation to those 
they see” (Ignatieff, 1998: 11-12).  
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Noting this gap in the literature, Höijer has explored audience reactions to the 
“discourse of global compassion” constructed by the media through the 
reporting of humanitarian crises, wars and political conflicts and their focus on 
their innocent victims (Höijer, 2004). Her research, based on empirical material 
gathered through interviews and focus groups in Norway and Sweden, studies 
viewers’ reactions to media reports of war and violent news and has indicated 
that compassion is most often directed to particular images of suffering and 
varies in its forms and expressions. Höijer’s general conclusion describes the 
complexity of audience responses to suffering as a “a two-sided effect of global 
compassion on the one hand, and ignorance and compassion fatigue on the 
other” expressed through “different forms of compassion as well as different 
forms of indifference” (Höijer, 2004: 528).  
Focusing on the audiences of humanitarian appeals, Seu also employed focus 
groups in a UK-based research to explore audience responses to NGO campaigns 
and news stories of human rights violations (Seu, 2003; 2010). Her analysis, 
focusing on the issue of audience (in)action and drawing upon the principles of 
psychology, psychoanalysis and rhetoric, illustrates the different ways people 
discursively distance themselves from the suffering of others and justify their 
unresponsiveness to human rights appeals.  
In an interesting, albeit much broader in its scope and concerns study, the 
Glasgow Media Group as part of their research for the Department for 
International Development5 conducted extensive focus groups in order to 
                                                        
5 This study follows previous work of the group which had focused on the Rwandan refugee 
crisis in 1994 and the war in Zaire in 1996 exploring the major themes and explanations offered 
by the U.K. news coverage in response to the respective crises (Philo, 2002: 173-4).  
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“identify patterns of understanding and belief [about the Third World] and to 
trace the origins of these” in the media, the education system or peer groups 
(DFID, 2000: 174). Focusing mostly on the theme of political conflict in African 
countries, the group discussions indicate a link between inadequate explanation 
provided by the media and audience misinformation but they are mainly 
illustrative of how audiences bring their own frameworks of understanding in 
their interpretation of media texts and fill in the gaps with their assumptions 
about African people and “neo-colonial beliefs”, such as preconceptions of 
tribalism (Philo, 2002: 176) and the political inability of Africans (Philo, 2002: 
185).  
A more recent and specific in its focus study explored the television news 
coverage of September 11 and the attacks on Afghanistan that followed it, as 
well as the consumption of this coverage by transnational audiences in Britain 
(Michalski et al., 2002; Gillespie, 2006). The audience study, in which the 
majority of participants were multilingual, indicates a great degree of scepticism 
against mainstream media, as well as the use of rumours and alternative media 
as competing frames for analysing British and U.S. news (Michalski et al., 2002: 
33).  
Interesting in their own right, these research projects constitute exceptions in a 
field of study which has hitherto largely ignored audiences of mediated 
suffering. In this respect, the present thesis aims at enriching this stream of 
studies and expanding their research insights. At the same time, however, it 
aims at moving beyond a narrow focus on audience “reactions” to media reports 
and news of human suffering, either as merely affective responses to specific 
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news stories, as in  Höijer’s study (Höijer, 2004), or translated in terms of action 
at a distance and contribution to relief efforts (Seu, 2003; 2010). Both of these 
empirical interests, the thesis argues, constitute aspects of the mediation of 
viewers’ agency vis-à-vis the suffering of distant others. However, this agency is 
not only constituted through what the viewer sees and how she or he feels in 
relation to suffering; it is also expressed through how viewers remember and 
tell stories about suffering witnessed through the media; it is further mediated 
by the audience beliefs about the media and the trust they attribute to them. 
The DFID study (2000) and the study of transnational audiences’ response to 
September 11 (Michalski et al., 2002; Gillespie, 2006), more in accordance to the 
interests of this thesis, approach audiences as situated within an environment of 
different resources of knowledge about distant suffering, where the media 
constitute an indispensable but not the only or even the major part of this 
environment.  
More recent theoretical work has problematised the nature of the audience not 
as mere “respondents” or “receivers” of media messages of distant suffering but 
as participants in a mediated global civic space, where the visibility of the 
vulnerability of distant others may form the basis of moral relationships and 
solidarity across geographical and cultural borders (Silverstone, 2007). In this 
context, the emotional and moral implications of watching the suffering of 
others has been theorised not only in relation to responses to particular media 
texts but as a generalised experience of the audience as witnesses rendered 
possible by mediated encounters with images of faraway others (Ellis, 2000; 
2009; Frosh, 2006; 2011; Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009b). In this context, the 
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focus moves from viewers’ relationship to particular texts to the possibilities of 
agency opened up by the media as resources of knowledge about the distant 
other (Couldry, 2006).  
Albeit largely theoretical, this body of work offers useful insights and conceptual 
tools for thinking about the construction of the moral agency of the viewer vis-
à-vis the suffering of distant others. Drawing upon these theoretical tools, the 
present thesis aims at exploring how the audiences make use of the resources 
provided by the media in order to understand and get involved with the distant 
other but, at the same time, is interested in illustrating how these media 
resources are implicated in other discursive frameworks audiences employ to 
make sense of the suffering of others, as well as how media stories become 
embedded in broader public discourses.  
1.3 Research questions 
Taking as a point of departure an understanding of the media as constituting a 
space that manages the visibility of the suffering of distant others and thus 
provides the viewer with the resources for imagining and understanding the 
faraway sufferer, the thesis does not focus on how audiences react to or read 
news of distant suffering but rather asks:  
In what ways do Greek audiences construct their moral agency vis-à-
vis the suffering of distant others through processes of mediation?  
This is the primary research question of the thesis which is based on the 
assumption that viewers as agents are not mere receivers of media texts – no 
matter how “creative”, “oppositional” or “active” this process of reception is – 
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but constitute participants in the mediation process (Silverstone, 2007: 107). 
For that reason, the present study moves beyond an exploration of the close 
relationship between media texts of distant suffering and their spectators. 
Empirically, this was achieved through the open discussion of different disasters 
and instances of human suffering as mentioned earlier and further discussed in 
Chapter 3. Theoretically, this study takes us a point of departure a 
conceptualisation of mediation as audience practices (Coulrdy, 2004; 2006) and 
argues for the exploration of viewer’s agency through the concept of media 
practices (Chapter 2). Practices are flexibly understood here as both talk about 
the media and actions instigated by the media, ranging from the expression of 
compassion, to donations to relief appeals or even the switching off of the 
television set. This is, therefore, a study not about the “consumption” or 
“reception” of media representations of suffering but a study about the 
possibilities of agency this mediation renders possible for the spectator of 
suffering.  
The viewer’s agency is of central significance with regard to the mediation of 
distant suffering, as watching the pain of others bears moral implications for the 
spectator; it poses questions about what can be done to alleviate this pain and, 
more importantly, what can the viewer do to help the faraway victims. Watching 
suffering is, therefore, fundamentally different from any other audience 
experience, as it assumes, more often implicitly than explicitly, a moral 
obligation to act upon the suffering. In order to explore the construction of 
viewers’ agency vis-à-vis the suffering of distant others, the study suggests an 
analytical framework which employs the concepts of witnessing (Ellis, 2000; 
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Peters, 2001; Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009a) and remembering (Halbwachs, 
1992; Edwards and Potter, 1992) as media practices. The secondary research 
questions that guided the analysis are, therefore, the following:  
(a)How do viewers position themselves as witnesses of the suffering of 
others made visible through the media?  
(b)How do audiences remember distant suffering? 
(c)How do viewers describe themselves as actors in relation to the 
suffering of people they witness through the media?  
Exploring how viewers position themselves as witnesses allows for the 
illustration of the moral implications audiences themselves attribute to their 
experience of watching the pain of faraway others and their emotional 
involvement with the scene of suffering and its victims (Chapter 4). The way the 
memories of these witnessed events are constructed through the practice of 
media remembering reflects the ways distant suffering becomes part of broader 
discursive frameworks beyond the moment of the audience viewing of the event 
and, therefore, part of the domain of the viewers’ lifeworld (Chapter 5). These 
two practices, media witnessing and media remembering, through which the 
moral agency of the viewer is articulated, are implicated in the kinds of actions 
viewers take and consider available to them with regard to the suffering of 
distant others (Chapter 6).   
The question of moral connectivity between spectator and distant sufferer 
ultimately pertains to the question of the mediation of cosmopolitanism as an 
audience disposition. Cosmopolitanism is understood here as a “concern” and 
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“willingness to engage with the Other” (Hannerz, 1990: 239) 6. In Beck’s word’s 
such a “cosmopolitan outlook” requires “dialogical imagination in everyday 
practice”, namely “situating and relativising one’s own form of life within other 
horizons of possibility” and seeing “oneself from the perspective of cultural 
others” (Beck, 2006: 89). The question of mediated cosmopolitanism 
problematises the role of media in constituting the resources for such a 
dialogical imagination as to allow for relationships of responsibility and 
commitment among distant others to emerge on the basis of a common 
humanity and the subsequent construction of a shared global space of 
responsibility and agency (Beck and Sznaider, 2006; Robertson, 2010). It also 
explores the conditions for the formation of a cosmopolitan public on the basis 
of expressions of solidarity and responsibility towards suffering distant others 
(Chouliaraki, 2006). These broader issues, to which the thesis empirically 
contributes, will be revisited in the concluding chapter of the thesis.  
1.4. Thesis Chapter Plan 
The thesis is presented in seven chapters of which this introductory chapter is 
the first one. Chapter 2 will present the theoretical approach and analytical 
framework employed in the study. It argues that the moral agency of the viewer 
is articulated through the discursive practices of media witnessing and media 
remembering and begins by considering television as a space for the mediation 
of these practices, as it provides the resources for imagining and understanding 
                                                        
6 The concept of cosmopolitanism has been approached in a variety of ways and by different 
disciplines mostly to theorise normative ideals and practices and has been highly contested in 
most of these approaches (Pollock et al., 2000). For a discussion of the concept within the 
context of political theory, see Held, 2010; Archibugi, 2003. For philosophical conceptualizations 
of cosmopolitanism, see Nussbaum, 1996; Appiah, 2007. For a discussion of sociological 
cosmopolitanism, see Skrbis et al., 2004; Beck, 2006; Beck and Sznaider, 2006.   
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the distant other. However, due to the symbolic unevenness of this space and 
the hierarchies of pity established through the representational practices of 
reporting suffering, the mediation of the moral agency of the viewer is 
underlined by three fundamental tensions: between the viewer’s involvement 
and detachment, hospitality and indifference towards the distant other, as well 
as complicity with the media and responsibility of the spectator.  
Considering the viewer as an agent moving along these tensions takes as a point 
of departure an understanding of mediation as media practices, namely as what 
people do and say in relation to media texts reporting distant suffering (Couldry, 
2004; 2006). The two audience practices of media witnessing and media 
remembering are discussed in the last sections of the chapter. The former 
encapsulates the particularities of the spectatorship of suffering, entailing moral 
and emotional claims to the sensibilities of the viewer, whereas the latter refers 
to the viewers’ discursive reconstruction of the events witnessed. The two 
practices, themselves underlined by the three tensions in the formation of the 
moral self, illustrate the way viewers position themselves vis-à-vis the suffering 
of distant others and mediate the actions they might take with regard to this 
suffering.  
The methodological choices and tools for the exploration of the research 
questions are explained in Chapter 3. The chapter begins with the justification 
of the methodology of focus groups for the exploration of the research 
questions, arguing that it offers insights into the construction of commonsense 
discourses through the interaction of discussion; it is through this interaction 
that discourses are articulated, negotiated and illustrated. The chapter goes on 
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to discuss the way the empirical research of the thesis was conducted, briefly 
contextualising it in relation to the Greek news media landscape. Finally, the 
way in which the focus group discussions are analysed, drawing upon the 
principles of discourse analysis, is described. 
 The empirical findings of this analysis are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The 
structure of the empirical discussion of the thesis reflects the distinction 
between the two media practices of witnessing and remembering and the 
question of action at-a-distance, as outlined in Chapter 2. Therefore, Chapter 4 
discusses the practice of media witnessing, Chapter 5 the practice of media 
remembering, and, finally, Chapter 6 focuses on the question of public action 
vis-à-vis distant suffering. As will be noted later, the three issues are 
intrinsically interlinked in audience discourses. However, this distinction is 
analytically employed here in order to allow for an in-depth exploration of the 
research questions.  
In Chapter 4 the practice of media witnessing is explored. The chapter is 
structured around a typology of four different modes of witnessing illustrated in 
the discussions: affective witnessing, ecstatic witnessing, politicised witnessing 
and detached witnessing. These four types are constructed through the different 
positions viewers’ occupy along the tensions in the mediated construction of 
moral agency as described in Chapter 2. Overall, Chapter 4 illustrates the 
practice of media witnessing as multifaceted practice, contingent upon the 
different discursive positions viewers take vis-à-vis distant suffering, which in 
their turn are dependent upon the events reported, the way they are reported, 
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as well as cultural and political discourses that are into play within the context 
of viewers’ everyday life.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the practice of media remembering. It illustrates the 
discursive construction of viewers’ memories as a double process of 
remembering and forgetting. It argues that there is an implicit moral hierarchy 
of remembering disasters. At the bottom end of this hierarchy are events that 
have faded from viewers’ memory. A small category of events, the “ecstatic 
news” (Chouliaraki, 2006) of the South Asia Tsunami and September 11, are 
constructed as iconic in viewers’ memories. At the top of the moral hierarchy is 
the earthquake that hit Turkey in 1999, which is discussed within the frames of 
a reflexive cosmopolitan outlook. Finally, the chapter explores how events 
remembered as global disasters can be theorised as global media events, 
forming the basis of a cosmopolitan collective memory. It argues that, on the 
one hand, by constructing events as global disasters viewers simultaneously 
position themselves as members of a global audience; on the other hand, 
national and local frameworks of memory enter the discussion of global events, 
“localising” their significance.  
The way the viewers’ agency is enacted in relation to the suffering of distant 
others is explored in Chapter 6. The chapter addresses the question of action at 
a distance and examines what kinds of agency audiences attribute to themselves 
as public actors vis-à-vis the suffering witnessed through the media. It is argued 
that this agency is indeed very limited. The kinds of action viewers take are of a 
limited variety and heavily dependent on appeals orchestrated by the media, 
mostly in the form of telethons. There are two argumentative strategies viewers 
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employ in justifying this limited agency: first, their mistrust of humanitarianism 
and especially the mediators of humanitarian efforts; second, their sense of 
powerlessness both to affect events that are geographically distant but mostly 
as public actors in the public stage, be it national or global.  
The concluding Chapter 7, revisits the research question as to how the moral 
agency of the viewer is constructed vis-à-vis the news stories of distant 
suffering and relates it to the secondary questions as these were illustrated 
through the empirical discussion. The theoretical and empirical contributions of 
the study are addressed, both in terms of theories of mediation and the 
literature on distant suffering and cosmopolitanism, as well as the new 
directions towards which this thesis could move the relevant academic debate 
forward.  
The findings of this thesis illustrate the articulation of the viewer’s agency vis-à-
vis the distant other as conditional both on the nature of the suffering and the 
way it is reported by the media and local and nationally-specific frameworks of 
understanding. As the local and the national are the primary arenas for public 
action, it is mostly them that also considerably affect – or, most often, limit – 
viewers’ sense of agency in relation to distant others, irrespective of their 
engagement with the scene of suffering and their relationship to the media.  
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Chapter 2 Conceptualising the viewer as a moral agent 
Confronted with disturbing images of distant suffering on their media screens, 
there are a number of things viewers might do. They often switch off the 
television set or change channels; they might sit down and watch filled with 
compassion or anger; they can also get motivated to contribute to relief efforts; 
they might keep discussing about what they saw with their peers or they might 
as well forget about the pain of others soon after having witnessed it. All these 
options for action are available and performed routinely by audience members; 
all these actions are also endowed with moral meaning, as watching suffering 
differs fundamentally from any other kind of audience experience: the image of 
the sufferer is not a mere spectacle to be consumed but also makes moral 
demands on the viewer to do something with the knowledge of this suffering.  
The present chapter outlines the theoretical approach taken in this study to 
explore what viewers do with this knowledge and how processes of mediation 
are implicated in the way viewers construct their agency vis-à-vis the suffering 
of distant others. The main theoretical argument of the present thesis is that the 
agency of the audience with regard to media reports of suffering is articulated 
through the discursive practices of media witnessing and media remembering, 
in other words the way viewers witness and remember the suffering reported 
by the media. The following sections will unpack this premise and will gradually 
construct the framework for the design and conduct of the study.  
I start by considering the role of the media as discursive resources for the 
construction of the viewers’ sense of self in relation to the distant other. By 
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offering the basis for this relationship between viewer and sufferer, television 
also constitutes a moral space expanded at the level of the global. As this space, 
however, is characterised by biases and unevenness due to the material and 
symbolic characteristics of media institutions and forms, I argue that the 
mediation of the agency of the viewer towards distant sufferings is also a 
dynamic process, inevitably underlined by relevant tensions.  
The second section of the chapter focuses on a more specific conceptualisation 
of the viewer as an agent within this mediated global space. Initially 
contextualising this project in the context of audience approaches in media 
studies, the discussion moves on to the development of a theoretical framework 
which is based on an understanding of mediation as practices and argues for the 
study of viewers’ agency through an exploration of what people do and say 
about the media (Couldry 2004; 2006). Two such practices are suggested here 
for the study of audience agency vis-à-vis distant suffering, namely the practices 
of media witnessing and media remembering.  
These two concepts are explored in the last section of this theoretical chapter. 
Media witnessing, as the discursive articulation of the viewer’s position as a 
spectator of suffering, encapsulates the specificities and peculiarities, moral and 
affective, of watching actual human pain on the television screen. Media 
remembering, as the discursive reconstruction of stories of suffering witnessed 
through the media, throws light into how these stories are embedded over time 
in broader discursive frameworks and within the viewers’ local lifeworlds. The 
two practices, media witnessing and media remembering, are suggested here as 
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a conceptual framework for the study of audience agency in relation to the 
distant sufferer.  
2.1 The media as a moral space 
The theoretical starting point of the thesis is the concept of mediation as the 
process of the production of meanings about human suffering reported on the 
media. As such mediation becomes a moral force, providing “a framework for 
the definition and conduct of our relationships to the other, and especially the 
distant other – the other who only appears to us within the media” (Silverstone, 
2002: 762). I am using the word “moral” to refer to the distinction between 
right and wrong with regard to practices oriented towards other people 
(Appiah, 2008: 37; Tester, 1994: 83). In this understanding of the concept, 
morality is “practical”; “it is about what to do and what to feel; how to respond 
to our own and the world’s demands” (Appiah, 2008: 22).  The media constitute 
a moral space in so far as they provide the resources for our relationship with 
the distant and otherwise invisible other. As they are the means through which 
their audience see and make sense of the distant sufferer, they also “invite 
(claim, constrain) an equivalent moral response” from the viewer (Silverstone, 
2007: 7); as such, they constitute the resources and the space within which the 
moral agency of the viewer is constructed.  
As briefly discussed in the introductory chapter, the field of the theoretical 
arguments on the moral role of the media has been polarised between the 
optimism of the closing of moral distance between spectators’ and sufferers, 
which concomitantly guarantees the engagement of the former in the 
predicament of the latter (Thompson, 1995; Tomlinson, 1999), and the 
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pessimism that regards mediated relationships as inherently amoral (Bauman, 
1993; Robins, 1994; Tester, 1994). Both optimistic and pessimistic accounts, it 
was argued earlier, fail to take into account the processes of mediation 
underlying the relationship between spectators and unfortunates, and reflect on 
how these can both open up as well as close the moral distance between the 
viewer and the distant other. The next sections will illustrate the way mediation 
constructs a space for imagining and understanding the distant other, a space 
that is, however, underlined by tensions and disjunctures.   
2.1.1 Mediation: a theoretical framework 
The concept of mediation theoretically encapsulates the role of media in the 
production and circulation of meaning through technological, discursive and 
institutional practices. It emphasises the social place of the media not as merely 
technological infrastructures or symbolic texts and images, but rather as 
practices, which most importantly entail the practices of the producers of media 
content and their audiences, themselves embedded within specific social, 
cultural and economic contexts. Silverstone defines mediation as “a 
fundamentally dialectical notion, which requires us to address the process of 
communication as both institutionally and technologically driven and 
embedded” (Silverstone, 2005: 189). Mediation thus defined points towards a 
study of the media not as a strictly distinguished social institution, but as a 
complex field intrinsically interwoven with all influential institutions in society, 
which have themselves been transformed and reconstituted by the involvement 
of the media and communications (Livingstone, 2009: 2). Media are, therefore, 
both constituted and constitutive of the social world (Silverstone, 2007: 6); 
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modern media are meaningful because they are the product of human activity 
within specific socio-cultural contexts and, at the same time, “people 
understand the world and their position in it through the media” (Livingstone, 
2009: 5).  
In analytical terms, this poses difficulties in strictly separating objects of 
analysis and tracing origins or constructing explanations for mediated 
phenomena under study (Silverstone, 1999: 13). In its operationalisation within 
the context of different empirical and theoretical interests mediation has been 
applied in a variety of ways focusing on different stages and aspects of the 
mediation process7. This thesis approaches mediation to indicate “a shift away 
from a focus on specific media texts and productions, to a focus on the broader 
(reception) contexts within which media meanings come to be” (Thumim, 2007: 
38). Here, the focus is on the different ways in which the media, and more 
specifically television, create an environment within which meanings about 
distant suffering are circulated (Silverstone, 1999) and the ways this 
environment is implicated within broader cultural and social contexts in which 
the viewer is situated (Martin-Barbero, 1993). Approaching media as 
environmental, emphasizes the way they have become “tightly and dialectically 
intertwined with the everyday” (Silverstone, 2007: 5), in a way that they 
constitute primary resources through which people understand the world and 
their place in it. At the same time, it points towards a conceptualization of the 
                                                        
7 Thumim (2007) offers a comprehensive typology of the different ways mediation has been 
employed: as “the role of technology in the making of meaning” (p. 38); as a focus on the 
reception context (ibid.); as the “close readings of the processes…which shape a representation 
that is produced and displayed in the media” (p. 39); and, finally, with a focus on who mediates, 
exploring the possibility of media for communication among the public without the 
intermediary role of professionals (p. 40). 
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media as a “space”, technologically created and symbolically reproduced, within 
which everyday life is lived (Couldry and McCarthy, 2003a).  
What is of most significance here is that this mediated space is increasingly 
constituted by the distant, which has therefore become an irreducible part of 
the everyday (Thompson, 1995; Silverstone, 2007). In expanding experience 
beyond the confines of the local, the media frame and mediate social life in a 
way that is increasingly global in its reach and symbolism. In this context, “living 
in the world” takes a new meaning, as despite the fact that individuals are still 
contextually situated in time and space through the constraints of the body, the 
transformation of place through the intrusion of distance into locality, mainly 
due to the centrality of mediated experience, has changed “what ‘the world’ 
actually is” (Giddens, 1991: 187). Although the role of the media in extending 
and globalising social experience has been largely ignored by sociologists of 
globalisation (Rantanen, 2005: 12), media scholars have highlighted the 
primacy of the media in enhancing the reflexive aspect of globalisation as 
experienced in late modernity, namely the constitution of the globe as the frame 
for the beliefs of people and social groups (Albrow, 1996: 4). In this highly 
mediated and globalised context, agency is constructed through the selective 
incorporation, either consciously or unconsciously, of a variety of elements of 
mediated experience into everyday life (Giddens, 1991: 188; Stevenson, 1999: 
56); in other words, people’s construction of their agency is highly mediated 
and oriented towards the distant in the same way as it is locally situated. 
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2.1.2 The media as a global moral space 
Roger Silverstone coined the concept of the “mediapolis” to define “the 
mediated public space where contemporary political life increasingly finds its 
place, both at national and global levels, and where the materiality of the world 
is constructed through (principally) electronically communicated public speech 
and action” (Silverstone, 2007: 31). Despite the criticisms the concept attracted, 
mainly due to its heavily normative premises (Dayan, 2007), the mediapolis is a 
useful metaphor for thinking about the centrality of the media in the 
construction of individual and collective global imaginaries (Steger, 2008) and 
social relationships with distant others. In other words, it addresses the 
question of “the possibility of envisaging the media as enhancing a global 
cosmopolitan culture, one that might not require, indeed will not require, 
physical mobility, but mobility through the symbolic” (Silverstone, 2007: 12). 
At the heart of the argument is the assumption that the media increasingly 
define what constitutes the social world. And since through the use of the media 
people are constantly envisaged with images of distant others, the social world 
consists of globally mediated social relations that transcend cultural and 
geographical borders (Silverstone, 2007: 4). As such, the mediapolis, according 
to Silverstone, constitutes the starting point for the creation of a global civic 
space providing the means for participation in public life that extends to the 
global and “works for the human condition” (Silverstone, 2007: 33).  
In a similar argument, Couldry addresses the need for a discussion about what 
he names “media ethics” in academic literature and institutional practice. He 
avoids relating these ethics on specific deontological codes and absolute moral 
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norms but describes them as “an open-ended process of reflecting on how we 
need to act so that we live well, both individually and collectively” (Couldry, 
2006: 102). This concern for a media ethics stems from the acknowledgment 
that “we live with media, among media” (Couldry, 2012: 180; emphasis in the 
original). For that reason, if we are to think about how life can be lived in a more 
democratic, just way in a shared world, we have to assess how media can 
contribute – or how they indeed might prohibit – this kind of life and create a 
framework for thinking about how we should act in relation to the media 
(Couldry, 2006: 109).  
There are three main virtues of practices related to the media that Couldry 
recognises as central in a discussion about media ethics, namely accuracy, 
sincerity and care (Couldry, 2012: 190). The first two address issues of 
representation and intention mostly related to journalistic practice; the last one 
stems from the acknowledgement that “media sustain a space that puts us in 
view of each other” and highlights the fact that “without some degree of mutual 
recognition as moral agents requiring respect, the chances of us living together 
sustainably are small” (Couldry, 2012: 195). Questions of media ethics do not 
exclude audiences as active participants in the process of mediation and 
consumers of media technologies and texts. Audiences have themselves a sense 
of media ethics and their (re)evaluation of media as symbolic forms and 
institutions is central in the process for the construction of a broader media 
ethics (Couldry, 2006: 104).  
These theoretical arguments about the constitution of a mediated global civic 
space echo in some ways Appadurai’s earlier arguments about media as a global 
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space. Appadurai employed the term “mediascapes” to refer both to the 
“distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate 
information” and “the images of the world created by the media” (Appadurai, 
1990: 9). Within these mediascapes, local experience is “dematerialised” 
(Appadurai, 2002: 33) as it is not anymore bound to locality but is intrinsically 
interwoven with imagination, in the sense of imagined spaces and possibilities 
of life. Appadurai describes the renewed role of imagination in social life as the 
most significant cultural dimension of globalisation (Appadurai, 1990; 1996). 
Due mainly to the increasing prominence of the media at a global scale, modern 
experience appears to be a “complex transnational construction of imaginary 
landscapes” (Appadurai, 1990: 10). Although this is not original to modernity, it 
is only now that it has become part of the “quotidian mental work of ordinary 
people” entering “the logic of ordinary life” (Appadurai, 1996: 5), as well as “a 
property of collectives” and not merely “a faculty of the gifted individual” 
(Appadurai, 1996: 8). This social role of imagination is translated into new 
forms of social action and collectivities beyond national borders thus 
constituting a “collective tool for the transformation of the real” (Appadurai, 
2002: 34).  
Although Appadurai’s original argument is mostly based on works of fiction that 
“allow scripts for possible lives to be imbricated with the glamour of film stars 
and fantastic film plots” (Appadurai, 1996: 7), imagination has been more 
broadly theorised as an instrumental resource for a cosmopolitan engagement 
with the world (Delanty, 2006; Stevenson, 2003; Robertson, 2010). There are 
two strands that intertwine in the notion of cosmopolitan imagination.  
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Expanding Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community” (Anderson, 1989), 
the media have been approached as the basis of an imagined community beyond 
the nation, one that includes the globe (Robbins, 1998; Urry, 2000). “Like 
nations”, Robbins argues, “worlds too are imagined” (Robbins, 1998: 2). This 
kind of community beyond the nation, as theorised in such accounts, describes 
the “imagined” community of the Western spectators, constructed through the 
simultaneous consumption of and engagement with transnational media flows 
(Chouliaraki, 2006: 10). It is the consequence of imagining “ourselves sharing 
events, experiences and personalities with many others, with whom we 
constitute certain kinds of community” (Urry, 2000: 69). This kind of 
imagination, linking fellow spectators through a sense of common experience, is 
the imagination of the “communitarian public of the West” (Chouliaraki, 2008), 
which ultimately misses the moral dimension of connecting the viewer to the 
distant other, the human being that appears on the screen.  
Conceptualised in moral terms, cosmopolitan imagination refers to imagining 
and understanding the perspective of the distant other (Boltanski, 1999; Arendt, 
1994; Chouliaraki, 2006; Beck, 2006; Fine, 2007; Robertson, 2010). It is this 
kind of imagination, connecting the viewer with the other on the screen, 
ultimately forming the basis for a cosmopolitan public (Chouliaraki, 2006), that 
is of interest here. In this context, imagination becomes the moral force for the 
construction of the agency of the viewer and her relationship with the distant 
other. Through nourishing the imagination of their audiences, Boltanski argues, 
media also expand their moral space of care and responsibility by offering 
descriptions of the internal states of people spectators have no direct access to 
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(Boltanski, 1999: 51). This takes place by the introduction of symbolic forms 
and objects one can think of with the aim of enjoyment (without necessarily 
assuming that they exist in the real world) but also “can think that are possible 
in the real universe by putting oneself in the state of mind of someone who 
makes judgments concerning them” (Boltanski, 1999: 51). Media images of 
suffering have the potential of rendering human pain imaginable for viewers not 
only as a thought (this kind of suffering might exist) but as a reality experienced 
by others (this suffering does exist and is being experienced by other people). It is 
by way of the latter that the moral imagination of the spectator gets engaged 
with the suffering of the distant other. Imagination thus becomes the mediated 
resource for overcoming the distance separating the spectator from the sufferer 
(Boltanski, 1999: 38). It becomes the key to understanding the other and his or 
her predicament.  
This kind of understanding requires from the viewer to distance herself from 
her own position and “see things in their proper perspective” (Arendt, 1994: 
323), without bias and prejudice. Allowing for the consideration of the 
viewpoints of others and moving beyond moral dichotomies and pre-existing 
categories, understanding constitutes in its turn the basis for the formulation of 
judgment (Fine, 2008: 166). Following Fine’s reading of Arendt, judgment is 
understood here as the application of thinking to particular situations in the 
social world and especially the ability to tell right from wrong independently 
from pre-existing principles and norms (Fine, 2008: 164). With regard to distant 
suffering, the formulation of judgment entails “taking a stand” towards the 
suffering and evaluating it as a cause for commitment, irrespective of pre-
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existing communities of belonging, national, religious or political (Boltanski, 
1999: 31).  
Arendt names this “reflective judgment” and links it to the application of 
“common sense” (Arendt, 1994: 318) and “enlarged mentality” (Arendt, 1968: 
242; Fine, 2008: 167). The former describes the sharing of a common world 
with others; the latter is world-oriented and moving beyond communal 
belonging and identification “seeks to behold the world through the eyes of an 
abstracted generalised other” (Fine, 2008: 167). Reflective judgment as 
perspective-taking becomes constitutive of a cosmopolitan outlook (Beck, 2006: 
7). The media constitute resources for judgment in so far as they provide the 
basis for imagining a world shared with distant others and the means for the 
formation of opinion on the social world beyond the confines of local experience 
(Silverstone, 2007: 44).  
If the media are instrumental resources for the nourishment of the viewer’s 
imagination and the formation of judgment vis-à-vis the distant other, thus 
contributing to the formation of the viewer’s moral agency, they are at the same 
time complex and often biased and distorted resources. The media as a moral 
space is highly complicated and unevenly developed as “the politics of media 
images and economies are not separate from the politics of space” (Couldry and 
McCarthy, 2003b: 2). The mediated public space is characterised by inequalities 
and restrictions, which reflect pre-existing power relations, economic, political 
and symbolic (Silverstone 2007: 12). It is shaped and defined by the 
mainstream representational culture of western media, which in its turn reflects 
the commercial interests of multinational corporations, as well as political 
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agendas of a national or transnational character (Silverstone, 2007: 12). This is 
not necessarily the result of purposeful media distortion but rather a 
consequence of the inherent systemic constraints of media production, which 
reproduces the uneven spatial distribution in the sources on which it relies on 
(Couldry, 2000: 53; Wark, 1994: 8-9).  
The previous chapter has discussed how the unevenness of the mediated global 
space is constructed through the Western bias in journalistic practices of 
reporting the world (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Gans, 1980; Adams, 1986) and 
the unequal distribution of media structures and resources (Boyd-Barrett and 
Rantanen, 1998; Thussu, 2003, Schiller, 2005). At the symbolic level this is 
reflected on the biased focus of media representations on the predicament of 
some sufferers and the absence of others (Butler, 2004; 2009), as well as the 
construction of hierarchies of life adopted by western media in reporting 
suffering (Chouliaraki, 2006; 2008, Joye, 2009). These hierarchies define whose 
misfortune matters (Chouliaraki, 2006) and which lives are “grievable” (Butler, 
2004; 2009). They position the viewer in different kinds of proximity and 
connectivity with the sufferers, constructing maximal distance with some while 
rendering others as worthy of engagement and commitment (Chouliaraki, 2006: 
187).  In this context, the symbolic power8 of the media in managing the 
visibility of distant suffering reproduces “the moral deficiencies of global 
inequality” (Chouliaraki, 2008: 329). As the image of the other is often distorted, 
partial or even absent in the global media space the engagement of the viewer 
with her suffering is also under question.  
                                                        
8 Symbolic power is understood here as the power of the media to construct reality (Couldry, 
2000).  
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2.1.3 The nation as a moral space 
The consideration of the media as a global moral space, where post-national 
solidarities emerge and are reinforced, implies a movement beyond the nation 
as a locus of solidarity and community. This is a significant and highly contested 
claim, considering the strength of the nation in ordering and framing everyday 
life (Billig, 1995). Indeed, approaches to cosmopolitanism as a form of post-
national solidarity and constitution of moral relations across geographical 
borders have often been criticised for neglecting or even stigmatising the role of 
the national community as a form of social solidarity and organisation of civic 
life (Calhoun, 2007). Calhoun alerts against the rejection of nationalism as a 
“moral mistake” by recent theories of globalisation and cosmopolitanism by 
arguing that nationalism is still a positive source of meaning for the majority of 
people around the world, helping them “locate an experience of belonging in a 
world of global flows and fears” (Calhoun, 2003: 170). As such national 
identities and royalties are primary structures of social integration within 
which moral decisions are being made (Calhoun, 2007: 9).                                                                                                    
Theories of the nation as a moral community have described the formation of 
moral obligations and feelings of solidarity as part of the collective affiliation of 
citizenship, itself embedded within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state 
system (Shapiro, 2001: 118). The argument is that “the community-like nature 
of the nation-state” and the sense of common belonging it promotes form the 
basis for social solidarity and a “feeling, or an illusion, of closeness and shared 
fate” (Tamir, 1993: 121). In this context, the political affiliations entailed in 
national citizenship are translated into moral obligations to fellow nationals. 
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Advocates of nationalism from a normative perspective argue that it is the 
“democratic forms of local community and civic participation” that form the 
basis of social moral order (Barber, 1996).  
At the same time, approaches to nationalism as a discursive framework, namely 
as “a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference 
that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us” 
(Ӧzkirimli, 2005: 30; see also Calhoun, 1997; 2007; Skey, 2011), highlight the 
moral order reproduced by nationalist frameworks of thinking. What 
nationalism as a discursive framework does first and foremost is categorising 
people, “both as a way of looking at the world as a whole and as a way of 
establishing group identity from within” (Calhoun, 2007: 39). This practice of 
categorisation simultaneously places moral primacy to one’s own national 
community, both in terms of claims to solidarity among the people belonging in 
the same nation and obligations to the nation as a whole (ibid.). In these terms, 
“the language of national or ethnic identity is indeed a language of morality. It is 
an encoded discourse about inclusion and exclusion” (Herzfeld, 1997: 43). 
These discourses are also reproduced by national media, as part of their daily 
routine. A number of earlier studies have highlighted the role of media in 
relation to the emergence and reproduction of national discourses and identity 
and belonging. Besides Benedict Anderson’s seminal study on the formation of 
the “imagined community” of the nation on the basis of common media 
consumption of the novel and the press and the construction through this of a 
common space and past (Anderson, 1989), a number of authors have addressed 
the significance of the standardisation of language through printing for the rise 
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of nationalism (Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 1964; Eisenstein, 1979), as well as the 
importance of modern media in the reproduction of national discourses in 
different national contexts (Martin-Barbero, 1988; 1993; Scannell, 1989). 
Despite the globalisation of mediascapes and the possibilities of the expansion 
of imagination beyond the local, as described in the previous section, the 
majority of media institutions and media content remain national in character, 
also assuming a national audience (Hafez, 2007). In this context, the media are 
still part of the banal practices of everyday life that reproduce the nation as a 
discourse and as framework for action (Madianou, 2007; Skey, 2011). In this 
role, more often than not, their representational practices are ethnocentric, 
reflecting national beliefs and stereotypes (Hafez, 2007) and, therefore, 
implicated in the symbolic hierarchies of life addressed in the previous section. 
  
2.1.4 Tensions in the formation of the moral agency 
Given the unevenness of the media as a moral space, due to their ethnocentric 
character, as well as broader technological and symbolic inequalities, the 
viewers’ imagination and formation of judgment are subjugated to the biases 
and complexities this space entails. What I wish to argue here is that this 
complex character of the media space as resources of imagination and judgment 
for the social world is reflected on respective tensions on the formation of the 
moral agency of the viewer with regard to her relationship with the distant 
other. The symbolic hierarchies of life underlining the reporting of suffering 
invite different kinds of audience engagement and allow for different relations 
with the sufferers. In this context, the articulati
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viewer becomes a complex process underlined by similar dynamics and 
tensions as the symbolic space of the media. These tensions concern the 
engagement of the viewers with the scene of suffering (their emotions and 
judgments about the events witnessed), their relationships with the distant 
sufferers (in terms of imagining and committing to their suffering) and their 
attitude towards the media (their trust and judgment about the media as 
adequate resources for understanding the other).  
The three tensions are described here as (a) the tension between emotional 
involvement and rationalised detachment from the scene of suffering, (b) the 
tension between hospitality and apathy towards the distant other, and, finally, 
(c) the tension between audience responsibility and complicity with the media. 
These tensions appear on the juncture between the moral claims made on the 
viewers by the spectacle of suffering, on the one hand, and the distance between 
the viewer and the scene of suffering both geographical – which the process of 
mediation attempts to manage – and cultural and moral – which the unevenness 
of the media space often accentuates – on the other hand. We can understand 
these tensions as dialectics of the positions which the individual discursively 
articulates in relation to reports of distant suffering within the process of the 
mediated construction of their moral agency. 
a. Emotional involvement vs. rationalised detachment 
The first tension in the construction of the viewers’ agency vis-à-vis the 
suffering of others describes their movement between the positions of 
emotional involvement and detachment from the scene of suffering. Emotional 
involvement is defined here as the viewer’s affective immersion in the scene of 
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suffering, which is experienced not through “a bird’s eye view” of people’s 
misery but at a “deeper level”, the “level of the heart”, at which the spectator has 
to “return into himself, go inwards, and allow himself to hear what his heart tells 
him (Boltanski, 1999: 81; emphasis in the original). As such, emotional 
engagement is based on the faculty of the imagination, itself nourished by the 
medium’s audiovisual quality to render the viewer a virtual witness of human 
suffering. Boltanski identifies three positions of the spectator’s emotional 
involvement with the scene of suffering: indignant denunciation towards the 
prosecutors of the suffering (Boltanski, 1999: 57), tender-heartedness and 
sympathy with the unfortunate’s gratitude inspired by the intervention of a 
benefactor (Boltanski, 1999: 76) and horror in the face of the subliminal 
spectacle of suffering (Boltanski, 1999: 115). In her research, Höijer identifies 
two additional forms of audience affective responses, which she names “shame-
filled compassion” and “powerlessness-filled compassion”, the former 
describing the discomfort of watching suffering and the latter the awareness of 
the limitations of the spectator’s possibilities to alleviate the suffering (Höijer, 
2004: 523).  
These last two sentiments, powerlessness and shame, however, can also form 
the basis for the viewer’s rationalised detachment from the scene of suffering 
(Seu, 2003). If the technology of the audiovisual can form imaginative links with 
faraway events, the actual physical distance from them still exists and can form 
the basis of viewers’ disengagement from them. The discomfort of watching 
other people suffer from the comfort of one’s home, accentuated by the inability 
to immediately act upon the suffering, can drive the viewer’s gaze away from 
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the suffering. This disengagement has been conceptualised and widely 
described in the relevant literature as “compassion fatigue” of the audiences 
(Moeller, 1999). However, what often happens, Cohen opposes, is “less 
compassion fatigue than compassion avoidance” (Cohen, 2001: 193). He 
attributes this to a general sociology of “denial and bystanding”, the essence of 
which is the “the active looking away, a sense of a situation so utterly hopeless 
and incomprehensible that we cannot bear to think about it” (Cohen, 2001: 
194).   
Combining emotional involvement with rational reflection, Chouliaraki 
identifies an ideal moral position for the spectator of suffering, which she 
describes as “reflexive identification (Chouliaraki, 2006: 46). This is defined as 
“the capacity of the spectators to, at once, act as if they were within the scene of 
suffering and as if they were speaking out their views on suffering in public” 
(Chouliaraki, 2006: 178). As such, the concept describes the viewers’ 
involvement both in terms of emotional engagement and identification, derived 
from the emotionally compelling nature of the singular suffering, as well as 
impartial deliberation and rational judgment, which impartially reflects of the 
historicity of the event (Chouliaraki, 2006: 179). If the former is necessary to 
attract audience attention, the latter is a precondition for public action. 
Reflexive identification, therefore, describes the moral experience of the self 
both as an emotional agent and a political actor.  
However, reflexive identification is not a generalised form of moral experience 
for the viewer. More often than not, audience members move between the two 
positions of emotional immersion in the scene of suffering and rationalised 
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disengagement. Approaching emotional engagement and rationalised 
detachment as in constant tension in the expression of the viewer as a moral 
agent vis-à-vis the suffering of others allows for the exploration of the 
conditionality of these two positions on different moments of mediation and 
ultimately for addressing the conditions of detachment.  
b. Hospitality vs. apathy 
The second tension pertaining to the construction of the viewer’s moral agency 
concerns the relationship between the viewer and the distant sufferer, as 
emerging within the unevenness of the mediated moral space. This relationship 
moves between the extremes of unconditional hospitality and apathy towards 
the sufferer. Derrida defines hospitality as a necessary moral imperative of the 
relationship with the foreigner (Derrida, 2000), in this case the image of the 
other in the media space. He distinguishes between conditional and 
unconditional hospitality, the former juridical and reciprocal, the latter an 
ethical imperative in itself (Derrida, 2005). Employing these ideas in the context 
of the media, Silverstone places the concept of hospitality in a salient position 
within his theoretical construct of the mediapolis, to refer to the moral 
imperative of openness of the media space to the images and voices of distant 
others, the obligation to welcome the stranger in the symbolic space of the 
media (Silverstone, 2007: 139). Such an obligation is already acknowledged by 
the media, which provide reports and images of the world on a daily basis; 
however, it remains, as it is, conditional on editorial controls and is limited in its 
tendency to marginalise voices in favour of others (Silverstone, 2007: 141). 
Within the context of his broader moral vision, Silverstone argues that it is 
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unconditional hospitality, unconstrained by self-interest and without an 
invitation, which is required in a cosmopolitan society (Silverstone, 2007: 142). 
According to the principle of unconditional hospitality, the viewer is to be open 
and willing to engage with the other, as well as accept the otherwise 
marginalised on their media screens.  
Moving beyond such a normative argument, it is argued here that viewers move 
between hospitality and indifference towards the image of the other. Hospitality 
is defined here as the ability and willingness of the viewer first, to welcome the 
presence of the other on the screen and, second, to understand their 
predicament. Approached in these terms, hospitality is conceptually close to 
Beck’s definition of ‘cosmopolitan empathy’ as the increased capacity and 
willingness to take the perspective of the other, to put oneself into the position 
of the suffering victims (Beck, 2006: 6).  
However, and unlike Silverstone’s moral vision, in empirical terms viewers’ 
hospitality is always conditional. First and foremost, it is conditional on the 
media choices of the events to be reported, and, to a further extent, the way they 
are reported – on the media’s framing role, both in the sense of the media’s 
power to frame the social (Couldry, 2000), and their role in selecting and 
highlighting different facets of events and issues through rhetorical and stylistic 
choices (Capella and Jamieson, 1997; Entman, 2004). Within the uneven media 
space as well as the broader social, cultural and political space, themselves not 
always hospitable to stranger, the viewer is bound to assume different positions 
of hospitality. In a media space characterised by symbolic hierarchies of pity 
(Chouliaraki, 2006: 8), hospitality might be preferentially distributed to 
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different victims around the world. Therefore, the spectator’s engagement with 
the distant other can vary from empathetic identification or compassion (Höijer, 
2004) to the reproduction of cultural stereotypes (Philo, 2002; Philo and Berry, 
2004) to hostility and de-humanisation (Butler, 2004; 2009).  
c. Responsibility vs. Complicity with the Media  
If the media are instrumental in their audiences’ relationship with the outside 
world and the distant other, this is not only because for the majority of the 
viewers they are the only resource for understanding the world beyond the 
local; it is also due to the underlying belief in the media’s ability, if not to 
accurately report the world, at least provide a realistic image of it (Silverstone, 
1994; Couldry, 2000). This trust in the media’s role in reporting the social world 
is an implicit aspect of the viewer’s mediation of agency with regard to distant 
suffering: whether the image of the other on the screen will engage, move and 
motivate the viewer is dependent, among others, on whether the viewer takes 
this image for granted and believes in its representational accuracy. The third 
tension, therefore, in the mediation of the viewer’s agency has to do with the 
question of trust in the media and is described here as the tension between 
complicity with and responsibility towards the media. The dimension this 
tension underlines is the extent to which viewers can critically reflect upon and 
move beyond mainstream media practices and their ideological implications.  
The audience is complicit to media representational failures, according to 
Silverstone, when “failing to challenge media representations and failing to 
reflect on those of its aspects, which, by default, risk betraying the world” 
(Silverstone, 2007: 3). Complicity describes the viewers’ failure to acknowledge 
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that although the media are indeed necessary sources for judgement and 
understanding of the world, they are by no means sufficient. The appeal and the 
risk of accepting them as such is that “complicity provides us with comfort, 
inoculates us against the challenges of the real and against taking responsibility 
for the other” (Silverstone, 2007: 130).  
In similar terms, viewers are in a relation of collusion with the media, when the 
morally compelling nature of the suffering of others is denied by its audience on 
the assumption that “the appearance of the other in crisis on the screen is 
sufficient for us to believe that we are fully engaged with him or her in that 
crisis” (Silverstone, 2007: 131). Collusion, as described by Silverstone, implies 
that the suffering of others becomes part of the habitual and mundane everyday 
routine of media consumption (Tester, 1997: 30), which in its turn can lead to 
denial, in the sense of ignoring the morally compulsive nature of the suffering 
(Cohen, 2001).  
The antipode of this collusive acceptance of media and their representational 
practices is audience suspicion of the reality of the representation or the 
urgency of the suffering, as presented on the screen. Such suspicion can be 
directed towards “the emotions, desires, and intentions which accompany 
representations of suffering” but also towards the very existence of the suffering 
and the unfortunates shown (Boltanski, 1999: 151). This uncertainty, Boltanski 
argues, is intensified by the increase in the quantity of spectacles of suffering 
that viewers are confronted with and which make moral claims on them (ibid.). 
In its turn, this culture of suspicion towards the media can again form the basis 
  
61
of viewers’ denial of the suffering, as a refusal to acknowledge the urgency or 
even the reality of the suffering (Cohen, 2001: 60-61).  
Audience responsibility, in this context, describes the viewer’s willingness and 
ability to move beyond the media text, questioning its representational 
practices and their concealed motivations, while trying to comprehend the 
specificities of the suffering reported. It requires critical engagement and the 
acknowledgement of the inadequacy of mainstream representational cultures to 
reveal the world in its entirety, as well as of the power inequalities of the media 
space, which tends to favour particular kinds of representations and voices 
(Silverstone, 2007: 127). As in the case of audience involvement and hospitality, 
viewers’ critical engagement with the media is approached here as a question of 
degree rather than in absolute terms. Viewers move between complicity and 
collusion, on the one hand, and responsibility as scepticism towards the media, 
on the other hand.  
So far, I have described the media as a space, which through the reporting of the 
distant and the global, enable the generation of discourses about the faraway 
other, nourishing the viewers’ imagination and providing the resources for the 
formulation of judgement. It has been argued that due to the symbolic 
unevenness of the mediated space, where some victims are constructed as more 
worthy of pity than others, the appropriation of the media discursive resources 
by the viewers to understand and engage with the sufferer is characterised by 
three major tensions, which are implicated in the spectators’ involvement with 
the scene of suffering, their relationship with the sufferer and their engagement 
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with the media reports. I will now turn into theorising the viewer as an agent 
moving within the media space, in its unevenness and tensions.  
2.2  The viewer as a moral agent 
The previous section discussed how the media constitute resources for the 
viewer’s engagement with the distant sufferer by nourishing the imagination 
and providing the resources for judgment and understanding. They thus 
mediate the viewer’s moral agency with regard to the suffering of distant others. 
Underlying assumption of this conceptualisation of the viewer as an agent in the 
present thesis is that agency is socially constituted and emerges through social 
interaction (Harré, 1998; Edwards, 1997; Billig, 2009). As such, agency is 
constructed and articulated through discursive practices.  
Discourse is loosely understood here as “all forms of spoken interaction, formal 
and informal, and written texts of all kinds” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 7). 
Discourse is integral in social and cultural practices, as practices are partly 
discursive but they are also themselves discursively represented (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999: 37). As part of social practices, discourse is both 
constitutive of and constituted by the social world; it is ideologically shaped by 
social relations and is built out of pre-existing semiotic resources, while at the 
same time its use is action-oriented, constructing accounts of the social world, 
reproducing or challenging social identities and social order (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Fairclough, 1992).  When people use language in social 
interaction, they construct versions of the social world and their position in it 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  
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In this context, agency is constructed through discursive practices both in terms 
of performance (people use language to present themselves as agents) and 
reflection (people discursively represent what they do as part of what they do) 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Holstein and Gubriun, 2000). This process of 
self-constitution is embedded within specific cultural and historical contexts 
that allow and make meaningful particular kinds of interaction (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2000: 89). In analytical terms, this suggests the study of agency 
through the exploration of discursive practices and discursive interaction, in 
other words the way “people tell stories about themselves and how they present 
themselves in talk” (Wetherell, 2001: 186).  
Under these premises, the moral agency of the viewer is discursively 
constructed within a cultural and social context, of which the media constitute 
an integral part. As has been argued so far, the media provide the discursive 
resources for the relationship of the spectator with the suffering other, thus 
mediating the articulation of the moral agency of the viewer. This agency is not 
only enacted and performed through public action vis-à-vis the suffering, such 
as donations or petitions. It is also expressed through what the viewers say 
about the reports of suffering and the kinds of stories they associate with and 
tell about them. Under this light, the framework of analysing audience agency in 
this thesis suggests an exploration of the viewers’ agency in terms of how they 
talk about distant suffering. In specific it suggests a focus on what people say 
about their experience of watching suffering (media witnessing), and the way 
the construct their memories of these media stories (media remembering).   
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Approaching the viewer as an agent assumes his or her conceptualisation as a 
participant in the mediation process and the mediated global space and a focus 
on audience practices with regard to media texts. The following sections will 
illustrate this conceptualisation simultaneously contextualising it within 
broader approaches to audience theorisation and research.  
2.2.1 Moral agency in late modernity 
Approaching the viewer as a “discourse-user” (Burr, 1995: 90) draws attention 
to the discursive practices through which social actors reproduce and 
reorganise established discourses. At the same time, however, it poses 
questions about the conditions and constraints allowing for, defining and also 
limiting these practices. As Phillips and Jorgensen argue, people are 
“fundamentally socially shaped, and the possibilities we have for reshaping the 
structures are set by earlier structures” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 38).  
Sociological theories of practice (Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1979; 1984) have 
argued that human actors are in a relation of creative appropriation to the social 
world, while at the same time embedded and constrained within temporal and 
social contexts. Bourdieu employs the concept of habitus to describe the 
disposition a person has towards acting and feeling in specific ways, which is 
developed over time through the internalisation of relationships and social 
expectations, themselves embedded in the place one has in the social structure 
(Bourdieu, 1984; 1990). Agency is, therefore, guided to a great degree through 
common sense knowledge, “the field of doxa” (Bourdieu and Nice, 2006: 166) or 
“practical sense”, which grants “a central role to the notion of habit, understood 
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as an active and creative relation to the world” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
122).  
Similarly, in his “stratification model” of agency, Giddens negates the opposition 
between agency and structure and approaches the two as mutually constitutive 
(Giddens, 1984). In his theory of structuration, agency is constituted through 
the use of knowledge and resources, themselves embedded within structural 
contexts; at the same time, agency is transformative of the structures within 
which it is embedded by making use of structurally formed knowledge in a 
creative way. His approach to the constitution of agency treats “the reflexive 
monitoring, rationalisation and motivation of action as embedded sets of 
processes” (Giddens, 1984: 3). Reflexivity is central concept in the formation of 
agency, as “the continuous monitoring of action which human beings display 
and expect others to display” (Giddens, 1984: 3). This monitoring takes place 
against the background of “tacitly employed mutual knowledge” (Giddens, 
1979: 58). This describes agency not only as embedded in structures, 
temporally and spatially, but also as inherently social and collective.  
Reflexivity has been a central concept in the way the constitution of the self has 
been addressed in the sociology of late modernity. (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 
Giddens and Lash, 1994; Thompson, 1995). One of the implications of 
modernity is the emergence of new ways of arranging and conducting social life, 
disembedded from traditional models (Beck, 1994: 14). These are characterised 
by the centrality of the individual agent in the conduct of social life. In the 
context of reflexive modernity, characterised by the collapse of traditional roles, 
continuous doubt of established expertise and proliferation of life-style choices, 
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the self, too, has to be reflexively made through a process of active intervention 
and transformation (Giddens, 1991: 3-5). “What to do? How to act? Who to be?”. 
According to Giddens, “these are focal questions for everyone living in 
circumstances of late modernity” (Giddens, 1991: 70), since they are no longer 
to be answered by an established social authority.  
Questions of moral nature in this context become part of the self-reflective 
construction of the self. In his pessimistic account of American life, Lasch argues 
that excessive consumerism has eroded the moral basis of American society and 
has created a self-absorbed and narcissistic culture, where self-improvement, as 
an instrumental ethic of pleasure and hedonism, finds itself at the core of social 
life (Lasch, 1980). This infatuation with the self has resulted in insensitivity 
towards and exclusion of others, to the degree that “even the most intimate 
encounters become a form of mutual exploitation” (Lasch, 1980: 65).  
In line with his broader theory of power and discourse, Foucault approaches 
morality as a form of subjection of social agents to institutional discourses 
(Foucault, 1997). He distinguishes between morality and ethics. The former 
describes the set of values and rules of action proposed to individuals by social 
institutions, especially through family socialisation and pedagogy, as a form of 
social control. The latter describes how the individual is to constitute herself as 
a moral subject of her own actions (Foucault, 1997: 263). Ethics, therefore, 
implies styling one’s own existence through self-disciplining and self-fashioning 
(O’Leary, 2002: 4). For Foucault, “morality as obedience to a code of rules” is 
disappearing in late modernity; what corresponds to this “absence of morality” 
is “the search for an aesthetics of existence” (Foucault, in O’Leary, 2002: 1).  
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Contrary to Foucault, and the widely held assumption that there is no space for 
morality in modern liberal democracies due to individualism and public 
indifference, Sznaider argues that morality is central in the constitution of 
modern societies (Sznaider, 2001). For Sznaider, public compassion, as a 
“concern with the suffering of others, accompanied by the urge to help” is “part 
of the cultural system of modernity” (Sznaider, 2001: 119). This is the outcome 
of two parallel processes, integral of the modern era, namely democratisation 
and marketization (Sznaider, 2001: 21). If the former has given rise to the idea 
of civic equality by supporting the belief that others are similar to us, 
marketization and the expansion of capitalism have defined a universal field of 
others with whom contracts and exchanges can be made, thus extending the 
sphere of moral concern (Sznaider, 2001: 11). Sznaider equates the expression 
of compassion in liberal societies with modern humanitarianism, as a form of 
“universal benevolence” (Sznaider, 2001: 117).  
 What all approaches to the relationship between morality and modernity 
highlight is the diversification of choice and lack of clear-cut social roles and 
imperatives. However, this does not imply the alleviation of issues of morality 
from the horizons of social life; rather it implies their reallocation on individual 
responsibility (Bauman, 1993) and embeddedness in the self-reflective project 
of the construction of the individual (Giddens, 1991). The moral environment 
within which the self-construction takes place is also layered with options, 
sometimes compatible but often incommensurable (Holstein and Gubrium, 
2000: 229). Although this seems to complicate the construction of the moral 
self, it does not imply that issues of morality have been displaced from social 
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experience, but it highlights the centrality of individual agency and 
responsibility. At the same time, the freedom of individual agency is not to be 
overstated; as already discussed above, agency is as socially constitutive as it is 
socially constituted. It is in relation of appropriation to the social world and 
(re)produces it through habitual practices and application of common sense 
knowledge. The moral agency of the viewer, therefore, in relation to media 
images of distant suffering is to be addressed as the active engagement of the 
viewer, which “through the interplay of habit, imagination and judgement” 
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 970), both reproduces and transforms these 
images and stories by incorporating them within – and thus also transforming – 
everyday experience.  
2.2.2 Conceptualising the audience 
The idea of the agency of the audience has been traditionally linked within 
media studies with the concept of the active audience. Taking as a point of 
departure Stuart Hall’s text on the “encoding/decoding” model, which argued 
that media texts can be read through different textual decodings or 
interpretations by different readers (Hall, [1973]1980), audience studies and, 
most dominantly, the reception paradigm have pointed out the ways that the 
interpretation of media messages is contingent on “cultural differences 
embedded within the structure of society” (Morley, 1992: 118), reflecting 
viewers’ “differential involvement and positioning in discourse formation” 
(Morley, 1980: 142). David Morley has thus theorised how the viewer’s ability 
to creatively make use of the media as resources is dependent on a set of other 
resources that are socially constituted and often defined by power relations and 
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institutions within society. As he observes, “the selection and manipulation of 
‘available’ symbolic material, and what is available to which groups is a question 
of the socially structured distribution of differential cultural options and 
competencies” (Morley, 1992: 95).  
Along similar lines, Livingstone, taking as a point of departure studies of social 
psychology, engages with the concept of the active viewer, describing her as the 
person who relates media stories to her own life, critiques conventions of media 
genres and employes her own knowledge to interpret and make sense of media 
narratives (Livingstone, 1998). In this context, the viewer is theorised “not only 
as a resource of knowledge nor simply as a representative of a particular 
demographic category, but also as a social actor in an interpersonal context” 
(Livingstone, 1998: 107). Although, however, the viewer as an agent in relation 
to the media cannot be completely passive, she can neither be utterly wilful, as 
“the activities of actual audiences lie somewhere in between these poles, and 
reflect the demands of the text as well as the orientation of the reader” 
(Livingstone, 1998: 174). This approach highlights the mutually constitutive 
relationship between the reader or audience member and the media text.  
Often, however, audience agency in relation to the media has taken the form of 
celebratory accounts of the semiotic powers of the audience. This approach, 
most notably advocated in John Fiske’s argument on “semiotic democracy” 
(Fiske, 1987), has been criticised for neglecting and obscuring power relations 
among social groups or indeed the ideological power of media as institutional 
discourses (Livingstone, 1998: 195). In this context, the claim of the active 
audience has been described by political economists of the media as “pointless 
  
70
populism” (Seaman, 1992: 308) or even “another version of the market system’s 
own claim that the ultimate power lies with the consumer” (Murdock, 1989: 
229). Although valid for a number of studies, this criticism does not do justice to 
the totality of reception research, since the interpretative power of viewers has 
hardly been presented as equivalent to the symbolic and institutional power of 
the media to construct the texts that viewers interpret (Morley, 1992: 31).  
Following a sociological approach, Couldry addresses audience agency in 
relation to media power through the concept of “media rituals”, which describes 
formalised actions organised around key media-related categories or patterns 
(Couldry, 2000; 2002). Through participation in these media-related rituals, 
audiences ultimately reproduce media power and, in particular, “the myth of the 
mediated centre”, namely the belief that there is a social centre in the real world 
and the media speaks for it (Couldry, 2002). Characteristic of these media 
practices, as implied by the term “ritualised” is their habitual character. 
Following Bourdieu, Couldry emphasises the social and political character of 
habitual practice. Individuals as agents are moving within “the ritual space of 
media” through patterns of everyday practices such as categorisation (Couldry, 
2002: 13). This is not to say that viewers are utterly passive regarding the 
media; rather what is highlighted is the pervasive impact of media’s symbolic 
power, as it affects not only audience practices but also their “ability to describe 
the social itself” (Couldry, 2002: 39; emphasis in the original).  
By adopting a focus on the audience, the present study attempts to explore 
media power, understood as the symbolic power of the media to “construct 
reality” (Couldry, 2000: 4), by studying the way media discourses are 
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(re)produced by audiences and are implicated in their understandings of the 
world. The construction of audience members as moral agents is conditional to 
institutional discourses and structural constraints, as well as media texts. The 
forms of this conditionality are of interest here. Thinking about the process of 
mediation as constituted at the intersection of these institutional and social 
discourses points to a second limitation of reception research, namely, the 
limited focus on the close relationship between media text and its audience.  
Mediation as approached by reception theorists and researchers hardly goes 
beyond the moment of “reading” of media texts. In this context, audiences are 
seen as active participants in the mediation process in so far as they make 
different “readings” or interpretations of the media content. Two relevant 
challenges have been put forward in relation to this: first, the close moment of 
reading does little to illuminate the broader role of the media in people’s lives. 
Second, in an environment of the proliferation of media technologies and forms, 
where is the place of the audience? How is the latter to be conceived and 
empirically explored?  
Articulating this second challenge, Ang has argued that “the world of actual 
audience is too polysemic and polymorphic to be completely articulated in a 
closed discursive structure” (Ang, 1990: 14). In a self-reflective turn, 
researchers have acknowledged the concept of the audience as a discursive 
formation intrinsically intertwined with relevant theoretical assumptions (Ang, 
1990; 1996; Allor, 1996; Bennett, 1996; Allasuutari, 1999; Schrøeder et al., 
2003).  
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As far as the first challenge of the limited scope and media-centrism of the 
reception paradigm is concerned, theory and research have attempted to 
contextualise audience experience within the framework of everyday life, 
reformulating and reconceptualising the relationship among technologies, texts 
and receivers (Silverstone, 1994; Bird, 2003). This acknowledgement has given 
rise to significant ethnographic work seeking “to understand audiences in the 
larger social, political and cultural formations in which they develop” (Gillespie, 
2005: 152).  
This ethnographic turn has also become apparent in the literature and research 
on news audiences and their engagement with public affairs (Bird, 2010). 
Although earlier research focused on the function of news as information and 
audience practices of learning and remembering (see, for example, Jensen, 
1986; Graber, 1990), more recent studies have focused on the different ways 
news as a media form is incorporated into practices of everyday life (Bird, 2010; 
Madianou, 2008; 2010). This work has highlighted the fact that news are not 
being consumed by audiences as purely informational texts but also as a form of 
keeping up with the world (Couldry et al., 2007) or even as an attempt to make 
citizen voices heard in the public domain (Madianou, 2010). It has thus 
challenged traditionally held dichotomies “upon which the normative 
assumptions for the news audience are based, that is between public and 
private, rational and affective, disinterested and interested” (Madianou, 2005b: 
99).  
At the same time, a number of recent studies have disconnected the idea of the 
engaged citizen from the viewer of traditional news media and described the 
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creative, self-actualising ways civic engagement can be expressed through the 
media, and especially new media (Jenkins, 2006; Jones, 2006; Hartley, 2010; van 
Zoonen et al., 2010). These studies have also marked a reconceptualisation of 
the relationship between news, audiences and civic engagement. They have 
questioned the traditional opposition between audiences and publics, where the 
former are seen as passive consumers of media texts, and the latter express an 
orientation to collective action (Livingstone, 2005: 17). As audiences actively 
engage with the media and appropriate their messages in their everyday life, 
and publics are increasingly formed on the basis of audience exposure to issues 
reported in the media (Dayan, 2005: 57), the distinction between audiences and 
publics is harder to draw. In this context, the factors and forces that precede 
public engagement are equally important and the public includes a broad 
variety of experiences and forms of engagement that are both action and non-
action oriented (Jones, 2006).  
There are two points emerging from this critical discussion of traditional 
reception research that are of particular significance here. First is the limitation 
of the question addressed by early reception research, namely “how do 
audiences interpret particular texts”? This question is even more limited when 
considered with regard to media texts of distant suffering. The significance of 
audience response to images of human pain goes well beyond the question of 
mere “interpretation”: it is a question of moral significance, as argued before, as 
the experience of suffering, albeit virtual and mediated, bears moral claims on 
the viewer. It is this specificity of the audience experience of images of suffering 
that the traditional reception studies questions fail to capture.  
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Second, following recent approaches to news audiences and their engagement 
with public affairs, the questions on audience engagement with distant suffering 
in the present study move beyond the dichotomy between audience and public 
and the transition of the former to the latter through public action but rather 
aim to explore the range of ways, affective and rational, engaged and detached, 
audiences relate to the suffering of distant others. If theoretical arguments on 
the audience of suffering have so far questioned the possibility of a 
(cosmopolitan) public on the basis of action at a distance (Chouliaraki, 2006), 
the present study is also interested in the “context-dependent yet under-
determined, plural and hybrid…practices and relationships that must and do 
shape people’s engagement with others, in private and in public” (Livingstone, 
2005: 31). It is suggested here that these questions can be better addressed by 
adopting the concept of media practice (Couldry, 2004; 2006) and through a 
conceptualisation of mediation in terms of audience practices.  
2.2.3 From audience reception to audience practices 
Turning the focus from reception to practice expands the question of reception 
studies of how audiences interpret media texts to address what the audiences 
do with this interpretation and how the latter becomes meaningful and 
appropriated in the context of everyday discourses. The adoption of the concept 
of practice here aims at illustrating what viewers do and say with regard to the 
suffering of faraway others, in other words the ways their moral agency is 
mediated through reports of distant suffering.  
Drawing upon sociological theories of practice (Schatzki, 1999; Swidler, 2001; 
Reckwitz, 2002), as well as the concept of mediation, Couldry argues for a new 
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paradigm within the field of media and communications, which will adopt as a 
starting theoretical point media-oriented practice “in all its looseness and 
openness” (Couldry, 2004: 119). By asking the simple question of what people 
are “doing in relation to media across a range of situations and contexts” 
(Couldry, 2004: 119), Couldry suggests that this approach could broaden our 
understanding of contemporary media culture as a whole. There are three 
important contributions of the incorporation of the concept of “practice” in 
media theory: first, it allows for the study of “media culture” in terms of specific 
practices and discourses, an interest concretised in specific questions (“what 
types of things do people do in relation to the media? And what types of things 
do people say in relation to media?”) (Couldry, 2004: 121); by keeping the 
definition of “practice” open and flexible it places audiences as actors in a media 
saturated world, where their experience of audiencing is not a discrete activity 
but is intertwined with other everyday practices (Couldry, 2006: 39); finally, 
practice theory does not neglect issues of power: if practices organise 
themselves through anchoring and categorisation, then the question of “how 
and for whom this anchoring works and with what consequences” does not fall 
out of the agenda (Couldry, 2004: 122).  
Overall, addressing questions of media and mediation in terms of “practice” 
allows us to explore “how media are embedded in the interlocking fabric of 
social and cultural life” (Couldry, 2004: 129). Expanding the theoretical and 
empirical questions concerning audiences from media reception to media 
practices highlights the character of mediation as “not just a matter of what 
appears on the screen, but…actually constituted in the practices of those who 
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produce the sounds and images, the narratives and spectacles, as well as 
crucially, those who receive them” (Silverstone, 2007: 42; emphasis added).    
The concept of practice, therefore, alludes to a conceptualization of audiences as 
participants in the mediated public space. Thinking about what audiences do 
with and in relation to the media raises questions about audience agency and its 
conditionality on media texts as resources. It is in this context that the concept 
of practice is a useful analytical tool for thinking about how audiences 
experience themselves as moral and emotional agents in relation to media 
stories of suffering and trauma. Furthermore, the concept of “audiencing” is 
useful in illustrating this aspect of audience experience as practice – rather than 
as mere interpretation or “reading” of media texts. It is through the practice of 
audiencing that the moral self is mediated in the context of the global mediated 
public space.  
2.2.4 Audiencing and the articulation of moral agency 
The concept of audiencing is used here first to illustrate the character of 
audience experience as practice and of audience members as agents, and, 
second, to argue that this modality of experience is not a distinct activity but is 
intrinsically embedded in the practices of the everyday (Abercrombie and 
Londhurst, 1998: 40) and therefore constitutive of the experience of the self. 
Abercrombie and Longhurst argue that “being a member of an audience is no 
longer an exceptional event, nor even an everyday event. Rather is constitutive 
of everyday life” (ibid.: 68-69).  
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The authors propose a new paradigm for thinking about audiences, which they 
name the “Spectacle/Performance” paradigm. This is to replace the 
“Incorporation/Resistance” paradigm, as they name the bulk of work 
originating and influenced by the encoding/decoding model, emphasising the 
focus of previous audience research on the question of whether audiences 
incorporate or resist to the ideological messages of media texts (Abercrombie 
and Longhurst, 1998: 15). Characteristic of this new paradigm is a redefinition 
of “what an audience is and what it does” (ibid., 1998: 39). This novel approach 
defines audiences as “diffused”. This modality of audience experience does not 
supersede previous ones, such as the direct or mass media audience but rather 
coexists with them, offering new ways of looking into the concept of the 
audience (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 39). The main characteristic of 
this kind of audience experience is that “everyone becomes an audience all the 
time” (ibid: 68). The diffused audience encapsulates the idea that the media are 
everywhere and therefore the audience is also everywhere. What this new kind 
of audience does is perform (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 40). 
In a similar vein but in an argument that addresses more extensively questions 
of power resulting from the ubiquity of the media, Couldry suggests the concept 
of the “extended audience”, which “requires us to examine the whole spectrum 
of talk, action and thought that draws on media, or is oriented towards media” 
in a way that “can broaden our understanding of the relationship between 
media and media audiences as part of our understanding of contemporary 
media culture (Couldry, 2005: 196).  
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Such an approach to the audience and its experience is salient in this study for 
moving beyond definitions of viewers as “addressed” by the media texts and 
forms and their close readings of them to point to the broader implications of 
audience experience in a mediated world. It also highlights the audience as 
participants and agents in a mediated public space. The experience of being a 
member of an audience, of audiencing, is not ontologically different from other 
daily practices and is therefore implicated and embedded within the fabric of 
the everyday. As such, it is implicated in the experience of the self and the 
constitution of the moral and emotional agency of the audience.  
2.3  Moral agency and public action 
With regard to distant suffering, the moral agency of the audience has been 
more conspicuously questioned in terms of the actions of the viewers in 
response to media reports of crises and human pain. “In effect”, as Boltanski 
argues, “when confronted with suffering all moral demands converge on the 
single imperative of action” (Boltanski, 1999: xv). Two main kinds of such action 
at a distance are commonly observed, namely “paying and speaking” (Boltanski, 
1999: 17; Chouliaraki, 2006: 201).  
Paying, as money contributions in the relief efforts for the alleviation of the 
suffering is the most common – and often desirable, as far as humanitarian 
organisations are concerned – form of action at a distance (Tester, 2001: 123). 
The effectiveness of payment as a form of action, however, is dependent upon 
the existence of intermediary institutions that will both receive the donations 
and forward them to the unfortunates, as well as the appropriate use of the 
funds by such institutions (Boltanski, 1999: 17). As a form of action, paying has 
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the advantages of being easier to be seen as action and therefore making the 
spectator’s investment easier to calculate (Boltanski, 1999: 18). On the other 
hand, money donations can be critically interpreted as an impersonal and easy 
way of spectators’ ridding themselves of the guilt of watching other people’s 
suffering, obscuring the lack of a real emotional link between viewer and 
sufferer, as well as the specificities and the singularity of the particular situation 
(Boltanski, 1999: 18; Tester, 2001: 130).  
Speaking, on the other hand, in order to become effective in terms of reducing 
the suffering of the unfortunates has to take the form of public opinion engaging 
with political institutions (Boltanski, 1999: 18). This kind of effective speech 
assumes the element of publicness, in the sense that the spectators intent their 
speaking to be heard from others (Boltanski, 1999: 186; Chouliaraki, 2006: 45). 
It also presupposes a “reflexive ability” of the viewers to consider themselves as 
speakers (Boltanski, 1999: 40, Chouliaraki, 2006: 45). Examples of this kind of 
effective speech as a form of action at a distance are protests, demonstrations or 
the signing of petitions. Through these public expressions of political speech 
suffering is rendered an issue of public concern and a moral cause for the 
spectators. Speaking, however, as the public expression of moral indignation is 
often seen as a “safe, cheap and uncomplicated” form of public action (Cohen, 
2001: 19).  
Paul Frosh argues against the emphasis of the relevant literature on ostensible 
action as a measure for the moral impact of the media. He argues that 
approaches to the mediation of moral care have so far been largely limited by an 
“attentive fallacy”, namely “the automatic assumption that moral sensibility has 
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a necessary basis in audience attentiveness, intimacy and involvement” (Frosh, 
2011: 385; emphasis in the original). There is, however, an underlying moral 
dimension in television as a medium of connectivity that is neglected by this 
fault assumption, which is its function as the basis for a form of union and 
communion among distant others and an expression of human sociability 
(ibid.). Frosh uses the term “phatic morality” to describe the moral ground 
cultivated by television through “the long term, habitual, ambient forms of 
mediated connectivity rather than the attentive engagement of viewers with 
particular texts” (Frosh, 2011: 383).  
In this context, the moral agency of the viewer is constructed through the 
habitual familiarisation with the image of the other, “cumulatively across many 
particular news stories and programmes, in a background framework of 
televisual non-receprocity, civil inattention and the generalisation of 
individuals”, which ultimately “produces a serial aggregate of the human figure 
as a shared ‘condition’” (Frosh, 2011: 392). In this account the viewer of distant 
suffering is not the “engaged spectator” but rather the “diffused audience” 
(Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998), whose moral agency is not tied to 
particular stories but grounded in the social connectivity produced by the media 
on a constant basis as part of the experience of everyday life (Frosh, 2011: 386). 
This discussion is useful in moving beyond the conceptualisation of the moral 
agency of the viewer as expressed through actions (of giving and speaking) 
directed to specific causes and in relation to specific events. It is also significant 
in highlighting that mediation as a low-intensity kind of connectivity with 
distant others is morally significant in naturalising the presence of distant 
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others and maintaining a collective civic mood, which constitute the 
prerequisite background for the performance of moral action at a distance.  
If the viewer’s moral agency can be measured in terms of responsiveness to the 
media stories of suffering as “paying” or “speaking”, the failure to respond in 
these ways has been theorised, as discussed earlier, as an indication of 
“compassion fatigue” (Moeller, 1999) or “moral apathy” (Seu, 2010). Drawing 
upon the premise of agency as discursively constructed, the present thesis 
suggests an analytical framework, which focuses on the ways viewers illustrate 
their own moral agency through their talk about mediated suffering, namely 
their descriptions about their experience of watching suffering (media 
witnessing) and the ways they construct stories of suffering witnessed through 
the media (media remembering). This focus illustrates the different 
articulations of agency rendered possible through processes of mediation, thus 
addressing the grey area of the link between watching suffering and acting upon 
it, neglecting or forgetting it.  
In this context, media witnessing refers here to the ways people describe 
themselves as virtual witnesses of distant suffering through the media, with the 
emotional and moral implications this might imply, thus encapsulating the 
specificities of the experience of watching human pain. In talking about the 
media stories of human pain, audiences also give accounts of their media 
memories of the events. Through the practice of media remembering, audiences 
reconstruct narratives of the events, and through that their sense of agency in 
relation to them. What is being explored through the study of media witnessing 
and media remembering goes beyond the different ways audiences interpret 
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specific news of human vulnerability; it illustrates how discourses of distant 
suffering are constructed and embedded within the context of the everyday. The 
theoretical premises for the exploration of these two audience practices will be 
the subject of the rest of the chapter.  
2.4 Media Witnessing 
Media witnessing is employed here to refer to the distinct modality of audience 
experience – or audiencing –, which is particularly tied to media reports and 
images of distant suffering (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009b). Two are the 
dominant characteristics of this experience: first, its affective nature, due to its 
close relation to human vulnerability, pain and trauma; second, its cultural 
endowment with a sense of responsibility to interfere with and act upon the 
suffering witnessed. As such, media witnessing as audience practice is central to 
the construction of the viewer as a moral and emotional agent.  
The specificities of media witnessing need to be viewed in relation to the 
context of the globalised media environment as discussed above. Sontag defines 
witnessing as “being a spectator of calamities taking place in another country” 
through the “cumulative offering by more than a century and half’s worth of 
those specialised tourists known as journalists” (Sontag, 2003: 18). Electronic 
media have expanded people’s perception way beyond their immediate 
experience by confronting them with events, peoples, and places otherwise 
distant and foreign (Ellis, 2000: 1). The infiltration of everyday life with this 
kind of distant representations has reformed people’s perception of the world 
by placing them in the position of witnesses. Although, according to Ellis, 
witnessing has evolved throughout the twentieth century through the different 
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electronic media, it is in television that the specific modality of experience is 
notably exemplified (Ellis, 2000: 10). The overabundance of detail found in the 
audiovisual, the details of the image and the “atmosphere” of the sound instigate 
“a pervasive sense of liveness and intimacy” (Ellis, 2000: 12). It is this mediated 
sense of intimacy that forms the basis of the emotional implications of 
witnessing. Watching suffering, seeing people in pain, even if only on the screen, 
is emotionally compelling due to the knowledge that this suffering is real, is 
actually happening, a sense enhanced by the “real-effect” of the audiovisual.  
If the audiovisual mediation of suffering forms the basis for the emotional 
character of witnessing, its liveness, the fact that it takes place simultaneously 
to the act of viewing, is what renders media witnessing morally compelling. 
Simultaneous suffering poses questions about what can be done to alleviate it, 
urging its viewers to take a moral stance vis-à-vis what they see on the screen 
and act in the present (Peters, 2001: 721).  
Media witnessing is employed in the context of the present study as an 
analytical concept to explore the ways audiences position and experience 
themselves as moral agents in relation to mediated suffering, which confronts 
them on their media screens, implicitly and explicitly making claims to their 
emotional, moral and charitable sensibilities. Media witnessing in this sense is a 
second or event third-order kind of witnessing. Journalists, by being there, are 
the actual witnesses the testimony of whom the audiences come to receive; 
journalists can also be themselves receivers of the witnessing testimony of the 
actual victims, the primary witnesses of the disaster and trauma. The witnessing 
of the audience in this chain of events is restricted to attending to the 
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testimonies of the journalists, their witnessing texts. Although the focus here is 
on the audiences as witnesses, the complex relationship between primary and 
secondary witnessing in not to be dismissed or ignored but is implicated in the 
complexity of media witnessing as an analytical category.  
Witnessing is by definition a semantically challenging concept. It can refer to an 
actor (who bears witness), an act (bearing witness), a statement or text 
(witnessing testimony) or the “inward experience that authorises the statement 
(the witnessing of an event)” (Peters, 2001: 709). In this sense, as Peters puts it, 
it is intelligible to claim that “the witness (speech-act) of the witness (person) 
was witnessed (by an audience)” (Peters, 2001: 709). Approaching audiences as 
witnesses involves tensions and complexities that go beyond the concept of 
“viewers” or “spectators”. Media witnessing collapses three different practices: 
audiences become witnesses themselves, vicariously experiencing events that 
happen elsewhere; they become witnesses of the witnessing victims, the people 
that give testimony of their suffering on the screen; and, finally, they are 
witnesses of the witnessing texts, those of the journalists that bear witness to 
the events taking place. Media witnessing thus conflates but also presupposes 
this three-fold distinction, highlighted by Frosh and Pinchevski: “between 
witnesses in the media, witnessing by the media, and witnessing through the 
media” (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009b: 1). Far from being a mere semantic game, 
this distinction is central to the complexity and weight of the concept of media 
witnessing and analytically useful for the exploration of how audiences 
experience the world through the position of a witness.  
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Becoming themselves witnesses through the media, viewers become confronted 
with a kind of “painful knowledge”, since it is accompanied by “an aching sense 
that something must be done” for the alleviation of the suffering witnessed 
(Ellis, 2000: 11). Knowing about the pain of others implies, in cultural and social 
terms, complicity in their suffering and the moral obligation to act for its 
alleviation. Witnessing, thus, goes beyond the act of “seeing” or “watching”; it 
implies a kind of participation, albeit vicarious and fleeting, to the events 
presented on the screen (Rentschler, 2004: 298; Peters, 2001: 708). At the same 
time, as discussed earlier, the geographical distance separating the viewer from 
the unfortunates undermines the moral impulse to act upon the suffering.  The 
combination of the sense of involvement in the events that knowledge of them 
provides with the sense of powerlessness that distance perpetuates finds itself 
at the heart of media witnessing. It is also underlined by the tension between 
emotional engagement and rationalised detachment, as discussed in section 
2.1.3. (a). Exploring the experience of witnessing through the media, therefore, 
poses the question of how viewers position themselves vis-à-vis images of 
distant suffering and pain, compelling in their sensational visibility but remote 
in their mediated representation.  
As witnesses of the witnesses in the media, viewers make imaginative 
connections with the distant victims whose suffering they watch on their 
screens. For Ellis this kind of imaginative connections seems to reside in the 
management of distance through the audiovisual illusions of “thereness” and 
“liveness” (Ellis, 2001: 1). Silverstone rightfully reminds us that mediated 
distance is a manageable category dependent on the media representational 
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practices, which “continually swings between incorporation (that is denial of 
both difference and distance) or annihilation (that is denial of both common 
humanity and distance)” (Silverstone, 2002: 770)9. Audiences are on a daily 
basis confronted with distant events that are either framed into recognisable 
and familiar patters thus denied of their specificity and “otherness” or deprived 
of an explanatory framework and therefore exaggerated in their difference and 
stereotyped as incomprehensible and foreign (Silverstone, 2007: 48). In this 
context, distance also becomes a moral category, defining the limits and ways of 
the viewer’s relationship with the distant other. As such it is also implicated in 
the tension between hospitality and indifference, which underlines the 
mediation of distant suffering, as suggested in section 2.1.3.(b). There is a 
degree of required proximity for the nourishment of the imagination that will 
allow the adoption of the position of the other in a relationship of hospitality 
and commitment (Dayan, 2007: 117).  
Finally, the relationship of viewers as witnesses to witnessing by the media 
pertains to the tension between viewers’ complicity with and responsibility 
towards the media, as presented in section 2.1.3.(c). Witnessing as a practice 
entails the transformation of experience to discourse, of private sensation to 
public words, and as such, Peters argues, is vulnerable to the inescapable losses 
of such a process and marked by an inherent “veracity gap” (Peters, 2001: 711). 
The veracity gap becomes even more prominent in the case of broadcasting, 
where distance accentuates the distrust and doubt in the mediation of 
                                                        
9 In line with his broader normative vision, Silverstone uses the concept of “proper distance” to 
signify the “more or less precise degree of proximity required in our mediated inter-
relationships” (Silverstone, 2007: 47), which sustains both difference with the other and 
recognizes common humanity (Silverstone, 2003).  
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experience among people who have no physical proximity or first-hand 
knowledge of it. This observation points to the complexities of the relationship 
of the audiences with the “witnessing texts”, posing questions of attributed 
authenticity and trust, central to the nature of media witnessing as a “cultural 
achievement” (Frosh, 2006: 270). Such questions are always entangled with the 
viewer’s experience, not necessarily as readily formulated ontological 
arguments of disbelief (Did this really happen?) but as complexities in the 
relationship with the media text itself (Is the image representative of everything 
that happened? What is left out?). They are ultimately questions addressing the 
evaluative assumptions about the media that underline viewers’ positioning 
towards the suffering witnessed and their trust in media representational 
practices and intentions.  
Media witnessing as an analytical category, therefore, allows for the illustration 
of the viewer’s moral positioning vis-à-vis the suffering of faraway people 
through the tensions of mediation discussed earlier. It illustrates the ways the 
viewing experience of real life suffering is both aesthetically and emotionally 
different from any other media experience. Discussing their experience as 
witnesses of incidents of faraway suffering, viewers simultaneously construct 
their memories of them, formulating judgments and constructing 
categorizations. This practice of the viewers’ narration of past media reports of 
distant suffering, named media remembering, will be explored in the next 
section.  
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2.5  Media Remembering 
Media remembering is defined here as the discursive reconstruction of viewers’ 
memories of the events witnessed through the media. The focus on the 
discursive emphasizes the practice of remembering as much more than a mere 
reproduction of the stories of suffering as witnessed through the media. As a 
reconstruction of media reports of human pain, media remembering illustrates 
the process of turning memories of distant suffering into stories through 
discourse. What is mostly interesting in these stories is not what is remembered 
but rather how they are put together, which throws light into the social 
discourses and resources people employ into reconstructing their memories, as 
well as the cultural and moral meanings they endow them with. In this 
conceptualization of remembering, the thesis draws upon the work of Maurice 
Halbwachs on “collective memory” (Halbwachs, 1992), as well as discursive 
psychology (Middleton and Edwards, 1990; Edwards and Potter, 1992).  
Halbwachs’s concept of collective memory highlights the mutually dependent 
relationship between individuals and society and argues that it is through this 
interactive relationship that people come to construct their memories as social 
members. The individual mind, Halbwachs argues, is only capable of the art of 
recollection, when it places itself within social frameworks of memory 
(Halbwachs, 1992: 38). As these collective frameworks people draw upon to 
reconstruct an image of the past reflect the predominant thoughts of society, 
when people remember, they do not retrieve the past from memory but they 
actively reconstruct it on the basis of the present (Halbawchs, 1992: 40). In 
other words, the way people remember past events reflects the way they think 
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about the present as members of a social group. Collective memory as “a set of 
ideas, images, feelings about the past…is best located not in the minds of 
individuals, but in the resources they share” (Irwing-Zarecka, 1994:4).  
This socially constructed nature of memory is also emphasized in the work of 
discursive social psychology, which describes remembering as a process of 
diffusion of discourses, personal and collective, past and present, “in a single 
task through which we construct a discourse that allows us to objectify our 
experience” (Achugar, 2008: 7). The approach of discursive psychology to the 
construction of memory emphasizes especially the dependence of the practice 
of remembering on the particular communicative circumstances in which it 
occurs (Middleton and Edwards, 1990: 11). According to this account, 
remembering as formulated through ways of talking is both constructive and 
action-oriented; constructive, because it provides a particular version of events, 
and action-oriented because this version of events aims at doing something, for 
example arguing, justifying or countering (Edwards and Stokoe, 2004: 2, 
emphasis in the original). Remembering as a social practice is based on 
elaborations, rearrangements and even omissions. In this context, remembering 
and forgetting are both aspects of the same practice of memory construction; 
they are flexible practices and occasioned by the interaction of the 
communicative context in which they take place (Middleton, 1997).  
Under this light, media remembering becomes a practice not only of recollection 
but also of passing judgment about the events remembered. It is a reflexive 
articulation of the past intertwined with personal reaction (Edwards and Potter, 
1992). As such, remembering as the re-telling of moments of media witnessing 
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is filtered through the moral and affective evaluation people associate with that 
experience. Memories thus become “not only the simple act of recall but social, 
cultural, and political action at its broadest level” (Zelizer, 1998: 3). Through the 
articulation of their memories people construct versions of the events, as well as 
position themselves in relation to the social world and others.  
At the same time, being embedded within collective social frameworks, the 
discursive practice of media remembering also illustrates the ways people place 
themselves within the perspective of the group they are members of (Halbwachs, 
1992: 52). This also means that the associations among different events people 
make in their reconstruction of the past reflect the associations between these 
individuals and the group(s) they belong to (Halbwachs, 1992: 53). 
Remembering thus becomes a factor and indicator of social belonging and 
solidarity and concomitantly of the normative order and moral imperatives that 
underline such social relations (Irwing-Zarecka, 1994: 9).  
Considering this relationship between memory and belonging, Levy and 
Sznaider discuss the formation of “cosmopolitan memory” as a basis of 
emerging moral interdependencies and transnational solidarities (Levy and 
Sznaider, 2002). The authors argue that globally shared memories such as the 
Holocaust construct a global moral space, where the Other becomes part of a 
common global past and “new cosmopolitan sensibilities and moral-political 
obligations” emerge (Levy and Sznaider, 2002: 103). In a similar vein, in their 
work on the project of Global Media Generations, Volkmer and her colleagues 
studied the ways media-related memories can formulate a common ground for 
perceiving the world (Volkmer, 2006a). The authors argue that formative news 
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memories, such as the Vietnam War, the moon landing, or the death of Princess 
Diana, provide a framework for people’s current perception of the world, which 
is generation-specific (Volkmer, 2006b: 14).  
The media, as widely shared and used discursive resources, play a double role in 
the construction of social memories. First, they provide a reservoir of mediated 
experiences to become the “raw material” for the construction of a remembered 
past; second, they are implicated in the “social definition of worthiness vis-à-vis 
remembrance” (Irwing-Zarecka, 1994: 164). The differential media attention 
and extent of reporting of different events is a case in point. Therefore, the 
media not only provide viewers with experiences to be remembered but also 
with the resources to interpret these experiences and future ones of the same 
kind. As such, the media, as representations and as institutions, are 
instrumental in the construction, reservation and reconstruction of public 
memory (Zelizer, 1992; 1998; Sturken, 1997). With the exception of the Global 
Media Generations project (Volkmer, 2006a), the relevant work on the 
relationship between media and collective memory has illustrated the role of 
the media as “technologies of memory” (Sturken, 1997:10), namely as cultural 
resources instrumental in the construction, reservation and reconstruction of 
public memory (e.g. Zelizer, 1992; 1998; Sturken, 1997; Neiger et al., 2011). In 
that context, the focus of research has largely been on the analysis of the media 
as representations and as institutions.  
By focusing on the practice of media remembering, the present thesis explores 
the appropriations, (re)interpretations and (re)articulations of the media 
discourses by audiences, illustrating the mutually constitutive relationship 
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between media texts and their viewers (Livingstone, 1993: 7) beyond the point 
of media reception, in the context of everyday discourses people employ to talk 
about and make sense of distant suffering. In this context, exploring media 
remembering as an audience discursive practice throws light into the viewers’ 
emotional engagement with stories of distant suffering and the role of the media 
in the (re)articulation of these memories, as well as the viewers’ expressions of 
allegiances and solidarity within social groups.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has set out the theoretical premises underlying the research focus 
of the present thesis and has suggested an analytical framework for its study. It 
has argued that the moral agency of the viewer vis-à-vis distant suffering is 
constructed through processes of mediation and articulated through the 
practices of media witnessing and media remembering. The resources for these 
practices are provided within the media space, which expand the viewers’ 
experience beyond the local and create relations with the distant other through 
the nourishment of imagination and the formulation of judgment.  
However, the mediated space is underlined by unevenness, inequalities and 
restrictions, which reflect the symbolic status quo established by western media 
and their representational practices. At the same time, the mediated space is 
often ethnocentric in character, as it is embedded in national contexts and 
addressed to national audiences. This unevenness is concomitantly reflected on 
the mediation processes through which the moral agency of the viewer is 
articulated. For that reason, I have argued that the formation of the moral self of 
the viewer takes place along three significant tensions, which I have described 
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as the tension between the viewer’s emotional involvement and rationalised 
detachment from the scene of suffering, the tension between hospitality and 
apathy towards the suffering other, and, finally, the tension between audience 
responsibility and complicity with the media.  
I then proceeded to suggest an analytical framework for studying mediation in 
this context. Following Couldry’s conceptualization of mediation as practices 
(Couldry, 2004; 2006), I suggested that the mediation of viewer’s agency with 
regard to the suffering reported by the media should be studied as media 
practices, namely as the kind of things people say or do about suffering.  
I introduced two media practices that are central in the articulation of the moral 
agency of the viewer. First, media witnessing describes the way viewers position 
themselves as spectators of the suffering of others. Second, media remembering 
refers to the discursive reconstruction of the audience memories of the events 
witnessed through the media. I argued that in describing how they see and how 
they remember stories of distant suffering, viewers simultaneously articulate 
their sense of agency.  
This analytical focus based on the practices of media witnessing and media 
remembering aims, in the first place, at addressing the absence of audience 
studies of distant suffering, as described in the introductory chapter. The 
analytical focus on the discursive construction of viewer’s agency, as explained 
throughout this chapter, also aims at illustrating the complexities involved in 
the mediation of distant suffering, obscured when moral agency is merely 
considered in terms of audience response to humanitarian appeals and public 
action or the affective impact of specific media images or reports of suffering. 
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Looking into how people talk about and remember distant suffering allows for 
the exploration of the specificities of how the suffering of faraway others gets 
embedded into the audience lifeworlds and the implications of this for the 
viewers’ sense of moral agency.  
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Chapter 3 Researching Audience Discourses: Design and 
Methods 
The previous chapters have established the central research interest of the 
thesis as the construction of the moral agency of the viewer vis-à-vis the 
suffering of distant others. Chapter 2 has argued that there are two audience 
practices that are instrumental in the construction of the moral agency of the 
spectator of suffering, namely media witnessing and media remembering. It has 
also problematised the issue of action at a distance and has argued that the 
viewers’ inclination to act upon the suffering reported is mediated through the 
practices of witnessing and remembering. This conceptual framework has 
constituted the basis for the secondary research questions of the thesis, namely: 
How do viewers position themselves as witnesses of the suffering of others made 
visible through the media? How do audiences remember distant suffering? How do 
viewers describe themselves as public actors with regard to the suffering of people 
they witness through the media?  
These three research concerns, media witnessing, media remembering and 
action at a distance have guided the design, conduct and analysis of the 
empirical research. As explained in the introductory chapter, Greece constituted 
the research context of this empirical investigation, its focus being on Greek 
audience discourses of distant suffering. This chapter will address the 
methodological and analytical choices made with regard to the selection and 
analysis of the research material.  
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The chapter begins with the justification of the choice of focus group discussions 
as the preferred methodology for accessing audience discourses also 
contextualising the use of focus groups in the field of media and 
communications research. The conceptualisation of the construction of the 
moral agency of the viewer as discursively articulated through the practices of 
media witnessing and media remembering led to the employment of focus 
groups as a research method that employs the interaction of participants in 
discussion to gather empirical material.  
The chapter then discusses the practicalities of conducting the discussions, also 
briefly situating the research within the context of the Greek news media 
landscape. It outlines the framework for the analysis of the research material, 
based on the principles of discourse analysis. The final section of the chapter 
will engage with issues pertaining to the evaluation of the design and conduct of 
the research in a way of a reflexive commentary.  
3.1 Researching Audience Discourses 
The empirical research of the thesis is based on twelve focus group discussions 
that were conducted during the period between July and September 200610. As 
outlined in the introduction, discussions mainly focused on the three disasters 
of the East Asian Tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmir 
Earthquake of 2005.  Their duration was 50 – 80 minutes and they were tape-
                                                        
10 The total number of focus group discussions conducted for the purposes of the research was 
eighteen. After an initial careful consideration of the material and the decision to explore the 
discussions into further depth, the actual number of the groups analysed in greater depth was 
limited to twelve. The final choice of the discussions used for the analysis was based on the 
richness of the relevant material provided by the groups (for example, some groups were 
eliminated on the basis that their participants would rarely watch television) as well as the need 
to keep groups representative of different segments of the audience. 
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recorded and subsequently transcribed. Notes were taken immediately after 
each discussion, regarding the peculiarities and interesting points of each group, 
which were later significant in the analysis of the discussions.    
Krueger defines a focus group as “a carefully planned discussion designed to 
obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-
threatening environment” (Krueger, 1994: 6). Its particular character as a 
research method consists in its ingredients, namely “(1) people, (2) assembled 
in a series of groups, [who] (3) possess certain characteristics, and (4) provide 
data (5) of qualitative nature (6) in a focused discussion” (Krueger, 1994: 16). 
As such, focus groups seem to share the same aim and character with individual 
in-depth interviews in gathering accounts and interpretations of reality, with 
the only difference lying in the number of participants. However, such a 
definition seems to obscure the main characteristic of focus groups as a 
qualitative methodology: its reliance on the group interaction as a resource of 
research material (Morgan, 1988: 12; Kitzinger, 1994: 103). Emphasising 
exactly this dimension, Morgan defines focus groups as a “research technique 
that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the 
researcher” (Morgan, 1996: 130). As such, the method of focus groups is not 
merely interested in eliciting participants’ attitudes on the research issues; 
rather is explores the ways meaning and knowledge are discursively 
constructed through group interaction.  
Based on these characteristics of the methodology and under the light of the 
interests of the thesis, focus groups were employed here on two grounds. First, 
because of their emphasis on the discourse as constructive of meanings and 
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identities, they allow for the exploration of the viewer’s discursive construction 
of moral self with regard to distant others. Second, their illustration of the social 
and active construction of meanings among discussants places the focus on 
viewers as participants in the process of mediation. The next two sections will 
further explore these issues, first by contextualising the use of focus groups as a 
methodology in media studies and then by addressing the discursive 
construction of meanings within focus group discussions. 
3.1.1 Focus Groups in Media Studies 
It is the interest in and the potential to explore the active construction of 
meaning that rendered focus groups a popular methodology in media studies 
over the last decades. Lunt and Livingstone attribute the increasing 
employment of focus groups by media scholars in the beginning of the 1980s to 
the broader turn from the “effects” tradition to an emphasis on the social 
aspects of the research context and the emancipation of the research subject 
(Lunt and Livingstone, 1996: 83). Although Merton (Merton, 1987; Merton et al., 
1956), the “father of focus groups”, first employed the method along with 
Lazarsfeld (Puchta and Potter, 2004: 4), the methodology became almost 
exclusively an instrument of market research, only to resurge in media studies 
as a valid research tool on its own within the context of the broader turn in 
audience studies, which placed the focus on the active construction of meanings 
by the audiences, considered not anymore as aggregates of individual opinions 
but as active interpreters of media messages through the use of their own socio-
cultural resources (Hall, 1973/1980; Livingstone, 1998). It signifies a break 
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with the tradition of “effects” studies and a turn towards the process of media 
consumption as a contextual activity.   
In his seminal work on the Nationwide audience, David Morley used twenty-
seven homogeneous groups of various socio-economic backgrounds to compare 
their different readings of the current affairs programme (Morley, 1980; 1981). 
Morley’s work was the first significant approach to explore the way media 
programmes are incorporated into the particular framework of viewers’ 
everyday lives through audience talk. His choice of homogeneous groups 
reflected the effort to allow for differences of socio-economic position to be 
more easily expressed. As such, focus groups were regarded as settings for the 
expression of participants’ identity (Morley, 1980).   
Focus groups were famously adopted by Liebes and Katz within the context of 
their study on Dallas and its consumption by different cultures around the 
world (Liebes and Katz, 1990). The authors used as participants members of 
pre-existing groups, such as family members or friends. They approach their 
focus groups as a naturalistic setting that can be used as the assimilation of the 
everyday domestic viewing of the soap opera and, therefore, “a key to 
understanding the mediating process via which a program such as this enters 
into culture” (Liebes and Katz, 1990: 28).  
Livingstone and Lunt have used focus groups to study the dialectic processes 
through which public opinion is being formulated (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; 
Lunt and Livingstone, 1996). The focus is placed on the “the openness and 
interactive potential” of the method, which is seen “as a device which allows 
people to discuss issues abstracted from their social identities, as informed by 
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Habermas’s (1989) concept of the public sphere” (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996: 
88).   
In another famous study, Philo asked from the focus groups included in his 
research on news bias to get involved into creative activities, producing news 
reports based on still images of the 1984/5 miners’ strike (Philo, 1990; 1993a). 
Once more, based on the assumption that “culture and beliefs are, after all, the 
product of collective thought and action” (Philo, 1990: 22), the author places the 
focus on the way members of the groups collaboratively respond to the activity 
challenge, taking into account their different socio-economic backgrounds as the 
basis for the variation in their responses.  
Overall, focus groups have been largely used in media research as a 
methodological tool that provides insights into audience processes of meaning-
making and consumption of media products, based on the belief that the 
method replicates some of the everyday interactions through which people 
appropriate media, although “the setting within which they are conducted and, 
crucially, the ways in which they are conducted, are much less naturalistic” 
(Burgess et al., 1991: 502). The use of focus groups allows for significant 
insights into the social processes through which meaning is produced by 
audiences. According to Lunt and Livingstone: “The focus group emphasizes the 
social nature of communication and does not reduce social scientific research to 
the study of the individual, an important consideration in the context of media 
research where mechanical conceptions of media effects are giving way to more 
social, semiotic, and diffusion-based conceptions of media processes” (Lunt and 
Livingstone, 1996: 90).  
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More recently, and in attempt to capture the complexity of contemporary 
audience activity, as described by the concept of the diffused audience 
(Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998), focus groups have been employed in 
innovative ways or in combination with other methods in line with the broader 
ethnographic turn in media studies and news consumption (see discussion in 
section 2.2.3. in the previous Chapter). Madianou, in her study of news 
audiences in Greece, combines focus groups with individual interviews and 
participant observation in order to capture the place of news in the viewers’ 
everyday life (Madianou, 2005a; 2008; 2010). Other researchers have tried to 
create quasi-naturalistic situations, where focus group discussions mimic 
everyday conversations and can be, therefore, treated as a route into exploring 
how people talk about news in the context of their everyday lives (Bird, 2003; 
Martin, 2008; McCallum, 2009).  
However, a “sociological investigation of the contemporary diffused audience”, 
which requires “to get as close to the everyday life of participants in the diffused 
audience as possible” (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 166) is rarely 
practical for scholars with limited time, as this way of studying the audience 
might involve hours of observation before any significant data emerges (Bird, 
2011: 495). In this context, Bird uses the concept of “news talk” as “the informal 
and often very active way that news stories are communicated among people 
and meanings are made that may have more or less to do with the original 
intent of the journalist who created the text” (Bird, 2010: 494). What the 
concept underlines is the fact that news stories are the product of interpersonal 
communication as much as the output of specific media texts (ibid.). Studying 
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news talk in everyday contexts is one way of exploring the activities of the 
diffused audience, which stems from the assumption that audiences are not only 
to be studied as addressed by specific media texts, but that the experience of 
audiencing leaks out into the conduct of the everyday (Abercrombie and 
Longhurst, 1998: 75).  
Although artificial in their design and conduct, focus groups were chosen here 
as a methodology for exploring the audience practice of news talk about distant 
suffering. The artificiality of the design was minimised by the use of peer 
groups, which are assumed to be the social networks within which news and, 
therefore, stories of suffering are being discussed. Furthermore, the focus of the 
study being on viewers’ engagement with stories of distant suffering rather than 
their habits of news consumption, it was judged that focus groups were an 
adequate method in gaining insight into the ways these stories are incorporated 
into the audiences’ everyday life. As news of suffering are a frequent but not 
daily occurrence, it would have been challenging, if not impossible, to design a 
naturalistic study of how people engage with images of human pain in real time. 
Ethnographic methods might have provided richer material but that would have 
been hard and time-consuming to acquire and it would not necessarily address 
the research focus which is on how viewers discursively position themselves in 
relation to suffering rather than how they routinely consume the news. This 
focus on the discursive also entails an interest into how common sense 
assumptions and knowledge are (re)produced through social interaction, for 
which focus groups can provide invaluable insights. It is this character of focus 
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groups as a form of discursive interaction which provides insights into the 
constructed nature of social meanings that the next section will address.  
3.1.2 Focus Groups and the Social Production of Discourse 
The focus of this study is on the discourses employed by media audiences when 
talking about distant disasters. The aim is to explore through these discourses 
how viewers position themselves as moral agents with regard to the suffering of 
distant others. Although individual interviews could also have offered “access to 
people’s ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words” (Reinharz & Chase, 
2002: 222), it is through the interaction of discussion that commonsense 
discourses are more vividly articulated, negotiated and illustrated. Michael 
Billig justifies such an approach to focus group discussion: “In the cut-and-
thrust of discussion, one can hear the processes of thinking directly, witnessing 
the actual business of people formulating and using thoughts. When people 
argue, they justify and criticize, frequently appealing to common-sense or to the 
values of accepted common-places” (Billig, 1992: 16-17).  
A crucial point of this discursive interaction consists in its form, which is close 
to everyday talk, allowing the researcher to explore uses of language, which in 
itself can prove more illustrating of people’s beliefs and attitudes than their 
actual responses. As Kitzinger notes, “people’s knowledge and attitudes are not 
entirely encapsulated in reasoned responses to direct questions” (Kitzinger, 
1995: 300). Less structured forms of talk, such as jokes, teasing and arguing can 
prove equally, if not more, informative. In the more controlled environment of 
an individual interview, such forms of everyday communication are difficult to 
occur. The one-to-one discussion retains the power asymmetries between 
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researcher and participants (Briggs, 1986; 2002) and, thus, the formal character 
of the interaction in a greater degree than focus group discussions. The 
presence of more participants who listen to, agree with and challenge one 
another makes these everyday forms of communication more salient in focus 
groups (Kitzinger, 1994: 108). In this way, focus groups “reach the parts that 
other methods cannot reach” (Kitzinger, 1995: 301).  
Despite the close similarity among focus group and everyday talk, however, 
Myers underlines the risk of uncritically regarding focus group discussion as 
everyday conversation (Myers, 1998). The great resemblance aside, he argues, 
focus groups are peculiar forms of interaction, which takes place under special 
circumstances and with specific purposes. For this reason, it is essential not to 
take isolated utterances at face value, but rather analyse the discussion as a 
specific speech event and report more on the ways focus groups work (Myers, 
1998).  
Group interaction of such kind provides insight not only in the knowledge and 
understandings that people hold but also in the way that this knowledge has 
been formed. It highlights the operation of social processes in the articulation of 
knowledge represented at the micro-level of the group processes (Kitzinger, 
1995). Krueger argues that the focus group interview works because “it taps 
into human tendencies” (Krueger, 1994: 10). Attitudes, perceptions and 
meanings are never formed in a social vacuum but always through interaction 
with others. Evidence from focus group discussions can provide insights of how 
these interactions influence individual utterances and the process of meaning 
construction. Especially in relation to media messages and use, “the way 
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individuals use and make sense of media material is determined by the 
identities and communicative repertoires they are socialized into as a result of 
their membership of these groups in the course of their life history” (Schrøder 
et al., 2003: 5). A focus group discussion brings these identities and 
communicative repertoires into the front light. It also provides an insight into 
the role of the media in the construction of knowledge and understandings 
about the world. It is, therefore, the “key to understanding the mediating 
process via which a [media] program…enters into the culture” (Liebes and Katz, 
1990: 28). Focus group discussions throw light into the ways audiences 
themselves make sense of these media messages drawing upon their socially 
situated identities and communicative repertoires. In numerous occasions 
during the discussions participants would justify their expressed attitudes and 
opinions as due to their status as “women”, as “young people” or as “Greeks”, 
illustrating how different reference points were implicated in the production of 
meanings.   
What can also be discerned behind group interactions is the normative 
framework underlying them (Kitzinger, 1995; Bloor et al., 2001). Focus groups 
provide insights into the dominant cultural values that influence assessments 
and beliefs and how these may vary across different segments of the population. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the discussions throw light to dominant 
narratives about the media, distant suffering or humanitarianism and charity. 
For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, participants often felt the need to 
justify themselves for not responding to humanitarian appeals, as inaction is 
equated to a moral failure within the context of a normative humanitarian 
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discourse. Although these normative narratives can also be reflected in 
individual interviews, their status as taken for granted stock of knowledge is 
more likely to be negotiated and challenged through group interaction. As Bloor 
and his colleagues acutely put it, “the group is a socially legitimated occasion for 
participants to engage in ‘retrospective introspection’, to attempt collectively to 
tease out previously taken for granted assumptions” (Bloor et al., 2001: 5-6).  
A further methodological advantage of focus group discussions is the fact that 
they allow for a greater degree of unexpected responses (Kitzinger, 1995). 
Individual interviews, based on a question-answer structure, often seem to bear 
a stimulus and response character. Discussion is mainly restricted to the topics 
initially identified by the researcher and the emergence of new ideas is 
dependent on the participants’ communicative skills and enthusiasm about the 
topic as well as the interviewer’s capacities to follow cues and identify 
interesting ideas, something that requires experience and can be proven 
difficult in the flow of the interview. On the contrary, the smaller degree of 
control that the researcher has over the group discussion might prove beneficial 
in encouraging participants to share experiences and opinions that might break 
away from the initial assumptions of the researcher about them. Whereas in 
individual interviews it is more likely for researchers not necessarily to “hear” 
what their informants tell them, but “only what their own intellectual and 
ethical development has prepared them to hear” (Johnson, 2002: 106), this 
possibility is minimized in the group discussion, where there are more than one 
participant voices and the control of the researcher over them is less.  
  
107 
This is also reflected in the negotiation of differences among the participants. 
Kitzinger makes an interesting point in arguing that the focus group discussions 
allows for participants to theorise about the diversity of opinions among 
themselves (Kitzinger, 1994). Different perspectives have to be supported by 
elaborate arguments or description of experiences in order to be persuasive or 
justified by the other participants. Thus, whereas the researcher analyzing 
individual interviews “might have been faced with ‘armchair’ theorizing” about 
the causes of such differences, in focus groups these can be explained “ ‘in situ’ 
with the help of the research participants” (Kitzinger, 1994: 113).  
Finally, there are a number of practical advantages that characterise focus 
groups as a research material-gathering methodology in comparison to 
individual interviews. The presence of other participants enhances a permissive 
environment and minimizes the structural distance between researcher and 
participants, therefore rendering participation in the group discussion a more 
appealing experience to the respondents. It is easier, then, to secure 
participation by people who would be unwilling to be interviewed individually, 
either because of the perceived formality of the situation or because they feel 
that they have nothing interesting to contribute (Kitzinger, 1995). Especially in 
the case of pre-existing peer groups, there is the extra advantage of a sense of a 
shared obligation to attend, which can spare the researcher from the difficult 
situation of non-attendance (Bloor et al., 2001: 23).  
3.1.3 Problems with Focus Groups 
The important advantages of the focus groups aside, researchers have often 
pointed out the need for caution against some potentially problematic aspects of 
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group discussions. Most of these have to do with the group dynamics and their 
potential harmful side-effects. There is a strong likelihood that the voices that 
tend to deviate from the norm may be silenced in fear of repercussions by the 
group (Kitzinger, 1995), either in the painless form of teasing or in more serious 
forms such as open disapproval and confrontation. In the context of the present 
study, it was considered likely that participants might be unwilling to express 
views that might contradict dominant norms, such as lack of interest for distant 
suffering or refusal to contribute with any form of aid. Such problems were, 
however, minimized through the planning of the focus groups and selection of 
participants. As proved during the discussions, participants did not hesitate to 
challenge or disagree with each other.  
The majority of the focus groups in this thesis were formed on the basis of pre-
existing social groups. Gamson names these naturally occurring groups, the 
members of which are already familiar to each other outside the research 
setting, “peer-group discussions” (Gamson: 1992). Most of the respondents 
belonged to the same network of friends, some were colleagues and in a couple 
of cases members of the same family. This allowed for a permissive atmosphere 
during the discussions, leaving space for disagreements and opposing 
arguments to be expressed. Group dynamics in peer group discussions are likely 
to be similar in real life, too (Katz and Liebes, 1990: 29). Indeed, Sasson argues 
that peer group discussions are more suitable than conventional focus groups 
for the exploration of popular discourses, since due to the fact that they “have a 
social existence independent of the sociologist’s contrivance, their discourse can 
be regarded with greater confidence as reflective of the particular subcultures 
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from which they are drawn” (Sasson, 1995: 20). Pre-existing social groups, who 
are in close contact, are also more likely to discuss about media stories (Liebes 
and Katz, 1990: 23) and it is this kind of popular discourse that the present 
study is interested in.    
The content and flow of the discussion is also vulnerable to the group dynamics, 
which unavoidably affect the material drawn by group discussions. A number of 
issues can prove to be problematic, such as the domination of the discussion by 
the louder participants, the existence of quiet or shy participants that are 
difficult to include, or a general unwillingness of the group to respond to the 
moderator’s questions, often expressed through hush (Morgan, 1988). Although 
minimized, these problems cannot be securely avoided through the use of peer 
groups. Such issues did occur during the conduct of the focus groups in this 
research. And while it was not extremely hard to keep the balance between 
louder and shy participants by interfering in the discussion or encouraging 
alternative views, the general silence or reluctance of some groups was 
regarded as informative in itself of the indifference of the respondents about the 
issues under discussion.  
3.2 Conducting the research 
3.2.1 Planning the focus groups 
The study is focusing on Greek audiences and their discourses on mediated 
distant disasters. As such, the population was restricted to audience members of 
Greek national identity. Although the inclusion of members of ethnic minorities 
would have provided an interesting point of comparison, especially in terms of 
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how different national and cultural discourses interfere with the viewers’ 
engagement with distant suffering, such a choice would have added further 
dimensions to the study that would complicate its analysis and affect its depth 
and quality given its necessary limits. It was among these members of the 
audience with Greek national origin that an effort was made to secure the 
biggest possible variability of respondents through the sampling process.  
Since the purpose of the study, as in all qualitative research, is not the 
generalisability of the results on a broader population but rather the in-depth 
exploration of different views and practices on the issue under study (Gaskell, 
2000), purposeful sampling was employed for the choice of the participants in 
the focus groups so that they better fitted the goals of the research (Morgan, 
1998: 56). This theoretical approach to sampling ensures the most productive 
and insightful results, as opposed to random sampling, which aims at collecting 
statistically reliable and valid data.   
The segmentation of the focus group participants was based on pre-existing 
theoretical propositions and the relevant literature and with the greatest 
variability of perspectives in mind (Morgan, 1996: 143; 1998: 64-65). Based on 
these, there were factors that were regarded as the most significant in 
respondents’ variability, namely their age, gender and education.  
Age 
Participants in the focus groups covered two main age cohorts, the younger 
consisting of people in their twenties and the older of people in their forties and 
fifties. There are a number of reasons for such a distinction. Younger 
  
111 
generations usually display a greater degree of media literacy and use and this 
might affect the way they use media to connect to world. Furthermore, being the 
target group of transnational media corporations and in particular the music 
industry they are more inclined to be members of a “cosmopolitan cultural 
citizenship” (Chaney, 2002) and an “entertainment cosmopolitanism” 
(Malcomson, 1998; Urry, 2000). Although mundane and often unintended, such 
a cosmopolitan experience could possibly be associated with more reflexive and 
“genuine cosmopolitan outlooks” (Skribs et al., 2004: 130), expressing a concern 
with and commitment to the distant other.   
Age was also considered to be an important segmentation factor with regard to 
the practice of media remembering. Influenced by Mannheim’s argument that 
the experience of historical, and in particular traumatic, events is the connecting 
link among members of the same generation (Mannheim, 1952), Edmunds and 
Turner have suggested the concept of “global generations”, united through the 
electronically mediated experience of global traumatic events (Edmunds and 
Turner, 2005). Volkmer and her colleagues make a similar argument in their 
study of global media generations, discussed in the previous chapter, as they 
explore how news memories are formative of different generations’ framework 
for making sense of the world (Volkmer, 2006c). Different memories of global 
events, such as World War II, the Vietnam War or Princess Diana’s death, as well 
as the engagement with different media proved to be crucial for each 
generation’s background or commonsense knowledge about the world. 
Supportive of these findings about the variety in the ways different generations 
engage with the world were also the findings of the research conducted by Urry 
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and Szerszynski on the emergence of a cosmopolitan culture among audiences 
(Szerszynski and Urry, 2002), which seemed to differ in meaning between older 
and younger generations11. 
In short, age seems to be an important factor that accounts “for differences in 
cultural value orientation within cultures” (Fern, 2001: 32) and for this reason it 
was regarded a significant factor guaranteeing variation in audience responses 
with reference to their engagement with distant suffering, both in terms of 
witnessing and remembering them. 
Gender 
“Gender”, Denzin argues, “filters knowledge” (Denzin, 1989: 116). In the case of 
the mediation of distant suffering, it also seems to filter responses towards the 
suffering victims. Gilligan has claimed that there is a difference in “moral voices” 
between men and women (Gilligan, 1993). Accounting for the moral 
development of children, the author has argued that boys and men interpret 
morality in terms of abstract ideas and rules, such as fairness and justice, while 
girls and women understand it in terms of an ethic of care and responsibility. In 
a similar argument, Höijer in her study of “global compassion” in relation to 
television images of violence and war concluded that there are gendered 
                                                        
11 According to the authors, the results of their project indicated that ideas of global 
connectedness and responsibility were interpreted by the younger respondents as an “openness 
to the new and culturally different”, whereas for the older ones they were associated to 
“received notions of British character and the fulfillment of duty, familiar from the days of 
Empire and the World Wars” (Szerszynski and Urry, 2002: 476). Different cosmopolitan 
interests and practices seemed to be prominent in different stages of the lifecycle, with the 
younger being interested in traveling and working abroad and duty and responsibilities being 
regarded as more associated to older citizens (ibid.). Finally, different generations gave different 
reasons for not feeling responsible global citizens; the young people because they were more 
concerned with enjoying themselves, the older because of more urgent and immediate 
responsibilities and the retired because they thought it was time to think of themselves (ibid.). 
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differences in the way viewers react to images of violence and conflict. She 
argues that compassion appears to be “gendered” (Höijer, 2004: 525), since her 
female interviewees often identified with the victims, whereas men were 
occasionally cynical, something which, according to the author, can be 
attributed to the fact that when men “hear and see documentary depictions of 
the victims of violence, they meet a story about themselves through the hidden 
myth of violence and manliness” (Höjer, 2004: 526).   
 A second reason that gender seems to be an important factor of the 
segmentation of participants is the actual habitual gendered segmentation of a 
number of public spaces as well as social roles, something that is particularly 
relevant to the older generations. There are still male dominated spaces, such as 
pubs or sport clubs, as well as activities that women usually do together at 
shopping malls or private houses. This is reflected on the existence of gendered 
social networks and spaces, where people of the same sex are likely to discuss 
private as well as public issues (Massey, 1994). News stories and, for the 
purposes of this study, news of distant disasters are also cases that can be 
discussed in similar terms, namely by people of the same sex within informal 
networks. In other words, respondents of the same gender are likely to draw 
upon similar interpretative repertoires in engaging with distant suffering. 
Indeed, when respondents were asked whether they would discuss about the 
news of the disasters with other people, female respondents claimed to do that 
over coffee with their female friends or while watching the news at each other’s 
homes; men, on the other hand, would often say that such discussions would 
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arise at the coffee places they frequented when the television news was on, or 
with colleagues at work.  
Education  
Respondents were also considered and segregated according to the level of their 
education. It was decided that an effective choice would be the segregation of 
respondents depending on whether or not they have completed a University 
Degree. There are two main reasons for this choice. In the first place, it 
expresses an attempt to test the hypothesis that education might enhance 
cosmopolitanism as “a willingness to engage with the Other” (Hannerz, 1990: 
239). Although there is not an explicit association in the relevant literature, 
there seems to be an implicit assumption that might permit a connection of 
education to cosmopolitanism. Hannerz describes the latter as “an intellectual 
and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences” and 
highlights the fact that it can be a matter of competence, of “a personal ability to 
make one’s way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and 
reflecting” (Hannerz, 1990: 239). Szerszynski and Urry relate cosmopolitanism 
with the “semiotic skill to be able to interpret images of various others, to see 
what they are meant to represent, and to know when they are iconic” 
(Serszynski and Urry, 2002: 470; emphasis in the original). Along similar lines, 
Hall argues that cosmopolitanism requires the ability to draw upon discourses 
from a variety of cultural repertoires (Hall, 2002: 26).  
Furthermore, education was used in the context of this study as an indication of 
socio-economic status. Respondents were chosen in such a way that their 
educational background was reflected in their occupational status, 
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distinguishing between professionals and upper white-collar professions on the 
one hand, and lower white-collar, blue-collar and unskilled workers on the 
other. In the rest of the thesis I will refer – rather allusively – to the former as 
“middle-class” and the latter as “working-class”.  
Locale 
The focus groups were shared between two different locations within Greece. 
Virtually half of the focus group discussions were conducted in the capital city of 
Athens and the rest in the town of Komotini. This was mostly dictated by the 
time constraints of the fieldwork, which, taking place during the summer, 
demanded for immediacy and time-effectiveness in the organizing and conduct 
of the group discussions. Having already contacts in both places, it was easier to 
effectively plan the groups. This segmentation of respondents, however, can 
also be explained on theoretical grounds.  
The two places are separated by more than 800 kilometres of distance as well as 
by significant differences in the lifestyle of their inhabitants. Athens, counting 
five million people, is a cultural and economic centre, a modern European 
capital, accommodating transnational communities and migrants and attracting 
great numbers of tourists. As such it constitutes an example of a “global city”, a 
space where the macrosocial trends of globalisation materialize (Sassen, 2007: 
101; see also Sassen, 1994). Komotini, on the other hand, a town of fifty 
thousand, represents the typical semi-rural Greek life. On the northern border 
of the country it lacks in cultural activities and centres and can hardly constitute 
a tourist attraction. If mobility seems to be main characteristic of the capital, 
then stability and permanence seem to be typical in a semi-rural town. To 
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appropriate Hannerz’s distinction of people (Hannerz 1990), the two places 
could be described as representing the cosmopolitan and the local respectively. 
There is, however, a significant factor that complicated this distinction. 
Komotini is home to a large Turkish-speaking minority, mostly of Turkish 
origin, which amounts to almost half the town’s population. In this sense, the 
town could be characterized as a “cosmopolitan place” in its lack of national 
homogeneity. It, therefore, theoretically encapsulated the both/and principle of 
cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2006: 57) as the internalization of difference within 
society (Beck, 2004: 438). Whether this can be translated into a cosmopolitan 
outlook from the perspective of its inhabitants is a challenge open to empirical 
investigation. Although currently peaceful – albeit not very close – the 
relationship between the national majority and the minority has been 
characterized by turbulences in the past. It is also underlined by the historic 
hostility between Greece and Turkey.  
The segmentation of focus group participants according to these different 
criteria reflects an attempt to explore a diversity of discourses and ways of 
articulating moral agency rather than the objective of putting the differences 
between the audience groupings into a strict test. The peer groups are adopted 
here as social occasions that are indicative of the real-life peer discussions, 
where moral discourses on distant suffering are being articulated rather than as 
reflective of the participants’ common “involvement in various forms of cultural 
frameworks and identifications” (Morley, 1980: 26) based on their social class, 
age or gender. In this context, the diverse discourses are approached as 
collective, namely “mutually constructed by the social interactions among 
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members of particular subgroups” rather than as taxonomic, “distributed across 
the individuals within particular sociodemographic subgroups” (Livingstone, 
1998: 113). As such, the dimensions of participant segmentation do not form 
major dimensions in the analysis. The focus here is on social interaction among 
the group participants rather than the implication of their sociodemographic 
characteristics in the construction of their moral agency.  
Focus Group Composition 
The focus groups were homogeneous in their composition. This was decided on 
the basis of the argument that respondents tend to feel safer and more relaxed 
among people of common social characteristics, which facilitates discussion and 
disclosure (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 190), whereas participants in heterogeneous 
groups tend to stick to superficial statements (Myers, 1998). Besides, the 
homogeneity of the groups was in most cases a consequence of the choice to use 
peer groups of pre-existing social networks.    
3.2.2 Sampling the disasters to trigger the discussions 
As already stated in the Introduction, the focus group discussions were 
instigated by three major disasters: the South Asian Tsunami in December 2004, 
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 and the Kashmir Earthquake in October 2005.  
The South Asian Tsunami – which will be hereafter also referred to as 
“Tsunami”, as also named by the participants – was caused by an undersea 
earthquake with a magnitude of 9 in the Richter scale, which occurred in the 
Indian Ocean on December 26th 2004. The destructive force of the Tsunami hit 
fifteen surrounding countries and claimed about 230,000 lives, resulting in one 
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of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history. A significant number of 
the victims were tourists from around the world that were travelling in the area 
at the time, an aspect that affected global media coverage (CARMA, 2006; 
Kivikuru and Nord, 2009).   
Hurricane Katrina hit the Southern regions of the United States at the end of 
August, leading to flooding and destruction and resulting in almost 2,000 deaths 
and the displacement of about 100,000 people. The economic damage caused by 
the disaster rendered it one of the costliest in U.S. history. The media coverage 
of the disaster, however, often moved beyond the discussion of the damages and 
became a “site for discursive contention and even political dissent” (Cottle, 
2009: 61), focusing, on the one hand, on the “civil unrest” and looting that 
followed the disaster in New Orleans (Tierney et al., 2006), and, on the other 
hand, on the political failures of the US government (Cottle, 2009: 64).  
The Kashmir earthquake shortly followed Hurricane Katrina, occurring on the 
8th of October 2005, in Kashmir, Pakistan, rendering 2005 “the year of natural 
disasters” (Braine, 2006: 4). The earthquake, with a magnitude of 7.6, killed 
73,000 people and left millions homeless. Although not as extensively covered 
as the other two disasters by Western media, the devastating aftermath of the 
earthquake triggered considerable humanitarian response from around the 
world (CARMA, 2006: 16).  
The three disasters were chosen as triggers of the focus group discussions on 
the basis of a number of factors, as explained in the introductory chapter. First, 
they were all relatively recent to the inception of the research and almost 
concurrent to each other, taking place over a time period of less than twelve 
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months. Disasters of great destructive force, they were all extensively covered 
by the media, often through the interruption of the scheduled programmes, in 
the form of breaking news or occupying great parts of the regular news 
bulletins. There were, to be sure, differences in the extent of this reporting 
across the three disasters, as well as in their framing by the different media 
(CARMA, 2006). This rendered the three disasters interesting cases of 
comparison. As Chapter 2 has explained, the interest of the thesis does not lay 
with audience responses to particular disasters but rather the way the viewer 
formulates her moral agency within the media space, where the visibility of the 
other in her human vulnerability is a common occurrence. The three destructive 
events were judged to be good examples of this mediated moral space and its 
inherent unevenness in terms of symbolic power. They were, therefore, judged 
to be useful examples to instigate discussions that would address the questions 
of interest in the thesis.  
Chapter 1 has also explained the choice to employ only natural disasters as 
triggers of the discussions. As viewers’ responses to political suffering were 
thought to be more explicitly embedded in political and nationalistic discourses 
that might interfere with their engagement with victims of natural disasters, it 
was considered to be appropriate not to initiate the discussions with the 
example of a political disaster or conflict that might have framed or limited the 
debate to political events and ideological conflicts. Of course, this distinction is 
formulated as an ad hoc analytical choice, as it is widely accepted that there is 
hardly anything natural about apparently natural disasters (Wisner et al., 1976; 
Sen, 1983), as the intensity of the consequences of natural phenomena is always 
  
120 
conditional on political, economic and social structures. In this context, the 
Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmir earthquake, were selected as 
disasters inscribed through the media with emotion and appeals to a common 
humanity based on the human vulnerability in the face of natural catastrophe 
(Cottle, 2006: 421; 2009: 51). As such, they were judged to be better triggers for 
the instigation of broader discussions on stories of distant suffering.  
3.3 Greek audiences in context 
Thinking about the mediation of viewers’ moral agency vis-à-vis news of distant 
suffering requires a contextualisation of the research question in the context of 
Greek civic and media culture. Before moving on to the specifics of conducting 
and analysing the focus group discussions, this section will briefly illustrate the 
television news space in Greece, as the landscape within which the participants 
of the study situate themselves as audiences, the characteristics of this 
audience, as those emerge from the limited empirical studies, and, finally, the 
broader Greek civic context within which the study is embedded.    
As suggested in the introductory chapter, the national and cultural 
characteristics of this context constitute a peculiar landscape that does not 
comfortably fit with the assumptions held about Western societies in relation to 
suffering. On the one hand, Greece as a European country belongs to the “safety 
zone” of the West, as institutionally defined and symbolically reproduced by the 
media. At the same time, Greece historically and culturally is situated between 
the West and the Eastern world. Having experienced a series of conflicts, crises, 
population displacements and other forms of political and social suffering in its 
long history, the country differs from the context traditionally assumed for the 
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Western spectator of distant suffering. As such, the focus on Greece as a case 
study by the present thesis can offer useful insights not only in relation to how 
audiences engage with distant suffering but also with regard to diversifying the 
positions attributed to the spectator of suffering, which has so far been 
conceptualised in terms of a homogeneous Western perspective.  
3.3.1. The television news media landscape in Greece 
Television news in Greece constitutes a typical example of the transgression of 
the traditional generic form of the genre and its transformation to a mixture of 
information and entertainment broadly described as infotainment (Pleios, 
2006). News programmes, as formed especially during the last couple of 
decades and after the deregulation of the broadcasting sector in the end of the 
1980s (Papathanassopoulos, 1997), are characterised by a fusion of different 
media genres, such as talks shows, entertainment and of factual news stories. 
The most significant of the peculiarities of the Greek news environment can be 
summarised in the long duration of the programmes, reaching and often 
surpassing one hour, sensationalism in the coverage of news, reports of 
celebrity gossip, personification of political debates, live interviews or talks and 
high degree of intertextuallity between the news and other programmes or 
media, mainly programmes of the same channel or media belonging to the same 
organisation (Papathansassopoulos, 1999; 2000; 2001; Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Chondroleou, 2004). This shift away from “hard” 
news also entails a decrease in the coverage of foreign news 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2001: 510). Live coverage of celebrity weddings or 
reports on celebrity feuds are frequent features in the news programmes. 
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Although state channels differ from private channels in that they have not fully 
embraced this news culture of infotainment, the Greek public service 
broadcaster lags in audience preferences (Leandros, 2010).   
The rise of infotainment in the Greek news programmes cannot be viewed 
independently from the wider political culture of the country, which is broadly 
characterised by a profound mistrust in the state (and, concomitantly, state 
broadcasting), a weak civil society, a strong clientelist system, partisan political 
character of the press and an intersection of interests between media owners 
and the political status quo (Papathanassopoulos, 2001; Chondroleou, 2004; 
Leandros, 2010). All these form a peculiar mediated political environment, 
where politicians and media owners find themselves in a constant interplay 
over the control of public agenda and the audience is left with poor information 
and, most importantly, with a general mood of mistrust over the news they are 
provided with (Papathanassopoulos, 1999; Madianou, 2005a).  
Elements of this civic culture and the general mood of mistrust and suspicion 
were evident in the discussions, as the empirical chapters will suggest. What is 
to be noted at this point is that these elements and character of the news 
programmes in Greece constitute the media landscape within which the 
research project situates itself and the specificities of the construction of the 
moral agency of Greek viewers are explored.  
3.3.2. Greek audiences 
Partly related to the characteristics of commercialisation and competition 
within the media landscape, as described above, audience research has been 
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traditionally linked in Greece with quantitative research. The use of market 
research to provide media owners and advertising agencies with audience 
ratings seems to have also affected the methodological choices of academic 
inquiry. Audience research, often limited in surveys and quantitative studies, 
has generally indicated public dissatisfaction with the media and public 
disengagement (Papathanassopoulos, 1997; Leandros, 2010). These studies, 
however, have ultimately failed to illustrate the dynamics of mediation of public 
life in Greece.   
In an attempt to explore the use of information and communication 
technologies within the Greek social and cultural context, Tsatsou combined 
quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups) methodologies to indicate 
how the slow adoption of the Internet in Greece is linked to a “dismissive 
culture” of the public, who found the Internet unnecessary in the context of their 
everyday lives (Tsatsou, 2011: 119), as well as a widespread technophobic 
attitude (Tsatsou, 2011: 120). In its turn, this technophobic attitude can be 
linked to the problematic notion of citizenship as developed in the Greek 
context that goes hand-in-hand with a failure to recognise the Internet as part of 
the Greek information society (ibid). The study, therefore, highlights how the 
use of media and communications is embedded in broader socio-cultural 
frameworks and people’s perceptions about and attitudes towards politics.  
A significant exception within the lack of audience studies, and most 
importantly news audience studies, in Greece is Madianou’s study on the 
relationship between media and identities in Greece (Madianou, 2005a). 
Following an ethnographic approach, the author explores how different ethnic 
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and cultural groups within the country, namely Greeks, Cypriots and members 
of the Turkish-speaking minority articulate their identities in relation to media 
consumption and television news. She illustrates how, despite the ethnocentric 
character of news programmes, audience members often challenge this 
dominant national discourse. The way they do that does not necessarily reflect 
their ethnic identities, but often their personal experience with the media, 
which provides them with knowledge that contradicts the information given in 
the news (Madianou, 2008: 328). Furthermore, when a news story was 
interpreted as an internal affair, viewers were more likely to be critical of the 
dominant discourse, whereas they embraced the nationalistic discourse, when 
the regarded a story as foreign news, and therefore something foreign to their 
identity (ibid.). In this context, although the media do not determine identities, 
they do contribute to the creation of communicative spaces of inclusion and 
exclusion, whereby identities are negotiated (Madianou, 2005a: 56).  
Madianou’s study is important in highlighting the dialectical relationship 
between news consumption and everyday life. The former is described as a 
dynamic process that involves a number of material, social and individual 
parameters (Madianou, 2005a: 5). It also interestingly reveals viewing 
paradoxes in the consumption of news. There seems to be a discrepancy 
between what people say about their relationship with the news in the context 
of the interview and what they actually do with it, as revealed through 
participant observation. While audiences were critical and cynical about the 
news when being interviewd, it was proved that they watched the news as a 
daily ritual, when observed in their everyday context. Similarly, although they 
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claimed that the only news worth watching were the ones provided by the 
public broadcaster, this was not the news they watched during participant 
observation, when they preferred the commercial channels (Madianou, 2005a: 
60).   
3.3.3. The Greek context  
As the two aforementioned studies have indicated, exploring audience 
engagement with the media as technologies and as content requires an 
examination of the social and cultural context within the audience is embedded. 
As argued in Chapter 2, the theoretical framework of mediation approaches 
both media and their audiences as socially and institutionally embedded. At the 
same time, the nation still functions as a primary basis for the development of 
social solidarity and moral sentiments, and, therefore, nationally embedded 
discourses mediate the relationship of the viewer to the spectacle of distant 
suffering.  
Modern Greek culture has been described as a blending of tradition and 
innovation between what is old (elements of ancient Greece) and what is new 
(elements of modern Greece), on the one hand, and what is native and what is 
foreign, on the other hand (Babiniotis, 1995: 230). If this holds truth for most 
modern societies, what is particularly important for Greece is the opposition 
between West, as Europeanism, and East, as Byzantine culture, which are 
actually the two sides combined in the Greek national identity, giving it an 
inherently double nature (Babiniotis, 1995: 231; Lipovats, 1994: 124). This 
national cultural identity emanates from the country’s history, with its classical 
world having supported Western ideas and its Byzantine past having dominated 
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the East for centuries, on the one hand, and four centuries of slavery and foreign 
intervention and national tragedies thereafter (Babiniotis, 1995: 240).  
The complexity of the broader national culture is also reflected in the political 
culture, underlined of similar contradictions and tensions. Diamandouros 
distinguishes Greek political culture in two distinct co-existing discursive 
frameworks: what he calls “the underdog culture”, which is the inward-looking, 
parochial outlook and insistence on tradition with a hostile attitude towards 
ideas of Western Enlightenment and modernity, on the one hand, and a 
Western-oriented modernising and universalising culture that favours 
rationalisation and liberal ideas, on the other hand (Diamandouros, 1993). 
While the latter resides in the margins of intelligentsia and diasporic 
bourgeoisie, the former is an integral part of the way the majority of Greek 
people make sense not only of politics but also the world overall and their place 
in it. Main characteristics of this underdog culture are, apart from an inherent 
introvertedness and parochialism, a xenophobic attitude often expressed 
through “a conspirational interpretation of events and…a pronounced sense of 
cultural inferiority towards the Western World, coupled with a hyperbolic and 
misguided sense of the importance of Greece in international affairs and, more 
generally, in the history of Western civilisation” (Diamandouros, 1993: 18).  At 
the same time, the underdog culture is expressed through the victimisation of 
Greece in the “hands of mightier entitites” and the Greek tendency to express 
allegiances to “collectivities which share a perceived ‘common heritage of 
exploitation’” by the world powers (Stefanidis, 2007: 8). 
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Part of this underdog culture is also a strong anti-Americanism, widespread and 
deeply rooted in Greek social discourses (Calotychos, 2004; Katzenstein and 
Keohane, 2007). Politically, Greek anti-Americanism can be traced back in the 
American involvement in Greek politics in 1947, in the early days of the Cold 
War, which has since produced a number of other political interferences, 
conspiracies as well as conspiracy theories. At the same time, Calotychos 
recognises in Greek anti-American feelings the “Greek penchant for conspiracy 
theory and political immaturity that strives to place responsibility elsewhere” 
(Calotychos, 2004: 182; see also Mouzelis, 1993). The latter is part of a broader 
cultural framework through which people understand power relations as well 
as history and their place in the world (Calotychos, 2004; Sutton, 2003).  
There is an ongoing debate about both the origins and the consequences of 
these characteristics of Greek political culture and its inclination to conspiracy 
theories (see Demertzis, 1994; Sutton, 2003). Whether these political discourses 
should be approached as a social pathology that undermines participation in the 
public sphere (Mouzelis, 1993) or are expressive of Greek people’s everyday 
understandings of global politics and the shaping of local experiences by distant 
forces (Sutton, 2003) is beyond the interests of the discussion here. The political 
discourses of conspiracy theories, the tendency to place responsibility on 
invisible forces and the “underdog culture” are approached here as constitutive 
of a cultural vocabulary Greeks make use of in talking about the social world 
and their place in it.  
These understandings of power and peoples’ relation with it also apply to the 
national political arena. They are expressed through feelings of detachment and 
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alienation from political institutions and especially politicians, as well as 
widespread mistrust (Kafetzis, 1994). Expressions of such mistrust, Demertzis 
argues, are part of a broader culture of political cynicism in Greece, itself 
discursively constructed through the articulation of a varied vocabulary of 
affective expressions, such as despair, detachment, sarcasm, indignation, 
pessimism, fatalism and irony (Demertzis, 2008). This political cynicism and 
disengagement has been particularly prominent since the 1990s, when the 
exuberance of the post-dictatorship period started to wear off and party politics 
disillusioned the public (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2005).  
These political discourses are not restricted to the field of politics but also 
underline perceptions and discussions about the social. The pervasiveness of 
the political culture in all aspects of social life has been attributed to the 
organisation of the Greek political system since the formative decades of the 
Greek state in the mid-19th century (Mouzelis, 1995). Characterised by 
clientelism and populism, politics has coloured the way people approach and 
understand public life overall (Mouzelis, 1995; Sotiropoulos, 2004). Despite the 
centralisation of politics and party organisation and the expansion of political 
participation after the 1967-1974 military dictatorship, the clientelistic modes 
of incorporation have resisted in a political system that is characterised by a 
“vertical, authoritarian integration of the people into the national political 
arena” (Mouzelis, 1995: 19). In this context, the expansion of party politics and 
its involvement in mass movements since 1974 has been translated into the 
“partyness of society” (Papadopoulos, 1989: 66; see also Mouzelis and 
Pagoulatos, 2005). Party competition has been extended in all Greek mass 
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movements and cultural and social organisations, suffocating social life 
(Papadopoulos, 1989: 66). The pervasiveness of political discourse in all social 
interactions and cultural exchanges can be, therefore, attributed on the one 
hand to the extent of state expansion and penetration and, on the other hand, on 
the fact that knowledge of the political system by lay citizens is a “necessity in a 
social environment in which any economic or social project, however trivial, 
requires for its fruition clientelistically achieved state support (Mouzelis, 1995: 
22).  
The pervasiveness of the political system is reflected in the atrophic nature of 
civil society in Greece. Recent in its emergence, with most NGOs and civil society 
associations coming of age only in the last couple of decades, civil society in 
Greece has faced the consequences of the organisation of public life in the 
country, where clientelism and populism have been the main characteristics of 
the pervasive political system, leaving little space for alternative political 
participation (Panayiotopoulou, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004). As the organisation 
of the political system follows a top-down approach of control and mobilisation, 
there are few alternatives for the formation of horizontal ties among citizens 
and interest groups (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 17). In this vertical system of patron-
client relationships (Mouzelis, 1987), even labour organisations and 
professional associations are controlled by political parties (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 
18). The weak civil society is, therefore, the characteristic of a country where 
politics, or rather party politics, has prevailed over “any other logic that might 
emanate from different institutional spheres” (Mouzelis, 1995: 20).  
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At the same time, it can be viewed along the lines of the general culture of 
mistrust in institutions, which has inhibited the crystallization of a civic spirit. 
In a country where party interests predominate public life and there have been 
deficiencies of defining common good and collective goals, not only is the State 
seen as “an entity to be suffered, played with…[and] never taken seriously” but 
also citizenship and civic participation or responsibility are generally seen “as 
smoke screens for the system of domination” (Tsoukalas, 1995: 198).  This 
attitude is not restricted to state institutions but expands to civic associations 
and projects. According to Tsoukalas, “Greeks are still born and socialised to the 
tunes of an anarchic individualism, which considers liberty as coterminous with 
total irresponsibility towards the collectivity, the law, and the others” 
(Tsoukalas, 1995: 1999).  
Symptomatic of this weak civil society culture is the limited volunteerism as 
systematic collective action (Sotiropoulos, 2004; Demertzis et al., 2008: 64-67). 
Despite the increase of voluntary associations during the 1990s, participation in 
these is still weak. Although social care and philanthropic associations are the 
biggest in numbers and the most diverse volunteer organisations in Greece, they 
also have more limited memberships in comparison to sports clubs and cultural 
associations (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 24). This is reflected in the World Giving 
Index, published in 2010 by the Charities Aid Foundation, which reports Greece 
as scoring very low among 153 nations. On the basis of a worldwide survey that 
explores the percentage of population giving money to charity, volunteering and 
helping strangers, Greece is ranked at the 147th place and is reported as the 
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country with the least charitable population in Europe (World Giving Index, 
2010).  
The underdevelopment of civil society organisations in Greece can be also 
related to the relevant lack of development or independence from the State of 
institutions that have been central in the construction of the public sphere and 
civil engagement in other Western countries. Mass media, as seen on the 
previous sections, have not only failed to provide the premises for civil 
engagement in public life but, on the contrary, exhibit characteristics of the 
broader political system, further enhancing public cynicism and mistrust. At the 
same time, the limited use of new technologies (Tsatsou, 2011) has indicated 
limitations in the emergence and sustainment of an informal Greek civic culture 
(Tsaliki, 2010).  
At the same time, underdevelopment of the Greek civic sphere has also been 
attributed to the dominant and restrictive role of the Greek Orthodox Church, 
which lacks autonomy as a collective actor (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 17; Danopoulos, 
2004). Embraced by the State for nation-building purposes after the country’s 
independence in the 1820s and 1830s, the Church has been attributed and still 
retains a “national-salvationist” self-image (Danopoulos, 2004: 48). This has 
given the Church a pervasive interfering role both in politics and in social affairs 
overall, as well as rendered Orthodoxy synonymous to Greekness (Danopoulos, 
2004: 49). This strong nationalistic character of the Orthodox Church goes 
hand-in-hand with its parochial “centrality and unchanging nature” that 
ultimately promote “anti-intellectualism and racist and xebophobic attitudes” 
(Danopoulos, 2004: 51). In this context, despite its charitable work within the 
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country, the Church’s narrowly perceived communitarian values contradict 
openness to and understanding of the distant Other. It is rather a factor for 
xenophobic and anti-Western tendencies characterising Greek cultural identity 
(Demertzis, 1994: 67), as these were described above.  
In this context, the dogmatic nature of Orthodox Church stands next to the 
conservatism of Greek nationalism in sustaining and reproducing practices of 
xenophobia and cultural and social discrimination against ethnic minorities, 
especially the small number of Slavo-Macedonians in northern Greece and, most 
importantly, the large Muslim minority in Thrace, the majority of whom are 
culturally Turks but are not allowed to be identified as such (Mouzelis and 
Pagoulatos, 2005: 90). Although discriminating practices have weakened in the 
last couple of decades, partly due to governmental affirmative action policies, 
xenophobia and racism are on the rise, especially against immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and northern Balkans (notable example of whom are the 
Albanians) (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2005: 95; see, for example, 
Hatziprokopiou, 2003).  
These characteristics, although not exhaustive, broadly describe the social, 
cultural and political landscape in Greece as the context for the present study. 
There are a few points to be highlighted from this discussion as the most 
relevant for the audience engagement with distant suffering. First, the pervasive 
politicisation of public life and public discourses frames and underlines the 
ways people make sense of social life and their place in it. Closely related to that, 
this politicisation is implicated in the broad lack of a strong civil society as a way 
of orienting the people to common public cause outside the political, or rather 
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party politics. Finally, there are a number of characteristics in Greek culture that 
are related to inward looking and xenophobic attitudes, mostly encouraged by 
the dominant role played by the Church or the “underdog culture” that 
underlines the way Greeks understand world politics and public life. As will 
become evident in the empirical chapters of the thesis, these characteristics are 
significantly implicated in the way people position themselves in relation to the 
distant sufferers on the media screens.  
3.4. Conducting the Focus Groups  
Conducting the focus group discussions was proved to be a much less 
straightforward process than initially expected. The hardest part of the process 
was convincing people to participate and making sure that they did show up on 
the planned day; its most rewarding aspect was the richness of the material 
obtained by most of the discussions.  
Respondents were accessed in three ways. Most of the focus groups were 
assembled through networks of friends and acquaintances. The idea was that 
one person would be the key contact, who would arrange a meeting with their 
own friends or colleagues and further contacts would be made from then on 
through the snowballing method (Gaskell, 2000). In other instances, people 
were contacted through groups or organisations they belong to, as was the case 
with the Red Cross in Komotini (Focus Group 5) or a football fun club in Athens 
(Focus Group 10). In these cases, there was no prior key contact with the 
participants but respondents were accessed through visits to the meeting points 
of these groups. Finally, some participants were accessed by the simple way of 
me talking about my research at different social settings (for example Group 7 
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was assembled from young women that were introduced to the research at a 
beauty salon). In all cases, it was ensured that the people selected to participate 
in the research were conforming to the criteria of segmentation as outlined 
above.  
Ensuring participation to the focus group discussions was proved to be a hard 
process. A lot of viewers, unfamiliar with the concept of focus groups or 
academic research for that matter, were initially reluctant to participate, 
worrying that the discussions would test their knowledge and skills. Most of 
them were even surprised that their opinions would be of any academic interest 
and would express their feelings of inadequacy in the beginning of the 
discussions. Some even asked whether they should prepare by reading 
something in advance. The group of housewives I talked to in Komotini were 
rather harshly teasing one of the members of the group by telling me she did not 
manage to get any sleep the previous night due to her stress about the 
discussion and that she had spent the last few days “reading encyclopaedias” 
(Group 2). Constant efforts of reassurance had to be made before the conduct of 
the discussions that what was of interest was what people thought rather than 
what they knew.  
Once respondents accepted to participate, arrangements were made so that the 
place and time of the discussion were of convenience to all. Despite these 
efforts, however, there were cases when respondents cancelled at the last 
minute. This resulted in some of the groups having considerably less members 
than initially planned and in comparison to what the general rule of thumb of 
six-eight people recommends (Morgan, 1998: 71). The groups were generally 
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consisted by a mean of around four people, varying from two to seven 
participants. In the end, this turned out to be rather effective, since participants 
in smaller groups had more time to debate and express their views. Indeed, in 
the focus groups that consisted of seven members (Focus Group 6), it proved 
hard work to ensure that everybody’s views would be heard, since more silent 
participants found it easier to avoid involvement, as well as to keep the 
discussion in order and the respondents focused, as they would have the 
tendency to get divided into smaller groups.  
The discussions were conducted in locations suggested by the respondents 
themselves, mainly their homes but also places they would use to gather 
together, such as coffee places. This choice, apart from the practicalities of being 
the most convenient to the respondents, was also made on the basis of securing 
the most naturalistic setting possible, thus enhancing a relaxed and permissive 
atmosphere for the participants. Of course, this is not to deny the artificiality of 
focus groups as a set-up of a social situation (Kitzinger, 1994: 106). Rather, it 
reflects an attempt to encourage respondents to engage with one another in a 
setting they felt comfortable with.   
The discussions started with the presentation of three sets of photographs from 
the three respective disasters, without an explanation of what the disasters 
were. Launching the focus group discussions by presenting media material is a 
practice quite usual for media research (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996: 83). In this 
context, the photographs were used as a means to trigger the discussions rather 
than as their main focus. The sampling of the photographs was more random 
than purposeful, as it included the most clear and considered to be 
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characteristic of the disaster photographs displayed on the front pages of major 
newspapers during the respective periods. Participants were asked to attribute 
each of the set of photos to an important global disaster they could recall and 
then to retell the events about each of the disasters as they could remember 
them. This opening, although mainly aiming to probing the broader discussion, 
provided interesting information in terms of audience memory and attributed 
importance to the disasters. The discussions would later proceed in a relaxed 
and informal style, with the least intervention possible, so that apart from their 
views on the predetermined questions, respondents would also be able to 
indicate what other issues they regarded as important in relation to the main 
topic.  
Discussions varied in duration from fifty to eighty minutes and were generally 
successful in providing rich information on the issues discussed. Most of them 
flowed easily and were generally enjoyed by the participants themselves, a lot of 
whom expressed afterwards that they had found the experience more pleasant 
than initially expected. There were, however, rare occasions when it proved 
extremely difficult to keep the participants’ interest and engagement active (for 
example, Group 12). Nevertheless, even this kind of indifference can be 
interpreted as significant information in itself about the perceived relevance, or 
rather lack of it, of the issues addressed in people’s lives.  
3.5. Analysing the Focus Group Discussions Material  
The audiotapes of the focus group discussions were later transcribed amounting 
to a large amount of material for analysis. Aid for the analysis was provided by 
notes taken during and shortly after the discussion, which pointed towards the 
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most remarkable elements with regard to the interests of the study and 
summarized the main arguments displayed and the particularities of each 
group.  
The material was read repetitively before the detailed analysis took place. The 
analysis, underlined by the secondary research questions outlined in the 
beginning of the chapter, focused on the practices of media witnessing, media 
remembering and the issue of action at a distance. It was conducted on the basis 
of the principles of discourse analysis, informed by a combination of critical 
discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992; 1995; 2003) and discursive psychology 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987). The method focuses on the use of language not 
only in terms of content (what is being said) but also in terms of its functions 
(what is being done and how) (Wood and Kroger, 2000: 28). As such, discourse 
analysis allows the researcher to go beyond the denotative meaning of 
participants’ responses and explore the ways these responses are constructed 
through the choice of specific discursive choices excluding alternatives. In other 
words, it provides insights not only in what people think but how they have 
come to think this way.  
This emphasis of discourse analysis on “understanding and interpreting socially 
produced meanings rather than searching for objective causal explanations” 
(Howarth, 2000: 128) is in accordance with the interest of focus groups as a 
methodology on the social character of the construction and articulation of 
knowledge and opinions, as addressed above.  As the interest of the thesis is on 
the ways viewers discursively construct their agency vis-à-vis the suffering of 
distant others, the constructionist assumptions of both focus groups 
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methodology and discourse analysis seem to be suitable methodological choices 
in the context of the empirical research.  
Given the plurality of discourse analytic perspectives and the lack of specific 
procedural description of applying the method (Gill, 2000: 177), the analysis 
draws upon a variety of relevant work (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wodak 
et al., 1999; Billig, 1987; 1988; 1991; 1992; Fairclough, 1992; 1995; 2003). The 
first strand of discourse analysis informing this study is Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) as developed by Fairclough (Fairclough, 1992; 1995; 2003) and 
Chouliaraki (Chouliaraki, 2007; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999).  
Critical discourse analysis takes as a point of departure the conceptualisation of 
discourse as a social practice, which, in dialectic relation with other non-
discursive practices (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999) contributes to the 
“constitution of the social world, including social identities and social relations” 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 61). In terms of analytical focus, the methodology 
takes “the larger discursive unit of text to be the basic unit of communication” 
(Wodak, 2001: 2). The framework of analysis expands from the close textual 
analysis - the “internal” relations of text (Fairclough, 2003: 36) to the 
relationship of the texts to other elements of social events, practices and 
structures – the “external” relations of text (Fairclough, 2003: 36). Drawing 
upon the principles of critical discourse analysis, two main analytical categories 
were identified here in relation to the research questions: the viewers’ 
discursive strategies of representing agency (Van Leeuwen, 1996; Fairclough, 
2003: 145-6) and the discursive strategies of perspectivation and involvement 
(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 82; Kryžanowski and Wodak, 2007: 105).  
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In relation to the construction of agency, the analysis draws upon Van 
Leeuwen’s framework on the representation of social actors in discourse (Van 
Leeuwen, 1996). For the purposes of the research the following discursive 
practices have been especially relevant in the context of the analysis: 
nomination and categorization; functionalisation, namely the description of 
actors on the basis of what they do (for example, victims or sufferers) and 
identification, which defines actors in terms of what they are (for example 
Greeks or Americans); personalization and impersonalisation; individualization 
and assimilation (Van Leeuwen, 1996). The use of personal pronouns is 
particularly instructive in terms of categorization (for example, “we”, “our”, 
“they”) (Billig, 1992), as devices for the construction of unity, sameness or 
difference and distinction (Wodak et al., 1999: 35). As it will be made explicit in 
the empirical chapters of the thesis, these distinctions in talking about agency 
play an important role in the evaluation of social actors and the attribution of 
agency, either in terms of the viewers’ self-representation or the victims’ and 
other actors’ representation. With regard to attribution of agency, the discursive 
strategy of role allocation was also explored in distinguishing between actors 
represented as “agents” or “patients” with respect to given action (Van 
Leeuwen, 1996: 43). Finally, equally important for the analysis were practices of 
exclusion, namely the omission of specific actors or categories of actors from the 
discussion. What is absent in discourse is just as important as what is present.  
The discursive strategies of involvement, on the other hand, “aim both at 
expressing the speakers’ inner states, attitudes and feelings or degrees of 
emotional interest and engagement and at emotionally and cognitively engaging 
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the hearers in the discourse” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 82). Strategies of 
involvement or, adversely, detachment, are realized in discourse through the 
use of spatial (for example “here”, “there”, “our country”) and temporal deixis 
(“at that moment”, “then”), direct or indirect speech, active or passive voice, as 
well as the use or not of linguistic markers of emphasis and intensification, such 
as intensity markers (for example, “really”, “very”) or verbs and phrases that 
encode the speakers emotions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 82). As it will be 
further discussed in the empirical chapters, these linguistic choices articulate 
the viewers’ engagement with distant suffering, as well as their sense of 
proximity and distance from the events and the suffering victims.    
Finally, the analysis also draws upon the tradition of discursive psychology 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 1987; 1988; 1991; 1992), which emphasises 
the active use of discourses as resources in talk-in-interaction and the context-
bound nature of utterances and attitude expressions (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 110). Whereas critical discourse analysis focuses on unravelling and 
denaturalizing the way ideological power structures are constructed in and 
through discourse, discursive psychology is looking into interaction in discourse 
and the details of talk among discussants (Simpson and Mayr, 2010: 61). 
Underlying assumption of discursive psychology and, in particular, the 
rhetorical approach is that argumentative strategies are dependent upon the 
context of argumentation (Billig, 1987). In other word, understanding the 
meaning of a statement requires its consideration in relation to what the 
counter-statements, which it opposes, are (Billig, 1987: 245). This accounts for 
the inconsistencies and variations of arguments a discussant might draw upon. 
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Discursive psychology has used these principles of conversation analysis to 
think about and explore practices of remembering based on the assumption that 
what is remembered and forgotten is both flexible and occasioned on the 
“interactive business of communicative action” (Middleton, 1997: 73). 
Remembering in this context is explored as offering versions of events, which 
are examined “in terms of the specific contexts of situated action for which they 
are constructed” (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 27). It is this approach to 
remembering as well as its focus on the negotiation of meaning within 
discursive interaction that render this approach especially relevant for the 
purposes of the present study.  
Drawing upon this tradition of discourse analysis, the final analytical category to 
the focus group material consists of a focus on the argumentation strategies 
employed by the participants. The analysis of the discussions explores in 
particular the “topoi” or “loci” used in the discussions. These can be described as 
the commonsense principles that function as “content related warrants of 
‘conclusion rules’ that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, 
the claim” and as such “they justify the transition from the argument to the 
conclusion” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 74-75). The interplay between different 
topoi within the discussion depending upon the discursive context and the 
different positions people find themselves arguing against (Billig, 1987: 247) is 
of great interest here. Participants in the discussions would often move between 
different discursive positions and draw upon a variety of topoi, such as 
humanitarianism, national community or political mistrust, in different 
occasions during the discussions.   
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3.5. Issues of evaluation and reflexivity 
Social science research has been traditionally evaluated against the criteria of 
validity and reliability. The latter refers to the internal consistency of the 
research, which is required to produce the same results on repetition. Validity, 
on the other hand, concerns the extent to which the methodological and 
analytical choices capture what they were chosen to explore (Gaskell and Bauer, 
2000: 340). There are two ways the validity of a research can be thought of: 
first, as the accuracy of the interpretation of the results through the adoption of 
a specific procedure; second, in terms of generalisability of the results in a way 
that can reflect reality, which has been often referred to as “external validity” 
(Brewer, 2000: 10).  
However, both concepts have been challenged in the field of qualitative 
research, as presumably based on positivist assumptions about social reality 
and its empirical investigation (Seal, 1999). Reliability as repetition is hard to 
assess in qualitative research, where the analysis deals with complex concepts 
rather than numbers.  It is even impossible in relation to focus groups 
methodology, where even the same group of people might generate different 
results, if asked the same questions again. This has been particularly the case in 
the field of discourse studies. Validity proves an equally challenging concept, 
since it is tested against truth claims, which are fundamentally against a 
discursive approach to the constructed nature of reality. In the same way, 
triangulation, widely used by social researchers, to warrantee soundness of 
results is considered “inconsistent with the principles of discourse analysis in 
that it assumes that different versions…can be taken as a route to something 
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behind them, and further, that there is one correct version” (Wood and Kroger, 
2000: 176). Thus, alternative criteria have been suggested for the evaluation of 
empirical analysis, to match the tradition’s metatheoretical and epistemological 
perspectives. 
Following Wood and Kroger, the notion of validity here is concerned with the 
trustworthiness and soundness of the research and its claims (Wood and 
Kroger, 2000: 169). Crucial in that respect is the documentation of the research 
process in a way that gives a clear description of all facets of the research not in 
order to be able to test its replicability but to understand the claims made 
(Wood and Kroger, 2000: 169). In terms of soundness, the analysis is judged 
mostly in terms of the demonstration of its grounding on the empirical material 
and the plausibility of its claims (Wood and Kroger, 2000: 171; 174). Equally 
important here is the inclusion of participants’ own orientation during the 
discussion in the analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 170). This ensures that 
the analysis is not merely based on pre-established categories, blind to new 
directions, but also takes into account what respondents themselves see as 
important.  
Especially in terms of external validity, it has already been noted above that the 
purpose of the research is not the generalisability of its results but the 
exploration of everyday discourses on distant suffering. As Gaskell argues, 
qualitative research does not aim at “counting opinions or people but rather 
exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the issue” 
(Gaskell, 2000: 41). It has already been thoroughly explained how the 
methodological and sampling choices made served this purpose.  
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The above issues were the guiding lines throughout the conduct of the research 
and the analysis of the empirical material. However, there are number of factors 
inherent in the research process that have to be taken into account. The first has 
to do with the use of focus groups and the constructed nature of their context. 
Although adopted as a method closest to processes of everyday talk, focus 
groups are still of a constructed character, which generally implements a 
normative context on the discussions. Far from being a naturally occurring 
situation, a focus group discussion constitutes a “deliberately constructed 
exchange between the moderator and the members of the group interview” 
(Morrison, 1998: 166). Participants in the discussion are aware that their input 
will be used by the moderator for her own purposes. There are two implications 
of this “moderator demand” (Morrison, 1998: 184): on the one hand, the 
presence of the moderator in itself can push respondents towards specific 
answers that they think mostly relate to the researcher’s interests; in a closely 
related way, participants often self-censor themselves, avoiding expressing 
opinions that can be interpreted as extremist or prejudiced. In order to 
minimize the effect of these issues, the topic of the research was never explicitly 
and thoroughly explained to the participants, unless requested after the 
discussions were finished; usually the research interest was generally defined 
as “people’s opinions about major disasters that occurred rather recently”. The 
use of naturally occurring groups is also a way of minimizing the effect of the 
normative assumptions (Kitzinger, 1995: 302). Participants did not feel obliged 
to create a positive image in front of people they already knew quite well and, in 
case they did, they would often be challenged by the other people in the group. 
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These techniques seem to have been effective in the context of the present 
research.   
Another important aspect that has to be taken into account was my own role in 
the research process. Two are the issues of greater significance. The first has to 
do with the fact that, being Greek myself, I am sharing the same cultural 
characteristics as my research subjects. Studying one’s own culture has been a 
major issue in social research, especially in relation to ethnographic studies. It 
has been common knowledge within the field of anthropology, where these 
debates were initially addressed, that only through the immersion of the 
researcher in the culture of the studied population could the former actually 
comprehend the “structures of signification” (Geertz, 2000: 9) of the latter. By 
getting familiarized with the culture, customs and behaviours of their 
respondents, researchers are able to discern the hidden, connotative meaning of 
their actions and responses and clarify ambivalences and paradoxes that seem 
incomprehensible to the outsider. These abilities are more of a given when 
somebody is studying their own culture. Such a first-hand familiarization, 
however, could prove to be a trap in its blinding the researcher towards the 
taken-for-granted commonsense assumptions of the studied culture, which she 
also shares (Chock, 1986: 87). Participants themselves, also taking for granted 
the researcher’s sharing of their cultural views, might often find it unnecessary 
to elaborate on statements that are commonplaces in their culture. Being 
reflexive on one’s own position in the dominant culture and critically addressing 
commonsense assumptions during the analysis are ways such obstacles can be 
addressed.   
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The second aspect of the researchers’ identity possibly affecting the research 
field consists in their status as seen by the respondents’ perspective. My status 
as a researcher was intimidating at times, creating a distance with the focus 
group participants. The initial reluctance of some people to participate into 
something they were mistakenly regarding as a knowledge test has already 
been addressed. The fact that the research was conducted within the 
institutional framework of a British university was a factor that would 
contribute to this. Funnily enough, at points I was addressed as a mediator with 
the British public, urged by some respondents to “say that to the British” or “to 
Blair” (Focus Group 2) or not to include something that might have been 
insulting to them. However, being young and female was a counter factor to this 
constructed distance with the respondents. I would often be addressed by the 
members of the older groups as “the girl” or the “kid” and they would often 
express their willingness to do “everything they could to help me”12. My gender 
was proved to be an issue only in the case of one group of young working-class 
men (Focus Group 9), who would use humour and irony at an excessive degree 
apparently challenging my control over the situation (Schwalbe and Wolkomir, 
2002). In this case, I had to try and establish myself as one of the group by 
laughing at the participants’ jokes and avoided direct questions, mostly by 
asking them their opinions as outsiders on the events and other people’s 
reactions (Adler and Adler, 2002: 529).     
                                                        
12 This of course had a two-sided effect, since there was the fear that respondents would try to 
satisfy me by trying to say things that I needed to hear. It was in these cases that it was most 
important to avoid leading questions. 
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Summary and conclusions 
The present chapter has set out the methodological and analytical framework of 
the research process. It justified the choice of focus group discussions as the 
methodology selected for the gathering of the empirical material with regard to 
the research questions of the thesis, which focus on the audience of suffering 
and the discursive articulation of their agency. Given the theoretical assumption 
that the viewer’s moral agency is discursively constructed and articulated 
through social interaction, focus groups were deemed to be the appropriate 
methodology for the research concerns of the thesis.  
The chapter also described the research process in terms of planning, 
organizing and conducting the focus group discussions with members of 
different segments of the Greek audience and contextualized the Greek viewers 
with regard to their information environment as constructed through the 
commercialization of television news in Greece.  
The chapter has described the analytical principles of the exploration of the 
empirical material based on the premises of discourse analysis. Two strands of 
discourse analysis were in particularly employed, namely Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Fairclough, 1992; 1995; 2003; Wodak et al., 1999) and discursive 
psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1993; Billig, 1987; 
1988). The analysis aims at exploring the way viewers position themselves as 
witnesses of the suffering of others, the kinds of responsibility they attribute to 
themselves with regard to this suffering, and the different ways they 
reconstruct their memories of stories of such suffering, as witnessed through 
the media.  
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The research design both in terms of methodology of gathering the material and 
its analysis is based on the assumption that through discursive interaction, 
participants actively construct identities for themselves and each other and 
represent the world not “abstractly but in the course of and for the purposes of 
their social relations with others and their construction of social identities” 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 41). In this context, the way viewers talk 
about media stories of distant suffering with each other illustrate how they 
construct their interpretations of these events as well as their position towards 
them and their perceptions of the distant sufferers.  This audience talk was 
analytically distinguished – and with regard to the conceptual framework 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the secondary research questions presented in the 
beginning of this chapter – into three discursive categories: media witnessing 
(namely the discursive construction of the viewer as a witness), media 
remembering (the discursive reconstruction of the viewers’ memories of the 
events) and action at a distance (the discursive construction of the viewer as an 
actor vis-à-vis the suffering witnessed). These three analytic categories will be 
addressed in the following empirical chapters.  
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Chapter 4 Media witnessing 
I now return to the empirical analysis of the focus group discussions in order to 
address the ways in which participants positioned themselves as witnesses of 
mediated disasters. The focus of this chapter is on the participants’ emotional 
engagement with media stories of distant suffering. In the analysis, I take as a 
point of departure the assumption that the audiences’ experiences of witnessing 
can be analyzed in terms of the three tensions of mediation identified in Chapter 
2: the tension between emotional involvement and rationalised detachment, the 
one between hospitality and indifference and, finally, the tension between 
viewers’ complicity and responsibility in relation to the media representations. 
What this analysis enables me to do is to produce a ‘typology of witnessing’, 
which identifies in some detail the specific conditions upon which the 
experience of media witnessing may allow for certain forms of moral 
engagement and not others. I argue, in particular, that the emotional agency of 
the viewer is contingent upon the events witnessed, their textual representation 
by the media, as well as broader cultural and social discourses.  
This typology consists of four articulations of the witnessing position. The first 
articulation is that of affective witnessing, characterised by expressions of 
empathetic connections between the viewer and the distant sufferers. Ecstatic 
witnessing, as described here, is an exceptional case of affective witnessing, 
where the high levels of emotionality are closely connected to the audiovisual 
qualities of the media text and their impact on momentarily annihilating the 
spatial and temporal limits between viewers and event. Politicised witnessing, on 
the other hand, is highly embedded in cultural, local and national frameworks, 
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distinguishing between victims worthy and unworthy of empathy. Finally, there 
is the detached witness for whom the perceived banality of suffering and safety 
of the local restricts the possibility for an emotional connection between viewer 
and sufferer. In the rest of the chapter, I will illustrate these four types of 
witnessing, drawing upon the focus group discussions and the participants’ 
discourses. Each type of witnessing is presented below with reference to its 
characteristics in relation to the three tensions. 
4.1 Affective witnessing  
The use of affective language was particularly common in the participants’ 
accounts of their experience of witnessing distant disasters. Words like “shock”, 
“was touched” or “was moved” were often used to describe both their emotional 
reactions to the events on the screen and their feelings towards the suffering of 
the victims.  
It is this type of witnessing, describing participants’ affective reactions and 
emotional expressions, that I call ‘affective’ witnessing. The concept of 
“affective” is employed here to describe the dependence of viewers’ responses 
and engagement on the visual stimuli of the television image of the sufferer, 
with an emphasis on her body and emotion. Affect in this context is understood 
as the impact of the sufferer’s body on the viewer’s (Zembylas, 2006: 309). 
Affect has been theorised as a non-conscious and unstructured physiological 
experience as a response to stimuli (Tomkins, 1962; Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987; Massumi, 1996). In this context, affect differs from emotion as the latter is 
the transformation of affect after conscious attention and reflection (Massumi, 
2002). In other words, it can be argued that affect pertains to the body and 
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emotion to the mind (Zembylas, 2006: 310; see also Shouse, 2005). However, 
they are also intrinsically interlinked concepts, as the emotion is the product of 
affect. As participants in the focus groups described the affective impact of the 
image as they experienced it, their affected response was translated into 
emotional terms and expressions such as the above. However, and despite the 
transformation of affect into emotion in discourse, the concept of “affective” is 
chosen here instead of that of “emotional” in order to account for the initial 
affective response of the viewer.  
This category of witnessing, which focuses on the description of inner feelings 
as motivations for reactions, constructs the viewer as an emotional agent, who 
relates to the distant sufferer primarily through a process of empathetic 
identification with her or his suffering. Affective witnessing applies to a variety 
of events that were mentioned during the focus group discussions and can be 
defined in terms of specific characteristics that consistently emerge across 
audience discourses: 
• The employment of strategies of involvement realised through the use of 
verbs and phrases that expressed the viewers’ emotional response to the 
suffering they witnessed on the screen (“I was shocked”, “I get upset”). 
• The centrality of personalised stories of suffering, where the victims of 
the disasters were represented through discursive specification and 
particularisation (“the image of a girl”, “the child”, “the mother”).  
• The construction of commonalities with the victims, through the use of 
empathetic connections with the suffering people on the screen. 
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Linguistically, this was achieved through the use of pronouns (“we”) or 
choice of verbs (“we empathise with”).   
These three characteristics constructed the practice of witnessing as a highly 
emotional experience, whereby the viewer becomes a moral agent primarily 
through the expression of affective responses, mostly characterised by empathy 
and compassion towards the victim. The way this construction of moral agency 
takes place will be further explored in the discussion below, where affective 
witnessing is discussed in relation to the three moral tensions of mediation.  
4.1.1 Emotional involvement as empathetic identification  
The construction of the affective witness was centred on two basic discursive 
elements: the description of an image singularising particular sufferers on the 
screen and the articulation of the affective impact of the image on the viewer. 
This dual argumentative structure is illustrated in the following quote of a 
viewer talking about his experience of the Tsunami disaster: 
Dimitris: The image of a girl, on its own, that was running, I mean, that 
was from the Tsunami…of a girl that was crying non-stop, she had just 
found out that her parents were found drowned on a beach and stuff, 
and she runs and calls her little brother. Among the wreckages, in a 
deserted place. Well, that was it! I was shocked at that point, I started 
crying on the spot!...When you see people on the screen…When you see 
their emotions…How can you do otherwise? You cry!  
(Male, 27, middle-class, FG8) 
In articulating his position as a witness, this viewer combines two forms of 
reporting: the description of the victim’s suffering, what Boltanski calls, the 
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“external report” (“the image of a girl…”) with the depiction of the viewer’s 
emotional response to that description (“I was shocked…”), or, in Boltanski’s 
words, the “internal report”, which expresses “the states through which the 
heart passes” (1999: 86).  
The viewer’s emotional response here confirms the power of visuals in 
capturing audience’s emotional imagination (Cohen, 2001: 173; Höijer, 2004: 
520; Sontag, 2003: 85) and, in particular, the significance of the singularisation 
and personalisation of suffering in the process of visualisation (Boltanski, 1999: 
11; Chouliaraki, 2006: 123). Personal stories of suffering, in their detail, seem to 
arouse audience’s imagination and emotional engagement. Victims singled out 
from the masses of sufferers become real people to whom audiences are able to 
relate to. These specific figures of sufferers seem to combine in their specificity 
the possibility of the spectator to both think of the suffering – that is, of thinking 
people suffering from the consequences of disasters but without necessarily 
considering that this takes place – and think that extreme suffering is actually 
being experienced by others, there and then, connecting the idea of suffering to 
the particular situations on the screen. As discussed in Chapter 2, this double 
articulation of the process of thinking, thinking of and thinking that, is central 
for the spectator’s imagination and necessary for the expression of commitment 
and emotional involvement with the scene of suffering (Boltanski, 1999: 51). 
In expressing his own emotions towards the suffering, the participant above 
also introduces an implicit evaluative dimension of the appropriate response to 
suffering and, at the same time, attempts to engage the rest of the group in this 
kind of involvement. The rhetoric question “How can you do otherwise?” is 
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indicative of this attempt. Empathy is not presented merely as a personal 
reaction but as an indisputable moral response to suffering. In affective 
witnessing, the viewers’ emotional engagement is articulated as the 
spontaneous or natural feeling of empathy and compassion that emanates from 
the image of the individual sufferer. 
On the other end of this highly emotional involvement of the viewer with the 
scene of suffering, was the frustration about being unable to act upon the 
suffering. The following quote, from a discussion of the 2006 Lebanon war, 
which was taking place contemporarily with the research, is indicative of this 
position: 
Olga: There was somebody [on TV] holding a dead kid in their arms 
and was saying…and crying… 
Ira: Then I just lose my joy for life!  
Olga: What else is there to see! I don’t want to! I don’t want to analyse 
it, I don’t want anything! I mean, it’s shameful! You feel bad that 
there’s a man there holding a child in his arms saying “here’s my 
child!”. There’s no image worse than this one!...No matter how just the 
war is! 
Chrysa: But that’s how we are, us human beings, we need to be shocked 
in order to get involved! 
Olga: I see the child and I get goosebumps and I cry and then what, it 
doesn’t stop, does it?  
Penelope: We don’t do anything! No, we do nothing! 
Ira: We can’t do anything! 
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Olga: It’s an embarrassment being a human being! And you tell 
yourself “shame on me, I’d rather not switch the television on! So that I 
don’t get shamed over and over again”!  
(Female, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG4) 
The intense emotional involvement of the viewers with the scene of suffering 
also marks the limits of their engagement with it. The focus on the viewers’ 
accounts is on their own affective response rather than on the reality of the 
suffering. To go back to Boltanski’s distinction between internal and external 
report, the former overtakes the latter, in an indulgence to the sentiment of the 
viewer, which overshadows the description of the victim’s reality (Boltanski, 
1999: 98). As seen in the extract above, the focus of the discussion is on how 
this image makes the viewers feel, the internal account of their affective 
response described through the employment of a variable vocabulary of 
sentiment, “shame”, “shock”, “goosebumps”. The mismatch, however, between 
these intense emotions and the perceived impossibility to act upon the suffering 
renders the former obsolete.   
As a consequence of this impossibility to act, what is illustrated in this extract is 
the need of the viewer to “work through” the emotional experience of 
witnessing (Ellis, 2001). The urgency of the situation, recognised as “an aching 
sense that something has to be done” (Ellis, 2001: 11) cannot be translated as an 
invitation for action by the viewer, it is, therefore, only experienced as 
emotionally disturbing and, as such, something to be avoided:  
Gerasimos: When I watch a disaster, I watch what happened and I 
don’t want to know anything else. Because I get upset, I start thinking 
this and that, and every time this happens, I don’t want to learn any 
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details. I don’t know if this is bad, I don’t think I would get any better 
by sitting and watching how the children get killed, the mothers, these 
stories that are tragic and they shake you emotionally. When I see the 
mother crying...I saw the other day that there was an earthquake 
somewhere in Peru, where was it? When did it happen lately? And a 
woman says “I’ve lost my family!”. Where was that? Was it in Peru? It’s 
a week now that it took place. I was so sorry for her! She says “I’ve lost 
my entire family!”. What about that?! What more should I see! That’s 
what I’m telling you, I don’t...”.  
(male, 56, middle-class, FG11) 
Expressing an initially strong emotional engagement with the scene of suffering, 
this viewer’s reflection on the experience of witnessing eventually leads him to 
disengage from the event13. Conscious as he is of the normative framework 
against which his judgment is made (“I don’t know if this is bad”), he rationalises 
his choice precisely on the basis of the extreme emotional intensity of mediated 
witnessing. It is because of the tension between distance and the moral 
compulsion to act, inherent in the mediation of suffering, that the viewer prefers 
to consciously disengage from the suffering and stop watching it.   
4.1.2 Empathetic identification and hospitality  
Hospitality, defined in Chapter 2 as the willingness of the viewer to engage with 
and understand the other, is based on the empathetic identification of the 
spectator with the sufferer. As in Boltanski’s topic of sentiment, the relationship 
established between spectator and unfortunate is a relationship of “heart to 
                                                        
13 The quote here also offers interesting insights into the implication of the image’s affective 
impact on the viewer’s remembering of the events. He recalls the face and words of the woman 
on the screen but not the disaster that led to her suffering (“there was an earthquake somewhere 
in Peru, where was it? When did it happen lately?”), a theme that will be further explored in the 
next chapter.  
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heart, going from interiority to interiority” (Boltanski, 1999: 81). It is a 
relationship established on the basis of the spectator’s emotional response to 
the sufferer’s emotional pain, as perceived and imagined by the viewer. In 
affective witnessing, the image of the other makes the viewers feel and think of 
the victim’s suffering in relation to their own lifeworlds and frames of reference:  
Gerasimos: Whenever I see a human face I feel sorry as if it were my 
mother. There have been times when I said “she could be my mother”, 
let’s say. You understand... 
(male, 56, middle-class, FG11) 
The sufferer, as a face that renders the pain imaginable, becomes an object of 
concern, reflection and emotional engagement. In this context, two seem to be 
the preconditions of the viewer’s hospitality towards the sufferer: first, the 
image of the human face, which renders the suffering visible (“Whenever I see a 
human face”) and, second, the assumption of the commonality of human pain, 
which renders the suffering of the other imaginable and relatable to the viewer 
(“she could be my mother”). There is a certain degree of narcissism, however, in 
such expressions of empathy. The participants’ emotional connections to the 
sufferers are expressed on the assumption that the latter are people similar to 
the participants and thus experiencing and feeling things in similar ways.  
This illustrates an apparent collapse of distance between the spectators and the 
distant others on the basis of the perceived sameness in the face of human pain. 
This is not to say that the physical distance has been ignored and eclipsed; 
rather, as Silverstone puts it, identification with the other entails “the elision of 
the different to the same” and “the refusal to recognise the irreducibility in 
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otherness” (Silverstone, 2007: 47). The specificity of the suffering and the 
particularities of the context it emerges in are neglected. In the quote in the 
previous section, Gerasimos empathises with the woman that “lost [her] family” 
but does not comment on the context of her suffering. In a similar vein, a group 
of women claimed to be moved by suffering, as their families, parents and 
grandparents, had “went through the same things”, as they had experienced war 
and displacement.  
Litsa: And I called my mother the other day and she was crying! Here, I 
told you, Penny, didn’t I? Not today, you know about this! And I tell her, 
“mum, why? Your blood pressure will go up”. And she was crying cos 
she was watching images from Lebanon, and she was saying that she 
had experienced the same things in the war with the Germans… 
(female, 45, working-class, FG2)  
In this context, hospitality is conditional on the assumption of sameness. The 
viewer is moved by the image of the other on the screen and is affected by the 
morally compelling nature of her suffering, in so far as this suffering is 
understood in familiar terms, such as the loss of loved ones. In affective 
witnessing the particularities of the suffering that escape the screen, also escape 
the attention of the viewer. Empathy does not necessarily encompass 
understanding and judgement, essential for a duty of care, as described by 
Silverstone (Silverstone, 2007: 47).  
The conditionality of empathy on the visibility of specific faces and human 
stories underlines the circumstantial character of the viewers’ emotions and 
illustrates the problematic of particularisation, which lies at the heart of 
affective witnessing and, indeed, of the representation of suffering. In order for 
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private emotions towards the sufferer to be translated into an engagement with 
the suffering as a public cause, suffering needs to be concrete in its 
representation, allowing for the viewer’s imagination to bridge the distance 
with the victim, while at the same time retaining its generalisability(Boltanski, 
1999: 100). However, what the case of affective witnessing illustrates, is that the 
relationship with the other, emotional and engaging as it is, is based on the 
visual and its morally compelling nature. As such, it is bound up with a 
particular situation. It therefore does not easily and necessarily translate into a 
generalised politics of pity and moral duty of care (Boltanski, 1999: 100). 
Empathy is expressed towards “the image of a girl”, “the mother crying”, “the 
children”, vulnerable figures that have been described in the literature as “ideal 
victims” (Moeller, 1999). Affective witnessing, as illustrated here, is biased 
towards the particular in a way that the relationship with the distant other is 
consumed through compassion towards specific faces and figures.  
Characteristic of this difficulty in generalising viewers’ emotional responses 
from the particularity of the pained face to the masses of the victims was the 
substitution of the empathetic references to specific sufferers by detached 
generalisations when referring to the entirety of sufferers, described through 
discursive practices of impersonalisation and objectification. In this way, the 
victims were described in the discussion as “the wretched” (Focus group 2 and 
8), “the hungry” (FG1, 2 and 9), people who “would even eat the expired products” 
(FG1) sent to them by charity organizations, the “dead bodies” or the “damned” 
(FG8). Whereas the compelling image of individual sufferers instigated 
empathetic connections between the viewer and the distant other, general talk 
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about the sufferers as a whole would construct them as aggregates of victims 
displacing their agency and emphasizing the irreducibility of difference between 
the viewer and the suffering distant other. Hospitality is thus delimited and 
fragmented.  
Affective witnessing, in this context, describes the moral positioning of the 
viewer in a way that recognises the other on the screen as a singular face, the 
situation of whom is imaginable on the basis of the perceived commonality of 
human pain. Hospitality for the other is, therefore, conditioned by the 
imaginability of the suffering, itself contingent upon the visibility of particular 
cases and victims.   
4.1.3 Sensationalism and complicity  
The last dimension of affective witnessing addressed here concerns the 
relationship between the spectator of suffering and the media. It has been 
argued so far that the visualisation of the pain of distant others, as expressed by 
particular people on the screen, was at the heart of the experience of affective 
witnessing. At the same time, however, this visualisation was also at the centre 
of the viewer’s critical engagement with the media representational practices. 
Journalistic sensationalism, described as the morbid fascination of the media to 
focus on the most hurt and devastated, while reporting the events, was the main 
point of this criticism:  
Maria: Why should we see everything?! And they have this 
melodramatic music and they show the faces and then they go above 
the crying mother and they ask: “How do you feel?” How should she be 
feeling?! 
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(female, 45, middle-class, FG5) 
These criticisms are moralizing, in that they question the ethics of graphic 
representations of suffering and the limits between witnessing and voyeurism. 
This critical engagement with the media is dependent on the viewers’ ability to 
decipher and recognise regularities in the journalistic conventions of covering 
suffering (Boltanski, 1999: 84). Through a long familiarity with these practices 
of reporting suffering and crises, the viewer recognises the reporter’s attempt to 
move them on the basis of a constructed sentimentality.   
However, there is a paradox here. Despite extended criticism of media reporting 
for its emphasis on emotionally charged scenes and the sensational depiction of 
human pain, it was mostly these images that also proved to be the participants’ 
anchoring point for emotional identification with the sufferer. When asked 
about their experience of the events, participants would often draw upon this 
repertoire of people crying over lost family members or similar images. Some 
would even admit that this is what mostly attracted them in the daily news 
bulletins, namely stories of human pain. This paradox is best exemplified in the 
case of the following respondent, a housewife in her forties, who was vocal in 
her criticism of the media and journalists throughout the discussion accusing 
them of 
Litsa: …searching to find wherever there was a dead body, a dead child, 
a wrecked person to show them and try to attract bigger audience 
numbers! That’s what I have experienced! Of the media! 
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However, when she was asked along with the other respondents about her daily 
news consumption and the kind of news she was mostly interested in, she 
admitted the following after briefly hesitating 
If I have to be honest, it’s always news of human pain that attract 
us…It sells, that’s it! I think it’s awful, I say this, and yet I watch it! 
 (Female, 45, working-class, FG2) 
This seems to be a constitutive paradox in the mediated experience of 
witnessing: on the one hand, human pain, in order to be communicated and 
morally engaging, needs to focus on the human body in order to nourish the 
viewers’ imagination (Peters, 2005: 118; 262); on the other hand, this focus on 
sensation and the bodily pain renders suffering into a spectacle and viewers 
into voyeurs, lending itself into the critique of sensationalism (Seaton, 2005: 
127; Cohen, 2001: 204-205). The emotionally compelling nature of sensational 
images cannot be neglected. Even if the modality of reporting is being under 
attack, the existence of the suffering and its appeal to the emotionality of the 
viewers is beyond doubt. In affective witnessing, the viewers are affected by 
media representations in exactly the way they accuse the media of trying to 
affect them. In this way, the viewers fail to substantially challenge template 
journalistic reporting. On the contrary, and despite their critical approach to it, 
they are influenced by it and appropriate it in their discussions of the events.  
Furthermore, and despite their criticisms, viewers appear to be in a relation of 
collusion with the media representations of the suffering in accepting the media 
as a sufficient way to fully engage with it. One of the implications of the 
disengagement from the scene of suffering on the basis of the intensity of 
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emotions, as described above in section 4.1.1., is accepting the emotional 
engagement with the sufferer on the screen as an adequate form of involvement. 
This is also evident in the quote below, where one respondent is describing how 
witnessing events of human suffering “makes him feel a better person”:  
Dimitris: [I mean] that at that time, I realize…I mean, while sitting in 
front of the television, I realize my sentiment, I mean, whereas I don’t 
in my routine…Simply, when you witness things like these, I feel that I 
become a better person – in what sense? – in that I have a nice feeling 
about everybody, I mean…I feel happy about the people and say “well-
done”  to the people that help. How many times do you say “well-done” 
to people around you here, in the city where you live? Well-done her for 
doing this?...I will say “well-done” to the people that go and send 
humanitarian aid, well-done to the correspondents that are there and 
they are trying to speak, to find, they run in their jeeps, they live in 
wretchedness, even if it’s for five-six days, if they do their job...You feel 
sorry for the people for what happened to them. I’ve seen...I have cried, 
let’s say...And you know, I realise, you tell yourself, “it can’t be, since 
there is a tear on my face, it can’t be, I’m a human being, I feel 
something!” I mean, you are touched.  
(male, 27, middle-class, FG8) 
The quote is descriptive of the emotion of “tender-heartedness”, as approached 
by Boltanski (Boltanski, 1999). This emotion is addressed towards the 
benefactor, the victims, even the journalists who connect the viewer to the 
scene of suffering. He thus positions himself as an emotional agent vis-à-vis 
human pain, exemplifying the case of emotional engagement with the scene of 
suffering in affective witnessing as described above. However, what is also 
evident is the viewer’s indulgence in his own feelings (Boltanski, 1999: 99). It is 
him who “becomes a better person”, his humanity that is highlighted. The moral 
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actors, however, in the respondent’s account are the benefactors and the 
reporters; his own role as a public actor is not being reflected upon and 
questioned. What can be concluded from this is that the mere appearance of the 
sufferer on the screen is sufficient for the participant here to believe that he is 
adequately engaged with the suffering, in a relationship of collusion with the 
media representational practices. This indulgence in sentimentality, also 
addressed in section 4.1.1., constructs the viewer as a narcissistic spectator, 
emphasizing private emotionality and self-inspection (Lash, 1980; Illouz, 2007). 
Affective witnessing thus described overall favours sentimentality over 
judgment. It describes a type of witnessing, where the viewer emotionally 
engages with particular sufferers on the screen through the faculty of 
imagination. At the same time, however, this engagement is expressed through a 
narcissistic indulgence to emotion at the expense of judgment.  
4.2  Ecstatic witnessing 
There were two particular events that were distinguished as exceptional within 
the narratives of the respondents in terms of their emotional impact: the South 
Asian tsunami disaster, which was among the disasters initially addressed by 
the discussion topic guide, and September 11, which, although not included in 
the events participants were asked about, was extensively discussed by all 
groups as an exemplary case of a global disaster. The two events are, of course, 
hard to include within the same category, due to the great differences in their 
nature, occurrence and causes, 9/11 being the result of a terrorist attack on the 
United States, whereas the Tsunami a natural disaster, devastating mostly poor 
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areas14 but also claiming the lives of thousands of tourists from around the 
world, and especially Western Europe. In this sense both September 11 and the 
Tsunami involved the imaginary community of the West as an integral part of 
the experience of the suffering (Chouliaraki, 2008). Most importantly, a number 
of commonalities emerged through the ways the two disasters were discussed 
about by the focus group participants when describing their experiences as 
vicarious witnesses of the two events. These commonly perceived 
characteristics can be summarised in the following points:  
• The viewers’ emotional involvement with the suffering through 
emotionally charged verbs and expressions, in a way similar to affective 
witnessing but often at an intensified degree (“Oh, God!”, “so shocked”).  
• The sense that the viewers were immediate witnesses to the events at 
the time of their occurrence expressed through the extensive use of 
temporal and spatial deixis to indicate this sense of liveness and 
closeness to the scene of suffering (“at that moment”, “in front of our 
eyes”). This sense of “ecstatic” experience of the two disasters also had 
implications for their construction as “iconic events” through the practice 
of remembering, an issue that will be further discussed in the next 
chapter.  
                                                        
14 These are of course only a few of the differences between the two events. Equally important is 
the fact that the two disasters did not make the same moralising claims to the viewer: the 
Tsunami destruction left huge numbers of victims in need of aid, whereas the attack of the Twin 
Towers did not call for similar public action from the part of its spectators. However, what is 
important at this point and of interest in the present section is the way the two events were 
constructed in similar terms in audience discourses.   
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Overall, these two dimensions were implicated in the way viewers experienced 
their moral agency and constructed their status as witnesses of the two events. 
Drawing on Chouliaraki’s description of the coverage of September 11, this 
witnessing will be named here ecstatic witnessing15 (Chouliaraki, 2006). 
Characteristic of this kind of witnessing is that within the three tensions 
involved in the construction of the moral agency of the audience, viewers tend 
to move towards extreme positions of full immersion in the scene of suffering as 
presented on the screen: intense emotional involvement with the events 
witnessed with little reflection; unconditional hospitality towards the people 
suffering “in front of their eyes”; and unquestioning acceptance of the media 
coverage. Marked by a strong affective element ecstatic witnessing can be 
regarded as a version of affective witnessing, as that was described in the 
previous section. The extraordinary character of the emotional involvement of 
the spectator, however, and the sense of unmediated witnessing renders this 
type of moral positioning of the viewer an extreme case of affective witnessing.   
4.2.1 Ecstatic emotion 
Characteristic of the respondents’ narratives when describing their experience 
of the events, as broadcast during the Tsunami disaster and 9/11, was a sense of 
instantaneous proximity to the scene of suffering, a feeling that the viewer was 
witnessing the events as they were unfolding. This is indicated in the following 
                                                        
15 Chouliaraki uses the term “ecstatic news” to describe the coverage of September 11, as an 
event that was broadcast both as “a local tragedy” and as “global political fact”, in terms of its 
spatiality; and both as “contingent”, “lived experience”, and as historical in terms of its 
temporality. “Ecstatic time”, as she defines it, “breaks with the ordinary conception of time as a 
succession of “now” moments and presents us with truly historic time” (Chouliaraki, 2006: 158; 
emphasis in the original).  
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quote, where a participant is describing her experience of watching the collapse 
of the Twin Towers. 
Nana: I was realising…I mean, I would catch myself thinking – the 
plane having crashed on the, let’s say 50th floor-, wondering “what are 
the people up there doing? Is this the end? Is this it? I mean, is their life 
over?...Oh, God!  
(Female, 26, middle-class, FG3) 
The spectator’s emotional involvement is once more expressed in relation to 
specific people, in a way similar to the type of affective witnessing. This time, 
however, it is not the specificity of suffering faces that the viewers find 
emotionally compelling. Rather, it is in the urgency of the situation, itself 
created through the use of live footage, that the emotional force of the suffering 
lies.  
Tina: For example, with the Twin Towers, let’s say, the fact that people 
were jumping from the balconies and we could see it happening, we 
could see that at that moment this person had reached their limits, I 
mean, they had lost their mind at that point, I mean, what was going 
on in their mind that they thought that they could save themselves by 
falling from the window, which was on – I don’t know what floor, and 
they were doomed because of that, it was suicide what they were doing, 
but still…I was so shocked by that…so much…  
(Female, 26, middle-class, FG1).  
Watching the Tsunami disaster was also often described in similar terms of a 
feeling of urgency and immediacy of the suffering witnessed.  
Tina: The moment that you would see the wave to emerge and you 
would see the people that were on the street being taken by the wave 
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and then you wouldn’t see them anymore and that was going on, this is 
what affected me the most. Because you would actually see the event. I 
mean, in this case, we had visual contact with the event, we saw it 
taking place, I mean at that…there was a video and we saw it.   
(female, 26, middle-class, FG1) 
The mechanism of the spectators’ emotional immersion in the scene of 
suffering, their movement from thinking of suffering as a generalised reality to 
thinking that people suffer contemporaneously takes place in a similar way as 
described in the case of affective witnessing, instigated by visuals that render 
the suffering imaginable and emotionally compelling.  
There are, however, two characteristics that render this emotional involvement 
“ecstatic” and extreme in its expression. First, the viewers position themselves 
as immediate, simultaneous witnesses, almost present in the scene of suffering. 
The emotional vocabulary employed in affective witnessing is also present here 
(“I was shocked!”, “Oh, God!”). These expressions, however, are not only 
responses to the particular face of the sufferer but also to the fact that the 
suffering is being unfold in front of the viewers’ eyes, that they “could actually 
see the event”. This sense of immediacy is constructed through the frequent use 
of temporal deixis, such as “at that moment”, “at that point”, “anymore”, which 
immerses the viewer in the scene of suffering.   
The second characteristic of ecstatic witnessing is that what the viewers are 
faced with and experience is not only the pain of a particular sufferer but the 
sublime spectacle of death and the fear it instigates. They become witnesses of 
the death of people, which renders the experience even more emotionally 
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compelling and unsettling than the general spectacle of suffering. If for affective 
witnessing the link between spectator and sufferer was based on the 
assumption of the commonality of the human pain, in the case of the ecstatic 
witnessing it is based on the attempt of the viewer to comprehend the fear of 
the sufferer in the face of death. This incomprehensibility of the victims’ 
experience is evident in the participants’ rhetorical questions included in the 
quotes above: “what are the people up there doing? Is this the end?”, “what was 
going on in their mind that they thought that they could save themselves by 
falling”.  
These two characteristics, the perceived immediacy of witnessing and the 
spectacle of death, constitute a position of witnessing which is overwhelmed by 
emotion. This intense emotional engagement overwhelms the viewer to the 
expense of reflexive contemplation. The emotional power of the image seems to 
be such as to absorb the spectator into a fully sentimental experience. The 
specificities of the suffering, the causes of the disaster and its broader impact 
seem irrelevant in the light of the emotionally compelling images. This is not to 
say that both the Tsunami and the 9/11 attack as moments of crisis were 
exclusively discussed in relation to the moments that the disasters took place, as 
these were covered and broadcast by television. Both events were further 
contextualised and discussed in relation to the conditions under which they 
took place and to their respective consequences. This was particularly the case 
for the World Trade Centre attack, a disaster of a political nature, which was 
extensively discussed in relation to its political implications, as will be further 
illustrated later in this chapter. However, what the concept of ecstatic 
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witnessing highlights is the construction of the viewer as a fully immersed 
witness in the scene of suffering on the basis of footage of images of death.  
4.2.2 Ecstatic empathy 
It is this intensity of the experience of death as seen on the screen that forms the 
basis for the imaginative link between sufferer and spectator. The fear in the 
face of death brings to the fore the theme of a common humanity shared by 
viewers and victims. The expression of the respondents’ emotional involvement 
is indiscriminatingly addressed to the dying victims. The agency of the latter is 
constructed through their description as specific people with thoughts and 
emotions (“this person had reached their limits”, “what was going on in their 
minds”). The victims are not recognised through their relational identification, 
as they mostly did in the type of affective witnessing, as mothers, children or 
parents having lost loved ones. Their differential status, national origin or 
cultural identity was also irrelevant in the topic of the ecstatic witnessing, which 
is especially remarkable for the case of 9/11, as will be later discussed in the 
type of politicised witnessing in section 4.3.  
Hospitality in this sense and in the context of the focus group discussions seems 
unconditional. The imaginative link between the viewer and the victim is built 
on the perceived commonality of feelings of fear and horror in the face of death. 
In this context, the presence of the other is not only welcome; it is unquestioned 
and morally compelling. If in affective witnessing the victims were mostly 
recognised because of their status as “ideal victims” (Moeller, 1999: 107), 
namely children and parents, which made their suffering imaginable, in ecstatic 
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witnessing the sufferer appears to be in a way identified as a universal human 
being symbolising the human fear in the face of death.   
There is a note to be made here with regard to the implications of the two 
events, September 11 and the Indian Ocean Tsunami, in challenging the clearly 
distinctive roles between Western spectator and non-Western sufferer, 
constructing the hitherto “safety zone” of the West as part of the disaster 
(Chouliaraki, 2008). Indeed, the Tsunami has been described as a “national 
disaster” in some European contexts (Kivikuru, 2006), whereas September 11 
has been theorised as a unifying global event around which “a feeling of 
solidarity within humanity” imploded (Haes, 2002: 279-80), due to its 
positioning of the West both as a sufferer and a spectator.  
The discussions of the focus groups in this thesis, however, do not seem to 
confirm such theoretical arguments from the perspective of the Greek 
audiences. With regard to September 11, as discussed above, it was the sublime 
spectacle of death that formed the basis for engagement and empathy with the 
other. Furthermore, and beyond the immediate experience of watching the 
victims on the screen, the strong Anti-Americanism of Greek culture, which will 
be addressed in the next section of this chapter, challenges this homogenous 
concept of the “West” experiencing the suffering of 9/11 in a unifying way. As 
far as the Tsunami is concerned, despite the existence of Greek tourists in the 
area at the time of the disaster, there were very few references to them by the 
focus group participants, perhaps due to the fact that there were ultimately no 
Greek victims of the disaster. The few relevant references made interestingly 
claimed no interest in the Greek tourists, as it was humorously argued that “it 
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served them right for going over there to sunbathe” (FG 4; 12) “instead of staying 
in Greece of the holy days of Christmas” (FG 5). Repeated references would be 
made, however, to a Greek showbiz couple that was travelling in the area at the 
time and attracted great media coverage, something all respondents were 
cynical about but that is also typical of the widespread celebrity culture in 
Greece.  
The care and engagement with the victims of 9/11 and the Tsunami, therefore, 
do not necessarily reflect in the case of the Greek audience the Western bias in 
reporting the events, since the West was part of the disasters (Chouliaraki, 
2008: 343). What is argued here, instead, is that the viewer’s engagement with 
the distant other is based on the sublime experience of death, virtually 
witnessed through the media. When viewers witness the death of people on the 
screen, distinctions between “us” and “others” seem to be rendered irrelevant.  
4.2.3 The immediacy of ecstatic witnessing 
Characteristic in the descriptions above of the 9/11 attack and the Tsunami 
disaster is the construction of the temporality of viewing as synchronous to the 
one of suffering (“Is this the end?”, “The moment that you would see the wave…”). 
Viewers go further than empathetic identification with the sufferer; they are 
drawn into the scene of suffering as if they are watching it taking place in front 
of their eyes. They become witnesses par excellence, as indicated in this 
discussion about the collapse of the World Trade Centre:  
Irini: …you actually went through this experience! You went through it, 
I mean, it was a tragic scene, which will stick in people’s memory for 
ever, because you are actually waiting to see whether that person will 
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manage to jump from the window or not, whether she will be saved 
from the fire… 
Nana: Exactly! You could see the person… 
Irini: It was tragic to know that at any moment they could do it, let’s 
say. To find your own death… 
Nana: Oh, God…  
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
Central in the symbolic construction of synchronicity is the usage of live footage, 
amateur in its majority, which create the sense of a realistic depiction of the 
events as they unfold and, therefore, construct a direct link to the scene of 
suffering16. The focus here is on mediation as immediacy, namely as the 
construction of suffering as it were happening in front of its spectators’ eyes 
(Chouliaraki, 2006: 39). The hypermediatic qualities of the medium, namely the 
semiotic and technological modes through which the suffering is staged, such as 
the camera shots and the narrative (ibid.), are ignored and almost forgotten by 
the viewers. Witnessing feels almost “unmediated”, as if the distance between 
the viewer and the scene of suffering is thus annihilated that the viewer can 
witness “live” the death of others. This sense of the annihilation of temporal 
distance is expressed through a number of temporal deixis and verbs (“waiting 
to see”, “at any moment”) and also the use of present and future tense (“will 
manage”, “she will be saved”), which place the speaker in a cotemporaneous 
relationship with the events witnessed.  
                                                        
16 According to Gillmor, the Tsunami catastrophe marked a turning point in the status of user 
generated videos, many of which became an indispensable part of the mainstream media 
reporting of the disaster (Gillmor, 2005: xiv).  
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In this annihilation of the technological and symbolic qualities of mediation, the 
space for judgement of the media representational practices is also annihilated. 
Complicity with the media is almost complete. The veracity gap between the 
suffering and its representation (Peters, 2001) is invisible. What matters is the 
suffering itself and the way it makes the viewer feel rather than its staging by 
the media. Characteristically, there is a transit in the description of witnessing 
from “they would show” (where “they” refers to the media and the journalists) to 
“you would see” and “I was realising”. Apart from the construction of the viewer 
as an active participant in the suffering, at least in a strongly affective 
dimension, these linguistic choices also express the idea of an unstaged reality, 
where the suffering witnessed is unmediated.  
4.3  Politicised witnessing 
The third type of witnessing described here is named politicised witnessing, due 
to the implication of political discourses in the audience discussions of their 
experience of the disasters and the suffering of others. “Politicised” is used here 
to describe discussions addressing relations of political, social and military 
power and inequality both at the global as well as the local level. These issues 
would form the point of reference and framing for people’s experience and 
perception of the disasters and the suffering on their screens. Overall, the 
characteristics of politicised witnessing can be summarised as following:  
• The movement away from the individual suffering subjects to the 
judgement of the events as a whole.  
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• The movement away from the relationship between witness and the 
individual unfortunate to the construction of collective identities, both 
for the viewers as witnesses as well as the sufferers, through the use of 
deictic words of difference and community (“the Americans”, “we”, “the 
rest of the world”, “they”). The latter were indicative of an interpretative 
frame of conflict, which informed the respondents’ articulation of the 
events discussed. 
• The reference to causes and justifications perceived to have led to the 
suffering and the linguistic choice of verbal markers for the attribution of 
blame (“due to”, “are to blame”, “involved”).  
Politicised witnessing should not be equated to the witnessing of political 
events, conflicts and crises, such as the war in Lebanon, which, as already noted 
before, was taking place simultaneously with the conduct of the focus group 
discussions and was therefore often mentioned by the respondents. It was of 
course more explicitly expressed in relation to such political crises. However, 
politicised witnessing was also implicated in the construction of the viewer as a 
moral agent in relation to natural disasters, such as the Tsunami, Hurricane 
Katrina and the Kashmir earthquake by framing audience understanding and 
positioning of the events.   
This description of the viewers’ experience of the events was especially 
prominent in the focus groups with male participants, who expressed an overall 
interest into politics, when talking about the news in general. It was, however, 
also present in almost all discussions, when participants focused on U.S.-related 
disasters and American victims. This was also the case with the 9/11 terrorist 
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attack; when discussions would move beyond the scenes covered by the media 
to address the broader issues surrounding the event, such as terrorism or the 
role of the USA in the world stage, viewers, in contrast to ecstatic witnessing 
discussed above, would position themselves by making political arguments 
rather than emotional ones. 
4.3.1 Indignation and powerlessness 
If in affective and ecstatic witnessing, the viewer’s emotional engagement was 
centred on specific images of suffering, in politicised witnessing there is a move 
from the specificity of the scene of suffering to the search for causes and the 
attribution of blame and political responsibility for the events witnessed. This 
was the case in relation to suffering attributed to political reasons (for example, 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were described as a compensation of the suffering 
Americans had inflicted elsewhere) in the same way as in natural disasters 
(earthquakes, it was discussed, only result in so many victims due to the lack of 
appropriate infrastructures, and hurricanes, when predicted, are not defended 
against with the appropriate measures). In the following extract, a group of 
housewives are even attributing the Tsunami catastrophe to manmade causes:  
Litsa: But who do you think caused the Tsunami? It is not only natural, 
a natural disaster…! The bombs the Americans throw…in the sea can 
also cause these things at some point.  
(Female, 45, working-class, FG2) 
In this context, the viewers’ emotional involvement with the scene of suffering 
can be best summarised in feelings of indignation, addressed either to the 
perceived reasons that brought about the suffering, or, most often, to its 
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perceived perpetrators. An exclamatory tone, irony and accusatory words were 
indicative of such expressions of indignation, as is evident in the quote below 
about the lack of infrastructure in Pakistan, which according to the respondents 
was the main cause for the high number of victims.  
Pavlos: They keep telling us about slum areas and stuff – but you are 
the one who wants the slum area to exist in the first place! There has to 
be a slum area, that’s it! OK, if the state didn’t want it to exist, they 
would have kicked them out of there! It’s very simple! The state itself 
damns them to go through all these!    
(male, 40, middle-class, FG6) 
What is also evident in the above is that these expressions of indignation take 
place along an interpretative frame of conflict between “us” and “them”, the 
latter being the ones to blame for the emergence of crises and the misfortune of 
the sufferers. This deictic “they” would either stand for the “state” or “states” or 
“the Americans”, as seen above or other referents that would alternate 
depending on the argumentative context.  
If indignation would describe the affective state of politicised witnessing, in a 
way similar to Boltanski’s topic of denunciation (Boltanski, 1999: 57), this 
emotional response would exhaust the engagement of the witness with the 
scene of suffering to the level of passing judgement about the causes, often 
perceived to be hidden and obscured, of the suffering. This in its turn would be 
extended to a fatalistic perception of the world affairs, where  
Simos: everything is initiated up there, everything. Everything depends 
on the people who have the power, either they are the state, or 
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Kokkalis, or Microsoft or the people who have the money…They don’t 
care about the rest who are below them.  
(male, 25, middle-class, FG1) 
In this categorical argument, presented not as a personal opinion but as an 
indisputable fact, responsibility about “everything” is placed with the “people 
who have the power” and there is no space for individual agency. The same is 
evident in the accusatory tone of the previous quote: “you are the one who wants 
the slum to exist in the first place!”. Apart from the judgement of unfairness in 
both quotes, the witness does not enter the discussion as an agent in any case. 
Through this absence, discussants constructed themselves as powerless pawns 
in the global stage, mere spectators of the suffering of others. Their witnessing 
of this suffering is exhausted in making evaluative claims about its injustice. 
Their powerlessness in relation to the situation was used as the basis for the 
rational detachment from the scene of the suffering.  
In the context of politicised witnessing, therefore, the emotional involvement of 
the viewer as a witness is limited to the passing of judgement and the 
expression of feelings of indignation towards the causes that led to the suffering 
of the victims. The perceived mightiness of the powerful, however, towards 
which their indignation targets, is at the same time the reason for their 
detachment of the scene of suffering: there is nothing that can be done, since 
this is how power works. The implications of this form of rationalised 
detachment for public action at a distance will be further explored in Chapter 6. 
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4.3.2 Deserving victims and the limits of hospitality 
Characteristic of the type of politicised witnessing was the discussion and 
interpretation of the events within the framework of an “us vs. them” 
dichotomy. This was expressed along the lines of the attribution of blame and 
responsibility of the events witnessed, as expressed above. At the same time, 
however, this interpretative framework was also applied to the relationship 
between the viewers and the sufferers. The latter were in some way 
distinguished between deserving and undeserving victims. Exemplary cases 
were the US-related disasters discussed by the focus group participants, namely 
Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. The latter, as discussed above, was experienced as 
an instance of ecstatic witnessing, where the viewers were drawn into the scene 
of the disaster as the events were unfolding. However, when discussions would 
turn from human stories to the generality of the events, American victims would 
hardly be considered to be worthy of pity and sympathy. This tension is evident 
in the following extract from one of the discussions: 
Hara: I mean, there were other things behind the events that were so 
shocking that I admit that during the specific disaster I wasn’t that 
moved from the…in the sense of human pain…Yes! I mean, in the sense 
“Oh, God, so many people have died!”…I mean, of course I was really 
upset. But there was all this background behind it…how terrorism 
started being represented, how this was a reaction…I mean, really, 
during the Twin Towers disaster, I was fully desensitised! Maybe 
because they were Americans, I don’t know, maybe I also have some 
anti-American… 
Tina: I do understand what you are talking about but I’m telling you 
what mostly touched me. I was touched in that moment that I would 
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see the people jumping or later, let’s say, that they would broadcast the 
phone calls they had made, when they were still inside and they would 
make the last phone call and they would say a few words to their loved 
ones and you could hear their voices and then, after a while, this 
person was dead, this person had died and these were her last words! 
That thing! That was the most tragic of the whole thing. I collapsed at 
that moment; these things touched me the most from anything else 
that I saw!  
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
The extract illustrates the juxtaposition between two types of witnessing, as 
described in this chapter: the second participant is situated as an ecstatic 
witness in relation to the scene of suffering. She highlights the collapse of time 
and space boundaries from the scene of suffering due to the qualities of the 
coverage, which bring her in an immediate relationship with the victim and 
emotionally draw her in the scene witnessed (“that moment”, “I would see”, 
“when they were still inside”, “last phone call”, “after a while”). Hara, on the other 
hand, adopts the position of a politicised witness, passing judgement about the 
events that brought about the suffering and considering the latter justified and, 
therefore, unworthy of compassion (“behind the events”, “background”, 
“reaction”, “Americans”). Suffering individuals are equated to American politics, 
and, therefore, are denied empathetic emotions.  
Characteristic of this kind of talk was the fact that, whereas the sufferers would 
be described as the “victims” in all other disasters, they would be identified as 
“the Americans”, when discussions would be about U.S. casualties. The 
identification of the victims in terms of their national identity was used to 
demarcate boundaries between them and the viewers, both spatial and 
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emotional. It implies that American victims are mostly recognised on the basis 
of their status as Americans rather on recognition of their suffering. In this 
context, hospitality is reserved for the victims of unjust suffering; victims 
regarded as deserving cannot make emotional and moral claims to the viewer’s 
sensibilities.  
The same kind of anti-American discourses were dominant in discussions of 
hurricane Katrina. Expressions of empathy were significantly less than 
comments about the inefficiency of the American government to take care of “its 
people”, a failure which was hardly ever mentioned about governments of other 
disaster stricken areas.  
Pavlos: You remember about this (Hurricane Katrina). They had 
warned them and they knew about it. They knew but they didn’t…most 
of them didn’t leave because of their own decision… 
Ilias: But why did they say then that they hadn’t been warned? 
Pavlos: They had been warned!  
Ilias: Nevertheless, they did not pay that much attention, they 
didn’t…people didn’t understand, they were not given the chance to 
understand that it was that… 
Pavlos: And indeed, what impressed me was that the political 
authorities were really late and they only went afterwards to play 
smart.  
Ilias:  Yes. It was said that they were late. That in the areas that should 
have been evacuated the state was also responsible for it. In… 
Pavlos: Responsibility, yes! 
(male, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG6) 
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It is evident in the above how discussants attribute responsibility in their 
reconstruction of the events. The description of the events begins not with 
images, as in the previous types of witnessing, but with an indication of the 
reasons that brought about the suffering. At the same time, the agency of the 
victims is highlighted: “they knew about it”, “they did not pay that much 
attention”. Being also uncomfortable in rendering the victims responsible for 
their misfortune, it is on the U.S. government that they ultimately attribute the 
blame in agreement. The events witnessed are no more a natural disaster and 
its consequent destruction but a state failure to take care of its people.  
The suffering of Americans is thus constructed as somehow justified based on 
cultural or national and nationalistic discourses. These discourses come to the 
fore in this type of witnessing. It is in politicised witnessing that feelings of 
national identity and belonging are either implicitly or explicitly expressed by 
respondents, when situating themselves in relation to the events witnessed. The 
deeply-rooted character of anti-Americanism in Greece has already been 
discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.3).  
Interestingly, anti-American discourses were often accompanied by expressions 
of the “underdog culture”, also discussed earlier in the thesis. The image of the 
“martyr nation, victim of unjust treatment by the ‘powerful of the earth’” 
(Stefanidis, 2007: 5), characteristic of the national popular discourse in Greece, 
was translated in the focus group discussions as the projection of feelings of 
indignation or empathy to the level of the nation, Greece, in a way of 
personification. In the following extract, the respondents are trying to explain 
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their statement that they are more interested in news of wars than of natural 
disasters:  
Why are you more interested in a war?  
Simos:  I don’t know… 
Hara: Maybe because it provokes more indignation. At least for me, I 
mean, this is it. I mean, a natural disaster…  
Simos: Yes, maybe in that case you say that there is nothing you can do. 
In the war, especially when it is done the way it is nowadays done, 
where only the US goes on war, and there are the rest after that, who 
are against it, then it is very frustrating, but this has to do with the fact 
that there are a lot of anti-Americans, let’s say, as a people, or at least 
as…anti-Americans. But yes…This is well-known. And also because we 
are a country that has gone through a lot of wars, it has it in its DNA, 
and at any moment there have been a lot, I mean this [a war] also 
affects us, in the sense that we know that we also have around us 
enemies, we have no friends. That is why… 
(male-female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
Asked to express his interest in war stories, the participant immediately 
projects his feelings of anti-Americanism to the country as a whole, as a people, 
as well as Greece as an entity (“it has it in its DNA”). Witnessing is expressed 
here as taking place through the national. Politicised witnessing is expressive of 
political discourses, which in their turn are entrenched in national and 
nationalistic culture.  
Within the position of politicised witnessing, in experiencing, framing and 
making sense of the events witnessed, viewers construct themselves as 
members of the imagined community of the nation. As such, politicised 
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witnessing adheres to the principles of a communitarian public, which shares 
pre-existing assumptions as to whose suffering matter and who are the 
unfortunates worthy of engagement and commitment (Chouliaraki, 2006: 188-
189).   
4.3.3 The media as part of the power structures 
Viewers’ relationship and evaluation of the media coverage within the context 
of politicised witnessing are also informed by the same lay understandings of 
politics which frame their understanding of global affairs and disasters, as well 
as their relationship with the suffering others. In a perceived universe of 
underlying political power inequalities and struggles, the media are constructed 
as an ideological mechanism that serves the dominant hegemony. Expressive of 
this discourse were criticisms of Greek media for focusing on disasters taking 
place in the U.S., namely the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers and Hurricane 
Katrina. In both cases the media were accused for differential attention. In the 
case of Hurricane Katrina they were blamed for obscuring the failures of the 
American government: 
Thanos: The American channels show what they want to be shown! I 
mean, there’s no one else there, no European…or somebody from other 
channels. The Americans do not show what is not to their interest. We 
see this in a lot of things, not only in this case. Also in the war and stuff, 
they always show what they think [is good]. This is what they did with 
Iraq, this is what they did with Iran, this is what they are doing now 
with Lebanon. Everything, everything from the perspective they see.   
(male, 58, middle-class, FG6) 
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Anti-Americanism comes to the fore, even when discussion is about the media 
coverage of events. The latter is described as a vehicle for American politics, 
therefore following preferential perspectives. Common knowledge and 
experience of the media coverage of other political events, such as the war in 
Iraq, are used as the basis for explaining the media coverage of the Hurricane.  
At the same time, the extensive coverage of the terrorist attack of 9/11 was also 
criticised for being exaggerated in terms of time and focus.  
Tina: When the planes crashed on the Twin Towers in the States, the 
whole world stopped moving, because, as if…A lot more people are 
being killed because of the wars Americans do. But then it was the 
States and all of us had to do something.  
(female, 26, middle-class, FG1) 
Again, anti-American feelings are expressed as a distinction between “the 
States” and “the whole world” or “all of us”. What is also implicit in this quote is a 
criticism of the hierarchies of life that underline dominant media 
representational choices, as described in the introductory chapter. The media 
are criticised for not focusing as much on the people killed by “the wars 
Americans do”, when they did cover extensively the disaster of the Twin Towers. 
This critique of the hierarchies in the attributed newsworthiness by the media 
was made often by the discussants:  
Ilias: There are so many things happening around us, either about Iraq 
either Afghanistan, either about that one [the earthquake in Pakistan] 
that first of all nobody pays any attention and the mass media of 
communication neither, and also because they happen in downgraded 
areas we think of them as second class people.  
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Pavlos: Let’s assume that you are at home and the television or radio is 
playing in the next room and you hear, let’s say, that there has been an 
earthquake in Pakistan, or an earthquake, let’s say, in Paris, I think you 
will focus and instinctively react in a completely different way. And 
since we take it for granted that the image and the sound should be 
only what sells best, I mean, then I will only show what is for my best 
interest, I will show what gets more audience…Now about Pakistan… 
… 
Ilias: But they showed so many things from Afghanistan! 
Thanos: Of course they did… 
Agis: But that was a war, they had to… 
Thanos: But the channels themselves don’t give any importance [to the 
earthquake in Kashmir]! What about CNN, I remember during the Gulf 
War, they would show everything! 
Ilias: Yes, but that was an earthquake! If it had been a war… 
Thanos: Exactly!  
(male, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG6) 
What is interesting in the above is the movement between complicity with the 
media’s hierarchies of life in the coverage of suffering to the exclusive 
attribution of blame to the media for ignoring some events and focusing on 
others, in other words between taking responsibility as a viewer and placing 
responsibility to the media. The extract starts with an admission that the 
viewers themselves show preferential attention to victims coming from some 
places in the world, considering others “second class people”. The media in this 
argument follow the viewers’ preferences, adopting similar hierarchies, in their 
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effort to attract audiences. Responsibility lies, therefore, with the viewer. As the 
discussion progresses, however, this responsibility is again placed on the media, 
which ignore events such as the Kashmir earthquake. The argument shifts from 
the media following viewers’ preferences to the issue of what the media decide 
to show and why. Once more, political reasons are seen as informing this 
decision; the preferential coverage of the media is seen as serving ideological 
purposes as was the case, according to the viewers, in the war in Afghanistan.   
There is, therefore, once more and similarly to the case of affective witnessing a 
paradox in the way viewers place themselves in relationship to the media 
coverage of suffering in the case of political witnessing. On the one hand, 
discussants seem to have their own lay theories of the ideological work of the 
media in their coverage of distant events and attributed newsworthiness. Their 
criticism focuses on the preference of the media to focus on Western, and most 
significantly American, traumas, as this is perceived by the audiences. In this, 
they try to morally distance themselves from such a practice. At the same time, 
however, they implicitly acknowledge that they themselves adopt such 
hierarchies of the newsworthiness of suffering. Although sceptical of the role of 
news, the audience seems unable to challenge their status as their main 
resource of imagining and understanding the distant other, thus confirming the 
symbolic power of the broadcasting of suffering “to reproduce the moral 
deficiencies of global inequality” (Chouliaraki, 2008: 329). Once, more, then, the 
audience critical engagement with the media can be interpreted as part of a 
broader culture of suspicion towards institutions rather than as a moral stance 
as a witness to the suffering of others, the misfortune of whom is absent or 
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misrepresented in the mainstream media. Viewers criticise dominant media on 
moral grounds; however, what evades them is the articulation of the moral 
stance they themselves take in relation to the issues criticised.   
4.4 Detached Witnessing 
The three previous types of witnessing, as distinguished here, described the 
construction of the viewers as moral agents either in emotional or political 
terms. The final type of witnessing analysed in this section illustrates the 
positioning of the viewer as a disengaged spectator of the suffering of the 
distant other.  Detached witnessing describes the experience of the suffering of 
others as something remote or ultimately irrelevant to the viewer’s everyday 
life. The expression of affect, either as emotional identification or indignation, is 
overall absent from this kind of witnessing. It was mostly the younger 
respondents that would more often construct themselves as detached from 
suffering and describe themselves as “mere spectators” to the events taking 
place on the television screen. The distinctive characteristics of this kind of 
discourse can be summarised in the following:  
• The absence of expressions indicating the viewer’s emotional state in 
conveying the media stories (“a lot of people died”, “parents crying, - ‘we 
lost our children’- , that kind of thing”).  
• The narration of the experience of witnessing as a sequence of events 
(“there was an earthquake, and then the tsunami was created”).  
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• The emphatic construction of distance between the viewer and her 
lifeworld and the scene of suffering through the use of spatial deixis 
(“outside of the situation”, “somewhere far”).  
In this context, detached witnessing describes the experience of spectatorship of 
distant suffering in a way that the latter fails to engage the emotional and 
political imagination of the viewer. The suffering of the other seems irrelevant 
to its viewers’ everyday life and concerns and therefore fails to enter their 
moral space of concern and reflection.   
4.4.1 Rationalisation of detachment 
As mentioned above, the emotional involvement of the viewer as a witness 
which characterises all three previous dimensions of witnessing is lacking in the 
type of detached witnessing. For one, this is marked by the absence of the 
emotionally charged verbs and expressions used in the previous types of 
witnessing (“shocked”, “touched” or “outraged”). Indicative of this way of 
experiencing distant suffering is the following description of the Tsunami 
disaster:  
Menelaos: There was an earthquake and then the tsunami was created 
and the rest, the sea was drawn in, the seashells came in the front… 
Stathis: The seashells?  
Menelaos: The sea was drawn in and the bottom of the sea came in the 
front. On the bottom there were starfish, different shells and stuff and 
they say, “oh, cool, let’s go to collect them” – no, seriously, that’s how it 
happened! They started, instead of going away, they stayed in the sea, 
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they went further in, and then the tsunami came, the first and the 
second and the third, anyway, and it took them.  
Haris: Some people that were in a village knew – a young girl knew 
about the tsunami and she gathered everyone and took them to the top 
of the hill.  
Kimon: Also the sea went in penetrated the land for about 7,5 
kilometres.  
(male, in their 20s, middle-class, FG12) 
 
Hurricane Katrina was described in similar terms:   
Menelaos: Katrina took place in New Orleans. I think in Northwest, 
towards central, though. New Orleans, anyway. It was a devastating hit 
to New Orleans, Katrina passed very destructively, areas were flooded, 
eh…What else? Electricity was down, a lot of people died, many refused 
to leave their homes, they went afterwards to the – what was the name 
of the basketball thingy? It was the dome, a big stadium, it was there 
that a lot of people went.  
(male, 26, middle-class, FG12) 
What mostly characterises this narrative of the experience of witnessing the 
Tsunami disaster on the screen is the focus on the external report (Boltanski, 
1999: 84) of the events as presented on the news. What is missing is the 
expression of the respondents’ emotional response to these events. Indeed, the 
viewer is completely absent as an agent in the narratives above, which consist of 
sequences of facts and images. Also absent is the suffering itself, which is briefly 
and abstractly referred to: “and it (i.e. the tsunami) took them”, “a lot of people 
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died”. When the victims are present in the narratives, this is also in an abstract 
way, as in the talk about the Tsunami disaster below:  
Vicky: I just remember watching little children running… 
Mary: The images afterwards.  
Vicky: …I mean, the things that the news were showing, the parents 
crying, “we’ve lost our children”, that kind of thing. 
Giota: A sense of panic everywhere.  
Vicky: Yes.  
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
The focus is again on the identification of the “ideal victims” of the disaster, the 
children and their parents (“little children running”, “the parents crying”), 
however, the narrative is not centred on specific stories and faces as was the 
case in affective and ecstatic witnessing; on the contrary, suffering is 
constructed as a generalised sequence of images where each face seems to 
dissolve into the other: it is “little children running” rather than “a girl, on its 
own, that was running” (see section 4.1.1. on affective witnessing, Dimitris, male, 
27, middle-class, FG8). Using the plural number, respondents identified a 
generalised category of sufferers rather than a specific instance of suffering. In 
sharp contrast with affective and ecstatic witnessing, there is no reference to 
any kind of emotional reaction towards the suffering of the faces on the screen. 
The only emotionally charged word in the quote, “panic”, is used to generally 
describe the scenes of suffering rather the affective response of the viewers.    
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Narrating distant suffering in indefinite terms as a state of a generalised 
category of unfortunates, devoid of its specificity, seems to result in a failure to 
imagine the pain of the other. This lack of involvement with the scene of 
suffering is justified by the distance separating the viewers from the 
unfortunates:  
Irini: Since we are outside of the situation, we only see it…we watch it 
just as…spectators.  
Kiki: True, you can’t really do anything else.  
Irini: Just a…we can’t really do anything, just a slight emotion… 
… 
Irini: And then it somewhere far…which does not touch us... 
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
Respondents justify their lack of emotional engagement (“just a slight emotion”) 
by emphasising the distance with the scene of suffering, both emotional 
(“outside the situation”) and geographical (“somewhere far”). It is this stark 
contradiction between the reality of the suffering on the screen and the viewers’ 
every day life that fails to render the pain of the other imaginable and ultimately 
engaging for the viewer.  
Irini: I don’t know, I think it’s an issue of indifference…I do…admit it! 
Nana: You think that it will never happen to you and you don’t sit 
down to think about it and you say, OK, I mean I do get upset, but… 
Kiki: Let’s say that for the five minutes you sit down and watch it you 
say, “what a pity”… 
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Irini: “What a pity, what has happened to them?!”  
Kiki: …but then, I don’t know, somebody gives you a ring, or you go for 
coffee, or…you have something else in your mind and you don’t… 
Irini: You go on with…Life goes on. 
Nana: Yes! That’s it! 
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3)  
Irini’s categorical statement that “indifference” is the reason for their lack of 
engagement with the victims of the disasters encompasses a moral evaluation of 
disapproval for the discussants’ stance. This indifference, however, is attributed 
not to the viewers’ emotional numbing but rather to the concerns (“you have 
something else in your mind”) and practicalities (“somebody gives you a ring”) of 
daily life that inhibit these viewers from emotionally engaging with the 
situation. Emotions like empathy or compassion seem to occupy some fleeting 
moments spent in front of the screen (“the five minutes”). Empathy described as 
such appears to be banal, an unreflective and fleeting emotional reaction that 
fails to connect the spectator with the sufferer. The rationalisation for this 
ultimately lies in the distance separating the two; the circumstances of the latter 
do not and cannot affect the lifeworld of the former; for the viewers “life goes 
on”, a cliché that rationalises their detachment from the suffering witnessed on 
the screen.  
4.4.2 Hospitality conditional on immediacy 
If participants’ emotional engagement with the suffering was articulated as 
fleeting and banal in the context of everyday life, hospitality towards the victims 
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on the screen was conditioned in similar terms. Victims were described as 
fleeting images on the screen. As seen in the quotes in the previous section, they 
are either altogether absent from the respondents’ narratives, or recognised as 
aggregates of sufferers (“little children”, “parents”) rather than individuals. They 
become part of a narrative of an event rather than presences, which albeit 
virtual, claim the viewers’ engagement and hospitality. This is not to say that the 
presence of the other on the screen is disputed, neglected or unwelcome. It 
rather means that hospitality is limited to the moment of watching; the other 
does not constitute a cause of further engagement. What is disputed is not the 
right of the other to a mediated presence but the urgency and relevance that 
this presence deserves in the viewer’s lifeworld. 
There is a distinction here between emotionally engaging suffering and 
suffering seen as media spectacle. This distinction does not take place on the 
basis of worthiness of suffering, as is the case of politicised witnessing. There is 
no distinction between deserving and undeserving victims. There is, however, a 
distinction between relevant and irrelevant suffering. And the measure of 
relevance seems to be proximity, based on conceptions of both geographical 
distance and community. In the following extract, the participants are 
discussing about their interest in the news of the Tsunami disaster: 
Nikos: I felt more interested in the Greeks. By all means, of course. 
Because they are our people… 
Sotiris: No, for everyone! 
Nikos: For everyone, but first of all for the Greeks! 
Gregoris: But this is bullshit, what you are just saying.  
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Nikos: OK, you have to think of the Greek citizen, because… 
Gregoris: What kind of bullshit is that, to think of the Greek and not of 
the kid that you see being drowned… 
Nikos: You put yourself in the situation of the Greek, don’t you get it? 
You don’t put yourself into the situation of an African. You say, for 
example, I could have been there…You won’t care about the Greek 
victim?! We have to care! 
(male, in their 20s, working-class, FG10) 
In arguing for the greater relevance of the suffering of the Greek victims, Nikos 
here is making use of two interlinked topoi: the first is the sense of belonging to 
a national community (“the Greeks…they are our people”) and the normative 
assumptions of care that it seems to entail (“we have to care!”); the second is the 
assumption that the suffering of fellow nationals is more easily imaginable, in an 
“as if” sense, since the viewer can assume that it could happen to him (“I could 
have been there”).  
In one of the focus groups of young women distance also seemed to be defined 
in similar terms. According to one of the participants, her lack of engagement 
with the Tsunami victims was justified because “It’s not next to us! If it happened 
next to us, I could totally see us all regretting it!”. Later on in the discussion, she 
explains what she means by “next to us”.  
Nana: If it doesn’t affect me, my family environment, my circle of 
friends, that’s it! My social environment…I mean, if it were something I 
was experiencing here, as when…What could I say now? Then, the 
example with the…the guy that was paralysed, what was his name? 
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Taxildaris!17 That they were saying then, yes, he is somebody that I 
believe that when the accident happened, I think that I would help and 
I would experience it, I would hear about it…do something 
about…discuss about it… 
(female, 26, middle-class, FG3) 
The moral space of care and emotional engagement is constructed through the 
use of spatial deictic terms, such as “next to us” or “here”. The narrow limits of 
this space include the unmediated experience of the everyday life, which entails 
the family, friends and the locally situated social environment. In the way of 
detached witnessing, the distant other fails to enter the moral space of the 
viewer.  
There is again a gravitation of the detached spectator towards the local and 
national community as a moral space, in a more obvious and affirming way than 
in politicised witnessing. The emotionally engaging victims are the ones closer 
at hand, either in terms of the local community (“here”) or the nation (the 
“Greeks…our people”), because it is their stories that affect the viewers’ everyday 
experience (“hear about it…discuss about it”), and it is their suffering that the 
viewers imagine that can happen to them (“you put yourself in the situation of 
the Greek”, “I could have been there”). Ultimately, the object of concern is not the 
suffering itself but its implications for the viewer. If the analytical concept of 
hospitality, as described in the theoretical chapter, is the measure of evaluating 
mediated relationships between the viewer and the sufferer, detached 
witnessing describes the viewers’ expressed limitations in establishing such 
                                                        
17 Alex Taxildaris is a local athlete, who became a swimmer and Paralympic medal winner, after 
an accident that left him suffering from paraplegia in 2000.  
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virtual commitments. In the moral space of the detached viewer the distant 
other is not unwelcome but also not morally and emotionally engaging; she is 
mostly indifferent and irrelevant.  
4.4.3 Complicity with the media 
Emotionally disengaged from the spectacle of suffering and its victims, detached 
witnessing was characterised by a similarly disinterested evaluation of the role 
of media in informing about the events discussed and bringing the world closer 
to home. Discussing about the differential attention attributed by the media to 
the different disasters discussed, respondents’ acknowledgement of it seemed 
to be devoid of any further kind of moral evaluation:  
Giota: (The Kashmir earthquake) wasn’t extensive, didn’t…ok, it didn’t 
get extensive coverage from the media, I think.  
Vicky: When did it take place, though? Perhaps it has to do with the 
period it took place?  
Giota: But it didn’t…The Tsunami…It didn’t get as much as the Tsunami 
neither as the earthquake in Turkey. 
Mary: Basically, I think it wasn’t shown as much.  
Giota: That’s it! It wasn’t covered extensively by the media.  
Mary: We are talking about more coverage, this is it. The way that the 
others will show it to you plays an important role! 
E: The way they will show it, exactly!  
G: And how much they show it, doesn’t it? 
E: And the way they show it! 
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C: But you know why it was the Tsunami? Because it is considered to be 
something totally strange according to everything given.  
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
Participants acknowledge the greater coverage the Tsunami disaster, as well as 
the Turkish earthquake, attracted in comparison to the Kashmir earthquake. 
This choice does not seem to be critically questioned in the extract. On the 
contrary, respondents are attempting to explain this difference by resorting to 
justifications for the media practices: perhaps the Kashmir earthquake was not 
covered as much due to the period it took place; in addition to this, the Tsunami 
“is considered to be something totally strange”.  
Furthermore, the discussants use this differential attendance of the media to the 
various events to justify their own difference of engagement – as well as 
easiness in recalling the events, as will be further explored in the next chapter – 
with these events. They place themselves at the receiving end of the media 
output, on which they have no responsibility themselves. By stating that “the 
way that the others will show it to you plays an important role” in their 
engagement with the events, they place responsibility on the media institutions 
and journalistic practices (“the others”), assuming a position of a consumer of 
media images with no responsibility or power of choice on them, complicit with 
the media representations.  
Another interesting element of this relation of complicity of the viewer with the 
media practices in the case of detached witnessing was the reproduction of 
discourses of celebrity implicated in the coverage of the Tsunami disaster. The 
focus of some Greek media on the local celebrities that were travelling in the 
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area at the time of the disaster was, on the one hand, satirised by the viewers 
but also, on the other hand, reproduced in their own discussions. Specifically, 
the story of a celebrity couple that was holidaying in Thailand when the tsunami 
hit the area was widely reproduced by some of the younger participants. The 
attention the couple attracted by Greek media was mentioned by most focus 
groups but often in a way of ridicule and irony as part of their broader criticism 
of the media:  
Tina: That thing with Gogo and Somer18! How many times did they 
show it?! You can’t imagine! They were gathering fish 
afterwards…Gogo, in her little hat, and they were actually showing her 
on the news!  
(female, 26, middle-class, FG1) 
In the discussions, however, that viewers mostly positioned themselves as 
detached witnesses of the events, this story was discussed as an integral part of 
the disaster. One of the participants starts describing the Tsunami disaster by 
referring to the story of the celebrity couple:  
Nana: I remember reading the interview by Somer… 
Kiki: Ah, she reads OK magazine!  
(laughter)  
Nana: …while I was waiting at the doctor’s – that he couldn’t see from 
far what it was, basically it was not at the…at the area where he 
stayed, at the hotel it was, he says, up to the knee… 
Irini: The water.  
                                                        
18 Gogo Mastrokosta and Kostas Somer are both actors and television personalities and at the 
time a celebrity couple favoured by the Greek tabloid press.  
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Nana: He didn’t…the water. So it hadn’t destroyed a lot, but just, he 
says, the hotel owner told them to evacuate the place for security 
reasons. They didn’t have any particular problems. Then, when they 
went to the beach, he says, he understood… 
Kiki: They were tide waves, which they say that rose… 
Nana: He says that things were not as tragic as they presented them, at 
least where he was, where he stayed.  
Irini: Alright, but weren’t there a lot of victims?  
Nana: And then they had problems in leaving, in going away. 
Irini: Exactly!  
Kiki: They couldn’t leave after that point.  
Nana: What else were they saying? That they gave their tickets, he 
said, to some people who needed them more. And they went by route, 
he says, up to a point…and then, he says, they went straight to Athens! 
Ha!  
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
Despite the reference to OK magazine, the following laughter and the apparently 
ironic “ha!” in the end of the extract, the validity of narrating the disaster 
through the footing of the celebrity tourist is not disputed in the extract. Two 
points are especially relevant in this narrative. First, the absence of actual 
victims and sufferers, characteristic of detached witnessing, as discussed above. 
Although one of the respondents is attempting to introduce this aspect in the 
discussion (“but weren’t there a lot of victims?”), the focus of the latter continues 
to be on the celebrity couple. Second, not only are celebrities accepted as the 
appropriate witnesses for exposing the extent of the disaster, but they are also 
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constructed as the benefactors of other victims, giving away their tickets “to 
some people who needed them more”.  
The celebritisation of the public sphere is a major aspect of the mediation of 
social life in Greece (Tsaliki, 2010: 153) and mostly evident in the tabloidization 
of television news, following a characteristic model of infotainment, as 
discussed in the previous chapter (Papathanassopoulos, 1997; 2001; Plios, 
2006). The apparent uncritical acceptance of this role of the media by the 
discussants here is another evidence of their complicit relationship with the 
media mainstream representational practices and journalistic choices.  
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have focused on the experience of witnessing distant suffering 
as a mediated audience practice implicated in the construction of the viewer as 
a moral agent. I have argued that the experience of media witnessing is 
articulated in a variety of modalities, which depend on the ways in which 
participants negotiate the tensions around involvement, hospitality and trust 
that traverse practices of mediation, as described in Chapter 2. Specifically, I 
suggested a typology of media witnessing, which consists of four different types 
of witnessing, as these emerge from the different positionings of the viewers in 
relation to the three analytical concepts above:  affective, ecstatic, politicised 
and detached witnessing. 
Affective witnessing was described as the articulation of a position of intense 
emotionality vis-à-vis mediated suffering. This was mostly expressed through 
the description of the viewers’ affective responses to human pain, triggered by 
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stories and images of individual sufferers. In this context, hospitality towards 
the sufferer was conditioned by the identification of the human face and the 
assumed commonality of human vulnerability. The relationship of the viewer 
with the representations of this pain was characterised by a paradox, since the 
media focus on the coverage of pained individuals was criticised for its 
sentimentality and sensationalism, on the one hand, but seemed to attract the 
viewers’ attention and engagement, on the other hand.  
Ecstatic witnessing was described as an extreme type of affective witnessing, 
associated with the Tsunami disaster and 9/11, which due to their mode of 
coverage, gave viewers the sense that they were positioned as “live” witnesses 
of the events on the screen. The extensive use of temporal deixis, which 
indicates this sense of liveness, is distinctive of ecstatic witnessing. The use of 
affective liveness to describe the experience of witnessing, the unconditional 
hospitality towards the victims in the name of a common humanity faced with 
the liminality of death, and the suspension of judgement towards the media and 
its representational interventions were the other main characteristics of 
ecstatic witnessing.  
Politicised witnessing was described as the position of the spectator who passes 
political judgements in relation to mediated suffering. It was argued that this 
positioning is not only relevant to political events but was also applied in cases 
of suffering induced by natural disasters. Expressions of indignation against the 
assumed persecutors of the suffering were at the centre of the viewers’ 
emotional engagement with the events, usually expressed through blame. These 
persecutors were generally identified as the global political state powers. The 
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media were constructed as part of the power status quo and were criticised for 
adopting relevant hierarchies of life in their preferential attention to different 
disasters and the representation of their victims. In the context of politicised 
witnessing, victims are distinguished between innocent and deserving ones and 
hospitality is limited to the former, usually constructed as culturally or 
politically proximate to the viewers’ culture and national community.  
“Detached witnessing” was used to describe the position of the viewer as an 
indifferent bystander to the suffering of others. More common among younger 
participants, detached witnessing describes the lack of emotional engagement 
of the viewers with the disaster and its victims. In this context, a variety of 
spatial references are used to construct distance from the scene of suffering and 
describe the pain of faraway others as irrelevant to the viewer’s lifeworld. In 
this way the distant other remains outside the viewer’s moral space of concern. 
Although the reality of suffering is not disputed, it is the relevance to the 
spectator’s life that is doubted. In accordance with the general indifference of 
the viewer to the suffering, her engagement with its representation is also 
characterised by the lack of reflective address. Far from critically reflecting on 
the role of the media as the connector between spectator and the suffering of 
distant others, participants, seeing the latter as irrelevant, are in a relation of 
complicity with the media, accepting them as adequate mediators.  
These four positions of media witnessing also construct the moral space of the 
viewer in distinctive ways. On the one hand, affective and ecstatic witnessing, as 
discussed here, describe the empathetic connection of the spectator with the 
sufferer, in a way of cosmopolitan empathy, as the willingness to take the 
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perspective of the distant other (Beck, 2006: 6). However, and although the 
moral imagination of the spectator as illustrated within these two types of 
witnessing moves beyond the limits of existing communities, this imagination is 
also delimited, first, by its being bound to particular images of suffering, and 
thus failing to generalise private emotions of empathy to a politics of pity, and, 
second, due to its over-indulgence in the sentimentality of the viewer in a 
narcissistic way. On the other hand, politicised and detached witnessing have 
described the viewer as positioned within the moral space of the nation and the 
local, either by employing nationally relevant frameworks in discussing about 
suffering or by demarcating the local and national as the space of moral 
concern. The imagination of politicised and detached witnessing is, therefore, 
that of a communitarian public (Chouliaraki, 2008). In all four dimensions of 
witnessing, therefore, and despite the differences in the viewers’ engagement 
with the distant other, the cosmopolitan imagination is constructed as limited 
and fragmented, if not utterly incapacitated, as in the case of detached 
witnessing.  
My analysis, therefore, shows that the way viewers position themselves along 
the three tensions of mediation is contingent upon the nature of the disaster 
itself, its depiction in the media, as well as broader social discourses available to 
focus group participants, such as anti-Americanism or public mistrust. In this 
context, no event was approached in a uniform way and respondents in general 
did not assume the same witnessing position for every event discussed. Instead, 
a complex matrix of different discursive positions is constructed for the viewer 
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to adopt. My typology of witnessing aims at illustrating this complexity rather 
than attempting to construct clear-cut types of media witnessing.  
Even though the practice of media witnessing is a multifaceted and complex 
process that cannot be pre-determined by either the nature of the suffering or 
its representation by the media, nonetheless, there are three specific properties 
of the mediated representation of events that emerge as significant. The first is 
the visual power of the face of the individual sufferer to nourish the viewer’s 
emotional imagination. This power was even more accentuated in the cases of 
the Southeast Asian tsunami, as well as in 9/11, which due to their way of 
coverage, gave viewers the sense of immediate witnessing of the disasters. The 
second is that, by virtue of the traditional iconography of the news, the 
participants’ hospitality towards the victims of disasters was constructed on the 
basis of an assumed commonality with the victims or of a sense of cultural and 
political proximity. Third, there was a fundamental paradox in the relationship 
between viewers and their media; although the media were often criticized for 
their ideological work and their sensationalism in reporting suffering, their 
symbolic power always seemed to co-opt viewers in a relationship of ultimate 
complicity with their messages, as the latter neither used nor looked for 
alternative mediators. Finally, and despite the pitfalls of attempting to match a 
particular type of witnessing to a specific segment of the respondents, it is 
remarkable that younger respondents most often constructed themselves as 
mere bystanders to the suffering of distant others and ultimately as detached 
witnesses.  
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Chapter 5 Media Remembering 
Media remembering has been defined in Chapter 2 as the audience practice of 
the discursive reconstruction of events witnessed through the media. Thus 
defined the practice of media remembering is integral in the mediated 
constitution of the viewer as a moral agent in that it throws light into the 
mutually constitutive relationship between media texts and their viewers 
beyond the point of media reception and into the ways media stories of 
suffering are integrated within the everyday discourses of their viewers. Media 
remembering is, therefore, the second analytical focus for the exploration of the 
focus group discussions and will be the subject of the current empirical chapter. 
As it has already been argued in Chapter 2, what is of interest here is not merely 
the way memories of media stories of suffering are stored and retrieved by the 
participants but rather the broader discursive frameworks these memories are 
embedded in and reconstructed through and the ways these discourses are 
combined in viewers’ narratives about the events.  
 With regard to the three disasters that were initially included in the topic guide 
of the focus groups, namely the South Asian Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina and the 
Kashmir earthquake, the most notable point emanating from the discussions 
was the great discrepancies in the respondents’ recollection of the events. The 
Tsunami disaster initiated long and lively discussions among the participants, 
who would readily recall its occurrence and the events following it, as well as 
narrate particular scenes from it, as already addressed in the previous chapter. 
However, this was not the case with Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmir 
earthquake, despite the relatively more recent occurrence of the two events. In 
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most discussions, participants needed probing in their remembering of 
Hurricane Katrina, which was mainly constructed as a failure of the U.S. state to 
support its citizens rather than in terms of the suffering it caused, as already 
seen in section 4.3. Finally, the Kashmir earthquake was only recalled as a 
distinctive event by very few respondents. In most discussions it collapsed into 
a general category of “earthquakes”, an often occurring and not unexpected type 
of disaster, and was discussed along these lines.  
These differences in recalling the three disasters followed broader patterns of 
participants’ remembering and “forgetting” events in the discussions. These 
patterns, as they emerge in the discussions, and as it has already been argued in 
Chapter 2, reflect the social frameworks of memory viewers employ and as such 
they are illustrative of the social groups they situate themselves within 
(Halbwachs, 1992: 22). In this context, the analytical emphasis here is on the 
discussants’ perspectivation strategies (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Kryžanowski 
and Wodak, 2007), as discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.), namely the 
discursive strategies through which viewers construct their involvement with 
the events remembered.  
In what follows, the focus will be on the different ways events are constructed in 
the discursive process of media remembering. I will argue that in narrating 
stories of suffering, viewers simultaneously constructed a moral hierarchy of 
remembering, reflecting the significance they attributed to the stories 
remembered, as well as their moral engagement with the suffering victims. The 
bottom of this hierarchy, explored in section 5.1. on forgetting suffering, 
includes events that had faded in discussants’ memory, described as frequent, 
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unoriginal and ultimately banal. The second section of this chapter will focus on 
the construction of a small category of events as iconic in collective memory due 
to their acute affective impact on the audience. The top of this moral hierarchy 
of remembering is addressed in section 5.3., which discusses viewers’ memories 
of the earthquake in Izmit, Turkey, in 1999. It is only in this last case that media 
remembering expresses a cosmopolitan moral engagement with the distant 
sufferer, recognising the other both in their difference and on the basis of a 
common humanity (Silverstone, 2007: 36).   
The final section of the chapter will explore the way the category of “global 
disasters” is constructed in media remembering. It draws upon the concepts of 
media events (Dayan and Katz, 1992) and media disasters (Cottle, 2006) to 
explore the ways global events are remembered as such by the viewers and the 
implications of this for the participants’ sense of belonging and expressions of 
solidarity towards a global community.  
5.1 “Forgetting” suffering 
As discussed in Chapter 3, focus group discussions were triggered by 
photographs from three relatively recent to the focus groups disasters, namely 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmir earthquake, 
before discussions continued and expanded to broader issues and events 
pertaining to the overarching theme of distant suffering. Although events 
surrounding the Tsunami disaster were easily recalled and vividly discussed by 
respondents, Hurricane Katrina and especially the earthquake in Kashmir 
seemed to have faded in public memory. These “absences” in participants’ 
memory were treated as equally important as their memories of other events 
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mentioned in the discussions. “The absence of memory”, Irwing-Zarecka argues, 
“is just as socially constructed as memory itself, and with an equally strong 
intervention of morally as well as ideologically grounded claims to truth” 
(Irwing-Zarecka, 1994: 116). Exploring then the practice of media remembering 
inherently presupposes the simultaneous study of practices of “forgetting”. 
“Forgetting” here is not to be addressed as blanks in the memory of audiences; 
rather, what is of great significance is how these events that participants claim 
not to able to recall are discussed about within the focus groups.  
The present section will focus on how meaning about these “forgotten” events 
was constructed through the interaction among focus group members. By 
constructing meaning in discussion, viewers would draw upon a number of 
other disasters and similar events either as points of reference or by way of 
confusion between different disasters. The ways viewers make these 
associations during the practice of remembering are telling of the different ways 
they position themselves in relation to these specific events and the suffering of 
distant others overall.  
5.1.1 Hurricane Katrina and Anti-Americanism 
Hurricane Katrina, as one of the disasters focus group participants were asked 
about, came up early on in the discussions. As already explained in Chapter 3, it 
was chosen both as a disaster contemporary to the Southeast Asian Tsunami, as 
it followed it about eight months later, as well as an interesting point of 
comparison with it (Section 3.2.2.). The section of politicised witnessing in 
Chapter 4 has addressed how participants in the focus groups positioned 
themselves through a framework of political and cultural stereotypes in relation 
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to disasters occurring within the U.S.A., including Hurricane Katrina (Section 
4.3.). Here the focus will be on participants’ memories of the event. 
Characteristic of most discussions was that these memories were not readily 
triggered among the participants. When shown photos of the events, it was 
common for group members to initially identify the disaster as a “flood” or even 
a “hurricane” but only about half of the participants could name the disaster and 
the place of its occurrence. The mention of the name “Katrina” sounded familiar 
to most respondents but even then only a few of them could recall the 
particulars of the disaster. “Now that you mention the name, I remember 
something” (Litsa, FG2; Kiki, FG3) and “I only remember the name” (Mary, FG7) 
were common responses to the name “Hurricane Katrina”.  
Characteristic of participants’ narratives of Hurricane Katrina and the events 
surrounding it was, first, the construction of the events as a political failure of 
the U.S. government, and, closely related to this, the framing of the Hurricane as 
a national disaster. Both of these aspects are in accordance with some of the 
characteristics of the type of politicised witnessing as described in Chapter 4 
(Section 4.3.), namely the focus on causes and attribution of blame for the 
suffering witnessed and the employment of anti-American stereotypes to make 
sense of the events. If participants positioned themselves as politicised 
witnesses in relation to U.S.-related disasters, they also constructed their 
memories of Hurricane Katrina in a similar way. The focus on the 
unresponsiveness of the American government due to its alleged racism and the 
construction of the victims as “poor black Americans” (Gregoris, FG10) were the 
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main characteristics of such anti-American discourses in audience memories of 
Hurricane Katrina, as evident in the following extracts.  
Do you remember anything about Hurricane Katrina? 
Mina: I remember that…When it happened more or less – last winter or 
autumn – but I can’t remember…I mean, I had heard about it but I 
can’t remember what happened after that. 
Simos: They knew that it was coming!  
Yes… 
Simos: And they were evacuating the cities.  
Tina: They weren’t evacuating it! Or rather… 
Simos: They had said that… 
Tina: …they warned them at the last moment and it was only white 
rich people that managed to leave and the black ones who were 
extremely poor could not go anywhere, this is why most of the people 
who drowned were… 
Simos: I remember, yes, that they had warned… 
Tina: were blacks! 
Simos:…and that there were very long queues on the streets from 
people fleeing New Orleans. Yes, I remember that.  
(mixed, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
The narrative is a combination of images and political analysis of the event, as 
recalled by the participants. Interestingly, Simos begins his narrative by 
immediately constructing the victims as agents through the nomination strategy 
of the deictic “they” and the use of the verb “know”, in a way implying that they 
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were partly responsible for their misfortune, as already seen in section 4.3.2. 
Tina later places agency and, in a way, blame on the authorities (“they warned 
them at the last minute”), also entailing an account of racism in her narrative, 
since it was only the “rich white people” that escaped the disaster. Similar issues 
were echoed in many of the other group discussions:  
Sofia: I remember the flooding; I remember the water, the flooded 
houses, people complaining because aid did not reach them on 
time…These.  
Gerasimos: Perhaps they were indifferent in this case…I…Yes, about the 
inhabitants complaining, it wasn’t just that they complained at that 
point – I think that this was in National Geographic, that I don’t really 
read, Sofia reads these things, I just browse it –perhaps there was not 
enough attention paid by the state, the Federal Government or 
whatever they call it, to those people, because they are black in their 
majority.  
(mixed, middle-class, FG11) 
By identifying as actors the “Federal Government” and the “black inhabitants” the 
disaster is implicitly framed and remembered as an internal national affair of 
the U.S., drawing a distinctive spatial demarcation between the disaster and the 
viewers’ lifeworlds. By focusing on the victims’ indignation (“people 
complaining”) towards their government, the event is also constructed as a 
political rather than natural disaster and most importantly as a political failure 
of the U.S. government. This framework of understanding and remembering the 
disaster seems to encompass an underlying anti-Americanism, as the section of 
politicised witnessing has already discussed.    
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Interestingly, such an anti-American discourse seemed to inform the narratives 
of participants that initially admitted not to recall a lot about Hurricane Katrina. 
In the following extract, a group of young women who claimed not to remember 
the hurricane as a specific disaster still find an opportunity to pass judgment 
about the USA overall.  
Giota: But even there, you know what? I have noticed that their houses 
in the US are like fake ones! They should learn how to build a house! 
(laughs) 
Giota: Guys, you know what? When…I can’t remember, that, and in the 
films I watch, I mean, their houses are like that! You know, as the pre-
constructed houses look like! 
Vicky: Prokat?  
Giota: Prokat! Yes, I mean there are no bricks, no cement, no anything! 
What else could the hurricane do to them then?! Now, that it serves 
them right, this is not something you say but… 
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
Not recalling specific images or facts from the disaster, the viewer draws upon 
other media images to reconstruct the disaster, namely general images of 
housing buildings in the USA, in this case from films. Most importantly, there is a 
latent anti-Americanism in her statements, placing responsibility to the victims 
as Americans, who “should learn how to build a house!” and virtually 
constructing them as deserving victims, despite the disclaimer of her prejudice 
(“not that it serves them right but…”). In a way similar to politicized witnessing, 
we see here how broader cultural and political discourses with a national focus 
enter the discussion about distant suffering. What is of interest here is the way 
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these discourses are employed to “fill in” the memory gaps during the practice 
of media remembering.  
Apart from resorting to cultural stereotypes in order to make sense of the 
disaster, discussants also used another important strategy to fill in their 
memory gaps about the event of the hurricane, namely the use of relevant 
media images of “flooding” and “water”, as the ones described in the quotes 
above. The interplay between actual images of the specific disaster as 
remembered by the focus group participants and of relevant events is evident in 
the quote below:  
Can you remember something specific about Hurricane Katrina? Has 
something made an impression on you?  
Chrysa: I can’t remember anything… 
Daphne: Me neither…not very much! 
Olga: The floods were very…these, flooded, the roads were covered in 
mud and this thing here [shows photograph of people sitting on the 
roof of the houses]…it was shown many times! They would show it all 
the time! 
Daphne: Yes, I… 
Olga: The mud!  
Daphne: And the boat, people travelling on the boat tying to 
escape…OK, well, over there… 
Chrysa: But that wasn’t from this specific one – specific but… 
Daphne: Yes, from the specific one!  
Olga: We’re talking about the specific one! 
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Chrysa: But usually, when we see disasters like that, because of 
hurricanes and stuff, this is how it is. Boats, people trying to escape, 
someone having climbed on the roof…But I can’t remember about this 
specific one… 
(female, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG4) 
Olga narrates her memories of Hurricane Katrina in terms of images of flooded 
roads and mud. These images seem to trigger similar memories to Daphne, who 
initially claims not to be able to recall a lot from the specific disaster. She then, 
however, goes on to describe similar images of water and even of victims 
indeterminately described as “people travelling on the boat”. The indeterminate 
character of the description is picked up by Chrysa, who attributes these images 
to the broader category of hurricane as a disaster and gives a repertoire of 
similar images that are associated with such events. What is at stake here is the 
specificity of the event under discussion, namely Hurricane Katrina, which 
seems to have faded from viewers’ memory and been assimilated to a number of 
similar events as broadcast by the media. A similar point is made by the 
participant below when asked what he can remember from the specific disaster:  
Alex: Which one exactly was Katrina? What was it, a hurricane? 
Yes.  
Alex: In the U.S., New Orleans…I can’t remember it. First of all, I can’t 
remember it because there have been many tornados, a lot of disasters 
because of tornados in the States and I don’t remember. I confuse them 
with all of them, because there have been so many! When I watch the 
news, I hear about a tornado, a disaster, a hurricane but I don’t retain 
the name.  
(male, 25, working-class, FG9) 
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The participant here feels the need to justify his inability to remember the 
specific hurricane by referring to the great frequency of similar events that take 
place in the U.S. and are broadcast by the media. The specificity of each disaster 
is lost in interchangeable images of tornados, disasters and hurricanes.  
The concept of the uniqueness and perceived originality of a disaster, or lack of, 
for that matter, is a theme that underlined all discursive reconstructions of the 
events addressed by the focus groups and will guide the discussion in the 
following sections. What is to be highlighted again in the case of Hurricane 
Katrina is, first, the construction of the event as an internal affair of the U.S. and, 
second, the resort to stereotypes about the specific country and similar images 
as broadcast by the media to reconstruct the events in the practice of 
remembering the Hurricane.  
5.1.2 Kashmir and the ordinariness of earthquakes 
If Hurricane Katrina seemed to have somehow faded from participants’ 
memories in most focus groups, this was even more the case with the 
earthquake in Kashmir, which followed Katrina only by a couple of months with 
a destructive force far greater in terms of its death toll. Only in a couple of the 
focus group discussions the earthquake could be remembered as a specific 
disaster. The group with the members of the Red Cross could remember it 
because of the aid the organisation sent to the affected area (Focus Group 5); in 
another group (Focus Group 12), one of the participants remembered it because 
it took place while he was doing his Masters’ degree in Manchester and his 
Pakistani classmates discussed about it extensively. In both cases, therefore, the 
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recollection of the disaster was linked to autobiographical rather than mediated 
memories.  
What is of greater interest, however, is the attempt of some participants to 
reconstruct the events that surrounded the earthquake. In both cases below, 
participants had initially claimed to “kind of remember” (Litsa, Focus Group 2; 
Giota, Focus Group 7) the Kashmir earthquake, after the location of the event 
was mentioned to them. Later on in the discussions, when asked again, they try 
to remember the event as described below: 
Can you remember anything about the earthquake in Kashmir? 
Dina: A lot of people died then… 
Litsa: I think it must…it must have been the case that in ten… 
Dina: Was it about 7-8 Richter, what was it then? 
Peni: And did it happen around the same time that an earthquake 
happened in Egypt? 
Litsa: But didn’t this happen a year ago? 
Yes.  
Litsa: Yes, I remember. And, actually, it must have been the case that 
after ten days, thirteen days, they found a little child and they kept 
showing it, I remember, for a long time… 
Peni: But didn’t this happen in the earthquake in Turkey? 
Dina: But I can’t remember anything… 
(female, in their 40s and 50s, working-class, FG2) 
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Giota: I remember people wandering around the ruins, looking for 
members of their families, mothers crying for their children…  
(Female, 23, working-class, FG8) 
It is evident that viewers in both extracts do not merely refer to the specific 
earthquake but rather draw upon a reservoir of media images and 
representational templates employed in the coverage of similar disasters. In the 
first extract, Dina uses a general reference to describe the aftermath of the 
earthquake and, although actively trying to participate in the reconstruction of 
the events, she finally concedes that “she can’t remember anything”. Litsa, on the 
other hand, refers to a story of a rescued child that she is not convinced that it 
took place (“it must have been”) and that, as Peni remarks, seems to be 
associated with earthquakes in general rather than be particular of the specific 
one. In the same vein, Giota makes use of generic images to describe their 
memories of the events. Children and mothers are subjects of these images, 
constituting the “ideal victims” (Moeller, 1999: 107) of media’s formulaic 
sensationalist reporting of similar disasters as has already been discussed in 
Chapter 4. These images seem to be subsequently recycled over time in public 
discourse in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish among different events. 
In the same way that hurricanes were reconstructed through a reservoir of 
relevant media images, earthquakes are also associated to a media repertoire of 
images. This is evident in the extract below, where participants discuss the 
interchangeability of media images of earthquakes.  
What about the Kashmir earthquake?  
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Sofia: I can’t remember then, cos I have them confused with the one in 
Istanbul…in Iran…in East Turkey, yes, that’s where it must have 
happened… 
Gerasimos: Yes, every time it happens… 
Sofia: And then…I can’t remember which one was that one… 
Gerasimos: There are so many that they don’t register anymore.  
Sofia: But the scenes are always the same. The houses falling down, 
because construction is not good and... 
… 
Gerasimos: Here, this child must have been rescued [shows 
photograph]. It should be the case that, there were two children 
that…now it slowly comes to mind…but OK, as Sofia said, there are so 
many and repetitive the images we see from earthquakes that you 
cannot distinguish them. 
(mixed, in their 50s, middle-class, FG11) 
Gerasimos here tries to recall a story of children rescued under the ruins after 
the Kashmir earthquake, which “slowly comes to mind” after looking at the 
photographs of the disaster. After some hesitation, however, he realises that this 
story might not have taken place during this specific earthquake, as it is not 
unique but rather part of many similar repetitive images. Indeed similar stories 
of survivors were discussed by other focus groups, as well. In the following 
extract, the discussion about the Kashmir earthquake initiated a lively exchange 
of stories of human suffering caused by earthquakes in other occasions:  
Giota: Guys, do you remember that there was an earthquake – I don’t 
remember in which country – and they found a woman who 
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Mary: Wasn’t it in Greece? 
Vicky: The factory? 
Mary: Yes, the factory of Ricomex! 
Vicky: In Athens19!  
Giota: And she was there for days… 
Vicky: Yes, they had rescued a woman, yes, yes, yes… 
Giota: Do you remember? How did she even survive?!  
Participants kept discussing the collapse of the factory Ricomex for a while only 
to come back to similar stories that they could recall:  
Giota: And then there was another one, with a little boy, Andreas20, I 
don’t know where…And it took them days to take him out of the ruins 
but they rescued him in the end.  
Vicky: I remember something else in Armenia21…A mother who had 
a…who was trapped with her child and in order to save it she had cut 
her fingers… 
Giota: Yes, and she would feed the child! 
Mary: Ooooohhh!!! A mother’s sacrifice! But it’s so touching! To hear 
stories like that! 
Giota: Guys, if you want to survive…First of all, if you are a mother, you 
want your child to survive! 
                                                        
19 Participants here refer to the collapse of the factory Ricomex during the Athens earthquake of 
7th September 1999. The collapse left 39 dead and a number of injured victims.  
20 Andreas Bogdanos was an 8-year-old boy that was extricated from the ruins of his home after 
a strong earthquake in the city of Aigio, Greece, in 1995. The rescue operation lasted for more 
than 20 hours and was covered live by the national media virtually for its entire duration.  
21 The participant seems to refer to the 1988 earthquake in the area of Spitak, Armenia.  
  
221 
Mary: And then another story, that somebody would drink their own 
urine in order to survive. But it’s so horrific! To be under the ruins and 
nobody finding you! 
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
Similar stories of survivors were also mentioned in other focus group 
discussions, such as of a woman who “was trapped, and they found her a month 
later…and there was a pack of pasta and she survived on dry pasta” (Georgia, 
Focus Group 5). Human stories of individual suffering have a lasting impact on 
viewers’ memory due to their emotionally compelling nature as “moving” or 
“horrific”, as it has already been discussed in the chapter of the experience of 
witnessing.  There is also, however, an over-indulgence in self-oriented 
emotions in these narratives, as already addressed in relation to affective 
witnessing (Section 4.1.).  
Nevertheless, and despite the affective impact the human pain of these stories 
evokes, what is being lost in the discussions is the specificity of the context in 
which these stories occur. The conversation becomes an interchange of stories 
of particular instances of horrific suffering, where the categories of time and 
space completely collapse and the historicity of the event is obscured. Susan 
Sontag makes a similar point with regard to photographic images of suffering. 
“The problem”, she argues, “is not that people remember through photos, but 
that they remember only the photos”, which “eclipses other forms of 
understanding and remembering (Sontag, 2003: 89). This does not mean that 
harrowing images lose their power to shock but “they are not much help if the 
task is to understand” (ibid.). In the same way and in congruence to the 
problematic of particularisation discussed earlier (Section 4.1.2.), harrowing 
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stories of specific sufferers are reconstructed by participants in the practice of 
media remembering but they are devoid of their socio-historical circumstances 
that would allow for better understanding of the predicament of the sufferers.  
The local (earthquake in Athens) is intertwined with the distant (earthquake in 
Armenia) and the discussion about the recent (Kashmir) brings to the fore 
images of the past. These associations point to the construction of the theme of 
human suffering caused by earthquakes as an interpretative category for a 
number of different events. At the same time, however, this process of 
categorisation obscures the specificities of particular events, which in its turn 
bears implications for the positioning of the viewer towards these events. These 
implications will be explored in the next section.  
5.1.3 Hurricanes, earthquakes and the banality of suffering 
In the process of the discursive retelling of the Kashmir earthquake as well as 
Hurricane Katrina, participants in the focus groups drew upon media images of 
trauma that seem to have accumulated over time into broader interpretative 
frameworks to which people resort to make sense of similar events. These 
discursive frameworks are acquired over a long period of exposure to similar 
media images and representations and shape understandings of subsequent 
mediated disasters of a similar nature (Kitzinger, 2000). Events, in this context, 
become “de-evented” (Silverstone, 2007: 62), they somehow lose their 
uniqueness and become part of a broader discursive framework, falling into 
“frames that they provide for each other as well as those that, in the media’s 
own imaginary, lie close at hand in the present and popular reservoir of 
dramatic images” (Silverstone, 2007: 63). They are de-contextualised from their 
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specificities and become part, through a process of osmosis, of similar mediated 
narratives (Kitzinger, 2000: 76).  
This “recycling” of images in audience discourses in a way that the uniqueness 
of the disaster is concealed bears significant latent moral implications for 
viewers’ engagement with the suffering of distant others. Disasters such as 
hurricanes and earthquakes are constructed through the practice of media 
remembering as expected, unremarkable and ordinary. In the following extract 
participants account for the fact that they cannot remember Hurricane Katrina 
by comparing the hurricane to the Tsunami disaster:  
Mary: They did not show this (Hurricane Katrina) as much as the 
Tsunami! 
Giota: I’m telling you, the Tsunami happened years ago and it feels as if 
it just took place. Whereas hurricanes and earthquakes are…a typical 
phenomenon by now, they are ordinary. This is why. 
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
The argument about the lack of uniqueness or originality of disasters such as 
hurricanes and earthquakes met earlier is made yet again. It is employed here 
as an argumentative strategy to justify the fact that viewers do not remember 
Hurricane Katrina as easily and vividly as the Tsunami. This apparent need for 
justification implies a normative discourse according to which forgetting is 
perceived as failing (Connerton, 2008: 59), in this case as a moral failure of the 
spectator and as indifference to human pain.  
By describing hurricanes and earthquakes as “typical” and “ordinary” viewers 
also construct the suffering that these disasters entail as ordinary, expected and, 
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ultimately, banal. Cohen describes the “normalisation” and “routinisation” of 
suffering as the loss of the potential impact of suffering due to the viewers’ 
familiarity with it (Cohen, 2001: 189). Audience engagement meets its limit 
“after activating the memory trace that ‘this is just the sort of thing that’s always 
happening in places like that’” (ibid.). This should not necessarily be translated 
as the viewers’ loss of the sense of conventional definitions of normal and their 
emotional numbness towards the suffering of others, as the compassion fatigue 
thesis implies (Moeller, 1999). What is rather at stake here is that particular 
areas are constructed as more exposed to disasters and the people living there 
as more vulnerable to trauma, as is the case in the extracts below in which 
participants reflect on the Kashmir earthquake:  
Vivi: Something that I always think about, when something like this 
happens, is why it is always that the poor people are hit! And in 
Pakistan the earthquake was huge! In Turkey, where it had taken 
place…the poorest people, the poorest places…. 
(female, 40 years old, working-class, FG5) 
Fanis: Wherever there is a poor person…that’s where it hits!  
Stelios: Wherever there are poor people, their bad destiny follows 
them, yes! That’s where it hits, yes! 
(male, in their 20s, working-class, FG9) 
The participants here make a moral judgment, expressing frustration with the 
apparent unfairness of disasters always hitting the most unfortunate (“why”). At 
the same time, however, through the use of the commonplace in Greek langue 
(Wherever there are poor people, their bad destiny follows them), discussants 
naturalise the occurrence of disasters in specific places and for specific people.  
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This is not to say that viewers cannot construct empathetic connections with the 
suffering victims in this context. As the empirical findings on media witnessing 
have already suggested, participants’ emotional involvement with the victims of 
“ordinary” disasters such as earthquakes was expressed in strong affective 
terms (Section 4.1.). However, within the practice of remembering this affective 
engagement is characterised by a self-orientation towards the private emotions 
of the spectator rather than a reflective engagement with the suffering of the 
other. Disasters of a similar nature covered by the media in similar ways are 
constructed through the practice of media remembering as interchangeable, 
unsurprising and banal. In a similar way the pain of the suffering victims is 
something to be expected.  
There is a further moral implication of the constructed banality of suffering in 
audience remembering, namely the complicity of the viewers with the media 
representational practices (Silverstone, 2007: 3). Although the repetitiveness 
and similarity of media images of the coverage of disasters were often pointed 
out by participants in the process of remembering the events, these were only 
used as a justification strategy to defend the difficulty of viewers to distinguish 
between different disasters. They did not form the basis for a critical 
engagement with the media and their template reporting as inadequate for 
revealing the multiple aspects of an event. On the contrary, the events become 
blurred with the media images, namely the means through which they were 
supposed to be remembered (Zelizer, 1998: 202).  
These template images provide a contextual framework for viewers to make 
sense of the events they witness. At the same time, however, they undermine 
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the events they contextualise by conflating the complexity of each individual 
event into a set of similar images (Zelizer, 1998: 226). What is at stake here is 
audience understanding of the particularities of a given disaster, which in its 
turn can allow for a full moral engagement with the situation witnessed. As 
suffering becomes de-evented, it is evacuated by the dimension of historicity, 
necessary for understanding the distant other and for the cosmopolitan 
imagination (Chouliaraki, 2006: 43). Chouliaraki approaches historicity as 
instrumental for the moralisation of the spectator of suffering, both as “social 
explanation”, contextualising a media story of suffering within a broader pattern 
of social and political relationships (Chouliaraki, 2006: 63) and as “the specific 
horizon of space and time that contextualises the singular event” (Chouliaraki, 
2006: 64). As such, historicity is an important dimension for the viewers’ 
understanding of the distant other and their engagement with her suffering.  
Overall, the moral implications of “forgetting” disasters, as illustrated in this 
section, do not lie so much with the lack of memories but rather with the 
apparently inadequate understanding of the events discussed. Media 
remembering in the case of Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmir earthquake is 
underlined by two characteristics: the use of cultural stereotypes and 
frameworks to make sense of the events, such as anti-Americanism or the 
platitude that disasters always hitting the poor; and the use of a reservoir of 
media images from the coverage of similar disasters as accumulated over time. 
Attending to the ways people attempt to reconstruct the events in the group 
discussions offers insights into the politics of memory construction, namely how 
ideological positions influence memory (Kumar et al., 2006: 222), as well as the 
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instrumental role of media representations as technologies of memory that 
embody and generate memories (Sturken, 1997: 10). At the same time, it 
illustrates viewers’ engagement with the suffering through the practice of media 
remembering as gravitating towards the self and private emotions of 
compassion with specific images of others rather than a reflective engagement 
with the suffering of the victims. This, it has been argued, is mainly due to the 
de-contextualisation of the events in the practice of remembering, depriving 
them from their historical dimensions which are necessary for judgment and 
understanding.  
5.2 Iconic media disasters and the spectacularity of suffering  
If hurricanes and earthquakes were constructed as banal through the practice of 
audience remembering, there was another limited category of disasters that 
were referred to in the discussions as exemplary memories of global disasters. 
This category consisted mostly of the South Asia Tsunami, which participants 
were specifically asked about, and the attack on the World Trade Centre of 
September 11, which, although of a very different nature, both in terms of its 
occurrence as a terrorist act and with regard to its death toll with a smaller 
number of victims, was discussed without probing by all groups in similar ways. 
The two events, as was argued in Chapter 4, were experienced by viewers in the 
form of ecstatic witnessing (Section 4.2.). This ecstatic character attributed to 
the mediated experience of the events, also has implications for viewers’ 
practice of remembering, as the two disasters were vividly recalled and most 
importantly referred to as points of reference and comparison with other 
distant disasters.  
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It is argued here that these events have become to acquire a mythic significance 
(Leavy, 2007: 4) because of their extraordinary character, which captivated 
audience attention at the point of their occurrence, but also because of the 
broader meanings that have been attributed to them as “icons” of global 
disasters and distant suffering. The extraordinariness of these events relate to 
their “originality”, as referred to by the participants in the discussions and 
mentioned above in relation to the “ordinariness” of earthquakes and 
hurricanes. The particular character of these events has also formed the basis 
for their appropriation into broader discourses and has ultimately constructed 
them as “iconic events” in public memory. “Iconic” is used here to denote the 
events that come to mean something further than their individual components 
and acquire a mythic meaning, representing universal concepts, emotions and 
meanings (Sturken and Cartwright, 2001: 36).  
The Tsunami and September 11 were especially remembered and narrated in 
relation to pictorial images as these were broadcast by the media. Most of these 
images were of the amateur footage covering the disasters as they unfolded. The 
affective impact of these images has been discussed in the previous chapter in 
relation to the type of ecstatic witnessing (Section 4.2.). Apart from their intense 
emotional element, however, there were also other characteristics of these 
images that rendered them impressionable and dominant in audience 
discourses: their spectacular character and, related to this, their originality. In 
the following extract the disaster caused by the Indian Ocean Tsunami is 
remembered not only in terms of its major destructive outcome but also as an 
  
229 
unimaginable spectacle. The extract follows a comparison between suffering 
caused by war and by natural disasters:  
Tina: Let’s say the Tsunami did not seem like a movie to me, because I 
have never seen something similar, I had never before in my life seen 
something like this… 
Hara: I cannot comprehend it, nevertheless… 
Mina: Hmmm… 
Tina: Me too, in the beginning, although we could see it, we see it as an 
image, what you’re saying, I could not comprehend it, I didn’t…didn’t, I 
mean, I could not…I could not really comprehend it. Did you also feel 
this thing? 
Simos: I did like this [moves as if to protect himself] to avoid the wave! 
(laughter) 
Simos: It was a show! It was an impressive wave that took everybody 
away!  
(mixed, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
Characteristic of ecstatic witnessing, the sense of immediacy with the scene of 
suffering is expressed through Simos’s alleged move to avoid the wave. The 
emotional compelling nature of the images of the Tsunami disaster, already 
discussed as an integral part of the experience of ecstatic witnessing, is 
conveyed through the use of the verbs “comprehend” and “feel”. This intense 
emotional engagement is linked not only to the sensed immediacy of the 
experience but also to the extraordinary nature of the event, as it was 
something the viewers had “never before” seen in their lives. The comparison 
implied constructs the tsunami disaster as “original” in comparison to other 
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“ordinary” disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, as discussed above. 
Closely related to this, the event is remembered as “a show”, its memory based 
on “impressive” pictorial images.  
The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre was also remembered in terms of its 
pictorial representation by the media. As already discussed in relation to 
ecstatic witness, the event was mostly discussed in terms of the “images of 
people burning and falling of the Towers” (Focus Group 8), of the planes hitting 
the Towers (Focus Group 1;3;4) or the broadcasting of the phone conversations 
that were broadcast after the event (Focus Group 1;3). These images 
overshadowed the character of the disaster as a terrorist attack and, therefore, a 
political event. In the following extract, the group is asked to explain why 9/11 
was the event that first comes to mind when they think of the concept of “global 
disasters”: 
Nikos: It was the most horrifying!  
Sotiris: Yes, it was something that had never happened before! 
Nikos: Along with the Tsunami, I think. No, it was the whole story 
even…First of all, it is not a natural disaster! 
Sotiris: It was like a film! 
Nikos: Exactly! It was not a natural disaster! 
Sotiris: You see it and you can’t believe it! As if it is fake! 
(male, in their 20s, working-class, FG10) 
In terms similar to the Tsunami, 9/11 is described as extraordinary, “something 
that had never happened before”. Although its extraordinariness is attributed to 
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its political character as a terrorist attack, it is again mostly on the visuals that 
the participants’ remembering focuses on. The attack is again constructed as a 
“terror spectacle” (Kellner, 2003b), a “film”.  
The vivid recalling of the two disasters, 9/11 and the Tsunami, through pictorial 
images was often attributed in the discussions to the extraordinarily extensive 
media coverage the two events attracted. In the following extract, the 
participants make fun of a peer’s detailed memory of the breaking news of the 
Tsunami disaster:  
Simos: You have the memory of an elephant! 
Mina: Have you been haunted by it? 
Tina: Guys, it was constantly on the news! Constantly! It was the only 
thing they would show! The whole duration of the news would be this. 
And they would show it until the evening, all the time, constantly! On 
that day and the next one and the next one… 
(mixed, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
The media coverage of 9/11 was also put at the centre of public memory of the 
attack: 
Irini: And this event [i.e. 9/11] overshadowed everything else. It had 
the greatest media coverage… 
Nana: Even the other day, I saw photographs in a magazine, of people 
just standing and looking. The planes having fallen but the Towers not 
having collapsed yet and these people standing there and not having 
understood what happened…. 
Irini: This event will stick with us! For many years! And they will 
always mention it! Whereas I think that the earthquake, either in 
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Pakistan or Turkey, has faded. And I believe that the Tsunami might 
also fade out. But this will always be mentioned. And the images will 
always be shown.  
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
There is an implied criticism and frustration about the media’s extensive focus 
on the two disasters in comparison to other events in the first extract, as 
indicated in the repetitive use of “constantly”. This focus is considered by 
participants to be instrumental in their recollection of the events. Recycled in 
the media for weeks after their occurrence, the events were also recycled in 
public memory (Teer-Tomasseli, 2006: 231).  
However, drawing a direct causal line between extensive media coverage and 
the vividness of viewers’ memory seems to be an oversimplification. A main 
characteristic of the articulation of remembering of iconic disasters is the 
presence of the viewer in the narrative of the events in a way of emotional 
immersion. The use of affective vocabulary such as “I cannot comprehend it [the 
Tsunami]”, “did you also feel this?”, “horrifying”, and “can’t believe it” in the above 
extracts is indicative of this emotional positioning of the viewers within the 
practice of media remembering. There is an important link to be made here 
between the experience of ecstatic witnessing and the practice of media 
remembering. Both events, the Tsunami and the attack of September 11, have 
been discussed in the previous empirical chapter as two events that were 
experienced by the viewers through the position of ecstatic witnessing. It was 
argued at the point that the two disasters, due to their mode of representation 
through unedited and amateur footage, gave the viewers the sense that they 
were immediate witnesses of the events, an experience of intense emotional 
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nature (Section 4.2. above). Remembering the disasters becomes an emotional 
enterprise, which focuses on instances of affective intensity rather than a 
narrative of facts and sequences of events. It is this affective impact that seems 
to be the triggering point for viewers’ recollections of the two events. It is also 
an element that links the two events in viewers’ collective remembering. They 
thus escape their individual meaning and become reference points in framing 
each other and in constituting points of comparison to other instances of 
suffering. In the following extract, the participant is describing her experience of 
the Tsunami disaster: 
 Nana: For me, when I saw it, it reminded me of the same feelings I had 
felt when I saw that of September 11 – I don’t know if that has any 
immediate relationship to this.    
Yes, sure… 
Nana: But the same kind of emotions that I felt for this one[i.e. the 
Tsunami], because it was one of the biggest disasters, as that one, it 
automatically brought into my mind what I had felt on September 11, 
that it is something you cannot fight, let’s say.  
(female, 26, middle-class, FG3) 
A particular characteristic of this emotional kind of remembering the attack on 
the World Trade Centre and the Tsunami was the construction of the events as 
“flashbulb memories” (Brown and Kulik, 1977, in Pennebaker and Banasik, 
1997: 5). The concept of “flashbulb memory” is used to describe the “mixture of 
personal circumstances and historical events in memory” (Pennebaker and 
Banasik, 1997: 5). In other words, it describes the situation where viewers not 
only remember the event itself but can also recall their personal situation when 
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they first heard about it. This is best illustrated in the following extract, where 
the group, when asked about their memories of other global disasters, start 
talking about September 11:  
Mary: Can I talk about it? I was sitting exams at the point! 
Vicky: But this is not a natural disaster! 
Mary: I was sitting exams for college and I was studying with the TV 
switched on! 
Giota: When did this happen? 
Vicky: In 2001! 
Mary: And while I was reading, I had the TV on, on mute. And I lift my 
eyes, I see an aeroplane on the TV, I say “what’s going on, are you 
kidding us?!”, I say “OK”, I’m about to start again, I look again, a second 
one! I drop the books! (laughs) I was shocked! I was shocked, of course, 
afterwards with these, with the last phone calls that were aired 
afterwards… 
Vicky: Exactly!!! 
Mary: that they would say “I love you all and I know that I will 
probably die and…”. 
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
Similar accounts were mentioned in other discussions too, with many 
participants recalling watching television in the afternoon of September 11 
2001 and suddenly being confronted with the incomprehensible sight of the 
Twin Towers collapsing. Although not as frequently, the Southeast Asian 
Tsunami was also remembered by some participants in terms of flashbulb 
memories, as the quote below describes:  
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If somebody would ask you “what happened during the Tsunami 
disaster?” what would you say?  
Dimitris: Well, I get into the house – listen to this – I get back home and 
suddenly I turn around, I hadn’t realised a thing, my sister was also 
there, and I turn and see the television, there was a huge wave on the 
screen at that moment, you know, there were people that had recorded 
the event with a camera, and they were showing this on the news, a 
huge wave, and I say “What is this?”, let’s say, I didn’t know…First of 
all, I didn’t even know what “tsunami” meant…   
(male, 27, middle-class, FG8) 
The viewers position themselves here as ecstatic witnesses of the events, in a 
virtually un-mediated relationship with the scene of the suffering, as has already 
been discussed in Chapter 4 in the context of ecstatic witnessing. Through the 
use of temporal references (“while I was reading”, “suddenly I turn around”), the 
participants describe the spectacle of suffering as “an immediate reality” 
(Chouliaraki, 2006: 40), as if the events were unfolding in front of their eyes, in 
a dimension of “instantaneous proximity” (Chouliaraki 2006: 164).  
At the same time, viewers not only vividly recollect the images of the disaster 
but also their exact situation at the time they heard about the event, in a mixture 
of mediated and autobiographical memory. According to Pennebaker and 
Banasik, people have such vivid recollections in relation to flashbulb memories, 
exactly because they can include themselves in the event as immediate 
witnesses and thus place themselves in a historical context (Pennebaker and 
Banasik, 1997: 5). Viewers’ narratives here are not of the events but of 
themselves watching the events.  Confronted with the sublime spectacle of 
terror, of a disaster that they cannot “comprehend” and “have never experienced 
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before”, viewers try to make sense of their experiences through “reflexive 
contemplation”, by placing themselves within the spectacle of the disaster, by 
“watching” themselves watching the disaster (Chouliaraki, 2006: 175).  
It is exactly this positioning of the viewer as an immediate witness to the event 
and, thus, part of a historical context that renders the Tsunami and 9/11 iconic 
in collective remembering. In describing the events as spectacular and original 
and, at the same time, expressing their emotional involvement with the media 
images, participants place themselves as witnesses of historical moments, which 
are then recycled in public memory as iconic disasters. Unlike earthquakes and 
hurricanes that are incorporated into already existing accumulative frameworks 
of meaning, the two disasters, the Tsunami and 9/11, are constructed as 
landmark events through the practice of media remembering. They are events 
through which viewers engage with and reflect on the global; however, they do 
this by placing themselves as participants in the events unfolded. This 
gravitation towards the self and the emphasis on the spectacular construct the 
events as iconic in memory but obscure the moral relationship between the 
spectator and the sufferer. If through the normalization of earthquakes and 
hurricanes as banal in media remembering understanding is suspended because 
of the decontextualisation of the suffering from its historicity, in iconic disasters 
understanding is overwhelmed by intense emotionality and the spectacularity 
of the events.   
5.3 The Turkish earthquake and the universality of human pain 
There was a third event, apart from the Southeast Asian Tsunami and 
September 11, that was recalled by all focus groups when discussing about 
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disasters and distant suffering, namely the Turkish earthquake of 1999. The 
earthquake occurred in Izmit, north-western Turkey, and its death toll rose 
above 17,000 victims. The geographical proximity to Greece rendered it a 
newsworthy event and its extensive media coverage was accompanied by great 
amounts of aid pledges. The Turkish earthquake was followed in less than a 
month by a strong earthquake in Athens, which although of a much smaller 
scale and destructive force, was one of the strongest Greece has experienced in 
recent history. The subsequent exchange of support between the two countries 
came to be described by news media as the “Greek-Turkish earthquake 
diplomacy” (Ker-Lindsay, 2000), symbolic of an apparent overcoming of the 
mutual hostility between the two neighbouring countries.  
The disaster seems to be unique in its complicated status as an event both 
proximate and distant. It is more proximate than any of the other disasters 
discussed, as it concerns a neighbouring country. It is also associated with an 
event of a national significance, the Greek earthquake. At the same time, 
however, it remains distant, as it occurred within another nation; this distance 
is even more accentuated by the hostile historic relations between Greece and 
Turkey.   
Although not part of the topic guide of the focus group discussions and 
participants were at no point prompted to talk about it, the Izmit earthquake 
was discussed by all focus groups. These discussions were more prominent and 
focused in the groups that were conducted in the town of Komotini, which, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, is home to a big minority of Turkish origin. However, the 
earthquake was also mentioned by the participants of the Athens groups. 
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Interestingly, and despite its much earlier occurrence – as well as the fact that 
participants were told that the photos were from recent disasters – the Turkish 
earthquake was the event most groups associated with the photographs of the 
Kashmir earthquake. It was also remarkably common for participants to turn 
the discussion to the Izmit earthquake, when asked about their memories from 
the Pakistan one. The extracts below are indicative of this tendency:  
Do you remember anything about the Pakistan earthquake?  
Mary: No! Nothing! 
Vicky: Only about the Turkey earthquake! 
How come? 
Vicky: I don’t know… 
Giota: It sticks more with you because it is a neighbouring country, is 
this why? 
Vicky: Maybe.  
Mary: About the Greeks that went there and helped and there was talk 
about Greek-Turkish friendship and stuff…Pakistan…Had we sent aid 
back then? No… 
Giota: We always send, guys. 
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
Hmmm…Do you remember anything about the Pakistan earthquake?  
Nana: I only remember the Turkey one, guys, really vividly.  
Kiki: When was that? 
Irini: Eeeehhh…it was summer… 
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Nana: Has it been five years? 
Kiki: It was a summer again; I think we were sitting exams for the 
second time.  
Nana: Wasn’t it after the Athens earthquake? 
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG3) 
The Izmit earthquake appears to be used by participants to “fill in” their 
memory gaps concerning the Kashmir earthquake. In a way similar to the use of 
template media images to remember earthquakes, as described in section 5.1.2. 
above, the Turkish earthquake is used here to frame the memory of the Kashmir 
disaster. In a line of “ordinary” earthquakes, the Izmit one is constructed as a 
landmark event and a frame of reference for others.  
There are two interrelated reasons that can be seen as the basis for this 
predominance of the Turkish earthquake of 1999 over other similar disasters. 
First, due to its geographical proximity it is described as more relevant and, 
therefore, more impressionable in viewers’ memories. Second, the disaster is 
attributed a further symbolic significance, due to its follow up by the Athens 
earthquake and the consecutive media and political discourse on “disaster 
diplomacy” (Kelman, 2011) between the two countries. Audiences seem to 
reproduce this discourse in their remembering of the events. As one participant 
put it:  
Dimitra: What has stuck with me from that event, besides the Richters 
and stuff, is that we were constantly talking about the relationship 
between Greece and Turkey, that Greece had helped a lot.                         
(female, 54, middle-class, FG5) 
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Unlike the disasters previously discussed, the Turkish earthquake is hardly 
remembered in terms of visual images of suffering, either in their template 
format, as discussed in section 5.1. or in specific visuals and reports, as is the 
case with the iconic disasters of the Tsunami and 9/11. Rather, it seems that the 
Izmit earthquake of 1999 has become embedded in broader national and 
political discourses. It is not constructed merely as a disaster but rather as an 
event of political significance for the national community. The national 
framework viewers draw upon is indicated through the use of deictic pronouns 
(“we sent help”) and spatial references (“neighbouring country”). At the same 
time, the earthquake was often referred to as an exemplary case of the 
compelling nature of mediated suffering and its alleged potential to connect 
people across geographical and cultural borders under the idea of a common 
humanity. In the following extract, participants are responding to the question 
of how interested they are in news from geographically distant places:  
Litsa: I just wanna say…But it’s irrelevant. I mean, I sent help to 
Turkey, after the earthquake in Turkey.  
Dina: Of course, it’s a neighbouring country! 
Litsa: And I’m saying that, because I think it’s interesting…I highlight 
the fact that it was in Turkey, because we are Christians, I don’t know 
whether you can write this, they are… 
Popi: Muslims!  
Peni: Turks! 
Litsa: They were Turks! I mean, another religion and enemies, so to 
speak. But I didn’t care about that, it didn’t affect me…I sent a lot of 
things…  
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Dina: We did too! It’s a neighbouring country, of course! 
Litsa:…to Turkey through a friend here who is Muslim. When I say a 
lot, I mean a lot of stuff! It didn’t care at all! The human being felt for 
the human being without caring about what and who they [the 
victims] are…  
(female, in their 40s and 50s, working-class FG2) 
The Turkish earthquake is constructed as a “landmark” event (Halbwachs, 
1992: 61) in viewers’ collective memory, in the sense that it symbolises the 
overcoming of national hostilities and individual prejudices in the face of human 
pain (“the human being felt for the human being”). At the same time, however, 
respondents distinctively position themselves as members of the national 
community, when remembering the disaster. As such they identify themselves 
in opposition to the Turkish victims, who are still defined as the “other”, as 
“another religion”, as the “enemy”, even in order to negate the significance of 
such categorisations when judged against the urgency of human pain. The 
recognition of boundaries of otherness goes hand-in-hand with the articulation 
of the discourse of a common humanity, by way of illustration of the “both/and” 
principle of cosmopolitan experience (Beck, 2006: 57), within which “there 
arises a space of overlapping but incompatible frames of reference and 
meanings” (Beck, 2002: 33).   
Such discussions were common among all focus groups. At the end of one of the 
discussions when participants were asked whether they had anything to add, 
one of them felt the need to emphasise the significance of the earthquake in 
Turkey:  
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Olga: I just wanna say about the issue of the Turks, when that disaster 
took place, how we were emotionally charged and we felt for the 
human being. And how, despite the whole hostility, we felt their pain.  
(female, 47, middle-class, FG4) 
The use of the deictic “we” – denoting the national community – and “their” – 
referring to Turkish people – is indicative of the adoption of a national 
framework, when viewers talk about the earthquake. The national context is 
used here as the “social framework of memory” (Halbwachs, 1992: 38), within 
which participants place themselves. The Izmit earthquake is attributed a 
meaning beyond its nature as a case of distant suffering; it is constructed 
through remembering as an incident of national significance and, therefore, of 
more immediate significance for viewers’ local lifeworlds. It becomes a “critical 
incident” in collective memory, as it constitutes a moment “by means of which 
people air, challenge and negotiate their own standards of action” (Zelizer, 
1992: 4). The Turkish earthquake of 1999 is such a moment, during which 
audience members negotiate their moral agency vis-à-vis the suffering of 
distant others, in this case as members of a national community who are asked 
to overcome traditional hostilities in order to feel for the “enemy”.  
In this context, it appears that cosmopolitan connectivity as the reflective 
engagement with the distant other is only achieved in media remembering 
through the national framework. In the hierarchy of remembering that has been 
so far discussed in this chapter, the Turkish earthquake is the only event 
constructed as a landmark of moral connectivity among spectators and 
sufferers. If in remembering other earthquakes or hurricanes the face of the 
other is taken out of context and becomes the basis for an indulgence in private 
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emotion, as also discussed in relation to particularisation in mediated suffering 
in the previous chapter, and in narrating iconic events the sufferer is obscured 
by the sublime experienced of the viewer herself, it is only in the case of the 
Turkish earthquake, that the viewers engage with the unfortunate both as an 
other and as a fellow human being. The recognition of common humanity, in this 
case, is conditional on national recognition.  
5.4 Media disasters and the global audience 
The three disasters discussed above, the Southeast Asian Tsunami of 2004, the 
September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 and the Izmit 
earthquake of 1999, were the events most often mentioned and discussed 
among the participants in the focus groups. Apart from being landmark events 
of distant suffering in audience collective memory, these disasters were also 
constitutive of the discursive category of “global disasters”. As such, apart from 
instances making moral claims to the viewers in relation to the suffering of 
others, they were also occasions for the creation of a “global audience”, 
establishing relationships among viewers around the world. This possibility of 
mediation to establish a sense of community among audiences around the world 
through the sharing of common mediated experiences (Tomlinson, 1999; Cottle, 
2006) has been discussed as part of the optimistic narrative of the creation of a 
cosmopolitan public on the basis of mediated experience (Chouliaraki, 2006) in 
the introductory chapter of this thesis. Here, this possibility will be explored in 
relation to the audience practice of remembering these vicarious experiences, 
through which viewers also construct their sense of space and belonging.  
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Arguments about the media’s capacity “to bring a global population, albeit 
momentarily, into the compass of a global community” (Silverstone, 2006: 83) 
echo Dayan and Katz’s theoretical construct of “media events” (Dayan and Katz, 
1992). Media events are defined as the television genre of the broadcast of 
ceremonial events, which interrupt the routines of daily media flow and attract 
large numbers of audiences brought together by the simultaneous viewing 
activity (Dayan and Katz, 1992). Although traumatic events such as disasters are 
not included in the initial definition of the genre, later critiques of its 
narrowness expanded it to include unplanned and sudden occurrences such as 
disasters and disruptive events (Liebes, 1998; Cottle, 2006; Katz and Liebes, 
2007; Kyriakidou, 2008). In such an attempt, Cottle describes the category of 
“media disasters” in terms similar to the one of media events, namely as 
“disasters that are publicly signalled by different media as major, often 
traumatic and, on occasion, historically momentous happenings, [which] also 
frequently exhibit high media performativity, circulate potent symbols, and 
invoke and/or mobilize solidarities” (Cottle, 2006: 421). 
What is of interest here is how viewers through the practice of remembering 
distant disasters construct them as global media events and themselves as 
participants in a global or cosmopolitan public. This focus will throw light into 
discussion about the cosmopolitanisation of memory (Levy and Sznaider, 2002) 
briefly discussed in Chapter 2, which has been theorised as instrumental in 
formulating a common global ground for perceiving the world (Volkmer, 2006). 
To that end, the rest of the chapter will first examine the kind of events viewers 
themselves construct as “global disasters”. It will then explore the ways these 
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disasters are also “localised” in collective memory by being associated with 
events and meanings of local and national significance. Audience collective 
memory in this context, I will argue, is a double process of simultaneously 
“globalising” and “localising” media disasters.  
5.4.1 Global media disasters 
September 11 and the Izmit earthquake were brought in the focus group 
discussions by participants themselves without any probing from the 
moderator, as mentioned earlier. In introducing these two events and 
discussing them alongside the three disasters initially chosen as the focus of the 
group questions, participants expanded the category of “global disasters” to 
their own understanding to include events different in nature (9/11 was a 
terrorist attack rather than a natural disaster) that they nevertheless 
interpreted in similar lines. In addition to these two events that were discussed 
by virtually every focus group, participants were asked later in the discussion to 
mention other “global disasters” they could recall, collectively expanding this 
discursive category.  
This question led to the collective construction of a list of events participants 
considered fitting under the category of “global disasters”. Events as diverse as 
the Chernobyl accident in 1986 (groups 1; 7; 10; 11; 12) and the Gulf War of 
1990 (groups 2; 6) fell under this label in audience discussions. The events 
ranged from man-made, such as the terrorist attack of the Madrid train 
bombings in 2004 (Groups 10 and 12) to natural disasters, such as a volcano 
eruption in the Philippines (Group 11) and from old disasters, such as the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (Groups 7, 10, 11), to 
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contemporary events, such as the war in Lebanon (Groups 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). 
Interestingly, in a great number of groups there was a discussion of climate 
change and its concomitant environmental risks as a kind of “manmade” global 
disaster (Groups 1, 2, 4, 6, 12), confirming the emergence of an environmental 
discourse as integral in the experience and construction of the global (Beck and 
Sznaider, 2006).  
Typically, discussants would collectively construct the category of “global 
disasters” through interruptions and interventions and often without drawing 
connections between the different events, as is evident here:  
What other global disasters come into your mind? 
Sofia: Hiroshima and Nagasaki! 
Gerasimos: But Hiroshima was not due to a natural disaster! 
Sofia: Yes, it came to my mind as a big disaster! 
Gerasimos: It was the nuclear bomb! 
Sofia: OK, and all the war, of course… 
Gerasimos: Chernobyl… 
Sofia: Huh…the wildfires in…that were huge – of course, ours were not 
smaller either but… 
Gerasimos: In the US? 
Sofia: In Los Angeles, around there. Wildfires burning millions of 
acres…I remember this vividly. 
(mixed, in their 50s, middle-class, FG11) 
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The conversation seems to jump from one event to the other, from the nuclear 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to the nuclear accident of Chernobyl of 
1986 to the wildfires in California in 2005. The environment seems to be the 
link for the association of these three disasters with each other, although all 
three of them are remembered on different grounds: the bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki are landmark historical events not experienced by participants 
but part of global history, the ecological disaster of Chernobyl is an event that 
affected Greece among others, and the California wildfires are remembered in 
terms of their media images. Interestingly, there is the national framework 
again at play, indicated by the deictic “ours”, meaning the wildfires that occur in 
Greece every summer.  
There are different meanings attributed to these events that construct them as 
global. Some of the participants constructed the category of “global” as affecting 
populations around the world. This was the case, for example, with 
environmental disasters such as the ones mentioned above.  For others, it was 
their worldwide broadcasting that rendered some events global. This interplay 
of attributes is evident in the extract below, which indicates how participants 
are again collectively constructing their memories of global disasters: 
What other global disasters come into mind? 
Ilias: The earthquake in Turkey? 
Thanos: The bombing of Serbia, Yugoslavia. The war. Those bombings. 
Dimos: The war in Iraq, in Kuwait.  
Pavlos: Look, the word “disaster” now, for example, for me, in the 
broader sense of disaster, I do think that it was a disaster when an 
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entire submarine was lost then in Russia, with all the people inside, and 
the way it happened22. Or when, let’s say, the spacecraft perished in the 
air23. I mean, a disaster that OK, maybe it is not that…But it’s 
considered to be…When, let’s say, you have for entire days a submarine 
with people inside slowly dying, let’s say, and you feel like you cannot 
help, you can’t do anything, and then it finally ends… 
Ilias: Yes, true… 
Pavlos: Also the environment! The environment. It’s a disaster that has 
a much bigger scale, let’s say…It depends on how each one sees it. What 
you consider, let’s say, to be a disaster.  
(male, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG6) 
Wars was a category of events conspicuous in the list of global disasters as 
constructed by the participants and it comes up in the discussion here both in 
terms of a geographically proximate (Serbia) and a distant (Iraq) war. What is 
mostly interesting, however, is the distinction between disasters in the “broader 
sense” such as the loss of Kursk submarine and the Challenger or Columbia 
space shuttle explosions and disasters such as environmental ones. The latter 
are described as global, since they are of a “much bigger scale”. What renders the 
loss of the Russian submarine a global disaster, however, as described here by 
the speaker, is the fact that through its global broadcasting it places viewers 
around the world into the position of witnesses. Indeed, there are a number of 
                                                        
22 The participant refers here to the loss of the Russian submarine Kursk, which sank together 
with its 118 crew members after an explosion on the 12th of August 2000. Rescue efforts were 
delayed and for a week it was uncertain where the submarine was located and whether there 
were any survivors.  
23 It is unclear whether the reference here concerns the 1986 Challenger space shuttle, which 
exploded seconds after its launch – which was covered live by the media – resulting in the death 
of its seven members of crew or the Columbia space shuttle, which disintegrating during its re-
entry into the atmosphere on February 1st 2003.  
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elements in this extract that point towards the category of ecstatic witnessing, 
as discussed in section 4.2. in chapter 4. The sense of immediate witnessing 
expressed through temporal and spatial deixis (“you have for entire days a 
submarine with people inside slowly dying”, “…and then it finally ends.”), as well 
as the sense of helplessness created by the spectacle of death (“you feel like you 
cannot help, you can’t do anything”) position the viewer as an ecstatic witness 
vis-à-vis the media report of the lost submarine. What constructs this event as a 
global disaster is “the way it happened”, namely that it took place in front of the 
viewers’ eyes, witnessed by global audiences.  
This global reach of the events through their media broadcasting was an aspect 
of the global disasters that was extensively discussed by the focus groups. In 
some ways, what is really global in these events is their reaching of audiences 
around the world through their broadcasting and media reporting. In this way, 
global disasters were constructed as moments of “mechanical solidarity” among 
viewers around the globe, as described by Dayan and Katz (1992: 196), based 
on the fact that “all those within reach of a television set are simultaneously and 
equally exposed, and they share the knowledge that everybody else is too” 
(Dayan and Katz, 1992: 197). In the extract below, one of the participants 
describes how he believes that during disasters such as the Tsunami people 
around the world might feel for their fellow human beings:  
Dimitris: And I am not saying this just for myself! I believe that then, 
during such disasters, let’s say like the Tsunami, that it is as if all the 
nations of the world were united.  
Tasos: Exactly!  
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Dimitris: I mean that everyone united felt for the victims… 
Tasos: You realise your emotions as a human being! 
Dimitris: Not just myself! That…I mean, even the murderer that might 
have committed a murder the previous night will…will sit down and 
watch this thing for a couple of hours! Not just me! Everyone!  
(male, in their 20s, middle-class, FG8) 
There is a sense that the “whole world is watching” (Gitlin, 1980) such globally 
mediated events, both in terms of nations (“all the nations of the world were 
united”) as well as individual spectators (“everyone!”). The viewer here positions 
himself not only in relation to the suffering witnessed but also to the “imagined 
community” (Anderson, 1989) of fellow viewers around the world. This 
imagined community is even elaborately described as the “global village” in 
another discussion:  
Menelaos: When disasters like these take place, the scale of which is 
much bigger and they surpass the borders of a country, for example the 
Tsunami of Hurricane Katrina, with such a scale, they cannot only 
preoccupy the country itself. At this moment, that big, that global 
village that we refer to as the mass media and communications is 
being activated!  
(Male, 26, middle-class, FG12) 
In narrating their experiences of global disasters, viewers simultaneously 
position themselves in relation to a community of viewers around the world, 
connected to each other through the practice of simultaneously viewing the 
same events, witnessing the same instances of distant suffering. They thus take 
part in the construction of a global collective memory based not on the sense of 
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belonging in “some continuing community of fate, but as the product of a 
reflexive choice to incorporate the suffering of the ‘Other’” in a kind of 
cosmopolitan memory in-the-making (Levy and Sznaider, 2002: 103). This does 
not necessarily assume a functionalist attribution to the role of media memory 
in creating and sustaining a “global community” (Couldry et al., 2010: 5). As it 
will become clear later in this chapter, there is nothing purely global in the 
sense of ecumenical in the way Greek viewers remember the disasters 
discussed. Rather, what is emphasised here is that in remembering events of 
global scale viewers position themselves not only in terms of their already 
constituted national community but also as members of a global audience.  
In constructing events as global disasters through the practice of media 
remembering, viewers position themselves as members of a global audience 
and participate in the construction of a global or cosmopolitan collective 
memory. While being categorised as global, however, the same events were 
simultaneously contextualised by participants within local frameworks of 
reference. This process of particularising and localising media disasters will be 
explored in the following section.  
5.4.2 Localising the global 
The category of global disasters as constructed by participants included both 
events remote in time and space and events that took place in close proximity to 
the discussants’ locale. The 1999 earthquake in Turkey was the most prominent 
of these proximate events; as discussed above, the event was remembered for 
its significance within the national context, as a disaster on the basis of which 
the two countries, Greece and Turkey, overcame their differences. Other 
  
252 
examples of such proximate disasters included the Serbian bombings of 1999, 
which were described as taking place in the participants “neighbourhood” 
(Groups 1 and 9), and, most notably, the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986, 
which albeit distant affected participants in their everyday lives. Chernobyl was 
especially mentioned by the group of the younger age cohort. Given that the 
participants in these groups were about five or six years old when the disaster 
took place, it was an event implicated with childhood memories, as is evident in 
the extract below:  
Menelaos: Chernobyl comes to mind.  
Stathis: Oh, that’s a good one! 
Menelaos: Nuclear disasters, if not Chernobyl, the trials at the…that 
France had conducted in Mururoa, what was their name. And…the 
environment, in general, whatever can affect a lot of people. There are 
many events like that.  
You mean these events affect you as well? 
Kostas: Not me, not all.  
No? Not Chernobyl? 
(laughs) 
Stathis: I was running in the rain, when I was little. And my parents 
were shouting “come, get the umbrella!”.  
Kostas: Yes, more those with nuclear stuff and the ones that are in our 
neighbourhood, like this, they affect us as a country.  
(male, in their 20s, middle-class, FG12) 
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The Chernobyl disaster is initially constructed as part of a broader category of 
environmental disasters affecting the globe. As such, the speaker positions 
himself as one of the “lot[s] of people” that can be affected by such events. Later 
on in the discussion, however, Chernobyl becomes a disaster implicated in 
autobiographical memory, as well as national and local life. By localising this 
way the memory of Chernobyl, participants embed global disasters into national 
and local frameworks. Through the use of spatial deixis (“in our 
neighbourhood”) and the use of metonymy (“us as a country”) to describe 
themselves as members of their national community, discussants highlight the 
fact that events become significant as long as they are implicated in their 
everyday lifeworld. In accordance with detached witnessing (section 4.4.), the 
adoption of local and national frameworks in memory places the viewer in a 
limited world of everyday affairs.  
Notably, local frameworks were also employed in discussions of events that 
have not had an effect on the local or national community. This interplay 
between the global and the local or national is best exemplified in the quote 
below, where the two are intertwined. The discussion is initially focused on the 
Tsunami, described as “the greatest ever global disaster”, only to turn to the 
issue of national disasters.  
Giota: I’m telling you, it [i.e. the Tsunami] hit there and it immediately 
found itself elsewhere, so many kilometres afar, in the other end of the 
world. This. And usually these things take place in the Pacific! That’s it! 
In the Pacific Ocean. So don’t think that they will ever happen to us. 
Don’t expect this! 
Mary: If it ever happened, that would be it for Greece!  
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Giota: It’s only earthquakes that happen here! Earthquakes and 
wildfires! And floods! 
Vicky: Oooh, I can’t stand it with the fires now! 
Giota: Look, it was on the news again yesterday that the ice is melting 
and Africa is beginning to slowly connect with Cyprus and Crete. It’s 
starting to raise slowly-slowly, the plaques.  
Vicky: We’re gonna sink all of us.  
Giota: Yes, in some years! I hope it doesn’t catch up with our children! 
Vicky: It won’t…I do believe this. That it will happen.  
Giota: Yes! It was on the news yesterday! 
Vicky: I was so sad now with [the wildfires in]Halkidiki now! 
Giota: Oh, yes! They completely burnt! And it was so nice there! 
(female, in their 20s, working-class, FG7) 
In the course of the discussion the focus turns from the global (the tsunami “in 
the Pacific ocean” or the “ice…melting”) to the local and the national (the fires in 
Halkidiki or Africa slowly connecting with Cyprus and Crete), while the 
participants retain their national collective frameworks positioning themselves 
as Greeks throughout the discussion (“don’t think that they will ever happen to 
us”, “we’re gonna sink, all of us!”).  
Based on a study of public memories of global events around the world, Teer-
Tomaselli argues that the most important influence on what was remembered 
by the audiences in different countries was cultural proximity (Teer-Tomaselli, 
2006: 235). Distant events were more easily recalled when they exhibited a 
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sense of local relevance but, even when not related with the immediate national 
area, they were often recalled in terms of factors associated with the national 
arena. This way of “localising” or “particularising” the memories of global events 
was prominent in the focus group discussions here. It was also expressive of the 
significance of national collective memory for the practice of media 
remembering. As members of a national community, viewers reconstruct their 
media memories within the social frameworks of the national collective 
memory (Halbawchs, 1991: 38). In this context, media remembering becomes 
the practice of articulating together mediated and personal, national and global, 
local and cosmopolitan memories.  
5.4.3 Media remembering: between the global and the local 
The practice of media remembering has been described in this section as a 
double process of “globalisation” and “localisation” of memory. On the one hand, 
a number of events are constructed and remembered by audience members as 
“global”. Through this process, viewers simultaneously situate themselves as 
part of a global audience and participate in the construction of a global 
collective memory. On the other hand, they seem to simultaneously “localise” 
their memories of the events they have witnessed through the media by 
remembering them alongside autobiographical memories or narratives of 
national or local significance. In this way, they re-contextualised their memories 
of global disasters to meaningfully fit into their own lifeworlds.   
This illustrates the practice of media remembering as a multidimensional 
process at the intersection of local, national and global discursive frameworks. It 
also describes the positioning of viewers as members of both pre-existing 
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communities of belonging, such as the nation or the local community and in the 
global community of spectators, a community in-the-making through the 
process of mediation. As discussed in chapter 2, looking into the discursive 
frameworks people employ in reconstructing the past is telling of their placing 
in social groups (Halbwachs, 1992). We have seen here that viewers, when 
remembering, employ both local or national and global collective frameworks. 
In its turn, this is indicative of their sense of belonging not only in the national 
community but also a more abstract global community, albeit fleeting and 
media-oriented. 
This dimension of constructing distant disasters as global media events misses 
the explicit moral gravity of the mediated connection between spectator and 
sufferer (Chouliaraki, 2006: 27). The bonds formed in this case seem to be 
merely among the spectators. As the previous sections have argued, the practice 
of remembering most often lacks a reflective engagement with the suffering 
witnessed, as the misfortune of the distant other is either forgotten, considered 
expected or remembered in terms of particular stories deprived of their 
historicity.  Therefore, even when remembering “global” suffering, viewers still 
gravitate towards the imagination of pre-existing memberships (Halbwachs, 
1992: 52): this is mostly the imagination of the national community, which 
seems to filter and re-contextualise global events in the social world of the 
everyday; but it is also the imagination of the communitarian public of the West, 
constituted by the spectators addressed by global media and based on the sense 
of connectivity to fellow spectators (Chouliaraki, 2006: 27).  
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Summary and conclusions 
The chapter has illustrated the practice of media remembering as being 
constructed at the intersection of different discourses. Two main tensions 
underlined the practice of remembering in audience discussions: on the one 
hand, there is the tension between the intertwined but antithetical processes of 
remembering and forgetting events witnessed through the media; on the other 
hand, there is the tension between employing national and global frameworks 
of memory.  
The exploration of the tension between forgetting and remembering has 
illustrated a moral hierarchy of media remembering. At the bottom end of this 
hierarchy, disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes have faded in collective 
memory; they are constructed as ordinary and the suffering they cause as banal 
and expected. This is justified by viewers on the basis of the relatively often 
occurrence of such disasters and lack of spectacularity or originality both of the 
events and the way they are reported by the media. The engagement with the 
distant other is expressed in these narratives as compassionate feelings towards 
particular stories of human pain, which are, however, decontextualised from 
their specificities and stripped of their historicity.  
The middle ground of the moral hierarchy of remembering is occupied by a 
small number of disasters that are constructed as iconic in collective 
remembering. The chapter has identified two such events in audience 
discussions, namely the Southeast Asian Tsunami and the September 11 attack 
on the World Trade Centre. It has been argued that these events have acquired a 
mythic meaning in collective memory and would resurface in the focus group 
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discussions as points of comparison and reference to the other disasters 
discussed. Due to the position of the viewer as an ecstatic witness to these 
events and the sense of immediacy constructed by the audiovisual reports, 
narratives of these disasters are characterised by the emotional immersion of 
the viewer in the scene of suffering. However, the spectator’s feelings of 
connectivity in the narratives are mostly directed towards the spectators’ self-
involvement and extreme emotionality as well as the spectacle of the disaster 
rather than the distant sufferer.  
Finally, it was the earthquake that took place in Turkey in 1999, a disaster that 
was discussed by all focus groups, that was at the top of the moral hierarchy of 
remembering. The event was not remembered in pictorial images or faces of 
human pain but for its significance as a disaster that brought together the two 
neighbouring but historically hostile countries of Greece and Turkey. It was, 
therefore, embedded in nationalistic and political discourses. Despite – or 
perhaps because of – these frameworks, however, the viewers reflectively 
engaged with the sufferers as both the national other and fellow human beings. 
The viewers’ cosmopolitan outlook, as both a universal concern and 
responsibility for the distant other and an acknowledgment of her difference 
(Appiah, 2007: xv), is rendered possible on the basis of national recognition.   
The chapter moved on to discuss how the construction of such events of distant 
suffering as global disasters also position the viewers as members of a broader 
and abstract global community of viewers brought together through the 
simultaneous witnessing of suffering and disasters. In this way, viewers seem to 
participate in the construction of global memories, which in their turn can be 
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constructed as social frameworks of viewers’ knowledge and understanding of 
the world and similar events (Volkmer, 2006a: 6). Such memories, however, 
seem to lack the moral engagement with the distant other; they instead connect 
the viewer with the community of Western spectators.  
At the same time, viewers recontextualised global events through national social 
frameworks, either attributing to them national significance or considering 
them in relation to national and local frameworks. In this context, the practice of 
media remembering confirms the centrality of the national community and its 
social context in framing and constructing collective memory. Media 
remembering as a practice constitutive of the viewer’s moral agency is, 
therefore, underlined by a number of tensions, which although momentarily 
positions spectators in a global space ultimately confirms their positioning as 
members of the national community.  
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Chapter 6 Audience Agency and Action at a Distance 
The previous two chapters demonstrated the ways viewers’ agency is 
articulated through the practices of media witnessing (Chapter 4) and media 
remembering (Chapter 5). The present chapter will address the kinds of agency 
viewers attribute to themselves with regard to the suffering of distant others. It 
will thus engage with the ways spectators of suffering construct themselves as 
public actors in relation to the events witnessed and will explore the question of 
action at a distance, namely what viewers feel that they should do and what they 
actually do as a response to their experience of witnessing the pain of others. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, it is this question that ultimately underlines academic 
and public debates over the mediation of distant suffering and its potential as a 
moral force in the globalised public space.  
The research findings from the focus group discussions indicated that viewers’ 
action at a distance was rather limited both in terms of its extent and the variety 
of forms it would take among the participants in the research. The first section 
of this chapter illustrates the kinds of actions that participants in the focus 
groups undertook as a response to the relief efforts targeting the victims of the 
disasters. These are not limited here to the three disasters discussed on the 
basis of the topic guide but include other instances when viewers claimed to 
have responded to charity and humanitarian appeals. Remarkably, these were 
rather limited despite the participants’ acknowledgement of the urgency of the 
events discussed and their occasionally intense emotional involvement with the 
suffering witnessed, as discussed in Chapter 4. This inconsistency between the 
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viewers’ acknowledging the need for action and not acting themselves will be 
the focus of the second part of the section (6.1.2.).  
The rest of the chapter will illustrate the range of justifications participants 
(re)produced in the discussions in order to ground their inaction in the face of 
human suffering witnessed on the screen and irrespective of the appeals to 
alleviate this suffering. These justifications generally followed two main 
argumentative strategies: on the one hand, viewers justified their inaction on 
the basis of their mistrust in the mediators of the relief efforts or in 
humanitarianism in general; on the other hand, they constructed themselves as 
powerless in the face of the disasters and the suffering caused and, therefore, as 
unable to take responsibility for the relief of the sufferers. These two accounts, 
the generalised culture of suspicion and the viewers’ sense of powerlessness, 
will be addressed in the last two sections of the chapter respectively.  
6.1 Action at a distance  
The question of action vis-à-vis distant suffering was explicitly discussed in 
focus group discussions as it constituted one of the main themes of the 
discussions’ topic guide. The question of action was posed to participants both 
in terms of actual practices (“had the participants contributed in any way to the 
appeals for aid relief?”) as well as potential practices as a response to media 
reports of suffering (“given a choice, what kind of sufferers would they favour 
with charity donations?”). The aim of the inclusion of these questions here was 
both to identify what kind of actions viewers considered available to them and 
which ones they undertook as well as to recognise what the conditions for 
public action vis-à-vis distant suffering are, as illustrated through the 
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participants’ discourses. Viewers’ actions, it is argued here, were limited and 
mostly restricted to media orchestrated efforts, in specific telethons. The next 
two sections will explore the conditions of this kind of action at a distance, as 
well as illustrate its limited character. 
6.1.1 Telethons and the media staging of action at a distance 
When discussions focused on the question of relief efforts and humanitarian 
appeals, only a minority of the participants in the focus group discussions 
replied that they had occasionally contributed to some of them. These 
contributions took mostly the form of monetary contributions, either in the 
form of donations through deposits to bank accounts, or, more often, through 
the practice of text messaging, where the costs of the texts were designated for 
the relief of the affected populations.  
With regard to the three disasters that were included in the discussion guide, it 
was virtually exclusively in the aftermath of the Tsunami that participants were 
motivated to take part in the relief efforts and respond to humanitarian appeals. 
Indeed, the Tsunami was often remembered along with the extraordinary wave 
of donations and organisation of charity events and telethons in Greece24. These 
were discussed by participants as part of the media “spectacle” of the Tsunami 
and the fixation of the media with the specific disaster, as already discussed in 
the previous chapter in relation to media remembering and the construction of 
the disaster as iconic in viewers’ memory. A predominant theme in the 
                                                        
24 Two of the groups also mentioned that they had collectively taken part in locally organised 
collections for the victims of the Kashmir earthquake: group 5 through the local Red Cross and 
group 4 contributed to the organisation of a collection at their workplace.  
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discussions about audience action was the primacy of telethons as the media 
genre that would instigate viewers’ responses in the form of monetary 
contributions to the relief efforts, as indicated here:  
Peni: For the Tsunami there was a whole thing in Greece…They 
organised… – what’s it called? – a “Marathon of Love”!  
Popi: Yes, yes, yes… 
Dina: A telethon! 
Peni: And a lot of money was gathered! 
Popi: We made phone calls.  
Toula: And went to the banks! 
Litsa: My daughter went to the church and gave a blanket and a…of 
course! 
(female, in their 40s and 50s, working-class, FG2) 
Through the use of impersonalisation (“there was a whole thing”, “money was 
gathered”), participants minimize individual agency and emphasise the telethon 
as a media-orchestrated (“they organised”), national (“in Greece”) effort. They 
thus mediate their own agency through the media’s organised actions and the 
national community. Positioning their contributions in relation to the mediated 
appeals for donations rather than to the victims that constituted their 
beneficiaries, participants here seem to view their actions as part of a national 
effort to contribute to the alleviation of the suffering and destruction the 
Tsunami caused to the affected areas and populations. They are responsive to 
the media campaign rather than the morally compelling nature of the suffering 
itself, as will be further illustrated later. The trigger for public action seems to 
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be the media and their forms of addressing the viewer rather than a moral sense 
of responsibility towards the suffering others.  
Overall, telethons seemed to be the trigger of most participants’ charity 
donations not only with respect to the Tsunami but other appeals and disasters 
as well. Interestingly, participants would often find it hard to specify the appeals 
they responded to or the context of the events that the telethons were organised 
to contribute to; they would only remember that they did send financial help or 
made a phone call or sent a text message as a response to “some” telethon. The 
specificity of events and of the different appeals would fade from memory; 
disasters and other charity appeals would all conflate to the single category of 
“telethons”, as seems to be the case in the extract below: 
Dimitris: I have sent, for example, to various telethons that take place 
in Greece in order to help people in Ethiopia, let’s say, that Mega 
Channel organised, I mean, telethons and stuff, or in order to build an 
oncologic hospital and stuff, yes, I have sent for stuff like that. Apart 
from the Tsunami, not that I haven’t been touched by anything else, but 
I can’t explain the reason why I didn’t donate. 
What is it that makes you want to donate?  
Dimitris: It has to do with the media…the mass media, how much they 
engaged, the things that were said, how they were said, how much 
attention was given to this thing, it motivates your sentiment. A bit 
more than in any other disaster.  
(male, 27, middle-class, FG8) 
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The agency of the media is once more highlighted by the viewer’s focus on their 
role in “motivating sentiments” about the Tsunami through the way the event 
was covered as well as the extended attention attributed to it by the media over 
a lengthy period of time. These factors have also been described as instrumental 
for the construction of viewers’ memories of the event in the previous chapter. 
Furthermore, humanitarian appeals are constructed through generalisations 
(“various telethons”, “stuff like that”) in a common category of telethons, 
stripped off the specificity of the cause of the appeal. Cases of emergent distant 
suffering, such as the Tsunami disaster, and charity appeals, such as the 
campaign for the construction of an oncologic hospital, are associated in 
audience talk on the basis of them being the theme of the same media genre of 
telethons.  
The telethon has been described by Tester as a “lengthy television broadcast”, 
which “asks the audience to support a specific charitable cause or to address a 
particular range of suffering and deprivation by pledging donations by 
telephone or participation in specially organised events” (Tester, 2001: 116). As 
a very peculiar television genre, telethons mark “the entry of television into a 
fund-raising role”, while suspending the routine television programming 
(Devereux, 1996: 48). Telethons attract viewers in three ways: by giving them 
the sense that “something can be done” to alleviate the suffering and misery of 
other people and that viewers as individuals can have an impact in this effort; 
by including celebrities, who in this context represent the possibility that 
serious causes do not necessarily entail “introspection” and “inwardness”; and 
by connecting viewers with a community of similar individuals, such as the 
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national community, as evident in the quote above (Tester, 2001: 118-120). 
What was evident, however, in the focus group discussions was that, the 
effectiveness of telethons to motivate the viewers aside, it was the telethon as a 
media event organised by and with celebrities that made a bigger impression on 
the viewers rather than the causes for which they felt the need to donate. This 
can be seen in the quote below, where the telethon is identified through its 
organisers rather than its cause:  
Irini: I made a phone call to a telethon this year.  
Which one? 
Nana: Ah, yes! 
Irini: This last one, for some kids, who was it for? 
Nana: Do you mean the one that Menegaki presented? 
Kiki: I think it was on Alpha Channel…Menegaki…  
Irini: Yes, on Alpha.  
Nana: By Hope Foundation. 
Irini: Yes.  
Nana: For something anticancer… 
Irini: You just make a phone call and the charging amount, let’s say, 
goes to these little kids. Just this… 
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
Once more, the action taken by the viewer is not described as a response to a 
specific instance of suffering or need but as the response to a telethon. The 
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latter is more easily associated with its celebrity organiser (“Menegaki”25), 
rather than the cause that was at the centre of its organisation. The appeal is 
described in vague terms as “for some kids” and “something anticancer”. 
Telethons become so integrated in the appeal to act in relation to a disaster or a 
charitable cause in general that they ultimately overshadow the significance of 
the cause. This can be seen as extreme consequence of the assimilation of 
modern humanitarianism to the media logic (Cottle and Nolan, 2007), which 
ultimately distracts attention from the suffering itself projecting it on the media 
spectacle instead. Viewers attribute significance to their actions as a 
contribution to a media appeal and, in a way, a form of participation in a media 
event rather than as a form of action aimed at specific suffering others.  
Characteristic of the lack of reflection over the viewers’ role as public actors 
with regard to distant suffering is the small effort involved and the easiness of 
the option of action available to the viewer as created by the telethon. The 
action required is “just” a phone call, a small investment in terms of time and 
money from the viewer. Stathis, a young participant who had a characteristically 
detached positioning towards disasters taking place in distant locales (Section 
4.4.), claimed to have contributed with text messaging in different telethons: 
Stathis: I always give to telethons and we should all give to telethons. 
Even to…I give to all telethons.  
Even for the Tsunami?  
                                                        
25 Eleni Menegaki is a popular television personality and presenter of a daily morning show in 
Greece.  
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Stathis: To all of them, yes. OK, it’s just a text, it doesn’t really cost 
anything! The thing is that I wasn’t affected but when they tell you 
“send a text to save a human being”, OK, I do send. Always. 
Despite a previous claim that the suffering of faraway others does not touch 
him, Stathis even becomes vocal in his reaction against the other members of 
the group when they admitted to being unresponsive to televised appeals:  
Menelaos: It’s not about what kind of happening will take place when 
it comes to giving money. It’s worth giving in any disaster, I mean, 
something you perceive in such a way. It’s just that it’s mostly about 
how you will be at that moment – not about how much it will touch 
you or not – that giving help depends on.  
Stathis: But of course you can send an SMS at that point. Or make a 
phone call.  
Menelaos: What about if you don’t watch television? 
Stathis: OK, if you don’t watch. But it’s a telethon, 24 hours, it can’t be 
that you haven’t watched television at all. It really bothers me that 
thing with the text message, it annoys me that you don’t sent texts! 
(male, in their 20s, middle-class, FG12) 
Menelaos attempts to justify inaction by separating emotional involvement with 
the scene of suffering (“how much it will touch you or not”) from action taken for 
the alleviation of this suffering. As a justification strategy, this distinction 
safeguards the ability of the viewer to feel for the suffering human beings as a 
moral agent irrespective of his inaction. Stathis, on the other hand, does not 
contradict this claim but argues that action should be taken in any case, when 
there is a call for it from the media. What is at stake here, however, is the kind of 
action discussed, a kind that seems to be separated both from emotional 
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engagement and the nature of the suffering it aims at alleviating. It is action that 
is easy and convenient for the viewer to undertake (“of course you can send an 
SMS”). It is action of “low investment” (Tester, 2001: 110) and unreflective.  
There are a number of issues, therefore, pertaining to the issue of action at a 
distance and viewers’ agency, also seen in other focus group discussions, that 
underline this dialogue. First, the action viewers take is described as 
independent of their feelings of empathy and compassion with the suffering 
victims. Emanating from this, action is constructed as circumstantial, namely 
not dependent on the nature of the suffering and its urgency but rather on the 
personal circumstances of the viewer herself. It is thus illustrated as 
fragmentary and random, as it is not based on a consistent relationship between 
the severity of the suffering and the viewer’s motivation.  
The prominence of telethons in instigating audience contributions also 
illustrates public action at a distance as highly contingent upon the media and 
their orchestrated efforts to motivate audiences towards taking action, in this 
case the telethons. Significant in this media orchestration is the presence of 
celebrities in attracting viewers to the telethon (Tester, 2001: 120). The 
involvement of celebrities with charity and humanitarianism has been 
especially widespread over the last couple of decades as part of the expansion of 
practices of marketing of the charity and humanitarian sector (Littler, 2008: 
240; Cottle and Nolan, 2007: 864) and the simultaneous increase in strategies of 
branding celebrities (Littler, 2008: 241). This synergy has been advocated, on 
the one hand, as necessary in order to raise the profile of humanitarian 
campaigns and expand their reach to the mainstream public (Littler, 2008: 241). 
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On the other hand, the use of celebrities by charities and NGOs has been heavily 
criticized for attracting attention to some problems and away from others, 
glossing over structural inequalities and emphasizing the role of the privileged 
as benign figures and ultimately ideologically obscuring the implications of 
capitalism in the reproduction of the world poor and global crises (Devereux, 
1996; Littler, 2008). The analysis of the focus group discussions was revealing 
in terms of the problematic relation between celebrity endorsement and charity 
appeals. On the one hand, the participation of popular celebrities in the 
telethons seems to attract audience interest and motivate viewers to contribute 
to the relief efforts. On the other hand, celebrity-led telethons are described by 
the viewers as media spectacles, where the spectacular deflects attention from 
the cause of the appeal and the sufferers.  
Media spectacles are understood here as “those phenomena of media culture 
that embody contemporary society’s basic values, serve to initiate individuals 
into its way of life, and dramatise its controversies and struggles, as well as its 
modes of conflict resolution” (Kellner, 2003a: 2). Telethons as spectacles initiate 
audiences in television’s fundraising role through the dramatization of human 
suffering and the assimilation to “a culture of celebrity which provides 
dominant role models and icons of fashion, look, and personality” (Kellner, 
2003a: 5). The focus group discussions illustrated two main problematic 
consequences of the association of public action with the media spectacle of the 
telethon, namely the commodification of distant suffering – and ultimately of the 
viewers’ sense of moral self – and its fictionalization.  
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Embedded in the economy of the cultural industry, the telethon commodifies 
human pain in order to attract audience attention and contributions (Smit, 
2003). As a television genre, the telethon capitalizes on the viewer’s experience 
of media witnessing and transforms it into that of the consumer and celebrity 
fan. The kind of public action suggested to the viewer is action that is easy and 
unreflective. What is ultimately commodified, Baudrillard argues, is the moral 
conscience of the viewer (Baudrillard, 1994: 68), who, urged by the telethon 
appeal to “send a text to save a human being” (Stathis, FG12), works through the 
uneasiness and moral guilt inherent in the experience of witnessing human 
pain. At the same time, the construction of the telethon as a show business 
genre renders this public action part of the spectacle of the telethon, staged for 
the purposes of representation. This merging of reality and representation 
results in the disappearance of the criterion of action with the concomitant loss 
of the distinguishing lines between reality and fiction (Boltanski, 1999: 154). 
This is evident in the loss of the relationship between the event of the telethon 
and its cause, as illustrated in the audience discussions above. The telethon as 
an expression of charity is disassociated with the reality of the suffering. 
Ultimately, the kind of public action initiated and supported by the telethon 
does not seem to unite the viewers as donors and the suffering victims; rather it 
unites the viewers with the media and with each other through participation in 
a media event and a national effort to raise aid pledges.  
6.1.2 Justifying inaction 
Apart from these limited number of responses to telethons, most participants 
claimed to remain unresponsive to the charity appeals organized in response to 
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distant disasters. Aware that this inaction was measured against the normative 
discourse of humanitarianism, discussants’ claims to inaction would be 
formulated as admissions to something morally unacceptable, often 
accompanied with hinted expressions of guilt. This guilt was at a constant 
interplay with different argumentative strategies participants used to justify 
their inaction. Interestingly, it was mostly among the younger respondents that 
such admissions to inaction would be more often expressed. This can be 
considered under the light of their young age and relevant lack of or just 
accomplished economic independency, as most of the respondents were young 
graduates who had just found employment or were still looking for one. At the 
same time, however, and seen along their generally detached positioning as 
witnesses, which was discussed in Chapter 4, inaction among younger 
respondents can be seen as part of the broader tendency of civic disengagement 
among young generations in Greece (Demertzis et al., 2008). Detached from 
public affairs overall and the civic life within the local and national community, 
the young seem to display similar disengagement as public actors with regard to 
distant suffering.   
In the following extract, a group of young participants is asked whether they 
had ever contributed to humanitarian appeals:  
Kiki: I haven’t, my mother has.  
Nana: I don’t think so.  
Irini: Me neither, I think.  
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Kiki: My mother and I, yes. I, for example, would tell my mother…In 
general, she always gives. When she sees something, an appeal for help, 
something, she sends, you know, she puts money in the bank, anything. 
But you don’t really give… 
Kiki: No, not me as an individual, I didn’t give anything… 
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
The participant avoids giving a clear answer about her possible actions as a 
response to charity appeals. What she does instead is displacing her sense of 
agency and expressing it through her mother’s contribution, a piece of 
information that is not relevant to the question asked. It is only after she is 
asked for a second time, that the participant admits to not doing something “as 
an individual”. Such expressions were common among other young participants, 
as well (Group 1; 9). Admitting inaction is incongruent with the discussants’ 
previously expressed emotional engagement as well as with normative 
humanitarian discourses. For that reason and in an attempt to defend 
themselves in the face of possible moral accusations, young participants 
displace their agency to their family or parents: their unresponsiveness is not a 
moral failure, if they have contributed as part of a family.  
As the discussion continues, another member of the group even admits that she 
changes the channel when she sees appeals on television: 
Nana: When I see the number of the bank account sometimes I change 
channels.  
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Kiki: But even this little help I don’t think it is that great. You are still 
like a spectator. I mean, two, five, ten, even, I don’t know, fifty Euros 
that you will give… 
Nana: Yes, but you still get yourself into the process of doing it.  
Irini: If we don’t experience it, I don’t think we can understand the 
degree of misery. If we don’t go through it.  
Nana: I don’t think so, because when you see the bank accounts, I say 
this for myself, I change channels. I mean I say, just a minute… 
(laughs). Yes! I see it and I say “perhaps you should give something?” 
and then I don’t even think about it and I just switch channels.  
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
Nana’s admission to inaction and indifference to the aid appeals is underlined 
by a sense of guilt and shame expressed through the question she pauses to 
herself (“perhaps you should give something?”). Kiki, on the other hand, moves 
from the use of the displacement of agency as a justifying device and now 
attempts to invalidate the effectiveness of action at-a-distance (“even this little 
help I don’t think it is that great”): action can only take the form of a small 
financial donation; and since this donation is too small to make a difference, 
what is the point of offering it? Cohen and Seu describe such argumentative 
strategies as the “vocabulary of denial” (Cohen and Seu, 2002: 189), namely of 
the audience avoidance of moral responsibility for the suffering witnessed. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of denial as the psychological, cultural and 
sociological mechanism of consciously and subconsciously blocking unwanted 
knowledge has been employed in order to explain audience unresponsiveness 
to distant suffering and human rights appeals (Cohen, 2001: 4-5). For the 
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vocabulary of denial to best work as a strategy of the rationalization of inaction 
it has to draw on believable stories, which are often commonplace and clichés, 
namely “cultural texts that are common but difficult to decipher” (Cohen and 
Seu, 2002: 189).   
The use of such argumentative strategies was a commonplace among 
participants, who felt the need to justify their lack of action, morally interpreted 
as indifference for the suffering of other human beings. These argumentative 
strategies will be further explored and categorised in the rest of the chapter. 
What is to be highlighted here is the felt need of the viewers to justify 
themselves for their inaction vis-à-vis the suffering of faraway others. This is 
also evident in the extract below:  
Did you sent something then (after the Tsunami disaster)? 
No! (the whole group).  
Have you ever contributed to a relief effort? 
Mina: Never! The truth is that… 
Hara: My parents have… 
Simos: Because the post office is not close enough? 
(laughs) 
Mina: No, it’s just that…Although I hear about it, I mean, I have never 
considered doing it!  
How come? 
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Mina: I don’t know! Because of boredom maybe? Probably? Perhaps it’s 
something like that. It’s not that I don’t want to or that I don’t have 
anything to give. In no way! It’s just that I don’t do it.  
(mixed, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
Once more, Hara is using the strategy of displacing her perceived responsibility 
to act to her parents. Mina, on the other hand, in a self-reflexive attempt 
contemplates the reasons for her inaction. She initially offers a morally 
condemnable explanation, “boredom”. She then rushes to distinguish between 
this explanation, however, and her actual intentions (“it’s not that I don’t want 
to”). She tries to separate emotional engagement, expressed as the intention to 
act, from the undertaking of action, in a way similarly addressed in the previous 
section, where the motivation to act was described by participants as 
independent of their feelings about the suffering witnessed. Lack of emotional 
engagement would imply indifference, which is condemnable; inaction, on the 
other hand, although also condemnable within the frame of a humanitarian 
discourse, seems to be the norm among audience responses. Indifference 
constructs the viewer as inhuman; inaction, however, constructs them as rather 
unremarkable. The way inaction is normalised through the viewers’ 
argumentative strategies will be explored in the rest of the chapter.  
What is evident in the above is the ambivalence in the construction of the 
viewers’ moral agency. It is constructed through the normative perceived 
responsibility to act for the alleviation of suffering, implicit in the act of 
witnessing the suffering of distant others, on the one hand, and the actual 
inaction vis-à-vis this suffering, on the other hand. The concomitant uneasiness 
produced by this incongruence is dealt with by discussants through the use of 
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argumentative strategies of justification, which displace or ultimately dissolve 
viewers’ responsibility to act. This section has highlighted the expression of this 
need within the focus group discussions. The remaining of the chapter will 
closer examine the argumentative strategies adopted to justify inaction. These 
argumentative strategies, as it will be further illustrated below, are in a constant 
interplay and often employed together by discussants. However, for the sake of 
their better illustration and clarification, they are analytically distinguished here 
in two broader discourses arguments are constructed within: a general culture 
of mistrust, which undermines the value of action at-a-distance, and the 
viewers’ sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the suffering witnessed, which 
renders effective action unimaginable. Both of these discursive strategies, as 
will be further discussed below, are embedded in broader cultural and political 
discourses, they are cultural clichés (Cohen and Seu, 2002: 89) that frame public 
life in Greece, itself underlined by civic disengagement and political cynicism 
(Demertzis, 1994; Kafetzis, 1994).   
6.2 Mediation and the culture of mistrust 
Questions about what kinds of action participants in the focus groups took in 
relation to disasters witnessed through the media would often transform into 
debates about why viewers did not take action, as explained in the previous 
section. A great part of the reasons participants employed would refer to the 
viewers’ mistrust in the mechanisms of transforming their action and donations 
into valuable support for the victims in order to alleviate their suffering. 
Elements of a broader culture of mistrust and suspicion have been hinted at in 
Chapter 4 in relation to politicised witnessing. Here this prominent theme in the 
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audience discussions will be discussed as an argumentative strategy for 
justifying inaction towards the suffering witnessed in the media. As such, 
mistrust was a central concept in viewers’ construction of moral agency vis-à-
vis distant suffering. Participants in the focus groups would express their 
mistrust both in terms of the motives of the people contributing to the 
alleviation efforts and, most often, in terms of the institutions mediating 
between the actions of the public and the delivering of aid to the affected 
victims. Both these dimensions of mistrust were used to explain viewers’ 
reluctance to take action.  
As already discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.3) expressions of mistrust are 
part of a broader culture of political cynicism in Greece, usually expressed by a 
varied vocabulary of affective expressions, such as despair, detachment, 
sarcasm, indignation, pessimism, fatalism and irony (Demertzis, 2008). As such, 
mistrust is embedded in a broader cultural vocabulary, thus enabling the 
rationalization of public inaction and more specifically audience inaction and 
unresponsiveness towards the suffering of faraway others (Cohen and Seu, 
2002).  
6.2.1 Mistrusting humanitarianism  
The previous sections have discussed how participants in the focus groups 
would distinguish between emotional engagement with the scene of suffering 
and their motivation to act for the alleviation of this suffering. Whereas the 
viewers’ emotional engagement was treated in most cases as indisputable – 
with the exception of the type of detached witnessing as discussed in section 4.4 
in Chapter 4 – action was often debatable. In some discussions this debate 
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would engage with the meaning of humanitarianism as a whole and the 
motivations of the donors, the members of the public that actually do take 
action and respond to media appeals.  
At the heart of the relevant criticisms was the nature of viewers’ action as 
selective and media-dependent. In the extract below, a young participant is 
expressing this position against media-instigated public action, by juxtaposing 
the outpour of donations towards the relief of the Tsunami victims to the 
general indifference towards other cases of suffering around the world:  
Simos: Good, why haven’t they sent help for so many years now to 
Somalia, let’s say, to Ethiopia, I don’t know where! Other people are 
being killed on a daily basis! 
Hara: It was like…I mean, we all know that a lot of people face 
hunger…. 
Simos: They are hungry, meaning… 
Hara: But when they bombard you with…with a specific stimuli, they 
instigate… 
Simos: So, you are like a little robot!  
Hara: No, I wouldn’t call it like that! They just touch sides of your 
sensitivity, I don’t know, I don’t know what, which you might have but 
not having them touched on a daily basis.  
Simos: You know what? I can’t accept sensitivity expressed from the 
sofa! 
(mixed, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
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The above argument is underlined by two critiques of mediated 
humanitarianism. The first is illustrated here through the questioning of the 
selection of the sufferers who matter: victims of poverty and famine in Somalia 
and Ethiopia are juxtaposed to the victims of natural disasters that gain media 
attention. The second criticism concerns the suspicion over the motivation 
behind action, which underlines the expression “sensitivity expressed from a 
sofa”. It is the ingenuity of the viewers’ emotion that is ultimately debated on in 
the argument. There is a double critique constructed in such discussions: what 
is challenged is both the altruistic nature of charity as a concept and practice 
and the potential of the media to foster such a practice. 
According to Boltanski, these two criticisms have intruded public discourse to 
the point they have become platitudes bolstering the reinforcement of anti-
humanitarian discourse (Boltanski, 1999: 159). He describes them as 
“uncertainties” underlying media-staged emotion and therefore media-staged 
public action (Boltanski, 1999: 154), namely the doubt about the choice and 
identification of the victims (Boltanski, 1999: 155) and the uncertainty about 
the motives behind the intention to act (Boltanski, 1999: 172)26. Taken together, 
these two arguments undermine the value of humanitarianism and are used 
here as strategies of denial (Cohen and Seu, 2002). In the discussion extract 
above, we see how these uncertainties are employed as argumentative 
strategies to undermine public action and justify inaction. In mistrusting the 
donors’ motivations and humanitarianism as a whole, viewers at the same time 
                                                        
26 According to Boltanski, the other two “uncertainties” consist in the attribution of the role of 
victims, persecutors and benefactors and the suspicion of the desire to look at suffering 
(Boltanski, 1999: 159). These have already been discussed in relation to the tension between 
the viewer’s responsibility and complicity with the media in Chapter 2, section 2.1.3.  
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position themselves as bystanders, refusing to take action upon the suffering 
witnessed.  
Simos: I just cannot understand the concept of charity. I mean, it 
sounds a bit…What I have already said, that we do it in order to get a 
key into heaven, let’s say, to get rid of the guilt. That’s it, this is why I 
am a bit negative and much more because we live in a society, which is 
the way it is. Which lives through television. In which everything is 
business, let’s say. It is not something which happens because of 
altruism, in no way.  
(male, 26, middle-class, FG1) 
Section 6.1. discussed how telethon-staged appeals constitute the horizon of 
mediated action at-a-distance for the vast majority of the focus groups. It is this 
mediated character of charity and humanitarianism that is criticised in the 
extract above. The first part of the argument defies the altruism of 
humanitarianism (“a key into heaven”); the second part constructs media as a 
pro-profit institution and instrumental in the conduct of social life (“everything 
is business”). In this context, it is impossible for the media to stage altruistic 
action, first because altruism as a concept is highly debatable and, second, 
because what the media as private institutions are ultimately interested in is 
financial profit. Aware of the embedding of media-staged humanitarianism in 
the economics of the culture industry, viewers apply their own critical readings 
of telethons as expressions of modern charity and express their suspicions of 
humanitarianism as a whole.  
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In the extract below, the criticism is centred on telethons as a media spectacle 
from which both television channels and the participating celebrities profit 
from. 
Gerasimos: I don’t give to the telethons, because I am against the 
telethons, they are just a scam. They are only organised for the 
spectators, I am sure of this, there is no other way. And let me tell you, 
Stai27 was on [television] the other day, who earns 600,000 per year, 
and she was talking with Lazopoulos28, and she said “we should do 
something! What should we do? Let’s do a telethon!”. Why doesn’t she 
just say: [I give]100,000 Euros! Since she earns 600, she can’t live 
without 100?...I am fanatically against telethons! Because it is only to 
show off! And then it shows: Mrs Katina: 50 Euros, Mrs Stavroula: 2 
Euros and stuff…But how do I know? Will she give it tomorrow? 
Because she does call, but will she go to the bank the next day? And in 
the end they say: “we have gathered so many millions!”. These 
millions…Have they really been gathered? Who gathers it? Where does 
it go? And who spends it? Why do they spend it? 
(male, 56, middle-class, FG11) 
The participant’s scepticism is targeted towards the character of the telethon as 
a spectacle – as addressed earlier in this chapter – which is “only organised for 
the spectators” and as a means for celebrities “ to show off”. This mistrust in the 
spectacularity of the telethon as a television genre expands to the substance of 
the aid pledges announced and the suspicion of whether the money is gathered 
in the first place. A series of questions express the viewer’s mistrust, best 
                                                        
27 Elli Stai is a Greek journalist and television news presenter. 
 
28 Lakis Lazopoulos is a popular comedian and writer of political satire.  
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summarised in the one he poses first: “how do I know?”. It is this lack of 
knowledge, that mistrust is based on.   
Similar arguments are also echoed in the following extract. It is part of the 
discussion of the housewives, who, as discussed in section 6.1.1., were among 
the few participants in the research that had taken part in a number of relief 
efforts by donating money, responding to telethons and sending food to the 
affected victims. However, there is a strong sense of cynicism in their talk about 
media-staged charity. Their contributions are juxtaposed to those of celebrities, 
who are accused of using the suffering of others to their benefit: 
Litsa: The famous, you can write down, so that the famous English also 
listen to it, they did go, they sung over there and they danced and 
pretended that they did that as a love charity and the channels were 
showing them again and again.  
(laughs) 
Litsa: Yes, and they were gathering from us, the poor, the phone calls.  
(laughs) 
Litsa: You write that down, too! This is what the famous people and the 
journalists did! The poor were the ones offering again! And there was 
Ploutarxos29 and there was that one now, don’t you remember – oh, 
Jesus! – and there was Roula Koromila30 presenting and all of them 
[did] nothing! They made money and I, the stupid, I was paying for 
phone calls! Write it exactly like that!    
(Litsa, 45, working-class, FG2) 
                                                        
29 Popular Greek singer. 
30 Television show presenter that has often hosted telethons.  
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There is an implicit criticism of the transformation of mediated aid appeals to a 
media spectacle. What is more evident here, however, is how the viewer’s 
agency is negotiated in relation to this process. While the participant here 
describes “famous people and the journalists” as making money, at the same time 
she victimises herself as she is “the stupid” and “poor” one that makes 
contributions. What is missing in this argument is the actual cause of the appeal. 
The participant does not situate herself in relation to the suffering victims and 
does not discuss her perceived agency and responsibility in relation to their 
misfortune; she positions herself in relation to the mediators of her 
contributions, the organisers and celebrities of the telethon in relation to whom 
her agency is passive. By constructing mediated charity and humanitarian 
appeals as media spectacles that address them as consumers and by critically 
resenting this position, viewers move away from their relationship with the 
people in need and focus on their relationship with the media. Mistrust in 
humanitarianism and its mediation, therefore, becomes a strategy of denial, 
distancing the viewer from the scene of suffering.  
6.2.2 Mistrusting the mediators of aid 
If skepticism towards humanitarianism and especially its transformation into a 
spectacle was one way viewers expressed their mistrust as a discursive strategy 
to justify their inaction, luck of trust in the way their contributions would be 
handled was another way. This mistrust was similar in its consequence of 
drawing attention away from the relationship between viewers and sufferers 
and victimising the audience as donors. In this case, however, mistrust was not 
expressed towards the idea of humanitarianism susta
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towards the way audience donations are (mis)handled in their way to the 
victims. Suspicion, therefore, is targeted more specifically towards the 
mediators of humanitarian help, namely NGOs, governments, the organizers of 
the appeals, as well as local organisations such as the church. Two main 
arguments were supporting this suspicion: first, rumours and reports of 
mishandling of the funds, and, second, the apparent luck of any evident results 
emanating from aid pledges.  
Such are the arguments underlining the following discussion:   
Have you sent any help?  
Ilias: Personally, I didn’t. I talk as an individual. But collectively or 
whatever, we did help. But personally, I mean, I find it a bit…to have 
your name written there with a…I find it…I don’t like it.  
Thanos: You know you can send anonymously, no? (laughs) 
Ilias: Even anonymously…It’s the same thing.  
Pavlos: I agree with what Ilias said. I mean, I believe that during the 
last years the humanitarian movement offers help doing assumingly a 
great job, more systematic, at least we used to have UNICEF at the 
centre then on a daily basis… 
Giannis: The “Doctors without Borders” nowadays.  
Pavlos: Yes, there is some work being done. But the issue is, however, 
that there have been doubts, I think, about this whole effort because, if, 
let’s say, you make simple maths, given that a lot of times the amounts 
of money gathered, I mean, are announced…well, you don’t see the 
result!  
(male, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG6) 
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A number of argumentative strategies are employed by the participants in the 
discussion in the extract above. First, we see the way Ilias displaces his personal 
agency to the community, whether local or national, in a way similar to the 
young respondents displacing their agency to their parents, as discussed in 
section 6.1.2.. He furthermore expresses his suspicion of the motivations of 
other donors, in similar lines to the preceding extracts, by embedding action as 
donation to the spectacle of the telethon. Constructing this action as morally 
condemnable, his own inaction is justifiable. Finally, the third argument 
employed in support of inaction are the “doubts” about the humanitarian effort 
overall, which Pavlos introduces. Interestingly, Pavlos claims to agree with 
Ilias’s argument, although what he goes on to talk about seems quite different 
from what his interlocutor is saying. The common theme among the two 
arguments is mistrust, which expands from the media-staging of charity to the 
actual “job” done by the “humanitarian movement” and the mediators of 
humanitarian aid, who do not manage to produce a result out of the amounts of 
money gathered through donations. Through the mitigation strategies of using 
abstractive voice (“there are doubts”) and the personal pronoun “you” rather 
than “I”, the speaker attempts to distance himself from the argument being 
made. It is not him debating the value of humanitarianism; it is a general social 
discourse. It is also a doubt based on undeniable evidence (“simple maths”).  
Such criticisms of the mishandling of the amounts of money and aid 
contributions gathered were frequent in discussions:  
Gregoris: No way! I never give help! 
In general?  
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Gregoris: This thing, with Roula31 and celebrities, it’s just a scam! I 
think that these things with SMS, this bullshit, it’s just a scam. And they 
never reach the victims. I would rather, for example, although I’ve 
never done it, to go there… 
Nikos: Would you ever help people affected by disasters in any kind of 
way? Apart from mobile phones? 
Gregoris: Only face-to-face.  
(male, in their 20s, working-class, FG10) 
Gregoris begins his argument by expressing his refusal to contribute to relief 
efforts in an intense manner (“no way!”). At the same time, however, he justifies 
his position by arguing that it is not charity itself that he opposes but media 
staged appeals and telethons about which he expresses his indignation, as well 
as the mishandling of donations that “never reach the victims”. In Nikos’s 
question that seems to challenge his intention to act, he replies by favouring 
“face-to-face” action. The premises and possibilities of such action are not 
discussed. The argument, however, does construct the speaker as somebody 
who wishes to take action for supporting the victims but cannot because of the 
ineffectiveness of mediated action at-a-distance.  
Claiming that the money viewers send is mishandled and does not reach its 
destination invalidates the effectiveness of action at a distance further 
constructing it as unnecessary. In the following extract, the participant explains 
his refusal to donate to charity for the Tsunami disaster victims:  
                                                        
31 Roula Koromila, the television show presented and occasional host of telethons already 
mentioned earlier (section 6.1.2.).  
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Simos: Because the money didn’t go anywhere, in the end. They wasted 
it all. And they didn’t…They would say afterwards…And actually, there 
was this big – I remember this – there was this very big concert that 
they organised in the Olympic Stadium with a variety of artists, where 
they supposedly gathered money to send and then all this…all these 
things and the mayhem that happened with the food and stuff… 
Tina: And they did, I think it was ERT that did… 
Simos: ERT as well…They all had done.. 
Tina: They all did something for the Tsunami. 
Hara: And auctions… 
Simos: As if! They conducted a research now, which said that in the end 
the amount of money that reaches the victims is… 
Mina: A lot smaller than the one gathered?  
Simos: A lot smaller than the one you give and the procedures take so 
much time and are so expensive that in the end it makes no difference.  
(mixed, in their 20s, middle-class, FG1) 
The argument here encompasses a critique of the mediators of humanitarian 
relief efforts as a whole, described through the deictic “they”, who “wasted the 
money”. By identifying the group of mediators between individual benefactors 
and the victims the money is aimed at reaching, the participant implicitly 
victimises the donors as well, arguing that their money do not reach its target. 
He then justifies his inaction as a refusal to be victimised in such a way and to 
participate in an effort that “makes no difference”. The victimisation of the 
viewers is used here as an argumentative device to justify non-action: since 
their donations will be consumed by the mediators, it is only fair that viewers 
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will try to protect themselves by not contributing to the relief efforts. It is the 
effectiveness of action at a distance that is ultimately undermined here.  
In reproducing this kind of justifications, already circulated in the public domain 
mostly through the media (“they conducted a research…”), viewers individually 
but also collectively construct inaction as justifiable and ultimately 
commonsensical and unquestionable (Seu, 2003). In the extract below, the 
participants are collectively constructing an agreement on the ineffectiveness of 
the mechanisms that administer the aid pledges.  
Penelope: Even if we did sent before, I have stopped now having heard 
that a lot of food rots, a lot of medicines expire because they throw 
them aside, I mean, there is not a right way to transfer them, this is 
why, I mean… 
Chrysa: A kind of co-ordination so that they arrive there! 
Penelope: Now that I walked into the supermarket, there was a basket 
saying “Help for Lebanon”. I didn’t reach my hand to give something… 
Chrysa: No, me neither! 
Penelope: because I thought, where will all these go? Will they reach 
their destination? 
Chrysa: Because we see on television that they say that they cannot 
reach… 
(female, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG4) 
The authority of the media is again called upon to validate viewers’ suspicions 
towards the mediators of the aid gathered for the victims of disasters. This 
illustrates the ambivalence of the role of the media in engaging the spectators: 
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on the one hand, they stage appeals to attract viewers’ contributions for the 
relief of distant sufferers; on the other hand, they become the sources of 
information undermining the value of these contributions by revealing scandals 
about their mishandling, thus providing the cultural vocabulary for 
justifications of inaction. Stories of food and medication going bad or donations 
never reaching their destination were common among all focus groups. In some 
discussions they were embedded in broader discourses of mistrust in 
institutions such as the church mishandling charity donations (focus group 2; 5) 
or politicians being dishonest and misspending public money (focus group 6). 
Discussions would alternate between such stories and their suspicion about 
action at-a-distance. As Cohen and Seu argue, for rationalisation to work as a 
technique to justify detachment, it should draw on believable stories, the best of 
which are often clichés and common cultural texts (Cohen and Seu, 2002: 189).  
This generalised culture of mistrust in political and social institutions is 
embedded in the broader political culture in Greece and forms a framework for 
understanding politics and public life (Stefanides, 2007; Sutton, 2003). Framed 
in broader cultural discourses of mistrust, scepticism towards the organisations 
that staged and managed humanitarian appeals was translated into rationalised 
detachment from distant suffering. This rationalisation took place in two steps: 
first, the placement of responsibility to the organisations and institutions 
managing action at a distance; and, second, the undermining of the effectiveness 
of these organisations. Implicit in this line of argumentation was the lack of 
control of the viewers over their contributions. The broader arguments about 
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the viewers’ powerlessness underlining these discussions will be addressed in 
the next section.  
6.3 Mediated agency and power  
The generalised culture of mistrust, as discussed in the previous section, 
displaced the focus of the discussion from the relationship between spectator 
and sufferers to that among the viewers, the media, and humanitarian agents 
that handle audience contributions, also constructing viewers as helpless in 
relation to controlling their contributions in the relief efforts. This expression of 
helplessness was embedded in broader discourses of power and viewers’ 
perceived powerlessness in relation to the events witnessed. These cultural 
frameworks of thinking about power have already been introduced in Chapter 
4, with regard to the Greek “underdog culture” (Diamandouros, 1993) and 
inclination towards conspiracy theories (Sutton, 2003). They are, therefore, part 
of a broader vocabulary of civic detachment and cynicism, characteristic of the 
Greek public space (Demertzis, 2008).  Such discourses minimised viewers’ 
agency in relation to the suffering of distant others. Nothing that the viewers did 
would ever change the situation, was the gist of the argument.  
The relevant discussions will be presented here as two streams of a similar 
argument: first, viewers felt powerless due to the distance separating them from 
the scene of suffering; second, they minimised their sense of agency as that of 
“powerless paws” (Focus group 2) in the public space. In this context, 
discussions of audience responsibility were substituted by arguments about 
audience powerlessness and their action at a distance was undermined as 
infeasible and ineffective, and ultimately unnecessary. In this line of 
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argumentation, “personal helplessness mingles with political scepticism and 
indifference” to justify audience inaction (Cohen and Seu, 2002: 196). Its 
underlying principle is that the viewers’ contribution cannot make a difference 
to the sufferer’s situation as it would be pitiful due to the spectators’ 
helplessness. 
6.3.1 Mediation and the impossibility of overcoming distance 
A common theme within the discussions about the possibility of the audience to 
intervene for the alleviation of the suffering witnessed through the media and to 
the assistance of the distant victims was that of the powerlessness of the 
viewers to have any effect on the situation due to the distance separating them 
from the scene of suffering. Indicative of this would be the response that 
participants are “mere spectators” of the events unfolding. This response has 
been touched upon in section 4.4.1. on detached witnessing as a basis for the 
viewers’ rationalisation of disengagement from the scene of suffering. Here, it is 
also highlighted as a rhetoric device for constructing the viewer’s agency vis-à-
vis the suffering witnessed:  
Panagiotis: Since we are outside of the situation, we only see it…we 
watch it just as…spectators.  
Alex: True, you can’t really do anything else.  
Thodoris: What can you do, go there and help?  
Panagiotis: And it’s far…it doesn’t really affect us… 
(male, in their 20s, working class, FG9) 
This response was common among other groups as well: 
  
293 
Kiki: You see the human pain and you think “what could I do”? And you 
just watch it… 
Nana: We watch it and we might get touched but the bottom line is we 
can’t go over there and help, can we? 
(female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
There are significant implications of this argument in relation to viewers’ sense 
of agency. Firstly, it indicates viewers’ reluctance to take up responsibility in 
relation to the events witnessed. In identifying themselves as “mere spectators”, 
viewers limit their sense of agency to the practice of media witnessing with the 
different responses to suffering this might entail, as discussed in chapter 4. They 
sharply distinguish between spectatorship of suffering and undertaking action 
for its alleviation. In this sense, viewers position themselves in a relationship of 
collusion with the media, accepting that the mere exposure to the image of the 
other on the screen is a sufficient form of engagement (Silverstone, 2007: 131).  
At the same time, viewers draw a strong distinction between the scene of 
suffering and their own everyday conduct and experience. In the extracts above, 
participants highlight the distance separating them from the sufferers, both 
geographical (“it’s far”, “over there”) and emotional (“it doesn’t really affect us”), 
to justify their inaction. By constructing themselves as powerless and negating 
that there is any kind of effective action available to them, they simultaneously 
fail to acknowledge the suffering of the other as a cause for public action.  
Seu recognises the discursive articulation of the spectators’ powerlessness as a 
defence mechanism that lies in the root of their desensitisation with regard to 
distant suffering and violations of human rights (Seu, 2003). However, the 
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employment of such argumentative strategies does not necessarily assume 
“desensitisation” or “apathy” (Seu, 2003) of the viewers. As seen in Chapter 4, in 
section 4.1.1. on affective witnessing, the feeling of powerlessness was 
occasionally expressed alongside an overwhelming of emotion. It was argued 
that in that case intense emotional involvement can militate against viewers’ 
reflective engagement with distant suffering, and consequently against action 
for its alleviation.  
Considering viewers construction of themselves as powerless in relation to 
suffering can be theorised as part of a broader sociology of denial, as it draws 
upon cultural commonplaces and clichés (Cohen and Seu, 2002). It is important 
to consider viewers’ perceived lack of agency vis-à-vis distant suffering 
alongside the context of the broader civic culture within which they are 
embedded. The sense of viewers’ powerlessness in acting at a distance is 
implicated with the participants’ cynicism and mistrust in the institutions that 
render this action possible. A generalised culture of mistrust in institutions, as 
illustrated above, is part of the broader public culture in Greece (Kafetzis, 1994). 
Distance is acknowledged as prohibitive of any kind of agency here not only in 
terms of the actual geographical separation from the scene of suffering but also 
because viewers’ do not trust in the mediators of the aid pledges and 
humanitarian appeals. Furthermore, their arguments about their sense of 
powerlessness can be seen as part of their broader perceived lack of agency as 
public actors. This will be the subject of the following section.  
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6.3.2 Powerlessness in the global public space 
Arguments about viewers’ powerlessness vis-à-vis distant suffering and its 
alleviation were not limited to the impossibility of overcoming the geographical 
distance separating them from the scene of suffering. They were further 
expanded in the broader sense of a perceived powerlessness of the participants 
as public actors. This argument can be seen alongside the discourses about 
power and politics underlying politicised witnessing, as explored in section 4.3. 
of Chapter 4. Similar conceptualisations of power expressive of the “underdog 
culture” characteristic of the popular understanding of public life in Greece 
(Diamandouros, 1993) were also implicated in participants’ sense of their 
agency within the public space. Positioning themselves as part of the underdog 
class, or “the small people” (Demertzis, 1994: 24) viewers minimized their 
sense of agency as public actors. Such arguments were constructed within the 
focus group discussions in a variety of ways.  
First, it was commonplace among viewers to juxtapose their agency to that of 
media celebrities and the affluent within discussions about contributions and 
donations to humanitarian appeals. This can be seen in the earlier quote in 
section 6.2.1., where the participants, identified as “the poor” are juxtaposed to 
“the famous”, who not only did not contribute to the appeals as much as they 
should have but apparently benefited from the telethons and the media 
coverage they attracted through it. The distinction is expressive of the 
ambivalence of the use of celebrities in order to publicise appeals. As already 
discussed, celebrity endorsement attracts and engages audiences with 
telethons. There is the implicit expectation that celebrities as good-doers will 
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function as role models for the viewers and their presence in the telethons as an 
invitation for action (Tester, 2001: 120). The risk, however, revealed by the 
focus group discussions here is that the social gap separating the viewer from 
the celebrity benefactor is prohibitive of an actual identification of the audience 
with the charitable celebrities. The latter are treated with irony and sarcasm, as 
their wealth ostensibly contradicts not only the suffering that celebrity charity 
aims at alleviating (Littler, 2008: 143) but also the viewers’ own social status 
and minimal agency.  
In the following extract, a group of young participants are making a similar 
point of distinguishing between the viewers as the “common people” and the 
powerful and wealthy:  
Giota: I did sent help, yes. You say, OK, I do help somehow. But there are 
other people that give millions, thousands of Euros, why would you go 
and give twenty or thirty Euros that you actually need? Therefore, you 
say, OK, I will give one Euro, or 1.20, which is how much a text costs 
and you will contribute with this action.  
Mary: The fact, of course, that the mighty ones, who have all the 
money, do not give and it’s the common people that give is even more 
annoying. Because, OK, it’s about ten people in Greece that own 
billions! And they don’t give!  
(female, in their 20s, working class, FG7) 
The women here minimise their own sense of agency and the effect of their 
contributions by emphasising how limited these can be (“somehow”, “one Euro”). 
At the same time, they juxtapose this minimal agency to that of the “mighty 
ones” who “don’t give”. It is the actions of those “who have all the money” that 
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could actually make an impact; however, these people remain, according to the 
discussants here, unresponsive to the media appeals. Therefore, viewers’ 
themselves are to be commended despite their small contributions or even 
justified for remaining inactive. By victimising themselves in relation to the 
“mighty”, participants, first, shift emphasis of the discussion from their own 
actions vis-à-vis distant suffering towards social relations within their own 
community, and, then, use these relations to justify their own lack of or minimal 
action.  
It is not only the powerful few that viewers juxtaposed their sense of agency as 
public actors but also “the system” of social and political structures, which 
further diminish their willingness to offer to people in need. In the following 
extract, the group of housewives moved from a discussion about action towards 
distant suffering to the obstacles they meet to their wish to contribute in their 
own community by reading to blind children. As the care house is outside the 
town and they cannot drive themselves, they argue that there should be public 
transport to enable them to get there.  
Dina: You want to offer and you can’t!  
Litsa: I mean, the system does not help us at all! This is my conclusion! 
…If you try through the church, the church will try to take advantage 
of you instead of sending you to the people in need. I don’t want to go 
through the church! Do you know where the person is? Send me, and I 
will go every day for an hour, to feed them, to help them…Like that!  
Popi: Offer to society! 
Litsa: There are five people that do these things to show off and they 
use us a bit like their instruments, they use me, they step on me, and 
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these are the people that television shows and this annoys me so much! 
Incredibly!  
(female, in their 40s and 50s, working class, FG2) 
Action at a distance and action within the local community are treated in the 
same context under the common theme of the viewers’ powerlessness when 
encountered with the “system”. It is this powerlessness and mistrust in the 
institutions (Demertzis, 2008) that is used once more as an argumentative 
strategy to justify viewers’ inaction vis-à-vis the suffering of others. The 
“system” appears to entail the “church”, celebrities (the “five people that do these 
things to show off”), as well as the media (“television”) that focus their attention 
on them. Viewers are constructed as victims of this system and ultimately as 
unable to “offer to society”, even if they want to.  
Ultimately, this sense of lack of agency of the viewers that participated in the 
discussions can be summarised in the quote below: 
Litsa: We identify more with the poor, with the wretched because 
unfortunately this is who we are as well. 
(female, 45, working class, FG2)  
In affective terms, what is expressed here is empathetic identification with the 
suffering victims. In terms of constructing her own agency, however, the viewer 
positions herself as powerless and victimizes herself in a way similar to the 
distant sufferers and thus distances herself from taking up responsibility for the 
events she witnesses. At the same time, identification with the other here entails 
“the elision of the different to the same” and “the refusal to recognise the 
irreducibility in otherness” (Silverstone, 2007: 47). The specificity of the 
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suffering and of the status of the sufferers is denied. Empathy in this case does 
not necessarily encompass understanding and judgement, essential for a duty of 
care, as described by Silverstone (2007: 47). It also minimises the viewer’s 
agency as a public actor vis-à-vis the suffering of the unfortunates. 
The distinction between the “powerful” and the “common people” is an 
underlying framework for the participants’ understandings of social and 
political life (Diamandouros, 1993, Stefanides, 2007). It concomitantly affects 
their understanding of public action and their own agency as well. Identifying 
themselves as the “common people”, viewers minimise their role as public 
actors. Inaction or unresponsiveness to humanitarian appeals, therefore, is not 
to be understood as merely an indifference or failure to engage with the 
unfortunates or as a moral failure of the process of mediation as a whole. 
Rather, it should be considered in relation to broader cultural frames about 
power and public action, which are into play in the context of the spectators’ 
everyday life. Expressions of powerlessness are part of a broader repertoire of 
emotion underlying conceptions of public life. As such, they are entrenched 
within a broader emotional discourse bound up with the social and cultural 
context (Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 1993).  
Towards the end of the focus group discussions, participants were asked 
whether they felt themselves to be “cosmopolitans”. The question was open-
ended in that it let group members to freely attribute meanings to the concept 
of the cosmopolitan without guidance. Its ultimate aim was to illustrate the 
different ways people might construct their own agency as public actors in the 
global public space. The question instigated interesting discussions and 
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responses ranging from conceptualisations of cosmopolitanism as part of the 
new world order, which serves the interests of the few mighty nations 
manipulating the rest of the world population (Focus Group 10) to a 
construction of cosmopolitanism as global citizenship with the rights and 
obligations this might entail for individuals (Focus Group 6).  
In their overwhelming majority these responses employed similar 
conceptualisations about power based on the distinction between the mighty 
few and the common people, highlighting the viewers’ lack of agency when it 
comes to public affairs.  
Chrysa: If we think about it, generally, I say that we cannot really feel a 
lot of things as cosmopolitans – there should be something that I could 
have an effect on as a citizen of the world, to be able to do some things 
for the good, some wars, some stuff to go through me, anyways, in 
order to change. We cannot do anything as citizens of the world. This is 
what I see and I feel that I am not a cosmopolitan.  
Penelope: But what do we do as citizens of own country? Isn’t it the 
same thing? 
Chrysa: As citizens of our own country, I can say that I can vote for 
something, I have the power of the vote to choose something specific. 
But from then on… 
Penelope: Only this! 
Chrysa: Only this! 
Penelope: From then on, I have no power! 
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Ira: I don’t even have any power in order for the town to be cleaned, or 
for this or that to be done, not to have a four-storey building built in 
front of me… 
Chrysa: Therefore, as cosmopolitans, we are completely powerless! 
What kind of cosmopolitans are we, when we can do nothing about this 
world!  
(female, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG4) 
The participants position themselves as completely devoid of any kind of agency 
vis-à-vis the global public stage due to their lack of influence on the global 
affairs. This lack of agency is further expanded to the level of the national where, 
voting aside, discussants still feel powerless, and even to the level of the local 
community, where viewers cannot even get their town to be cleaned. Viewers’ 
articulation of their agency vis-à-vis the distant, therefore, is infiltrated with 
discourses about their agency within the national and local community.  
It is important to note here that the word “cosmopolitan” is literally translated 
in Greek as “citizen of the world”. For that reason, most of the participants 
framed their answers through the concept of citizenship. Since the latter is 
mostly associated with civic life within the nation state, most answers seemed 
to be filtered through the viewers’ sense of citizenship within the national 
community. This is also the case in the following extract by a young respondent:  
Giota: I have to feel as a citizen of my own country first in order to feel 
a citizen of the world…If your own country does not take you into 
account, no matter how cynical this sounds, how will the foreigner ever 
take you into account? This is what I mean…If I can’t be an active 
member in my own country, how can I feel a citizen of the world?   
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(female, 23, working class, FG7) 
The viewer is once more constructed as passive in relation to an impersonal 
system, in this case her “own country”. It is this system that “does not take her 
into account” and does not let her “be an active member”. Interestingly, the 
global is identified here with the “foreigner”, in sharp contrast with the 
speaker’s “own country”, which makes her powerlessness towards it even 
greater. Evident in both the above quotes are the characteristics of the Greek 
civic culture as already described above, embedded with discourses of cynicism, 
powerlessness and ultimately disengagement (Demertzis, 1994; 2008; 
Stefanides, 2007).  
Similar arguments are made in the following discussion, where there is an 
interesting distinction made between global citizenship in terms of being 
informed about global affairs and participating in them.  
If somebody would ask you whether you feel like citizens of the world 
[i.e. cosmopolitans], what would you say?  
Ilias: Perhaps citizens of our neighbourhood… 
(laughs) 
Agis: No way!  
Pavlos: Citizens of the world in what sense?  
Giannis: With regard to participation or information? There is a 
difference here.  
To both. The way you see it.  
Pavlos: Both in relation to participation and information!  
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Giannis: [with regard to] information they give you whatever they 
want – don’t they give you whatever they want? Why, do we know a lot 
of things? Whatever they show you, whatever they send, whatever they 
want…What’s the other thing we said? 
Participation.  
Pavlos: It doesn’t exist! [There is] detachment from everything! I think 
so! Everyone is secluded in what is of personal interest and from then 
on I think there is no…and I think…we experience this at every moment 
of our everyday lives. There are associations with no members, 
organisations that do not function…There is no offer… 
(male, in their 40s and 50s, middle class, FG6) 
The viewers’ sense of agency is expressed as minimal with regard to both 
meanings they attribute to the concept of global citizenship.  In relation to 
information circulated in the global public space, they are constructed as 
passive receivers of what the media (“they”) give them. And, in expression of 
their mistrust and critical engagement with the media, they accuse them of 
showing “what they want” rather than what they ought to. With regard to 
participation in global affairs and public life, through the use of nominalisation 
(“detachment”, “offer”), the agency of the viewers is again reduced and the 
emphasis is placed on the effect rather than their own (in)action and lack of 
participation. Interestingly, once more, a question about cosmopolitanism and 
global citizenship is re-contextualised and answered through the context of the 
participants’ lifeworlds and “everyday lives”.   
This discussion on cosmopolitanism offers useful insights in relation to the 
concept of “global citizenship”. It illustrates it as a question understood by 
  
304 
audiences through national citizenship and as an expansion of it. Such a 
discussion, fruitful in its own terms, is beyond the scopes and interests of this 
chapter. What is to be highlighted here is that the viewers’ articulation of agency 
vis-à-vis the global and the distant is filtered through their construction of 
agency as members of a community, national and local. And as this membership 
is surrounded by discourses of powerlessness, the same discourses are 
implicated in viewers’ construction of agency as public actors in relation to 
distant suffering. Constructing themselves as powerless and as “common people” 
in juxtaposition with the powerful and mighty, viewers discredit the 
effectiveness of their action and justify their passivity in general and their 
unresponsiveness to the relief efforts in specific.   
Summary and conclusions  
The present chapter has explored the question of public action as a response to 
reports of distant suffering, which ultimately underlines viewers’ agency as 
public actors. As discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, it is usually this gap 
between knowledge of the suffering of distant others and audience 
unresponsiveness or minimal responsiveness that is at the heart of the debate 
about the potential of mediation to construct spectators as moral agents in 
relation to distant suffering. This chapter has illustrated the modalities and 
preconditions of audience action at a distance, by focusing, first, on the kinds of 
action viewers consider available to them, and, second, the array of justification 
strategies participants in the focus groups employed in order to explain their 
inaction vis-à-vis the pain of others.  
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Audience public action as a response to distant suffering, as illustrated in the 
current chapter, is rather fragmentary and elusive. It is heavily dependent on 
the orchestration of humanitarian appeals by the media and most often takes 
the form of donations through mobile phone texting within the context of 
telethons. According to the audience discussions, motivation to act towards 
distant suffering is therefore hardly a direct outcome of the urgency of the 
situation and the humanitarian crisis or the viewers’ emotional and reflective 
involvement with it; it is rather circumstantial and media-induced. In this 
context, viewers’ action or inaction as a response to distant suffering appears to 
be independent of the practice of media witnessing. As discussed here, 
emotional involvement was not always followed up by action to help the distant 
sufferers; on the other hand, viewers who positioned themselves as detached 
from the suffering of others claimed to have contributed to media appeals. What 
triggers public action, it was argued, is ultimately not the moral compulsion to 
act in the face of suffering but the attraction to participate to the media event of 
the telethon.  
This has further illustrated the problematic relationship between the reality of 
the suffering at the heart of the media appeals and their staging as a spectacle 
through the telethon. Although telethons manage to instigate public action and 
motivate audiences to contribute to relief efforts, their spectacular character 
ends up disassociating itself from the actual cause of the suffering, deflecting 
viewers’ attention from the people in need to the event of the telethon and the 
celebrities participating in it. The latter, it was argued, although useful in 
attracting audience attention, were also treated by viewers with irony in their 
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role as good-doers, which undermined their employment as public role-models 
of charity and humanitarianism.   
Despite viewers’ criticisms of telethons and their use of celebrities, however, 
participants in the focus groups still did not move beyond the kinds of action at 
a distance suggested by the telethons, namely contributions mostly through text 
messaging. Understanding themselves as public actors only in the limited sense 
suggested to them by the telethons and media appeals, viewers find themselves 
in a relationship of complicity with the media (Silverstone, 2007: 130) with 
regard to action at a distance. For most of the participants in the focus groups, 
however, their admission to inaction illustrated a collusive relationship with 
media reports of suffering, where the exposure to images of the pain of others 
was believed to be sufficient for the viewer’s engagement with them 
(Silverstone, 2007: 131), ultimately ignoring the morally compelling nature of 
the suffering.  
Aware of the criticisms of moral failure admission to inaction in the face of 
human suffering might raise, discussants would employ different discursive 
strategies to justify their unresponsiveness. These strategies were analytically 
distinguished here into two main discursive frameworks: first, a discourse of 
generalised mistrust of humanitarian action at-a-distance, and, second, a 
discourse of powerlessness that rendered viewers’ action ineffective. With 
regard to the first argumentative strategy, participants criticized the mediation 
of humanitarianism as a media spectacle, discrediting the motives both of the 
organizers and the donors, or expressed serious suspicions about the way 
public donations are handled by the mediators of humanitarian pledges, be it 
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NGOs, governments or other institutions. With regard to their positioning as 
public actors, viewers would construct themselves as powerless, both in 
relation to the events witnessed due to their geographical remoteness as well as 
in the broader context of public and political life. Minimizing their sense of 
agency as actors in the public stage, participants simultaneously discredited the 
effectiveness of their actions vis-à-vis distant suffering. 
The two argumentative strategies, of powerlessness and mistrust, are of course 
intrinsically intertwined. Viewers do not trust the mediators of public action, 
since they feel they have no power of control or accountability over them. At the 
same time, by mistrusting institutions who have power over the situation 
witnessed viewers simultaneously victimise themselves in relation to these 
institutions and stress out their own powerlessness. The two discourses are, 
however, analytically separated here in order to be explored in their 
particularities and also illustrate the complexity of the discussions surrounding 
public action. The argument to be made here is that viewers’ sense of agency 
vis-à-vis the suffering of distant others as expressed and enacted (or not) 
through action at-a-distance should be considered not merely in relation to or 
as a direct response to the media coverage of human suffering but also in 
relation to these broader discourses that surround the viewers’ understanding 
of public action and their position as public actors in the social world. In this 
context, it is a limited approach to theorise viewers’ unresponsiveness to 
humanitarian appeals and inaction vis-à-vis distant suffering as moral apathy 
(Seu, 2010: 440), compassion fatigue (Moeller, 1999) or as merely a moral 
failure of the media to convey the urgency of the situation. It has to be 
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understood alongside viewers’ sense of their own agency as public actors and 
relevant moral discourses that render this inaction expected, justifiable and 
commonsensical.    
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the ways viewers position themselves as moral agents 
in relation to geographically remote disasters and the suffering of distant 
others. The research began from the observation that everyday life has been to a 
large extent infiltrated by discourses about the global and the distant, as the 
media expand the sphere of visibility beyond the confines of the local and the 
immediate. Placing viewers within the context of a globalised media space, 
which functions as a discursive resource of meaning for the understanding of 
the distant other, the research set out to explore the significance of the 
experience of distant suffering for the viewers’ sense of moral self. 
An understanding of the concept of mediation as audience practices guided the 
exploration of audience discourses on distant suffering. Focus group discussions 
were employed as the methodological tool to explore the ways viewers 
discursively articulate their sense of moral agency in relation to television news 
of suffering of faraway others. The analytical focus has been on two interrelated 
audience practices, those of media witnessing and media remembering, namely 
the positioning of the viewers as virtual witnesses to distant suffering and their 
discursive reconstruction of the events witnessed. It has been suggested that the 
moral agency of the viewer in relation to these practices is articulated through 
three main tensions: the tension between emotional engagement and 
rationalised detachment, hospitality and apathy towards the distant other and, 
finally, the viewer’s complicity and responsibility towards media 
representations. The empirical chapters have illustrated that audiences engage 
with distant misfortune in diverse ways, often reproducing the symbolic 
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hierarchies of suffering adopted by the media, or constructing ones drawing 
upon national and cultural discourses.  
In this concluding chapter, I bring together some of the themes and findings of 
this study as a means to point out the academic contribution of the thesis, as 
well as to suggest avenues for future scholarship. The chapter begins with a 
review of the key empirical findings of the research, discussed in relation to the 
three empirical chapters. The contribution of these findings to the general field 
of media and communications studies as well as the more specific academic 
work on the mediation of distant suffering is also explored in the next section. 
Finally, a reflection on the research choices and the possible limitations of the 
thesis is followed by a consideration of the areas that the research presented 
here suggests for further study.  
7.1. Theoretical and empirical contributions 
The concept of mediation was the theoretical starting point of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 employed mediation to focus on the production of meanings within 
the broader context of the viewers’ lifeworlds, shifting away from a focus on 
media texts and media production. The concept was therefore used to 
conceptualise viewers as agents in a relation of appropriation to the media as 
discursive resources for the nourishment of imagination and understanding of 
the distant other, who is only visible through the media. Following Couldry’s 
conceptualisation of mediation as practices (Couldry, 2004; 2006), I employed 
the concept of media practices to study this relationship between audiences and 
media. Couldry suggests a new paradigm for media research which, theorising 
media as practices, focuses on the question of what people do and say in 
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relation to the media (Couldry, 2006: 39), in order to analyse the influence of 
media on everyday life in a media saturated culture (Couldry, 2004: 115). Based 
on the underlying assumption of the discursive construction of the self 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997), the thesis operationalises 
Couldry’s suggestion and explores what people say about media stories of 
distant suffering in order to illustrate the construction of their moral agency vis-
à-vis the remote sufferer.  
A key theoretical development of the present study was, therefore, the 
construction of a conceptual framework for the study of the mediated agency of 
the viewer of suffering. This framework placed two media practices at the 
centre of the constitution of the viewer as a moral agent: the practice of media 
witnessing and that of media remembering. Media witnessing was suggested as 
the concept that better describes the viewing experience of suffering, as this 
modality of audiencing  varies dramatically from any other audience experience 
in terms of its moral implications, and cannot be addressed by hitherto used 
concepts such as “reception” (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009b: 1). I operationalised 
media witnessing, a hitherto largely theoretical concept (Frosh and Pinchevski, 
2009a) to construct an analytical framework of three dimensions, which focuses 
on the relationship of the viewer with (a) the scene of suffering, (b) the distant 
other, and (c) the media report. Studying media witnessing along these aspects 
allows for the comprehension of the specificities of watching suffering, as well 
as the variability in the viewer’s engagement with different stories of suffering. 
It provides an analytical space for the exploration of the variety of moral and 
emotional implications of being exposed to distant suffering for the viewer that 
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go beyond the dichotomy of compassion and empathy, on the one hand, and 
compassion fatigue and moral apathy, on the other.  
Media remembering was conceptualised as an analytical category drawing upon 
Halbwachs’s concept of collective memory (Halbwachs, 1992) and discursive 
psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992). As a media practice of the discursive 
reconstruction of viewers’ memories of mediated stories of suffering, media 
remembering throws into relief the role of media in generating and reproducing 
memories of global disasters and human suffering, as well as the ways this 
suffering is employed by viewers in the context of their lifeworlds and gets 
embedded into broader frameworks of meaning.  
This is a study of audience talk and the production of discourses about media 
stories; as Chapter 2 has highlighted it is not a reception study and is not 
interested in audience responses to specific media texts. However, as evident in 
the exploration of the empirical material, the media text was far from absent 
from the audience discussions; its presence was dominant in the media 
practices of witnessing and remembering. It was specific media reports, either 
of individual sufferers or of the sublime spectacle of death that enabled the 
viewers’ intense emotional engagement with the scene of suffering and the 
victims, as discussed in relation to affective and ecstatic witnessing (Chapter 4). 
It was through “media templates” (Kitzinger, 2000) that viewers remembered 
distant suffering and respectively constructed their moral hierarchy of 
remembering, as explained in Chapter 5. It was also the media and their 
orchestrated appeals, mostly in the form of telethons, that motivated viewers to 
take action vis-à-vis distant suffering, as Chapter 6 has argued.  
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Some of these issues, already elaborated in the empirical chapters, will be 
further addressed below. What is to be highlighted here, in relation to the 
theoretical contributions of the thesis, is the use of media practices as audience 
discourses for the study of the symbolic power of the media. For what the 
empirical chapters have often confirmed – without of course neglecting the 
influence of the discourses, cultural, social and political, of the context of the 
viewer’s everyday life – is the power of media representations to define or 
delimit viewer’s engagement with the suffering witnessed.   
Finally, the focus on Greece as the context for the exploration of audience 
discourses of suffering has provided useful insights within the broader 
literature on the relationship between the Western spectator and distant 
suffering. Chapter 3 has addressed some of the peculiarities of the Greek 
cultural and political landscape, which illustrate Greece as a particular case of a 
Western context. These peculiarities became also evident in the empirical 
chapters, as they underline the way audiences engage with the suffering they 
witness through the media. The cultural and political discourses employed by 
Greek audiences in making sense of distant suffering challenge the 
homogeneous perspective of the Western spectator of suffering, which has so 
far been assumed by the relevant literature. The strong discourse of anti-
Americanism has challenged assumptions about a unified empathetic Western 
reaction to the events of September 11 (Haes, 2002; Chouliaraki, 2008). The 
study has illustrated how cultural conceptualisations of power, historical in 
their origin and thus deeply rooted in national culture, might be stronger 
influences in framing audience responses to suffering in comparison to cultural 
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proximity, as has often been assumed in the literature. It is these 
conceptualisations rather than the distinction between the West and the rest 
that underline expressions of empathy and allegiances. By focusing on Greece as 
its research context, therefore, the present study has challenged assumptions 
about the Western spectator as a homogeneous category.  
The following sections will discuss some of the empirical findings of the thesis, 
contextualising them within the relevant academic debates.   
7.1.1 Key empirical findings 
The thesis has illustrated the construction of the moral agency of the viewer 
with regard to the suffering of distant others as constituted not only in the ways 
viewers describe themselves as actors vis-à-vis media reports of human pain 
(Chapter 6) but also through the practices of media witnessing (Chapter 4) and 
media remembering (Chapter 5). In this section, I will summarise the key 
findings of the thesis across these three research sub-questions.  
Media Witnessing  
Media witnessing was employed here as the discursive articulation of the 
spectator’s experience of the pain of faraway others through the media. The 
exploration of the focus group discussions illustrated a variety of ways viewers 
experience mediated suffering along the three tensions in the mediation of 
moral agency. I analytically organised these in a typology of media witnessing, 
consisting of four different types or modalities of experiencing mediated 
suffering.  
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Affective witnessing was mostly characterised by the empathetic identification of 
the spectator with particular images of sufferers and an indulgence in 
sentimentalism and personal emotion. Ecstatic witnessing was described as an 
extreme case of affective witnessing, distinguished by the sense of immersion of 
the viewer in the scene of suffering, enabled by the mode of coverage of the 
media reports and the use of unedited footage. This type of witnessing was 
associated in audience narratives with the media coverage of the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami and September 11. Politicised witnessing was associated with the 
expression of political judgments about the suffering and feelings of indignation, 
as well as the tendency to attribute blame and distinguish the sufferers between 
innocent and deserving. Finally, the concept of detached witnessing was 
employed to portray the position of the viewer as an apathetic bystander to the 
suffering of distant others, described as irrelevant to the viewer’s moral space of 
everyday life.    
This typology dissects audience engagement with distant suffering, which has 
hitherto been rather uniformly described as “compassion” (Höijer, 2004), 
“compassion fatigue” (Moeller, 1999), “desensitisation” (Seu, 2003) or “moral 
apathy” (Seu, 2010). It describes mediated experience of human pain as a 
complex process, which cannot be assumed or predetermined by the nature of 
the suffering or its mediated representation. Media witnessing, as illustrated in 
this thesis, was found to be contingent both on the nature and the mode of 
reporting of particular disasters (as is mostly the case with affective and ecstatic 
witnessing) and broader social and political discourses viewers employ in 
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making sense of the events (as in the case of politicised and detached 
witnessing).   
Media Remembering 
Media remembering, as the discursive reconstruction of viewers’ memories of 
the suffering witnessed through the media, was illustrated as a complex process 
at the intersection of, on the one hand, remembering and forgetting, and, on the 
other hand, employing national and global frameworks of memory. 
Chapter 5 has illustrated the existence of a moral hierarchy in the practice of 
media remembering of distant disasters. It argued that, on the bottom end of this 
hierarchy, a large number of events reported as disasters, such as hurricanes 
and earthquakes, are de-evented in audience memory and are remembered in 
terms of media templates that characterise the reporting of similar disasters. In 
this case, the suffering of others is described as inevitable, expected, and, 
ultimately, banal. A smaller number of events, the ones experienced within the 
frame of ecstatic witnessing, namely the South Asian Tsunami of 2004 and the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, are constructed as iconic in the practice of 
remembering. Despite the viewers’ intense emotional immersion in the scene of 
the disaster, however, or rather because of it, audience engagement in 
remembering these disasters shifts emphasis away from the suffering and 
towards the viewer’s own emotions. Finally, the case of the earthquake in Izmit, 
Turkey in 1999 tops the moral hierarchy of remembering distant suffering. It 
was constructed in viewers’ memory as a moment of actual cosmopolitan 
engagement with the sufferers, whose otherness is recognised and 
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acknowledged but overcome in the construction of the victims as a subject of 
concern and expression of solidarity. 
The exploration of the focus group discussions has also indicated how in 
remembering global events, viewers position themselves in a world community 
of spectators, brought together through the simultaneous mediated witnessing 
of distant suffering. At the same time, however, viewers localised the 
significance of the events remembered by re-contextualising them in memory 
within national and local frameworks. Under this light, media remembering was 
illustrated as a practice which, albeit momentarily placing the viewers in a 
global space, is ultimately underlined by the frames of the local and national 
community.  
Action at a distance 
The issue of action at a distance was explored in the focus groups in relation to 
how participants talked about themselves as actors vis-à-vis distant disasters 
and their suffering victims. The discussions illustrated action as limited, mostly 
circumstantial and motivated by the media rather than the moral impulse to help 
the sufferer. Instrumental in the media staging of action at a distance was the 
telethon, as a televised appeal which breaks the routine television programme 
and employs celebrities in order to publicise humanitarian appeals. It was found 
that it is mostly through the telethons that viewers are motivated to act for the 
alleviation of suffering. However, the disassociation of telethons from their 
causes in audience narratives indicates that it is the participation in a media 
event that is the motivation for action rather than the actual humanitarian cause.  
  
318 
The focus group discussions also indicated a number of argumentative 
strategies participants employed to justify their inaction, which were 
analytically distinguished here in two main streams. First, viewers drew upon a 
generalised culture of mistrust to discredit either humanitarianism as a whole or 
the management of the resources gathered through humanitarian appeals. 
Second, they juxtaposed their sense of powerlessness to the needs of the distant 
unfortunates, either on the basis of the geographical distance separating them 
from the scene of suffering or, mostly, on their limited agency as actors in 
broader public and political life. These discursive frameworks of powerlessness 
and mistrust are entrenched in the broader civic culture in Greece and framed 
viewers’ understanding of public action overall. In this context, it was argued 
that inaction is not a necessary consequence of moral apathy of compassion 
fatigue but has to be understood within the broader political and cultural context 
of the viewers’ lifeworlds, which renders inaction expected, justifiable and 
commonsensical.    
Overall, the empirical discussion has illustrated the mediation of the viewer’s 
agency vis-à-vis the suffering of distant others as a complex process underlined 
by tensions and contingent upon the nature of the disasters reported, the media 
practices of reporting them and broader cultural and political discourses that 
underline viewers’ understanding of public life. The next section will open up 
the theoretical discussion by expanding on some key themes in the relevant 
academic work that the empirical findings of the thesis provide further insights 
to.   
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7.1.2. Discourse diversity among respondents 
As argued earlier in the thesis (Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.), the demographic 
criteria according to which participants were selected did not constitute major 
dimensions in the empirical analysis. The reason for this is twofold: first, an 
underlying assumption of the research and focus of the analysis was that 
discourses are mutually constructed through group interaction and are not the 
property of specific social groups; second, the small number of focus groups 
used for the analysis does not allow for safe conclusions to be drawn about the 
differences among the various groups. Nevertheless, a few points can be made 
in relation to the issue of the variability of discourses among the groups.  
A clear distinction among participants’ engagement with stories of distant 
suffering emerged on the basis of their age: as discussed in Chapter 4 and 
mostly on Chapter 6, younger respondents appeared to be more disengaged in 
relation to the participants of the older cohorts. They were described as 
detached witnesses and also as the least likely to act upon the spectacle of 
suffering. This finding, defying assumptions that younger generations, as 
consumers of global cultural products, might display cosmopolitan attitudes, 
was explained on the basis of civic disengagement among the youth, which is 
characteristic of Greek civic life (Demertzis et al., 2008).  
With reference to gender segmentation, there were no significant differences 
among the groups. Hӧijer refers to a gendered display of compassion in her 
research of audience responses to news of violence and war, as her female 
respondents were more inclined to express feelings of compassion and pity, 
whereas men tended to be more cynical (Hӧijer, 2004). This does not agree with 
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the findings of the present study. As seen in Chapter 4, section 4.1 on affective 
witnessing, male participants also made extensive use of emotional language to 
describe the way images of distant suffering affected them. At the same time, 
female participants often employed politicised discourses when discussing 
distant disasters (section 4.3). The difference on the use of political discourses 
was rather one of degree; although male participants expressed compassion and 
empathy for the victims, they were also more likely to discuss about structural 
problems underlying human crises (this was especially the case with groups 6 
and 11). However, as discourse analysis does not allow for quantification of the 
responses, reporting on the extent of this difference is not possible (see also 
section 7.3. on the reflections on the research design below).  
No significant differences in relation to the research questions were observed 
between participants from the two different locales in which the research was 
conducted. Interestingly, participants in both the Komotini and Athens focus 
groups extensively discussed about the Turkish earthquake of 1999. As the 
earthquake was remembered along the one that took place in Athens just one 
month later, namely a national disaster, the event seemed to be equally 
meaningful and memorable for both communities. One interesting observation 
concerning two groups in Komotini (groups 3 and 7) was that they rather 
extensively discussed the possibility of a war between Greece and Turkey 
towards the end or even after the end of the focus group discussions. These 
discussions, reflective of the long-rooted tensions between the Greek and 
Turkish-descended population in the area, can be seen as indicative of how 
discussions about the distant other are localised and transformed into 
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discussions about the “national” or “local” other. They are also illustrative of the 
fragility of cosmopolitan sentiments of humanitarianism in relation to national 
and nationalistic discourses. The significance of these discussions, however, 
merits in-depth exploration, which is beyond the scope of the thesis and the 
question of distant suffering.  
Finally, there were no major differences between the groups of the different 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The discourses employed for the viewers’ 
identification with the victims were both sociological (participants’ identifying 
with the “poor” and the “wretched”, because they felt the shared the same fate) 
but also psychological, expressed through empathy with the suffering mother or 
child on the screen. At the same time, the inclination to act (or not) seemed 
similar among all respondents, irrespective of their status. In his study of 
audiences of suffering in the Philippines Jonathan Ong has concluded that there 
are “classed moralities” in the ways people justify and act in relation to the 
suffering of the poor represented in the media (Ong, 2011). Drawing 
comparisons between this thesis and Ong’s study would be hard, given both the 
different aims of the projects (Ong’s research focuses on the suffering of Filipino 
poor as represented on television) and the different characters of the two 
national contexts. However, the differences between the two studies might raise 
interesting questions about the differences between watching distant and 
proximate suffering. If proximate suffering raises questions about local social 
structures and inequalities, and thus can be perceived as threatening to the 
elites, distant suffering always retains a degree of safety for the viewer, as it 
does not make claims to or challenge her own livelihood and lifestyle.  
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The lack of significant differences among the different focus groups should not 
be seen as an assumption of homogeneity among Greek audiences. This would 
be a naïve and false claim, which has in any case been challenged elsewhere 
(Madianou, 2005a). Rather, this lack of great variation should be seen along the 
lines of the research design and aims, and especially the analytical focus that 
dictated the small number of groups and participants.  
7.2. Discussion 
7.2.1. The mediation of suffering and the problem of particularisation 
The emotional involvement of the viewers with the scene of suffering and their 
hospitality as the ability to engage with and understand the other, as illustrated 
throughout the empirical chapters, is conditional upon images of specific 
sufferers whose pain is graphically reported on the television screen. This 
finding supports the theoretical and empirical arguments made in previous 
work about the morally and emotionally compelling power of visuals in 
conveying distant suffering (Cohen, 2001, Höijer, 2004; Sontag, 2003), as well as 
the instrumentality of the singularisation and personalisation of suffering for 
the latter to be rendered imaginable by the audience members (Boltanski, 1999; 
Chouliaraki, 2006).  
However, there is a problem of balance between emotionally engaging singular 
suffering, as it appears on the screen, and its generalisation to include the rest of 
the sufferers affected by the crisis. This problem of particularisation of suffering 
as associated with specific visible figures in pain has been described by Arendt 
as the inability to translate compassion inspired by and directed towards 
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particular individuals to a generalised politics of pity (Arendt, [1963]1990: 85-
90). The latter takes into account the dimension of distance and generalises “to 
reach out the multitude of suffering” (Arendt, [1963]1990: 89), expressing a 
commitment – rather than a sentiment – to the suffering as a public cause. This 
disconnection between compassion towards specific victims and the 
generalisation of their suffering to the masses of unfortunates affected by the 
disasters was evident in the practice of media witnessing. As discussed in 
section 4.1.2., viewers otherwise filled with empathetic emotions towards 
specific victims, would detachedly describe the aggregates of sufferers as “the 
damned” and “the wretched”. The same problem became apparent in the practice 
of media remembering, as viewers would emotionally reconstruct memories of 
stories of human suffering of particular individuals but their narratives were 
devoid of context and the dimension of historicity (section 5.1.). In this context, 
the engagement of the viewer with the suffering is an emotional one, lacking the 
necessary reflexivity necessary for deliberation and rational judgment 
(Chouliaraki, 2006: 179), as discussed in relation to the tension between 
emotional engagement and rationalised detachment (section 2.1.3.) 
The problem of particularisation seems to be unresolved with regard to the 
mediation of distant suffering both in terms of representation (how can 
somebody represent the suffering of thousands, if not by the use of a few 
specific faces?) and audience engagement (how can the viewer imagine what it 
feels like to suffer if not by identifying with a specific face?). If there is anything 
to be taken as instructive from the focus group discussions, this is the viewers’ 
engagement with the victims of the Izmit earthquake of 1999. As explained in 
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Chapter 6, participants’ recollections were not focused on the stories of 
particular victims; rather, they acknowledged the victims’ otherness on the 
basis of national identity, while at the same time considering their suffering a 
cause for commitment and public action.  
This, to be sure, had to do with the contextualisation of the disaster within 
national political and cultural discourses due to the construction of Turkey as 
the national enemy. It might also be related to the strong earthquake that hit 
Athens only a few weeks later. This kind of engagement beyond the particular 
sufferer, therefore, might be very particular to the specific case. It is, however, 
the contextualisation of the disaster, not only in terms of its own specificities but 
also in relation to the viewers’ lifeworlds within the national community, that 
renders the suffering of specific victims from particular images to exemplary of 
a situation (Boltanski, 1999: 11). As the mediation of suffering requires the 
transformation of personal emotions of compassion and empathy to a 
generalised pity for suffering to become a cause for public action, it requires the 
contextualisation of “the intensely personal in the realm of the public and the 
political” (Chouliaraki, 2006: 215). In the context of the empirical findings of 
this thesis, this contextualisation takes place on the basis of national 
recognition.  
7.2.2. The problem of action at a distance 
The problem of the particularisation in the mediation of suffering has been 
theorised as an impediment to public action vis-à-vis distant suffering, as it fails 
to translate audience emotional engagement to a commitment to a public cause. 
The empirical discussion in Chapter 6 has illustrated further issues pertaining 
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to action at a distance. It argued that viewers’ inaction is associated to their 
perceived lack of agency, which is not particular to the moral demands of 
distant suffering but embedded within broader discourses of power and 
mistrust in institutions, some of these particular to the Greek civic culture. In 
this context, viewers would often vicitimise themselves in relation to the 
organisations that mishandled audience donations (section 6.2.) or the 
“powerful” and the “system” (including individuals, institutions and states alike) 
(section 6.3.). As such, the lack of action vis-à-vis distant suffering can be seen as 
a problem of civic culture as much as it is a problem of mediation.  
 At the same time, the limited action viewers undertook as a response to images 
of human suffering was media-instigated, circumstantial and often disassociated 
with the specific sufferers, as the discussion on the telethons has illustrated 
(section 6.1.1). Action in this context is not only of low-investment (Tester, 
2001: 130) but also lacks a reflexive connection between the spectator as a 
donor and the sufferer whose predicament constitutes the cause for the 
donation. This poses questions not only of how the media can instigate public 
action for the alleviation of suffering but what kinds of action they enable and 
what kinds of moral connections are expressed by these actions. As the 
audience discussions here have indicated, action has often been expressive of 
the impulse to take part in a media event rather than of a direct response to the 
human pain witnessed. Measuring the moral response of the audience in terms 
of action (Seu, 2003; 2010) misses the more nuanced dimensions of what kind 
of moral connections action is expressive of.  
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The disassociation of mediated action at a distance from its cause, as illustrated 
in Chapter 6, also challenges the idea of compassion fatigue as the main 
challenge facing the question of social action with regard to distant suffering 
(Tester, 2001: 46). Albeit criticised by different accounts as conceptually 
problematic32 (Cohen, 2001: 187-193; Tester, 2001: 15-17; Cottle, 2009: 131-
135), compassion fatigue is still widely used both in academic and public 
discourse with reference to the unresponsiveness of media audiences to 
humanitarian appeals and reports of human suffering. Underlying assumption is 
that the emotional engagement of the viewer guarantees his or her motivation 
to act vis-à-vis the suffering witnessed through the media.  
The findings of the present thesis challenge the compassion fatigue argument on 
two grounds: first, by illustrating that the moral positioning of the viewer with 
regard to distant suffering varies significantly more than the binary opposition 
between compassion and compassion fatigue seems to imply; and, second, by 
describing action at a distance as disassociated from the viewer’s emotional 
engagement with the scene of suffering and the distant other. As argued in 
Chapter 6, inaction does not necessarily equate lack of compassion: participants 
who were emotionally affected by suffering claimed to never having contributed 
to media appeals, whereas people contributed to the telethons more as a 
participation in a media event than on the basis of their compassion to the 
suffering victims. At the same time, inaction was part of broader cultural frames 
of civic participation, powerlessness and mistrust.  
                                                        
32 Indeed, in her book of the same title, Moeller neglects to offer a clear definition of the concept 
of compassion fatigue. Instead, she descriptively explores study cases of different media reports 
of trauma, alternating between associating compassion fatigue with the audience response and 
attributing it to media reporting (Moeller, 1999). 
  
327 
The challenge for humanitarian communication and news reporting alike with 
regard to social action is, therefore, twofold. As far as the representation of 
victims is concerned, the question at hand is not only the evocation of the 
viewer’s emotion but also the contextualisation of the suffering in order to both 
enhance audience understanding and render the suffering relevant in relation to 
the viewer’s lifeworld, translating compassion to a politics of pity, as also 
discussed in the previous section. With regard to motivating spectators to act 
upon the suffering witnessed, the challenge, albeit hard and complex, is to 
undermine dominant discourses about humanitarian failure and mistrust and 
convince audiences of the relevance and effectiveness of their own actions.  
7.2.3. The moral hierarchies of suffering and the symbolic power of the 
media 
The thesis began by contextualising the global media space as a space of 
unevenness and inequalities, embedded within the unequal distribution of 
media structures and resources (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen, 1998; Thussu, 
2003, Schiller, 2005), reproduced through professional practices of Western 
journalism (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Adams, 1986, Chang et al., 1987; Singer et 
al., 1991) and symbolically reflected on the construction of hierarchies of 
suffering through media reporting (Chouliaraki, 2006; Joye, 2009). These 
hierarchies differentially construct the distant sufferer as an object of moral 
engagement and empathetic connection.  
Similar hierarchies of pity have underlined the audience discussions in this 
thesis. These would be either entrenched in national political frameworks and 
cultural stereotypes, or reproducing the media representational preferences. 
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The case of politicised witnessing has discussed how viewers would distinguish 
between worthy and unworthy victims on the basis of cultural allegiances and 
stereotypes, such as anti-Americanism. The practice of media remembering 
more elaborately illustrated a moral hierarchy in the way audiences remember 
suffering. In a way similar to Chouliaraki’s regimes of pity, the “banal 
remembering” of “ordinary” disasters and the “ecstatic remembering” of iconic 
disasters gravitate towards the personal emotions of the spectator and 
ultimately towards the imagination of a communitarian public, analogously to 
“adventure” and “ecstatic” news (Chouliaraki, 2006). It is only in remembering 
the Turkish earthquake that Greek viewers come closer to a cosmopolitan 
disposition, where the sufferer is both recognised as other and as a cause for 
commitment, similarly to the category of “emergency news” in Chouliaraki’s 
typology (Chouliaraki, 2006; 2008).  
There is, however, one significant difference between the regimes of pity, as 
constructed through media reports, and the Greek audiences’ hierarchy of 
remembering. If Chouliaraki’s analysis of television texts indicates that the 
moral positioning of the spectator in the case of the ecstatic news of September 
11 and the Tsunami was largely based on the identification of the viewer with 
the Western victims, this was not the case among participants in the focus 
groups. The identity of Western victims was not the basis for feelings of 
empathy and identification – indeed, as the typology of politicised witnessing 
indicated, in the case of 9/11 the identity of the sufferers as Americans was 
rather an impediment to empathetic identification. What was the basis for the 
intense emotional involvement of the viewer and the construction of these 
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events as iconic was the sense of liveness and the feeling of unmediated 
witnessing of the death of others. Of course, the present thesis does not include 
an analysis of the respective media reports of the disasters discussed, which 
would allow for a more detailed illustration of the extent to which media 
discourses are reproduced by the audiences. What can be safely argued, 
however, is that in remembering distant suffering viewers reproduce moral 
hierarchies of place and life similar to the ones constructed by the media, albeit 
in a non-straightforward way.  
This is also evident in the ambivalent way audiences related to television. As 
illustrated throughout the empirical analysis here, viewers’ relation with the 
media is underlined by tensions: on the one hand, television is criticised for its 
sensationalism, commercialism and ideological bias; on the other hand, 
however, viewers were positioned in a relationship of complicity with the media 
(Silverstone, 2007). Despite their cynicism about sensationalistic reporting, it 
was sensational representations of suffering that affected them the most and the 
ones reproduced in media remembering. Despite their scepticism towards 
media commercialisation, it was through the telethons and their spectacle that 
they engaged as public actors with the suffering of others. Despite their 
criticisms of media hierarchies and differential attention in reporting different 
parts of the world, it was this differential attention to different events that was 
ultimately reproduced in audience memory.  
The symbolic power of the media as emerging in the empirical discussion of the 
thesis is, therefore, not incompatible with viewers’ criticisms of the media 
(Couldry, 2000: 45); it is reproduced in audience discourses, which reflect the 
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unevenness of the mediapolis as a space of imagination and engagement with 
the distant other.  If the viewer as a moral agent is in a relationship of 
appropriation with the media as resources for imagining and understanding the 
distant other, as Chapter 2 has argued, what the discussion here and the 
empirical analysis throughout the thesis has illustrated are the constraints and 
limitations of the viewers’ agency, as it is highly conditional on the media and 
their representational choices.  
7.2.4. Distant suffering and mediated cosmopolitanism 
The question of the construction of the moral agency of the viewer in relation to 
distant suffering has been contextualised in the first two chapters of this thesis 
in relation to the issue of cosmopolitanism, both as a “concern” and “willingness 
to engage with the Other” (Hannerz, 1990: 239) and a global imagined 
community based on shared mediated experiences (Urry, 2000).  
As a concern and moral engagement with the distant other, cosmopolitanism 
was illustrated in the audience discussions as instigated by particular images of 
sufferers, based on an assumption of sameness, differentially attached to 
different victims and ultimately fleeting and elusive (Chapters 4 and 5). With 
regard to mediated cosmopolitanism as a global imagined community, Chapter 
5 has illustrated how in remembering global disasters viewers position 
themselves, albeit momentarily, in a relation of community with fellow 
spectators around the world. However, this kind of cosmopolitan imagination, it 
was argued, misses the moral dimension of the connection of the viewer with 
the distant other. Finally, cosmopolitanism as a sense of global citizenship 
(Stevenson, 2002), as briefly addressed in Chapter 6, was in most cases 
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categorically defied by focus group participants on the basis of their limited 
sense of agency in the global public stage.  
It is useful to draw here upon Beck’s distinction between cosmopolitanism as a 
process and its actual acknowledgement and reflexive awareness. Beck calls the 
former “cosmopolitanisation” and the latter “the cosmopolitan outlook” (Beck, 
2006: 21). Cosmopolitanisation is the “latent…, unconscious…, passive 
cosmopolitanism” (Beck, 2006: 19, emphasis in the original) and it is largely an 
unintended effect of market decisions at the global level or of the 
acknowledgement of global risks, such as climate change or terrorism (Beck, 
2005: 249). The cosmopolitan outlook, on the other hand, refers to “the 
awareness” of this latent cosmopolitanism, “its self-conscious political 
affirmation, its reflection and recognition” (Beck, 2006: 21). The fact that we live 
in largely cosmopolitanised societies, Beck argues, does not necessarily mean 
that we automatically become cosmopolitans. Indeed, he warns against this 
“cosmopolitan fallacy” (Beck, 2006: 89), which equates cosmopolitanisation to 
cosmopolitan consciousness. What the latter requires is “dialogical imagination 
in everyday practice”, namely “situating and relativising one’s own form of life 
within other horizons of possibility” and seeing “oneself from the perspective of 
cultural others” (Beck, 2006: 89). How this transcendence from 
cosmopolitanisation to reflexive cosmopolitanism is taking place is, according to 
Beck, a crucial question open to empirical investigation (Beck, 2006: 89). 
Beck’s distinction is useful in thinking about the differences between watching 
suffering and feeling for the human being on the screen, on the one hand, and an 
actual cosmopolitan outlook, on the other hand. Media witnessing in itself does 
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not guarantee a reflexive cosmopolitan outlook. The construction of global 
memories of disasters in the practice of media remembering is also part of a 
broader cosmopolitanisation process. What comes closer to the transcendence 
from cosmopolitanisation as a habitual exposure to images of faraway others to 
reflexive cosmopolitanism, as dialogical imagination, is the example of the 
viewers’ reflexive engagement with the Turkish earthquake of 1999. It is their 
contemplation on how differences, natural, cultural and religious, are overcome 
in the face of human pain (section 5.3.) that is expressive of reflexive 
cosmopolitanism as both a universal concern to fellow human beings and a 
respect for difference (Appiah, 2007). In the case of the empirical exploration of 
this thesis, therefore, the viewers’ expression of a cosmopolitan outlook 
presupposed national recognition, both of the spectators as Greeks and the 
sufferers as Turks.  
7.3. Reflections on the research design and context 
The design and implementation of the research entailed a number of decisions 
which inevitably influenced and shaped the findings of the thesis. A major 
determining factor of the research was the context of its conduct. Chapter 3 
briefly introduced the news media environment in Greece illustrating some of 
the particularities of the media space within which Greek viewers are situated. 
At the same time, the empirical chapters have argued that audience practices in 
relation to distant suffering are often embedded in discursive frameworks 
particular to the Greek political and social culture, such as anti-Americanism 
(Calotychos, 2004), widespread celebrity culture (Plios, 2006; Tsaliki, 2010) or 
civic disengagement and a generalised rhetoric of powerlessness and mistrust 
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(Demertzis, 1994; 2008; Sutton, 2003; Stefanidis, 2007). This suggests that the 
findings of the present thesis are strongly embedded in the Greek national 
context within which the research was conducted. It seems safe to assume that 
similar research within a different national and cultural context might have 
pointed out different dimensions and particularities of the practices of audience 
witnessing and remembering. This also points towards the potential value of the 
introduction of a comparative perspective to the present study. The application 
of the analytical framework in a different cultural research context is sure to 
provide different insights and dimensions to the research, therefore rendering 
its conduct a desirable future direction.  
This is also a comment about the broader generalisability of the research. There 
is a danger in attempting grand claims about any kind of small-scale qualitative 
research but I am particularly conscious of the cultural relativity of my research 
as well as the limitations of its scope. However, the thesis has suggested an 
analytical framework that aims at advancing understanding of the 
particularities of the mediated experience of suffering and can be used to 
further the study of how Western spectators place themselves in relation to 
distant others.  
The choice of focus group discussions as the methodological route for gaining 
empirical insights and especially the use of discourse analysis for their 
exploration, justified at length in Chapter 3, also bear implications for the 
research findings. The decision to closely explore the discussions dictated a 
necessary trade-off between the depth of analysis and the number of focus 
groups analysed. The choice of another qualitative analytical method, such as 
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thematic analysis, might have allowed for the inclusion for more discussions in 
the analysis. However, as the interest of the thesis was on the careful study of 
language use (in terms of how and not only what is being said) in the 
construction of the viewer’s agency and given the attempt to secure a 
representativeness of participants, the choice of discourse analysis appeared to 
be the most effective.  
This close focus to audience discourses also left out of the research design an 
empirical exploration of the media content, in this case the television news 
coverage of the relevant disasters discussed by the focus groups. Although of 
course valuable in its own terms, such an investigation was not included in the 
present research study. This decision was taken on the basis of the interests of 
the research, which, as highlighted in Chapter 2, do not lie with the audience 
reception of specific media texts but in the ways viewers construct themselves 
as agents in the mediated public space. As already suggested, though, the media 
were not absent from the research. As symbolic forms and images (of 
catastrophe and suffering), as well as institutions (orchestrating and mediating 
humanitarian appeals) and parts of a broader cultural context (for example, 
through the promotion of celebrity culture), the media anchored the way people 
talked about and positioned themselves in relation to distant suffering. It was 
this appropriation of media discourses in people’s everyday talk beyond the 
moment of reception that was the interest of the research.  
Finally, the analytical separation between witnessing, remembering and action 
in the discussions and the decision to present the empirical material in three 
chapters exploring each of these dimensions respectively meant that these 
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analytical categories were further reified by the structure and presentation of 
the research. This choice, however, has been theoretically justified and 
defended in Chapter 2. These media practices were considered to be central in 
the mediated construction of the viewer as a moral agent. They were, therefore, 
chosen as the analytical foci of the exploration of the empirical material in order 
to best address the research questions of the thesis. This indisputably led the 
discussion towards certain paths and issues, while excluding others; 
nevertheless, it was judged that these were paths of the utmost significance for 
the interests and research purposes of the study.   
7.4. Future directions 
The dimensions left unexplored by the specific focus of the research, as 
presented in the previous section, open up space for further exploration. An 
obvious direction to move the research forward would be the application of the 
conceptual framework in another cultural and national context, as suggested 
above.  
Another important aspect of the mediation of distant suffering left out from this 
thesis is, of course, the study of media texts of distant suffering. Media 
witnessing, as discussed in Chapter 2, involves a triangle of communication, 
which includes – apart from the audiences studied here – the sufferers (as first 
order witnesses) and the journalists (second order witnesses) (Frosh and 
Pinchevski, 2009a).  Exploring media reports of distant suffering as witnessing 
texts opens up the space for a range of critical questions regarding the 
authorship and composition of the text, such as how stories of suffering are 
constructed as witnessing texts and what types of audience witnessing are 
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invited by the choices of representation (Ashuri and Pinchevski, 2009). 
Addressing media reports through the concept of media witnessing also places 
the focus on the moral implications of journalism in reporting the world. Such 
empirical questions have been hitherto addressed more or less directly by a 
small number of studies (Chouliaraki, 2006; 2010b; Cottle and Rai, 2008, Cottle, 
2009). The expansion and continuation of such empirical interests are an 
imperative in order to critically address questions of symbolic power in the 
media space.    
Media witnessing as a modality of audience experience has been explored in this 
thesis in relation to television. This choice, explained in Chapter 1, had mostly to 
do with the primacy of television as a news medium in the Greek context. 
Outside of this specific national context, however, and given a number of 
technological advances since the conduct of the research, the nature of media 
witnessing as primarily tied to the audiovisual characteristics of television is 
challenged. The primacy of user-generated content in the media coverage of 
September 11 and the Indian Ocean Tsunami and its implications for audience 
witnessing and remembering have been addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. With 
the explosion of social media, such as Twitter (Harb, 2011; Ghannam, 2011), 
and citizen journalism (Gillmor, 2006; Allan and Thorsen, 2009) media 
witnessing takes place in a “media saturated environment” that provides “an 
open and instantaneous online structure of information and action, 
unprecedented in disaster reporting” (Chouliaraki, 2010b: 309).  
There are two issues raised in this continuously changing media environment 
with regard to the concept of media witnessing as approached and analysed in 
  
337 
this thesis. The first issue concerns the potential collapse of the communicative 
triangle of media witnessing consisting of the audience, the journalists and the 
sufferers, as audiences can now report the world as they see it through the use 
of social media, challenging the “authorship” of the mediators of media 
witnessing, the journalists (Ashuri and Pinchevski, 2009: 145). This in its turn 
poses further questions of authenticity and trust in user-generated content as a 
news source of secondary witnessing. The second issue concerns the moral 
implications for the audience of living in a media saturated, real-time news 
environment, which places audiences in a position of possible constant vigilance 
of the outside world, and renders the distant other a virtually constant presence 
in the media space. Both issues open up significant questions for future 
empirical research.   
An important theme that emerged from the empirical exploration of the focus 
group discussions and was addressed both in Chapter 6 and earlier in this 
chapter was the mediated conditions of action at a distant, as described by the 
participants in the research. Telethons were illustrated as a self-referential 
media space connecting viewers to each other, as part of the media spectacle. 
The ideological functions of the telethon have been critically addressed by a 
number of studies (Devereux, 1996; Tester, 2001; Driessens et al., 2011). In the 
light of the findings of this study and the ambivalent relationship between 
audiences and the telethon, which, on the one hand, was portrayed as the main 
motivation to act upon distant suffering, and, on the other hand, was the object 
of criticisms and viewers’ mistrust, more critical empirical explorations of the 
telethon as a media genre are a useful future direction of research. Questions of 
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both the construction of the spectacle of the telethon and the spaces it opens for 
viewers’ engagement, as well as audience responses to telethons are questions 
that need to be further explored. Closely related to this, the role of celebrities in 
humanitarian appeals, an object of theoretical debates with regard to the moral 
and ideological implications of celebrity endorsement of humanitarian appeals, 
was briefly addressed in this thesis, opening up more questions for empirical 
exploration. It was argued in Chapter 6 that although celebrities do indeed 
attract audience attention to televised appeals, they are also critically 
approached by audience members on the basis of the differential social status 
between them and the celebrities. The implications of the use of celebrities by 
humanitarian appeals, despite the relevant theoretical arguments, is an 
empirical area of study that remains largely untested.  
While this thesis was being written a number of large-scale disasters took place. 
An earthquake of 7.0 magnitude in Haiti on the 12th of January 2010 claimed the 
lives of more than 200,000 people and was rendered one of the deadliest ones 
in history33. May of 2008 was marked by the great earthquake of Sichuan, China, 
where almost seventy thousand people died and about five million people were 
left homeless34. Under the light of the research findings of this thesis a number 
of questions arise: what spaces of witnessing did these disasters create for the 
viewer, given the context of their occurrence – Haiti being a country often 
suffering from political conflicts and natural disasters and China being the most 
                                                        
33 Source: BBC News| Special Reports| Haiti Earthquake 
 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/americas/2010/haiti_earthquake/default.stm ) 
34 Source: BBC News| Special Reports| 2008| China quake 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/asia_pacific/2008/china_quake/default.stm ) 
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populated state and one of the world’s financial powers? These questions 
become even more relevant in the case of the Haiti earthquake, given that the 
media coverage of the disaster differed from the mainstream templates for 
reporting earthquakes focusing on the raw images of trauma and bloody victims 
(Fernando, 2010). Albeit belonging to the category of “banal” disasters of 
earthquakes, as constructed by viewers through the practice of media 
remembering, both events were extensively broadcast by the media, which 
poses further questions about their place and framing in audience memory.  
More recently, the earthquake that struck Japan on the 11th of March 2011 and 
the tsunami that followed it hitting the area of the pacific coast of Tohoku, 
killing more than 15,000 people, has given rise to extensive public debates and 
media coverage that is still ongoing35. The disaster was unique in its nature, 
since not only did it devastate local populations and areas but, hitting nuclear 
factories and releasing nuclear power into the atmosphere, it also spread 
widespread panic about its environmental consequences. It was therefore not 
just the degree of suffering caused but also the scale of the concomitant risk 
involved that rendered the Japan tsunami a global disaster. In terms of human 
suffering, reports on the affected areas became the centre of organised relief 
efforts around the world. As far as its consequences in terms of the nuclear fears 
that followed, the disaster exemplifies, if only momentarily, the conditions of 
living in a “world risk society” (Beck, 1992)36. This renders the disaster an 
                                                        
35 Source: BBC News – Japan Earthquake 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12711226 ) 
36 Beck uses the term “risk society” to refer to the whole series of interrelated changes, such as 
environmental and health risks, social insecurity and erosion of traditional modes of life, which 
were produced as the collective outcome of choices of modern societies and have altered the 
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extraordinary event, worthy of academic attention both in its reporting by the 
media, in terms of its construction as a global event and its characteristics, and 
its experience by global audiences, as a significant case of distant suffering and 
with regard to the global risk it entailed. In particular, it poses the question of 
how the inclusion of proximate risk in the spectacle of distant suffering 
positions the viewer as a witness, challenging or increasing the number of types 
of media witnessing illustrated in this thesis. With regard to the practice of 
media remembering, it furthermore poses the question of how the Japan 
tsunami will be remembered by audiences. Will the term “the Tsunami” keep 
describing exclusively the South Asian disaster of 2004 in media remembering? 
Will the Japan tsunami be rendered as iconic in audience collective memory? Or 
is the occurrence of a second significant tsunami rendering the disaster as banal 
as other categories of events, such as earthquakes, and thus not as memorable? 
These questions, as the present thesis has illustrated, are instrumental in the 
viewer’s construction of moral agency with regard to the suffering witnessed.  
Such questions will keep being raised for media scholars, as the world comes to 
witness more crises and trauma. These are important questions as our existence 
is increasingly interlinked with, dependent on and imagined within the global. 
They are also critical, as they open up the discussion of how the media can 
better facilitate and support our co-existence with the distant other. The 
present thesis has contributed in this debate by contextualizing these questions 
with regard to the moral implications for the viewer’s agency of watching the 
                                                                                                                                                             
nature of everyday experience in a way that links every decision with potential risk. Risks in 
that context are defined as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities” (Beck, 
1992: 21). 
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suffering of distant others, and by providing an analytical framework for the 
study of this agency. It has argued that, although viewers engage with the 
distant other in diverse ways and draw upon alternative discursive frameworks, 
local, political and cultural, in order to make sense of the suffering witnessed, 
their moral agency is highly conditional on the media and their representational 
practices. In this context, and as the global mediated space becomes even more 
complex and ubiquitous, and as the presences of distant others multiply in the 
mediated space of appearance, questions on the mediation of distant suffering 
continue to comprise a rich and pertinent field for empirical enquiry.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
342 
References 
 
Abercrombie, N. and Longhurst, B. (1998). Audiences: A Sociological Theory of 
Performance and Imagination. London: Sage.  
 
Achugar, M. (2008). What we Remember: The Construction of Memory in Military 
Discourse. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.  
 
Adams, W. C. (1986). “Whose Lives Count? TV Coverage of Natural Disasters”. In 
Journal of Communication, 36(2): 113-122.  
 
Adler, P. A. and Adler, P. (2002). ‘The Reluctant Respondent’. In Gubrium, J. F. 
and Holstein, J. A. (Eds.), Handbook of Interviewing Research: Context and 
Method. Pp. 515-536. London: Sage.  
 
Alasuutari, P. (Ed.) (1999). Rethinking the Media Audience: The New Agenda. 
London: Sage.  
 
Albrow, M. (1996). The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Allan, S. and Thorsen, E. (Eds.) (2009). Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives. 
New York: Peter Lang.  
  
Allor, M. (1996). “The Politics of Producing Audiences”. In Hay, J., Grossberg, L., 
and Wartella, E. (Eds.), The Audience and its Landscape, pp. 188-208. Boulder, 
Colorado: WestviewPress. 
 
Anderson, B. (1989). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.  
 
Ang, I. (1990). Desperately Seeking the Audience. London: Routledge.  
 
Ang, I. (1996). Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern 
World. London: Routledge. 
 
Appadurai, A. (1990). ‘Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural 
Economy’. In Public Culture, 2(3): 1-23.  
 
Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation. 
Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press. 
 
Appadurai, A. (2002). ‘The Right to Participate in the Work of the Imagination” 
(Interview to Arjen Mulder). In Brower, J., Brookman, P. and Mulder, A., 
TransUrbanism, pp. 33-46. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers. On-line source: 
http://www.appadurai.com/pdf/transurbanism.pdf  
Page accessed: 06/06/2005.  
 
  
343 
Appiah, A. K. (2007). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York 
and London: W.W. Norton.  
 
Appiah, A. K. (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Arendt, H. (1968). Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. 
New York: Penguin Books.  
 
Arendt, H. ([1963]1990). On Revolution. London: Penguin.  
 
Arendt, H. (1994). Essays in Understanding. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
 
Archibugi, D. (Ed.) (2003). Debating Cosmopolitics. London and New York: 
Verso.  
 
Ashuri, T. and Pinchevski, A. (2009). Witnessing as a Field. In In Frosh, P. and 
Pinchevski, A. (Eds.), Media Witnessing: Testimony in the Age of Mass 
Communication. pp. 133-157. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave and McMillan.  
 
Babiniotis, G. (1995). “The Blending of Tradition and Innovation in Modern 
Greek Culture”. In Constas, D. and Stavrou, T. G. (Eds.), Greece Prepares for the 
Twenty-first Century, pp. 223-252. Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press.  
Barber, B. R. (1996). “Constitutional Faith”. In Nussbaum, M. C., For the Love of 
Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Martha Nussbaum with Respondents. 
Boston: Beacon Press.  
Barnett, M. and Weiss, T. G. (2008). Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, 
Ethics. New York: Cornell University Press.   
 
Baudrillard, J. (1983). Simulations. New York: Semiotext(e).  
 
Baudrillard, J. (1994). The Illusion of the End. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Baudrillard, J. (1995). The Gulf War did not Take Place. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.  
 
Bauman, Z. (1993). Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage.  
 
Beck, U. (1994). “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive 
Modernization”. In Beck, U., Giddens, A., Lash, S., Reflexive Modernisation: 
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.  
 
Beck, U. (2002). “The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies”. In Theory, Culture 
& Society, 19(1-2): 17-44.  
  
344 
 
Beck, U. (2004). “The Truth of Others: a Cosmopolitan Approach”. In Common 
Knowledge, 10 (3): 430-449. 
 
Beck, U. (2005). ‘Cosmopolitanization – now!” (Interview to Terhi Rantanen). In 
Global Media and Communication, 1(3): 247-263.  
 
Beck, U. (2006). The Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
  
Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive Modernisation: Politics, 
Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Beck, U. and Sznaider, N. (2006). ‘Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social 
Sciences: A Research Agenda’. In The British Journal of Sociology, 57(1): 1-23.   
 
Bennett, T. (1996). “Figuring Audiences and Readers”. In Hay, J., Grossberg, L., 
and Wartella, E. (Eds.), The Audience and its Landscape, pp. 145-159. Boulder, 
Colorado: WestviewPress. 
  
Bethnall, J. (1993). Disasters, Relief and the Media. London: Tauris Books.  
 
Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social 
Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Billig, M. (1988). Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking. 
London: Sage.  
 
Billig, M. (1991). Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology. 
London: Sage.   
 
Billig, M. (1992). Talking about the Royal Family. London: Routledge.  
 
Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.  
 
Billig, M. (2009). “Psychologie Discursive, Rhétorique et la Question de 
l’Agentivité”. In Semen, 27: 157-184. 
 
Bird, S. E. (2003). The Audience in Everyday Life: Living in a Media World. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Bird, S. E. (2010). “News Practices in Everyday Life: Beyond Audience 
Response”. In Allan, St. (Ed.). The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism, 
pp. 417-427. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Bird, S. E. (2011). “Seeking the Audience for News: Response, News Talk, and 
Everyday Practices”. In Nightingale, V. (Ed.), The Handbook of Media Audiences, 
pp. 489-508. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
  
345 
Bloor, M., Frankland, J., Thomas, M., Robson, K. (2001). Focus Groups in Social 
Research. London: Sage.  
 
Boltanski, L. (1999). Distant Suffering. Politics, Morality and the Media. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Bourdieu, P. and Nice, R. (2006). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Boyd-Barrett, O. and Rantanen, T. (Eds.) (1998). The Globalisation of News. 
London: Sage.  
 
Boyer, P. (1985). “Famine in Ethiopia”. In Washington Journalism Review, 7(1): 
18-21.  
 
Braine, T. (2006). “Was 2005 the Year of Natural Disasters?”. In Bulletin of the 
World Health Organisation, 84(1): 4-6.  
 
Brewer, M. B. (2000). ‘Research Design and Issues of Validity’. In Reis, H. T. and 
Judd, C. M. (Eds.), Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality 
Psychology. Pp. 3-16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Briggs, C. L. (1986). Learning How to Ask: A Sociolinguistic Appraisal of the Role 
of the Interview in Social Science Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Briggs, C. L. (2002). ‘Interviewing, Power/Knowledge, and Social Inequality’. In 
Gubrium, J. F. & Holstein, J. A. (eds.). Handbook of Interviewing  Research: Context 
and Method. Pp. 911-922. London: Sage.  
 
Brooks, R., Lewis, J., Mosdell, N., and Threadgold, T. (2003). Embeds or In-beds? 
The Media Coverage of the War in Iraq. Report Commissioned for the BBC. 
Cardiff: Cardiff School of Journalism.   
 
Brown, K. S. and Hamilakis, Y. (Eds.) (2003). Usable Pasts: Greek Metahistories. 
Maryland: Lexington Books.  
 
Burgess, J., Harrison, C., and Maiteny, P. (1991). ‘Contested Meanings: The 
Consumption of News About Nature Conservation’. In Media, Culture & Society, 
13(3): 499-519.   
Burr, V. (1995). An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: Sage.  
  
346 
Butler, J. (2004). Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: 
Verso.  
 
Butler, J. (2009). Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? London, New York: 
Verso.  
Calhoun, C. (1997). Nationalism. Buckingham: Open University Press.  
Calhoun, C. (2003). “‘Belonging’ in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary”. In Ethnicities, 
3(4): 531-568.  
Calhoun, C. (2007). Nations Matter: Citizenship, Solidarity and the Cosmopolitan 
Dream. London: Routledge.  
 
Calotychos, V. (2004). ‘The Beekeeper, the Icon Painter, Family and Friends: 
“November 17” and the End of Greek History’. In Ross, A. and Ross, K. (Eds.), 
Anti-Americanism. Pp. 179-195. New York and London: New York University 
Press.   
 
Cappella, J. N. and Jamieson, K. H. (1997). Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the 
Public Good. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
CARMA (2006). The CARMA Report on Western Media Coverage of Humanitarian 
Disasters. CARMA, European Office. Available at: http://www.imaging-
famine.org/images/pdfs/carma_%20report.pdf Page last accessed: August 
2011.  
 
Chaney, D. (2002). ‘Cosmopolitan Art and Cultural Citizenship’. In Theory, 
Culture & Society, 19 (1-2): 157 – 174.  
 
Chang, T., Shoemaker, P., & Brendlinger, N. (1987). “Determinants of 
international news coverage in the U.S. media”. In Communication Research, 14: 
396–414. 
 
Chock, P. P. (1986). ‘Irony and Ethnography: On Cultural Analysis of One’s Own 
Culture’. In Anthropological Quarterly, 59(1): 87-96.  
 
Chondroleou, G. (2004). “Public Images and Private Lives: The Greek 
Experience”. In Parliamentary Affairs. 57 (1): 53-66. 
 
Chouliaraki, L. (2005). “Spectacular Ethics. On the Television Footage of the Iraq 
War”. In The Journal of Language and Politics, 4(1): 143-159.  
 
Chouliaraki, L. (2006). The Spectatorship of Suffering. London: Sage.  
 
Chouliaraki, L. (2007). ‘Mediation, Text and Action’. In Bhatia, B., Flowerdew, J. 
and Johnson, R. (Eds.), Advances in Discourse Studies. Pp. 211-227. London: 
Routledge.  
 
  
347 
Chouliaraki, L. (2008). “Symbolic Power of Transnational Media: Managing the 
Visibility of Suffering”. In Global Media and Communication, 4 (3): 329-351. 
 
Chouliaraki, L. (2010a). “Post-humanitarianism: Humanitarian Communication: 
Beyond a Politics of Pity”. In International Journal of Cultural Studies, 13(1): 
107-126.  
 
Chouliaraki, L. (2010b). “Ordinary Witnessing in Post-Television News: 
Towards a New Moral Imagination”. In Critical Discourse Studies, 7(4): 305-319. 
 
Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. (1999). Discourse in Late Modernity: 
Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Connerton, P. (2008). “Seven Types of Forgetting”. In Memory Studies, 1(1): 59-
71.  
 
Cohen, S. (2001). States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Cohen, S. and Seu, B. (2002) “Knowing Enough not to Feel too Much: Emotional 
Thinking about Human Rights Appeals”. In, Mark, B. and Patrice, P. (Eds.) Truth 
Claims: Representations and Human Rights, pp. 187-204. Rutgers University 
Press, New Brunswick. 
 
Cottle, S. (2006). “Mediatized Rituals: Beyond Manufacturing Consent”. In Media, 
Culture & Society, 28(3): 411-432.  
 
Cottle, S. (2009). Global Crises Reporting: Journalism in the Global Age. Berkshire: 
Open University Press.  
 
Cottle, S. (2007) and Nolan, D. (2007). ‘Global Humanitarianism and the 
Changing Aid-Media Field: Everyone Was Dying for Footage’. In Journalism 
Studies, 8(6): 862–78. 
 
Cottle, S. and Rai, M. (2008). “Global 24/7 News Providers: Emissaries of Global 
Dominance or Global Public Sphere?”. In Global Media and Communication, 4(2): 
157-181.   
 
Couldry, N. (2000). The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the 
Media Age. London: Routledge.  
Couldry, N. (2002). Media Rituals: A Critical Approach. London: Routledge.  
Couldry, N. (2004). “Theorising Media as Practice”. In Social Semiotics, 14(2): 
115-132. 
 
Couldry, N. (2005). “The Extended Audience: Scanning the Horizon”. In Gillespie, 
M. (Ed.), Media Audiences, pp. 183-222. Maidenhead: Open University Press.   
 
  
348 
Couldry, N. (2006). Listening Beyond the Echoes: Media, Ethics, and Agency in an 
Uncertain World. Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers.  
 
Couldry, N. (2012). Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media 
Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Couldry, N., Hepp, A. and Krotz, F. (2010). “Introduction”. In Couldry, N., Hepp, A. 
and Krotz, F. (Eds.), Media Events in a Global Age, pp. 1-20. New York: Routledge.   
 
Couldry, N. and McCarthy, A. (Eds.) (2003a). Mediaspace: Place, Scale and 
Culture in a Media Age. London: Routledge.  
 
Couldry, N. and McCarthy, A. (2003b). “Introduction. Orientations: Mapping the 
MediaSpace”. In Couldry, N. and McCarthy, A. (Eds.), Mediaspace: Place, Scale 
and Culture in a Media Age. Pp. 1-18. London: Routledge.  
 
Couldry, N., Livingstone, S. and Markham, T. (2007). Media Consumption and 
Public Engagement: Beyond the Presumption of Attention. London: Palgrave.  
 
Danopoulos, C. (2004). “Religion, Civil Society and Democracy in Orthodox 
Greece”. In Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 6(1): 41-55.  
 
Dayan, D. (2005). “Mothers, Midwives and Abortionists: Genealogy, Obstetrics, 
Audiences and Publics”. In Livingstone, S. (Ed.), Audiences and Publics: When 
Cultural Engagement Matters for the Public Sphere, pp. 43-75. Bristol and 
Portland: Intellect.   
Dayan, D. (2007). “On Morality, Distance and the Other: Roger Silverstone’s 
Media and Morality”. In International Journal of Communication, 1: 113-122.  
 
Dayan, D. & Katz, E. (1992). Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  
 
Delanty, G. (2006). “The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism 
and Social Theory”. In The British Journal of Sociology, 57(1): 25-47.  
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Demertzis, N. (1994). “Introduction to the Greek Political Culture: Theoretical 
and Empirical Issues”. In Demertzis, N. (Ed.), Greek Political Culture Today, pp. 7-
39, (in Greek). Athens: Ekdoseis Odysseas.  
 
Demertzis, N. (2008). “Cynical Democracy” (in Greek). Paper presented at the 8th 
Greek Association of Political Science Conference, The Turn in Democratic 
Function: Challenges and Threats in Early 21st Century. Athens, Greece. 
 
  
349 
Demertzis, N., Davou, B., Christakis, N., Stavrakakis, G., Armenakis, A., 
Boumbaris, N. and Georgarakis, N. (2008). Juvenescence: The Non-Standardised 
Factor (in Greek). Athens: Polytropon Publications.  
 
Denzin, N. K. (1989). Interpretive Interactionism. Newbury Park, California: Sage.  
 
Department for International Development (2000). Viewing the World: A Study 
of British Television Coverage of Developing Countries. London: DFID. Web site: 
www.dfid.gov.uk  
 
Derrida, J. (2000). Of Hospitality. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Derrida, J. (2005). On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. New York: Routledge. 
 
Devereux, E. (1996). “Good Causes, God’s Poor and Telethon Television”. In 
Media, Culture & Society, 18(1): 47-68.  
 
Diamandouros, N. (1993). ‘Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An 
Interpretation’. In Clogg, R. (Ed.), Greece, 1981-1989. The Populist Decade. Pp. 1-
25. London: Macmillan.  
 
Dogra, N. (2006). “‘Reading NGOs Visually’ – Implications of Visual Images for 
NGO Management”. In Journal of International Development, 19(2): 161-171.  
 
Driessens, O., Joye, S., and Biltereyst, D. (2011). “Help Haiti: Celebrities and 
Fundraising Shows. A Critical Analysis of Celebrities' Role in Dutch and Flemish 
Charity Shows”. Paper presented at the conference Cosmopolitanism, Media and 
Global Crisis, London, 4 June 2011. 
 
Edmunds, J. and Turner, B. S. (2005). ‘Global Generations: Social Change in the 
Twentieth Century’. In The British Journal of Sociology, 56(4): 559-577.  
 
Edwards, D. (1997). Discourse and Cognition. London: Sage.  
 
Edwards, D. and Potter, J. (1992). Discursive Psychology. London: Sage.  
 
Edwards, D. and Stokoe, E.H. (2004). “Discursive Psychology, Focus Group 
Interviews, and Participants' Categories”. In British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 22(4): 499-507. 
Eisenstein, E. L. (1979). The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: 
Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern-Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ellis, J. (2000). Seeing Things. Television in the Age of Uncertainty. London: I.B. Tauris.  
 
Ellis, J. (2009). ‘Mundane Witness’. In Frosh, P. and Pinchevski, A. (Eds.), Media 
Witnessing: Testimony in the Age of Mass Communication. pp. 73-88. Hampshire 
and New York: Palgrave and McMillan. 
  
350 
 
Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. (1998). “What is Agency?”. In American Journal of 
Sociology, 103(4): 962-1023.  
 
Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Fairclough, N. (1995). Media Discourse. London, New York: E, Arnold.  
 
Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Fern, E. F. (2001). Advanced Focus Group Research. London: Sage. 
 
Fernando, J. (2010). “Media in Disaster vs. Media Disasters”. In Anthropology 
News, 51(4): 4. 
 
Finch, H. and Lewis, J. (2003). ‘Focus Groups’. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (Eds.), 
Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers. Pp. 170-198. London: Sage.  
 
Fine, R. (2007). Cosmopolitanism. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Fine, R. (2008). “Judgment and the Reification of the Faculties: A Reconstructive 
Reading of Arendt’s Life of the Mind”. In Philosophy and Social Criticism, 34(1-2): 
157-176.  
 
Fiske, J. (1987). Television Culture. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 
 
Foucault, M. (1997). “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of the Work in 
Progress”. In Rabinow, P. (Ed.), Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. The Essential 
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 1. New York: The New Press.  
 
Franks, S. (2006). “The CARMA Report: Western Media Coverage of 
Humanitarian Disasters”. In The Political Quarterly, 77(2): 281-284.  
 
Frosh, P. (2006). ‘Telling Presences: Witnessing, Mass Media, and the Imagined 
Lives of Strangers’. In Critical Studies in Media Communication, 23(4): 265-284.  
 
Frosh, P. (2011). “Phatic Morality: Television and Proper Distance”. In 
International Journal of Cultural Studies, 14(4): 383-400.  
 
Frosh, P. and Pinchevski, A. (Eds.) (2009a). Media Witnessing: Testimony in the 
Age of Mass Communication. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave and McMillan.  
 
Frosh, P. and Pinchevski, A. (2009b). ‘Introduction: Why Media Witnessing? 
Why Now?’. In Frosh, P. and Pinchevski, A. (Eds.), Media Witnessing: Testimony 
  
351 
in the Age of Mass Communication. pp. 1-19. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave 
and McMillan.  
 
Galtung, J. and Ruge, M. H. (1965). “The Structure of Foreign News: The 
Presentation of Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers”. 
In Journal of Peace Research, 2(1): 64-91.  
 
Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Gans, H. J. (1980). Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC 
Nightly News, Newsweek and Time. London: Constable.  
 
Gaskell, G. (2000). ‘Individual and Group Interviewing’. In Bauer, M.W. and 
Gaskell, G. (Eds.). Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A 
Practical Handbook. Pp. 38-56. London: Sage.  
 
Gaskell, G. and Bauer, M. W. (2000). ‘Towards Public Accountability: beyond 
Sampling, Reliability and Validity’. In Bauer, M.W. and Gaskell, G. (eds.). 
Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook. pp. 
336-350. London: Sage.  
 
Geertz, C. (2000). Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical 
Topics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Ghannam, J. (2011). Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings 
of 2011. A Report to the Centre for International Media Assistance. Washington: 
CIMA.  
 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.  
 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.  
 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Gill, R. (2000). ‘Discourse Analysis’. In Bauer, M.W. and Gaskell, G. (Eds.), 
Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook. Pp. 
172-190. London: Sage.  
 
Gillespie, M. (2005). “Television Drama and Audience Ethnography”. In Gillespie, 
M. (Ed.), Media Audiences, pp. 137-182. Maidenhead: Open University Press.   
 
Gillespie, M. (2006). “Transnational Television Audiences After September 11”. 
In Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(6): 903-921.  
 
Gilligan, C. (1993). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
  
352 
 
Gillmor, D. (2006). We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the 
People. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly.  
 
Gitlin, T. (1980). The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & 
Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley and London: University of California Press.  
 
Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A. L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies of Qualitative Research. Hawthorne: N. Y.: Aldine de Gruyter.  
 
Graber, D. A. (1990). “Seeing is Remembering: How Visuals Contribute to 
Learning from Television News”. In Journal of Communication, 40(3): 134-156. 
 
Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Massachusetts: MIT Press.  
 
Haes, J. W. H. (2002). ‘Catching the Wave: German Media on September 11’. 
Prometheus, 20(3): 277-280.  
 
Hafez, K. (2007). The Myth of Media Globalisation. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Halbwachs, M. (1992). On Collective Memory. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Hall, S. ([1973] 1980). ‘Encoding/decoding’. In Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (Ed.), Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural 
Studies, 1972-79. pp. 128-38. London: Hutchinson.  
 
Hall, S. (1992) ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’. In Hall, S. and 
Gieben, B. (Eds.), Formations of Modernity, pp. 275-331. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Hall, S. (2002). ‘Political Belonging in a World of Multiple Identities’. In Vertovec, 
S. and Cohen, R. (Eds.). Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, Practice. 
pp. 25-31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hallin, D. C., Papathanassopoulos, St. (2002). “Political Clientelism and the 
Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective”. In 
Media, Culture & Society. 24: 175-195. 
 
Hannerz, U. (1990). ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture’. In 
Featherstone, M. (ed.) Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity, 
pp. 237-252. London: Sage.  
 
Harb, Z. (2011). “Arab Revolutions and the Social Media Effect”. In M/C Journal, 
14(2).  
 
Harré, R. (1998). The Singular Self: An Introduction to the Psychology of 
Personhood. London: Sage.  
 
  
353 
Harrison, P. and Palmer, R. H. (1986). News out of Africa: From Biafra to Band 
Aid. London: Shipman.  
 
Hartley, J. (2010). “Silly Citizenship”. In Critical Discourse Studies, 7(4): 233-248.  
Hatziprokopiou, P. (2003). “Albanian Immigrants in Thessaloniki, Greece: 
Processes of Economic and Social Incorporation”. In Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 29(6): 1033-1057.  
 
Held, D. (2010). Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Herzfeld, M. (1997). Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. New 
York and London: Routledge.  
 
Höijer, B. (2004) ‘The Discourse of Global Compassion: the Audience and the 
Media Reporting of Human Suffering’. In Media, Culture & Society, 26(4): 513-
531. 
 
Holstein, J. A. and Gubrium, J. F. (2000). The Self we Live by: Narrative Identity in 
a Postmodern World. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Howarth, D. (2000). Discourse. Buckingham, Philadelpia: Open University Press.  
 
Ignatieff, M. (1998). The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern 
Conscience. London: Chatto and Windus.  
 
Illouz, E. (2007). Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Innis, H. A. (1951). The Bias of Communication. Toronto: Oxford University 
Press.  
Irwing-Zarecka, I. (1994). Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective 
Memory. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. 
Jenkins, H. (2006). Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. New 
York: New York University Press.  
Jensen, K. B. (1986). Making Sense of the News: Towards a Theory and an 
Empirical Model of Reception for the Study of Mass Communication. Denmark: 
Aarhus University Press. 
 
Johnson, J. M. (2002). In-depth interviewing’. In Gubrium, J. F. & Holstein, J. A. 
(eds.). Handbook of Interviewing Research: Context and Method. Pp. 103-120. 
London: Sage.  
Jones, J. (2006). “A Cultural Approach to the Study of Mediated Citizenship”. In 
Social Semiotics, 16(2): 365-383.  
  
354 
Jørgensen, M., W. and Phillips, L., J. (2002). Discourse Analysis as Theory and 
Method. London: Sage.  
 
Joye, S. (2009). “The Hierarchy of Global Suffering: A Critical Discourse Analysis 
of Television News Reporting on Foreign Natural Disasters”. In The Journal of 
International Communication, 15(2): 45-61. 
 
Kafetzis, P. “Political Crisis and Political Culture. Civic Disengagement and 
Political Involvement. An Incompatible Relation?”. In In Demertzis, N. (Ed.), 
Greek Political Culture Today, pp. 217-252, (in Greek). Athens: Ekdoseis 
Odysseas. 
 
Katz, E. and Liebes, T. (2007). “‘No More Peace!’ How Disaster, Terror and War 
have Upstaged Media Events”. In International Journal of Communication, 1(2), 
157-166. 
 
Katzenstein, P. J. and Keohane, R.O. (2007). Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. 
Ithaka: Cornell University Press.  
 
Kellner, D. (2003a). Media Spectacle. London: Routledge.  
 
Kellner, D. (2003b). “September 11, Spectacles of Terror and Media 
Manipulation: A Critique of Jihadist and Bush Media Politics”. In Logos, 2(1): 86-
102.  
 
Kelman, I. (2011). Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters Affect Peace and Conflict. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Kennedy, D. (2009) "Selling the Distant Other: Humanitarianism and Imagery? 
EthicalDilemmas of Humanitarian Action." In Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance, 28.  
 
Ker-Lindsay, J. (2000). “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of Disaster 
Diplomacy?”. In Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 14(1): 215 — 232. 
 
Kitzinger, J. (1994). ‘The methodology of Focus Groups: the Importance of 
Interaction between Research Participants’. In Sociology of Health and Illness, 
16(1): 103 – 121.  
 
Kitzinger, J. (1995). ‘Qualitative Research: Introducing Focus Groups’. In British 
Medical Journal, 311 (2): 299 – 302.  
 
Kitzinger, J. (2000). “Media Templates: Patterns of Association and the 
(Re)Construction of Meaning over Time”. In Media, Culture & Society, 22(1), 61-
84.  
 
Kivikuru, U. (2006). ‘Tsunami Communication in Finland: Revealing Tensions in 
the Sender-Receiver Relationship’. In European Journal of Communication, 
21(4): 499-520.  
  
355 
 
Kivikuru, U. and Nord, L. (2009). After the Tsunami: Crisis Communication in 
Finland and Sweden. Goteborg: Nordicom.  
 
Krueger, R. A. (1994). Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. (2nd 
edition). London: Sage.  
 
Krzyżanowski, M. and Wodak, R. (2007). “Multiple Identities, Migration and 
Belonging: "Voices of Migrants"”. In Caldas-Coulthard. C.R. and Iedema, R. (Eds.), 
Critical Discourse and Contested Identities, pp. 95-119. Basingstoke , UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Kumar, K. J., Hug, T. and Rusch, G. (2006). “Construction of Memory”. In 
Volkmer, I. (Ed.), News in Public Memory: An International Study of Media 
Memories Across Generations. pp. 211-224. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.  
 
Kyriakidou, M. (2008) “Rethinking Media Events in the Context of a Global 
Public Sphere: Exploring the Audience of Global Disasters”. In Communications: 
The European Journal of Communication Research, 3(33): 273-291.  
 
Lasch, C. (1980). The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of 
Diminishing Expectations. London: W.W. Norton. 
 
Leandros, N. (2010). “Media Concentration and Systemic Failures in Greece”. In 
International Journal of Communication, 4: 886-905.  
 
Leavy, P. (2007). Iconic Events: Media, Politics, and Power in Retelling History. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
 
Levy, D. and Sznaider, N. (2002). “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the 
Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory”. In European Journal of Social Theory, 5(1): 
87-106.   
 
Lewis, J. (2004). “Television, Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: The Case of 
Britain”. In International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 16(3): 295-310.  
 
Lidchitt, H. (1999). “Finding the Right Image: British Development NGOs and the 
Regulation of Imagery”. In Skelton, T. and Alled, T. (Eds.), Culture and Global 
Change, pp. 88-104. London: Routledge.  
 
Liebes, T. (1998). “Television Disaster Marathons: A Danger for Democratic 
Processes?”. In T. Liebes, and  J. Curran, (Eds.), Media, Ritual and Identity. pp. 71-
85.  London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Liebes, T. and Katz, E. (1990). The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Meanings of 
Dallas. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
  
356 
Lipovac, T. (1994). “The Double Greek Identity and the Problem of Nationalism”. 
In In Demertzis, N. (Ed.), Greek Political Culture Today, pp. 115-132, (in Greek). 
Athens: Ekdoseis Odysseas. 
 
Littler, J. (2008). “‘I feel your pain’: Cosmopolitan Charity and the Public 
Fashioning of the Celebrity Soul”. In Social Semiotics, 18(2): 237-251.  
 
Live Aid, (1985). Live Aid. The Concert Programme. London.  
 
Livingston, S. and van Belle, D. A. (2005). “The Effects of New Satellite 
Newsgathering Technology on News Gathering from Remote Locations”. In 
Political Communication, 22(1): 45-62.  
 
Livingstone, S. (1993). “The Rise and Fall of Audience Research: An Old Story 
with a New Ending”. In Journal of Communication, 43(4): 5-12.  
 
Livingstone, S. M. (1998). Making Sense of Television: The Psychology of Audience 
Interpretation. Oxford: Pergamon.  
Livingstone, S. (2005). “On the Relation between Audiences and Publics”. In 
Livingstone, S. (Ed.), Audiences and Publics: When Cultural Engagement Matters 
for the Public Sphere, pp. 17-41. Bristol and Portland: Intellect.   
Livingstone, S. (2009), “On the Mediation of Everything: ICA Presidential 
Address 2008”. In Journal of Communication, 59(1): 1–18. 
 
Livingstone, S. M. and Lunt, P. K. (1994). Talk on Television: The Critical 
Reception of Audience Discussion Programmes. London: Routledge.  
 
Lunt, P.K. and Livingstone, S.M. (1996). ‘Rethinking the Focus Group in Media 
and Communication Research’. In Journal of Communication, 46(2): 79-98.  
 
Lutz, C.A. and Abu-Lughod, L. (1990). Language and the Politics of Emotion. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Macdonald, M. (2003). Exploring Media Discourse. London: Arnold.  
 
Madianou, M. (2005a). Mediating the Nation: News, Audiences and the Politics of 
Identity. London: UCL Press.  
Madianou, M. (2005b). “The Elusive Public of Television News.” In Livingstone, 
S. (Ed.), Audiences and Publics: When Cultural Engagement Matters for the Public 
Sphere, pp. 99-114. Bristol and Portland: Intellect.   
Madianou, M. (2007). ‘Shifting Discourses: Banal Nationalism and Cultural 
Intimacy in Greek Television News and Everyday Life’. In Mole, R. C. (Ed.), 
Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics. London: Palgrave.   
  
357 
Madianou, M. (2008). “Audience Reception and News in Everyday Life”. In Walf-
Jorgensen, K. and Hanitzsch, T. (Eds.), The Handbook of Journalism Studies. New 
York: Routledge.  
Madianou, M. (2010). “Living with News: Ethnographies of News Consumption. 
In Allan, St. (Ed.), The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism, pp. 428-
438. London and New York: Routledge. 
Malcomson, S. L. (1998). ‘The Varieties of Cosmopolitan Experience’. In Cheah, 
P. and Robins, B. (eds.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation. 
pp. 233-245. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Mannheim, K. (1952). ‘The Problem of Generations’. In Mannheim, K. (1952), 
Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. Pp. 276-322. London: Routledge.  
 
Martin, V. (2008). “Attending the News: A Grounded Theory about a Daily 
Regimen”. In Journalism, 9(1): 76-94.  
 
Martin-Barbero, J. (1993). Communication, Culture and Hegemony. From the 
Media to Mediations. London: Sage.  
 
Massey, D. (1994). Space, Place and Gender. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Massumi, B. (2002). Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. 
Durham: Duke University Press.  
McCallum, K. (2009). “News and Local Talk: Conversations about the ‘Crisis of 
Indigenous Violence’ in Australia”. In Bird, S. E. (Ed.), The Anthropology of News 
and Journalism: Global Perspectives. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.   
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: 
Mentor.  
Merton, R.K. (1987). ‘The Focused Interview and Focus Groups: Continuities and 
Discontinuities’. In Public Opinion Quarterly, 51(4): 550-566. 
  
Merton, R.K., Fiske, M. and Kendall, P. A. (1956). The Focused Interview: A 
Manual of Problems and Procedures. New York: Free Press.  
 
Michalski, M., Preston, A., Paterson, R., Gillespie, M. and Cheesman, T. (2002) 
AfterSeptember 11: TV News and Transnational Audiences. London: British Film 
Institute and the Open University.  
http://www.bfi.org.uk/education/conferences/after911-report.pdf  Page last 
accessed in August 2011.  
 
Middleton, D. (1997). “The Social Organisation of Conversational Remembering: 
Experience as Individual and Collective Concerns”. In Mind, Culture and Activity, 
4(2): 71-85.  
 
Middleton, D. and Edwards, D. (1990). Collective Remembering. London: Sage.  
  
358 
 
Moeller, S. D. (1999). Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, 
War and Death. New York and London: Routledge.  
 
Morgan, D. (1988). Focus Groups as Qualitative Research. London: Sage.  
 
Morgan, D. (1996). ‘Focus Groups’. In Annual Review of Sociology. 22(1): 129 – 
152.  
 
Morgan, D. L. (1998). Planning Focus Groups. Focus Group Kit 2. London: Sage. 
 
Morley, D. (1980). The Nationwide Audience: Structure and Decoding. London: 
British Film Institute.  
 
Morley, D. (1981). ‘The Nationwide Audience: A Critical Postscript’. In Screen 
Education, 39 (1): 3-14. 
 
Morley, David (1992). Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Morrison, D. E. (1998). The Search for a Method: Focus Groups and the 
Development of Mass Communication Research. Luton: Luton University Press.  
 
Mouzelis, N. (1987). Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and 
Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America. London: Macmillan.  
  
Mouzelis, N. (1993). “The State in Late Development”. In Greek Political Science 
Review, 1:53-89. 
 
Mouzelis, N. (1995). “Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and 
Political Culture”. In Constas, D. and Stavrou, T. G. (Eds.), Greece Prepares for the 
Twenty-first Century, pp. 17-34. Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press.  
 
Mouzelis, N. and Pagoulatos, G. (2005). “Civil Society and Citizenship in Post-
war Greece”. In Birtek, F. and Dragonas, T. (Eds.), Citizenship and the Nation-
State in Greece and Turkey, pp. 87-103. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Murdock, G. (1989. “Critical Inquiry and Audience Activity”. In Dervin, B., 
Grossberg, L., O’Keefe, B. J. and Wartella, E. (Eds.), Rethinking Communication: 
Paradigm Exemplars, pp. 226-249. London: Sage.  
 
Myers, G. (1998). ‘Displaying Opinions: Topics and Disagreement in Focus 
Groups’. In Language in Society, 27 (1): 85 – 111.  
 
Neiger, M., Meyers, O., and Zandberg, E. (2011). On Media Memory: Collective 
Memory in a New Media Age. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
  
359 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1996). ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’. In Cohen, J. (ed.) 
(1996). For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Martha C. 
Nussbaum with Respondents. pp. 2-17. Boston: Beacon Press.   
 
O’Leary, T. (2002). Foucault and the Art of Ethics. London and New York: 
Continuum.  
 
Ong, J.C. (2011). The Mediation of Suffering. Classed Moralities of Television 
Audiences in the Philippines. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Sociology, 
University of Cambridge.  
 
Ostagaard, E. (1965). “Factors Influencing the Flow of News”. In Journal of Peace 
Research, 2(1): 39-63.  
 
Ӧzkirimli, U. (2005). Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical 
Engagement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Panayiotopoulou, R. (2003). “Voluntary and Non-Governmental Organisations in 
Greece and Olympic Voluntarism”. In Vernardakis, C. (Ed.), Public Opinion in 
Greece: Surveys and Opinion Polls, pp. 111-148, (in Greek). Athens: Livanis.  
 
Papadopoulos, Y. (1989). “Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity 
within Change”. In West European Politics, 12(2): 54-71.  
  
Papathanassopoulos, St. (1997) The Power of Television (in Greek.) Athens: 
Kastaniotis.  
 
Papathanassopoulos, St. (1999) “The Effects of Media Commercialization on 
Journalism and Politics in Greece”. In The Communication Review, 3(4): 379-402. 
 
Papathanassopoulos, St. (2000). “Election Campaigning in the Television Age: 
The case of Contemporary Greece” . In Political Communication, 17: 47-60. 
 
Papathanassopoulos, St. (2001) “Media Commercialization and Journalism in 
Greece”. In European Journal of Communication, 16 (4): 505-521. 
 
Pennebaker, J. W. and Banasik, B. L. (1997). “On the Creation and Maintenance 
of Collective Memories: History as Social Psychology”. In Pennebaker, J. W., Paez, 
D. and Rimé, B. (Eds.), Collective Memories of Political Events: Social 
Psychological Perspectives.  pp. 3-20. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
 
Peters, J. D. (2001). Witnessing. In Media, Culture & Society, 23(6): 707-723.  
 
Peters, J. D. (2005). Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Philo, G. (1990). Seeing and Believing: The Influence of Television. London and 
New York: Routledge.  
  
360 
 
Philo, G. (1993a). ‘Getting the Message: Audience Research in the Glasgow 
University Media Group’. In Glasgow University Media Group, Getting the 
Message: News, Truth and Power. pp. 253-270. London and New York: 
Routledge.  
 
Philo, G. (1993b). ‘From Buerk to Band Aid: The Media and the 1984 Ethiopian 
Famine’. In Glasgow Media Group, Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power. 
Pp. 104-125. London: Routledge.  
 
Philo, G. (2002). ‘Television News and Audience Understanding of War, Conflict 
and Disaster’. In Journalism Studies, 3(2): 173-186.  
 
Philo, G. and Berry, M. (2004). Bad News from Israel. London: Pluto.  
 
Plios, G. (2006) ‘Infotainment in Television News: The Pre-Electoral Period of 
the 2004 General Elections’ (in Greek). In S. Kaitazi-Whitlock and A. Baltis (eds) 
Innovation and Challenge in the European Mass Media, pp. 235–61. Thessaloniki: 
University Studio Press. 
 
Pollock, S., Bhabha, H. K., Breckenridge, C. A. and Chakrabarty, D. (2000). 
‘Cosmopolitanisms’. In Public Culture, 12(3): 577-589.  
 
Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond 
Attitudes and Behaviour. London: Sage.  
 
Puchta, C. and Potter, J. (2004). Focus Group Practice. London: Sage.  
 
Rantanen, T. (2005). The Media and Globalization. London: Sage.  
 
Reckwitz, A. (2002). “Towards a Theory of Social Practices.” In European Journal 
of Social Theory, 5(2): 243-263.  
 
Rentschler, C. A., (2004). ‘Witnessing: US Citizenship and the Vicarious 
Experience of Suffering’. In Media, Culture & Society, 26(2): 296-304.  
 
Reinharz, S. & Chase, S. E (2002). “Interviewing Women”. In Gubrium, J. F. & 
Holstein, J. A. (eds.). Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method. Pp. 
221-238. London: Sage.  
 
Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2001). Discourse and Discrimination. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Robbins, B. (1998). ‘Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’. In 
Cheah, P. and Robbins, B. (eds.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the 
Nation, pp. 1-19. Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press.  
 
Robertson, A. (2010). Mediated Cosmopolitanism: The World of Television News. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
  
361 
 
Robins, K. (1994). ‘Forces of Consumption: From the Symbolic to the Psychotic’. 
In Media, Culture & Society, 16 (3): 449-468. 
 
Robins, K. (1996). Into the Image: Culture and Politics in the Field of Vision. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Sassen, S. (1994). Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks, Calif : Pine Forge 
Press.  
 
Sassen, S. (2007). A Sociology of Globalization. New York and London: W.W. 
Norton and Company.  
 
Sasson, T. (1995). Crime Talk: How Citizens Construct a Social Problem. New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Save the Children Fund (1998). Dispatches from Disaster Zones: The Reporting of 
Humanitarian Emergencies. A record of the public conference at Church House, 
London, May 27th 1998.  
Scannell, P. (1989). ‘Public Service Broadcasting and Modern Public Life’. In 
Media, Culture & Society, 11(2): 135-166.  
Schatzki, T. (1999). Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and 
the Social. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Schiller, H. (2005). “Not yet the Post-imperialist Era”. In Durham, M. and Kellner, 
D. (Eds.), Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works, pp. 318-333. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Schrøder, K., Drotner, K., and Kline, S., and Murray, C. (2003). Researching 
Audiences: A Practical Guide to Methods in Media Analysis. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic.  
 
Schwalbe, M. L. and Wolkomir, M. (2002).  ‘Interviewing Men’. In Gubrium, J. F. 
and Holstein, J. A. (Eds.), Handbook of Interviewing Research: Context and 
Method. Pp. 203-220. London: Sage.  
 
Seal, C. (1999). The Quality of Qualitative Research. London: Sage.  
 
Seaman, W. (1992). “Active Audience Theory: Pointless Populism”. In Media, 
Culture & Society, 14(2): 301-311.  
 
Seaton, J. (2005). Carnage and the Media: The Making and Breaking of News 
about Violence. London: Allen Lane. 
 
Sen, A. (1983). Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
  
362 
Seu, I.B. (2003). “Your Stomach Makes you Feel that You don’t Want to Know 
Anything about it: Desensitization, Defense Mechanisms and Rhetoric in 
Response to Human Rights Abuses”. In Journal of Human Rights, 2(2), 183-196. 
 
Seu, I.B. (2010) “Doing Denial: Audiences’ Reactions to Human Rights Appeals”. 
In Discourse and Society, 21(4): 438-457. 
 
Shapiro, M. J. (2001). For Moral Ambiguity: National Culture and the Politics of 
the Family. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Shaw, M. (1996). Civil society and media in global crises: Representing distant 
violence. London:Pinter. 
Shouse, E. (2005) "Feeling, Emotion, Affect," M/C Journal, 8(6). Retrieved 07 Jun. 
2012 from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0512/03-shouse.php>. 
Silverstone, R. (1994). Television and Everyday Life. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Silverstone, R. (1999). Why Study the Media? London: Sage.  
 
Silverstone, R. (2002). ‘Complicity and Collusion in the Mediation of Everyday 
Life’. In New Literary History, 33(4): 761-780.  
 
Silverstone, R. (2003). “Proper Distance: Towards an Ethics of Cyberspace”. In 
Liestøl, G., Morrison, A., Rasmussen, T. (Eds.), Digital Media Revisited: 
Theoretical and Conceptual Innovations in Digital Domains, pp. 469-490. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.  
 
Silverstone, R. (2005). ‘The Sociology of Mediation and Communication’. In 
Calhoun, C., Rojek, C. and Turner, B. (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Sociology. pp. 
188-207. London: Sage.  
 
Silverstone, R. (2006). ‘Media and Communication in a Globalised World’. In 
Barnett, C., Robinson, J. and Rose, G. (eds.), A Demanding World. pp. 55-102. 
Milton Keynes: The Open University.  
 
Silverstone, R. (2007). Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Simpson, P. and Mayr, A. (2010). Language and Power. London: Routledge. 
 
Singer, E., Endreny, P., & Glassman, M. B. (1991). “Media Coverage of Disasters: 
Effect of Geographic Location”. In Journalism Quarterly, 68, 48–58. 
 
Skey, M. (2011). National Belonging and Everyday Life. The Significance of 
Nationhood in an Uncertain World. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
  
363 
Skrbis, Z., Kendall, G. and Woodward, I. (2004). ‘Locating Cosmopolitanism: 
Between Humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category’. In Theory, Culture & 
Society, 21(6): 115-136.   
 
Smit, C. R. (2003). “Please Call Now, Before It's Too Late”: Spectacle Discourse in 
the Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Telethon”. In The Journal of Popular Culture, 
36(4): 687-703. 
 
Sontag, S. (2003). Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux.  
 
Sommers, S. R., Apfelbaum, E. P., Dukes, K. N., Toosi, N. and Wang, E. J. (2006). 
“Race and Media Coverage of Hurricane Katrina: Analysis, Implications, and 
Future Research Questions”. In Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 6(1): 
39-55.   
 
Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2004). Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society 
in Contemporary Greece. Discussion Paper No 16. London: The Hellenic 
Observatory, London School of Economics.  
 
Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. (1984). “Results of International Cooperation”. In 
Journal of Communication, 34(1): 121-134.  
 
Stefanidis, I. D. (2007). Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism 
and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967. Hampshire: Ashgate 
Publishing.  
 
Steger, M. (2008). The Rise of the Global Imaginary: From the French Revolution 
to the Global War on Terror. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Stevenson, N. (1999). The Transformation of the Media: Globalisation, Morality 
and Ethics. London, New York: Longman.  
 
Stevenson, N. (2003). Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions. Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
 
Stevenson, R. and Gaddy, G. (1984). “‘Bad News’ and the Third World”. In 
Stevenson, R. and Cole, R. (Eds.), Foreign News and the New World Information 
Order, pp. 88-97. Ames: Iowa State University Press.  
 
Sturken, M. (1997). Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the Aids Epidemic, and 
the Politics of Remembering. Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of 
California Press.  
 
Sturken, M. and Cartwright, L. (2001). Practices of Looking: An Introduction to 
Visual Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
  
364 
Sutton, D. (2003). “Poked by the Foreign Finger in Greece: Conspiracy Theory or 
the Hermeneutics of Suspicion”. Pp. 191-210. In Brown, K. S. and Hamilakis, Y. 
(Eds.), Usable Pasts: Greek Metahistories. Maryland: Lexington Books.  
 
Swidler, A. (2001). “What Anchors Cultural Practices”. In Schatzki, T., Knorr 
Cetina, K., and von Savigny, E., (Eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, 
pp. 74-94. London: Routledge.  
 
Szerszynski, B. and Urry, J. (2002). ‘Cultures of Cosmopolitanism’. In The 
Sociological Review 2002, 50(4), 461-481. 
 
Sznaider, N. (2001). The Compassionate Temperament: Care and Cruelty in 
Modern Society. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.  
  
Tamir, Y. (1993). Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Teer-Tomaselli, T. (2006). “Memories and Markers: Collective Memory and 
Newsworthiness”. In Volkmer, I. (Ed.), News in Public Memory: An International 
Study of Media Memories Across Generations. pp. 225-250. New York: Peter 
Lang Publishing.  
 
Tester, K. (1994). Media, Culture and Morality. London and New York: 
Routledge.  
 
Tester, K. (1997). Moral Culture. London, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.  
 
Tester, K. (2001). Compassion, Morality and the Media. Buckingham, 
Philadelphia: Open University Press.  
 
Thompson, J. B. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Thumim, N. (2007). Mediating Self-Representations: Tensions Surrounding 
‘Ordinary’ Participation in Public Sector Projects. Unpublished PhD Thesis. 
London School of Economics.  
 
Thussu, D. K. (2003). “Live TV and Bloodless Deaths: War, Infotainment and 
24/7 News”. In Thussu, D. K. and Freedman, D. (Eds.), War and the Media: 
Reporting Conflict 24/7, pp. 117-132. London: Sage.  
 
Tierney, K., Bevc, C., and Kuligowski, E. (2006). “Metaphors Matter: Disaster 
Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences in Hurricane Katrina”. In The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1): 57-81.  
 
Tomlinson, J. (1999). Globalisation and Culture. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Tomkins, S. S. (1962). Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: Vol. 1. The Positive Affects. 
  
365 
Tsaliki, L. (2010). “Technologies of Political Mobilization and Civil Society in 
Greece: The Wildfires of Summer 2007”. In Convergence: The International 
Journal of Research into New Media Technologies, 16(2): 151-161.  
 
Tsatsou, P. (2011). Digital Divides in Europe: Culture, Politics and the Western-
Southern Divide. Oxford and New York: Peter Lang.  
Tsoukalas, C. (1995). “Free Riders in Wonderland; or, Of Greeks in Greece”. In 
Constas, D. and Stavrou, T. G. (Eds.), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century, 
pp. 191-219. Washington, D.C.:The Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  
 
 
Urry, J. (2000). Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century. 
London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Van Leeuwen, T. (1996). “The Representations of Social Actors”. In Caldas-
Couthard, C. and Coulthard, M. (Eds.), Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical 
Discourse Analysis, pp. 32-70. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Volkmer, I. (Ed.) (2006a). News in Public Memory: An International Study of 
Media Memories Across Generations. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. 
 
Volkmer, I. (2006b). ‘Introduction’. In Volkmer, I. (Ed.), News in Public Memory: 
An International Study of Media Memories Across Generations. Pp. 1-25. New 
York: Peter Lang Publishing.  
 
Volkmer, I. (2006c). ‘Globalization, Generational Entelechies and the Global 
Public Space’. In Volkmer, I. (Ed.), News in Public Memory: An International Study 
of Media Memories Across Generations. Pp. 251-288. New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing.  
 
Wark, M. (1994). Virtual Geography: Living with Global Media Events. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Wetherell, M. (2001). “Minds, Selves and Self-making”. In Wetherell, M., Taylor, 
S. and Yates, S. J. (Eds.), Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, pp. 186-197. 
London: Sage Publications.  
 
Wisner, Ben, Westgate, K. and O’Keefe, P. (1976). “Poverty and Disaster”. In New 
Society, 9: 546-548. 
 
Wodak, R. (2001). ‘What Critical Discourse Analysis is about: A Summary of its 
History, Important Concepts and its Developments”. In Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. 
(Eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. pp. 1-13. London: Sage.  
 
Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. And Liebhart, K. (1999). The Discursive 
Construction of National Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Wood, L. A. and Kroger, R. O. (2000). Doing Discourse Analysis: Methods for 
Studying Action in Talk and Text. London: Sage.  
  
366 
 
Zelizer, B. (1992). Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and 
the Shaping of Collective Memory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Zelizer, B. (1998). Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the 
Camera’s Eye. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Zembylas, M. (2006). “Witnessing in the Classroom: The Ethics and Politics of 
Affect”. In Educational Theory, 56(3): 305-324.  
 
 
Sources: 
 
BBC News| Special Reports| 2008| China quake 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/asia_pacific/2008/china_quake/default.
stm, page accessed in September 2011) 
 
BBC News| Special Reports| Haiti Earthquake  
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/americas/2010/haiti_earthquake/defau
lt.stm, page accessed in September 2011) 
 
Source: BBC News – Japan Earthquake 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12711226, page accessed in 
September 2011) 
 
 
Eurobarometer EB72.5 E-Communications Household Survey 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_335_fact_el_en.pdf, page 
accessed in May 2011) 
 
European Journalism Centre 
(http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/greece/, page accessed in May 
2011)  
 
World Giving Index 2010 
(https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/WorldGivingIndex28092010Print.pdf, page 
accessed in April 2011) 
 
 
 
  
367 
Appendix A. Table of focus group composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group 
# 
Age  Gender Locale Occupational/Educational 
status 
Number of 
Participants 
1 25-
26 
Mixed Athens Professionals with 
university degree 
4 
2 45-
60 
Female Komotini Working-class without 
university degree 
5 
3 25-
26 
Female Komotini Professionals with 
university degree 
3 
4 42-
54 
Female Komotini Professionals with 
university degree  
5 
5 40-
58 
Female Komotini Mixed  4 
6 40-
56 
Male  Komotini Professionals with 
university degree 
7 
7 22-
27 
Female Komotini Working-class without 
university degree 
3 
8 27-
28 
Male Komotini Professionals with 
university degree 
2 
9 24-
28 
Male Athens Working-class without 
university degree 
5 
10 25-
26 
Male Athens Working-class without 
university degree 
3 
11 47-
55 
Mixed Athens Professionals with 
university degree 
2 
12 26-
27 
Male Athens Professionals with 
university degree 
4 
Total     47 
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Appendix B. Profile of participants 
Agis (FG6) 41-years-old; teacher at a primary school. 
Alex (FG9) 25 years old, mechanic.  
Chris (FG6) 40-years-old; gym instructor.  
Chrysa (FG4) 42 years old, primary school teacher.  
Daphne (FG4) 45 years old, primary school teacher.  
Dimitra (FG5) 54-years-old, teacher at a primary school, member of the Red 
Cross.  
Dimitris (FG8) 27 years old, architect.  
Dimos (FG6) 56 years old, bookshop owner.  
Dina (FG2) 58 years old, housewife. 
Fanis (FG9) 24 years old, taxi driver.  
Georgia (FG5) 56-years-old, retired kindergarten teacher, member of the Red 
Cross.  
Gerasimos (FG11) 56 years old; agriculturalist.  
Giannis (FG6) 44 years old, lawyer.  
Giota (FG7) 23 years old, hairdresser.  
Gregoris (FG10) 25 years old; works at the service of a petrol station.  
Hara (FG1)  24 years old, architect.  
Haris (FG12) 26 years old, advertiser.  
Ilias (FG6) 46 years old, primary school teacher.  
Ira (FG4) 54 years old, primary school teacher.  
Irini (FG3) 25 years old, civil servant at the local Municipality.  
Kiki (FG3) 25 years old, civil engineer. 
Kimon (FG12) 25 years old, PA for an MP.  
Litsa (FG2) 45 years old, housewife. 
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Maria (FG5) 46-years-old, teacher at a primary school; very involved with the 
local church and member of the Red Cross.  
Mary (FG7) 26 years old, secretary at an elevator construction company.  
Menelaos (FG12) 26 years old, programmer.  
Mina (FG1) 25 years old, architect.  
Nana (FG3) 26-years-old; French teacher. 
Nikos (FG10) 26-years-old; waiter at a restaurant. 
Olga (FG4) 47 years old, yoga instructor.  
Panagiotis (FG9) 25 years old, electrician.  
Pavlos (FG6) 40 years old, lawyer.  
Penelopi (FG4) 45 years old, English teacher.  
Peni (FG2) 49 years old, housewife. 
Popi (FG2) 49 years old, housewife. 
Simos (FG1) 26 years old, radio producer.  
Sofia (FG11) 50 years old; accountant.  
Sotiris (FG10) 25-years-old; cameraman. 
Stathis (FG12) 27 years old, software engineer.  
Stelios (FG9) 26 years old, works as a driver for a pharmaceutical company.  
Tasos (FG8) 28 years old, English teacher.  
Thanos (FG6) 58 years old, GP.  
Thodoris (FG9) 25 years old, taxi driver.  
Tina (FG1) 26 years old, civil engineer.  
Toula (FG2) 60 years old, housewife. 
Vivi (FG5) 40 years old, janitor, member of the Red Cross.  
Vicky (FG7) 25 years old, receptionist.  
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Appendix C. Topic guide 
A. Memory/knowledge of the disasters:  
• Can you remember the disasters presented in the photos (remind 
when they took place) 
• Can you remember what happened – describe the events as 
remembered:  
- Tsunami 
- Katrina 
- Kashmir 
• Is there a story that you remember more intensely? 
 
B. Participation/interest in the events: 
• Did you make any donations during the events? 
• Have you ever made any donations/when? 
• Do you know anything about the situation now in the affected 
areas? 
 
C. News consumption 
• Which other similar events come to mind? 
• Where do you usually get your news from? How often? 
• What is the news you are mostly interested in? 
• Do you usually discuss what you see in the news with other 
people? 
 
Always for end of discussion: What would you say if somebody asked you if you 
are “citizens of the world”?  
 
Do you have anything to add?  
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Appendix D. Monitoring Form for Participants 
Focus Group No:  
Date:  
Place:  
 
1. Name: ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. Age: …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. Gender: ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
4. Occupation: ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. I watch television news:  
             a. daily                     
             b. 2-3 times per week                 
             c. less than 2-3 times per week 
6. I read the newspapers: 
              a. daily                     
             b. 2-3 times per week                 
             c. less than 2-3 times per week 
7. I use the Internet:  
             a. daily                     
             b. 2-3 times per week                 
             c. less than 2-3 times per week 
8. Uses of Internet:  
             a. for entertainment                    
             b. for information                 
             c. for communication 
